Posts by BryenStephen:

    An Opportunity to Change US Policy on Taiwan

    November 17th, 2016

     

    United States defense policy toward Taiwan must change. Now there is a rare opportunity to make that happen with the election of Donald Trump. But everyone knows he lacks experience in foreign affairs, although he is a man with great instincts. If he can prevail over the established litany, there is a chance that Taiwan can stay independent. But if he follows the “party line” from the State Department and their supporting chorus in parts of the Pentagon, Taiwan is a goner. It is only a question of time.

    Taiwan is an island that lives next to a behemoth in the form of China. It is a democracy and, with its new government with a very strong domestic mandate, intent on maintaining its independence and democratic system. For China, democracy is the enemy as they have just demonstrated again in Hong Kong where they blocked two elected officials from taking office. Democracy threatens the Communist party dictatorship, and China is yearning for it. That is what happened before at Tiananmen, where democratic dissent was ruthlessly suppressed. And across China that is happening every day, and China’s government knows it. For them, the big thumb in their eye is Taiwan. They would take any opportunity to knock it off, and China has been building up forces to make it hard for the United States to come to Taiwan’s defense. When China’s forces reach a tipping point, and when they think America might back off, they will strike.

    The question is not whether but when. America should be following a defense policy that pushes the “when” back to “whether” and puts a price on the “whether” decision that would make it hard for China’s leaders to act, if they were unsure of the outcome.

    Unfortunately, America’s support of Taiwan has played directly into China’s hands and put Taiwan at considerable risk.

    Consider for example that Taiwan has been allowed to have only half an air force and half a navy.

    What is meant by “half”?

    A modern air force must be able to defeat an enemy air force before its planes and missiles bring death and destruction to its people. That means it must have strike capability.

    Taiwan’s air force does not have strike capability because Washington will not sell Taiwan strike aircraft such as the F-15 or advanced F-16s. Even the F-16s Taiwan was granted by George H. W. Bush are hobbled. The more modern multi-role models of the F-16 were not provided to Taiwan, and F-16 upgrades the Obama administration reluctantly approved for Taiwan do not include strike capability, meaning they are not multi-role and can’t take the fight to China.

    The result is that the Taiwan’s air force (officially known as the Republic of China Air Force or ROCAF) lacks beyond visual range weapons and can only function as an interceptor against Chinese forces invading the island. The ROCAF F-16s have very limited value against a Chinese main force invasion of the island because their F-16s can’t interdict their bases or zap them before they cross the Taiwan Strait.

    There is also half a navy made up primarily of old rejected U.S. frigates. These Carter-administration FFG tubs are thin-skinned, slow and poor sea fighters. On the other hand, China has been rapidly expanding its blue water navy and its submarine force. Taiwan has two usable submarines and two post World War II Guppy boats that are museum pieces. Its usable submarines are badly in need of an upgrade and they are no match for China’s nuclear and Kilo-class submarines that threaten the Island.

    Taiwan's Guppy II Class Submarines --Museum Quality

    Taiwan’s Guppy II Class Submarines –Museum Quality

    What all this means is that any fight that happens takes place in and over Taiwan, a great danger when one sees that most Taiwanese live near the coast and are exposed to attack. Taiwan has almost 24 million people but given that they are concentrated in narrow spaces and surrounded otherwise by mountains, any attack on Taiwan cities and towns will be highly destabilizing.

    Which is why the right defense strategy for Taiwan is to give it the ability to take the fight to the enemy and not wait to get crushed at home. Could you imagine a U.S. Air Force that waited until Russian airplanes were over New York, Washington DC, or Chicago? It will never happen, because the U.S. Air Force is designed to strike at the enemy, liquidate his bases, and destroy his fighting capability. While Taiwan is a pinprick in size compared to China, an offensive capability is the only way to set back China’s invasion plans.

    The usual suspects in the State Department will say that China will object if the United States gave Taiwan a real defense capability. American companies and financial institutions will complain they will lose business if China gets mad at us. China may stop buying Treasury bonds. But we have ways to counteract China. Anyway, Mr. Trump is not so happy about American companies shifting their manufacturing and technology to China, so maybe this will be part of his planned wakeup call.

    China’s complaints can be managed because in the end China needs our market for China’s regime to stay in power. No matter how excited they may get, that is the real bottom line.

    Over the last twenty-five years America’s support for Taiwan has been a lot of comforting words but also a dumping off place for a lot of military junk when the U.S. administration sells some hardware to keep Congress off its back. That policy has to be jettisoned because it is not in Taiwan’s interest or in the interest of the United States.

    Taiwan needs the other “half” of its air force, navy, and army in order to deter China. America needs Taiwan to stay safe and free or we lose all of our credibility in Asia.

    It is one thing to blindly pursue a policy, but when the policy is ultimately self-defeating and ill suited, it needs to be changed. And soon.

    It is inevitable that China will invade Taiwan because it is part of its strategic plan. But if China is forced to continually revise its schedule, then China will have to put its plan on hold or even give it up. That is exactly what America’s strategic goal should be.

    America needs a containment policy for China’s rising power, and Taiwan is the right place to start implementing it.

    President-elect Trump has a real opportunity to show China that America is not sleeping anymore.

    Story also published on The American Thinker.

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    ovocations and Syria: Where are we Headed?

    October 25th, 2016

    The US is once again provoking the Russians, but for what purpose? It seems the US no-win Syria policy is mutating into a lose-lose one which destabilizes the Middle East even more and has repercussions in Europe.

    The United States has announced that it has deployed 12 A-10 “Warthog” aircraft to Incirlik air base in Turkey. This is the same aircraft that the Air Force wants to get rid of but has found strong opposition in the Congress to liquidating this battle-tested aircraft. The A-10 is an effective close support platform with a powerful gun system that can destroy even armored targets. The aircraft is hardened, with self-sealing fuel tanks and cockpit protection. It has a range of around 800 miles. From Incirlik that means it can operate in northern Syria and into part of Iraq. Supposedly these aircraft are being deployed to go against ISIS, but an unnamed US official says: “the A-10s could potentially be used to support rebel groups fighting IS in northern Syria, including a group called the “Syrian Arab Coalition” that received a massive airdrop of ammunition this month.” (http://news.yahoo.com/us-deploys-ground-attack-10-planes-turkey-155644211.html) This statement comes at the same time that the US is supposedly working out deconfliction arrangements with Russia to prevent any chance of a clash between US or Russian aircraft. Unfortunately, the official’s remark suggests just the opposite: that by using A-10’s to support these rebel group the US will be directly engaging in actions involving Syrian, Iranian and Russian and other Syrian-proxy forces such as Hezbollah.

    While there are a few supporters of the so-called Syrian Arab Coalition on Capitol Hill such as Senator John McCain, it is a well established and known fact that the US-Saudi and Turkish-supported Arab coalition is weak and deeply fragmented and that pro-Islamist hard-

    Army Pfc. David Mitchell, a Soldier with 1st Battalion, 32nd Infantry Battalion, scans the landscape surrounding Vehicle Patrol Base Badel, located at the mouth of the Narang Valley in Konar Province with his TOW missile. (U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Amber Robinson)

    line groups, including most importantly al-Qaeda spin-off al-Nusra, are the real players in Syria. Indeed, after having wasted half a billion dollars on a furtive attempt to train “moderate” Syrian “fighters” who really were al-Qaeda operatives in Mufti, the US is persisting in a dangerous lose-lose strategy in Syria.

    Why a lose-lose strategy?

    Reason #1 The Russians have been keenly interested in setting up a system for deconflicting air encounters between US, Israeli and Russian aircraft operating in Syria. Sputnik International, which reflects official Russian thinking, says that the deconfliction deal was put in place in the middle of October and is centered in Tel Aviv, where Israel’s Defense Ministry is headquartered. According to the news reports, which is all we have since the parties won’t confirm or deny, a hot line has been established. It is important to note that this is a big concession by the Russians who wanted the deconflict system to have its headquarters in Baghdad where Russia has set up a command center made up of Iran, Syria, Iraq and Russia whose purpose is to manage the war in Syria. Unofficially the US has tried to minimize encounters with Russian aircraft by instructing US pilots to stay 20 miles away from any Russian aircraft. The only incidents have been with Turkish F-16’s where the Turks have claimed that the Russians violated Turkish airspace on at least two occasions. In these incidents the Russians responded to warnings, retreated to Syrian air space, and apparently apologized to the Turks for any “inadvertent” incursions by its pilots. Looked at from the diplomatic and military efforts to minimize incidents, the US-Russia-Israel deal seems to make sense. But if the unnamed official’s remarks reflect actual US policy, we could be in for a very nasty surprise since the Russians will not sit still while US Warthog’s pound Syrian and Iranian (plus Hezbollah) positions in “supporting” the Syrian Arab Coalition.

    Reason #2 The main combatants in Syria are different flavors of Islamic extremists. The so-called moderates are only a small fraction of the fighters operating there and no one today believes they will emerge from the fighting as winners. In any case, if the non-ISIS faction would somehow manage to topple Assad’s government, which was one of the operative theories before the Russians got there (and one of the reasons they went there), the next stage in the action would be a fight between ISIS and the non-ISIS factions, which will mostly if not wholly be al-Qaeda operatives. Either ISIS and the others will work out some deal, or the civil war will continue to try and determine the winner. Naturally this assumes the Russians and Iranians have gone home.

    The US with its various allies, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Oman and Jordan has been backing the non-al-Qaeda fighters, although exactly who we are really backing is anyone’s guess. Even the Pentagon really does not know. There is no way to vet these characters, but nonetheless meanwhile we are either shipping or allowing to be shipped, US TOW missiles, which are anti-tank missiles. In order to ship these into Syria, a Presidential decision would need to have been made, because otherwise it is against the law. And even if a Presidential decision was made, the Congress would have to be notified under the requirement of the Arms Export Control law. Was Congress notified? It is unlikely because such notification could not legally go to the Senate Intelligence Committee, which is often used by the administration to hide secret operations; it would need to go to the Senate Armed Services Committee, who might have a lot of questions and who might take action to try and block such deliveries.

    The recent delivery of TOW missiles has angered the Russians because it is a weapon that can destroy the current generation of tanks deployed in Syria, the most modern of which is the model T-72.. TOW stands for tube launched optically tracked, wire-guided weapon. The TOW operator is exposed when firing the missile, but the missile effects are devastating. It is almost a certainty that many of the TOW missiles delivered will end up in al-Nusra or ISIS hands. The Russians have been searching for weapons stockpiles and are trying to destroy them, but how much success so far is unclear.

    These weapons deliveries, along with the threat of the Warthog, open up important questions on how far the United States will go, and what the end result will be. If, as most think, it will be some kind of radical Islamic entity taking over in Syria eventually, the outcome is very destabilizing and could lead to war with Israel and Jordan, neither of which could tolerate that kind of regime. This makes offering such support with such an uncertain and dangerous outcome a risk not worth taking. Yet Washington continues to push while the Russians keep knocking off major Syrian Arab Coalition leaders, the latest to fall was Basil Zamo, formerly a captain in the Syrian military, who headed what is called the “First Coastal Division” who receive arms from the US and its partners. Zamo, who headed the group, was killed by a Russian air strike on October 19th. Also killed was one of Zamo’s fighters who was trained in how to use TOW missiles. On the same day, the commander of another such group, the Nour al-Din al-Zinki Brigades, was killed in fighting south of Aleppo.

    Reason #3 US and Turkish goals are not congruent, and the US presence in Incirlik makes it seem that the US targeting of ISIS is a NATO operation. In fact, the Turks have been promoting the idea of NATO taking a more active role against ISIS, leaving the Turks free to blast away at the Kurds, a major irritant to the Turkish government. The Incirlik base agreements allowing US operations there is supposed to require the approval of the Turkish government and is also supposed to be a NATO operation. But exactly why would NATO want to play a role in the conflict, especially if the outcome of the fighting is to swell the number of refugees pouring into Europe, which is being facilitated by Turkey who wants to liquidate the refugees it has on its territory. As of mid-March, 2015 there were 1.7 million refugees in Syria. But these numbers are estimates and many of the refugees are not registered, meaning that the number may be far higher. The increased fighting in recent weeks means even more refugees fleeing to Turkey, including many combatants who have shaved off their beards and even dressed as women as they cross the border. Sooner or later these may flee to Europe, posing a substantive threat that goes beyond just housing and caring for refugees who were victims of the civil war.

    From a purely NATO perspective a rapid settlement of the civil war would be the best outcome, even if it meant some accommodation with the “hated” Assad regime. But the chances for that are not improved if the US continues to push ahead supplying Russia and Syria’s adversary. Perhaps some in Washington think, as the White House has made clear, that Russia is getting itself into a quagmire from which it cannot win and which will eventually force a deal to be reached replacing the Assad regime. This involves a number of factors that depend largely on how tenacious the Islamists are and how long they can stand up to a professional army and air force. The early evidence is they are taking large losses. What we know less about is how severe are the Syrian army losses, and the losses of the Iranians and Hezbollah. The Russian boots on the ground are minimal so far, and there are internal reasons why it is likely to stay that way. But as the US has surely learned, although the lesson has to be constantly repeated, is that air power alone won’t decide a conflict. The Russians also know this, which is why they are trying to grease the war in such a way as to better empower land forces to win decisive battles and that by knocking out the rebel stockpiles and their ability to move out in the open. With most of the fighting now is in areas that have been depopulated to a large degree, the Russians can use more massive air power without too much collateral damage to civilian populations, and the rebels are more exposed because they cannot hide in the population.

    The worst part of the deal is the presence of Iranian military forces in Syria, which has been enlarged. It is the worst part of the deal because in the long term it threatens Israel. Iran wants to put its brigades on the Golan Heights, and Israel will not permit this without conducting a clearing operation, which means Israel would enter the war in order to liquidate Iranian and Hezbollah presence. Indeed, if a deal could be found, a key part of any arrangement would have to be clearing out the Iranians and Hezbollah. Israel is supposed to be an American ally, and Israel has a strategic agreement with the US. At the moment the administration largely ignores Israel as it pursues other objectives, especially radical Islamists and Iran.

    The US has said next to nothing about the Iranians, focusing most of its ire on Russia and Assad. The same holds concerning Hezbollah. What can we say about US policy objectives?

    1. It is generally agreed that the US push to defeat ISIS is broadly shared among Washington policy-makers, both Democrats and Republicans. Defeating ISIS would remove a threat from Iraq and from Syria, and prevent the spread of ISIS operatives in Africa, and elsewhere in the Middle East.

    2. It is also generally agreed that the US will supply air power but no ground troops. Efforts to promote a US ground presence have little or no public support.

    3. The US has no answer to the refugee crisis and has been silent about the infiltration of ISIS and other radical elements in Europe. By agreeing to take such refugees into the United States, the terrorist danger inside the US is exacerbated. No steps appear to have been taken to manage the emerging problem caused by the White House’a unilateral policy taking large numbers of Syrian refugees.

    4. The US support for the Free Syrian Army and the so-called Arab coalition is continuing. The statements by an unamed official about providing them air support invites a response by Russia and a serious escalation that may have implications well beyond the Middle East.

    5. US policy is badly conflicted because of the US nuclear deal with Iran. This means considerable confusion. In Iraq it has meant that Iranian-supplied aircraft and pilots (Su-25’s) are in use against ISIS targets while the Iraqis learn how to fly the dozen used Su-25’s sent there by Russia. Meanwhile the US has been flying its own missions, and no doubt coordinating with the Iraqis and probably the Iranians. The outcome of all this is that Iraq is aligning itself with Iran. The US has some options to help the Kurds, but it wants to do this through Iraq because the Turks otherwise are against it. All of this makes the US look even weaker and ineffective.

    6. While maintaining a strong anti-Assad posture, the US has also stepped up its anti-Putin rhetoric as well. This presents Putin with some opportunities in Europe if he decides to up the pressure on vulnerable and exposed NATO countries. Likewise, it shuts down avenues for accommodation. Some politicians also have picked up on anti-Russian rhetoric, most notably Marco Rubio. However, his position on Russia does not seem to have bought him much political support.

    The key question is when does “no-win” mutate to “lose-lose.” Right now the best that can be said of the US posture is that it is, optimistically, a no-win policy. Sustain the civil war and hope your guys win out, however unlikely the outcome. But lose- lose would mean that the war’s result is a truncated Syria with a good portion of the country under Assad-Russia control. If that happens the Russians can also come up with a government change that will make it appear they have put “responsible” leaders in place, effectively a Russian-engineered coup d’Etat to placate Europe and to show Russian flexibility and sensibility to European “values.” If this happens then the US goes to a lose-lose, leaving much of the once American-dominated Middle East in a shambles and Europe increasingly up for grabs.

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    Taiwan is on Its Own

    October 5th, 2016

    By Stephen Bryen.


    It is important not to allow the civilian component of the Pentagon and RAND to dictate measures that are suicidal for Taiwan and harmful to security in the Pacific and American credibility.

    The assumption for many years has been that that if China attacked Taiwan, Taipei would hold off China until the United States brought its power to bear and helped Taiwan survive.  The theory is no longer valid because the US lacks the both resources and the will to reliably intervene in time.  Taiwan will have to save itself, and it is in the U.S. strategic interest to help Taiwan have the defense equipment and technology it needs to protect its territory.

    Unfortunately, a RAND’s study of Taiwan’s air defenses, which was commissioned by Office of the Secretary of Defense, is more political than analytical. The study starts with a deeply flawed assumption – but one that Pentagon and State Department politicians appear to favor – namely that Taiwan should all but abandon its air force and defend itself with its cache of air defense missile, after China’s airplanes and missiles attack.

    While the study talks about options, it aims at getting Taiwan to keep only a small number of upgraded F-16’s and get rid of all the rest, which means scrapping 275 fighter jets including all of Taiwan’s home built IDF jets and all its Mirage 2000’s!

    RAND’s thesis is quite outlandish: When China decides to attack Taiwan with missiles and an overwhelming number of aircraft, Taiwan, with little air defense and early warning capabilities, will not be able to defend itself. Instead, it will have to watch how its planes are destroyed on the ground, and its airfields blasted away by Chinese missiles.

    This is a strategy that no other country in the world would entertain. It is not NATO’s strategy vis-a-vis  Russia; Israel’s facing Iran, or Japan facing China. Among these, Israel has good air defense missiles.  But why would Israel, which has good air defense missiles or Japan, or NATO put their military assets and their population under threat by waiting for the enemy? Suggesting that Taiwan becomes a sitting duck is preposterous.

    Taiwan’s air force is competitive in size and capability to Japan’s. But the Pentagon is not advising the Japanese to scrap their airplanes as the RAND study and the Pentagon are advising Taiwan.

    Of course, Taiwan is not Israel or Japan.

    The U.S. sells Israel, Japan, and many others the means to defend themselves. Why then the refusal to sell Taiwan the weapons it needs to counter the growing threat from China? The last time Washington sold an airplane to Taiwan was 1992 when George H.W. Bush’s decided to provide them with the early model of F-16. Since then, his successors refused to sell upgraded versions of the F-16 with better range and capability to penetrate China’s airspace.

    Fighter bombers (as opposed to purely air defense planes) have been absolutely out of the question.  Thus, Taiwan never got F-15’s or F-18’s, which would have helped ward off the Chinese.  Australia, Israel, and Japan got F-15’s, (Australia also got  F-18’s) and are now gettingF-35’s.  Why not Taiwan?  The RAND study did not even consider this issue, and therefore offered no change in policy.

    The RAND analysis misunderstood or ignored Taiwan’s home-produced fighter plane, known as the Indigenous Defense Fighter or IDF (technically the CK-1).  Although the IDF will soon be upgraded, it is already a prodigious dog fighter.  While it is not stealth, it can hide in and around Taiwan’s mountainous terrain and pop up and hit any Chinese fighters venturing into Taiwan’s airspace. Taiwan, of course, has no plans to scrap these planes or the 60 French Mirage 2000-5 fighter aircraft as RAND recommended.   Instead, it is planning to replace them.

    As for the IDF, Taiwan should consider extending the range, equipping it with improved BVRweapons and better radar, and consider reducing the plane’s radar signature wherever possible.  The new government in Taiwan, which will take office in late May, is now evaluating options either for an entirely new aircraft or improving the IDF.  It would be sensible to do both.

    To offset China’s move to stealthy aircraft Taiwan needs to improve its surveillance radars and expand the types of radars it uses to track enemy planes. Some experts, including Carlo Kopp from Air Power Australia, have studied developments in Russia and China, and the spread of stealth technology globally. Kopp sees a definite need for the U.S., Australia, and others to put in place a new generation radar sensors that can pick up stealth aircraft and attack it with long-range air-to-air and ground-to-air weapons.

    When Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir refused to preempt the Egyptian and Syrian military build-up in 1973, Israel learned that waiting for the enemy to attack first could be a near-death experience.  Her refusal to act preemptively cost the lives of hundreds of Israeli soldiers and airmen, allowed the Egyptians to cross the Suez Canal and blow away the Bar Lev defensive line that was supposed to protect Israel. Meir mistakenly believed that not shooting first would earn her important political support and military assistance from the U.S. But the U.S. resupply of weapons to Israel was dangerously tardy, and the delay almost led to a nuclear war.

    RAND’s recommendation to solely rely on ground-based missile air defense – though these missiles are not easier to protect than Taiwan’s air bases – is a prescription for failure.

    Democratic Taiwan is a U.S. ally and an asset in Asia. The civilian component of the Pentagon and the RAND Corporation should not be allowed to dictate measures that are suicidal for Taiwan and harmful to the security in the Pacific, and the U.S.  Stripping Taiwan of its fighting capabilities would send the wrong message to China.

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    The New Russian Base in Iran is a Strategic Asset For Moscow

    August 26th, 2016

     

    By Stephen Bryen.

     

    The new Russian base in Iran is a strategic asset for Moscow and may be a game changer in the power balance in the Middle East.

    The United States and Russia are competing for influence on a global basis.  In this game the Russians are operating from a position of substantial weakness when compared to US power and influence.  The Russian military, despite a rebuilding and modernization process underway, is still far short in both quality and quantity over the US military, which is a global force compared to Russia.  Furthermore, the Russian economy is in bad shape, making it difficult for the Russians to build out their forces even against a relatively modest plan backed by Russia’s government.  Even so, the Russians are bidding for power around their periphery and have expanded into the Middle East.  Here they face a dominant United States.

    (1)

    Washington, though, has experienced a number of setback as al-Qaeda, ISIS and related terrorists have gained a strong foothold in the Middle East and Africa. Having spent trillions of dollars and wasted thousands of lives, support for more wars in the Middle East is waning in America.  One of Washington’s latest gambits, to do a nuclear deal with Iran, has not shown any evidence of a political payback.  In fact the latest Russian move, to secure an agreement with Iran for use of an air base, is shaking up the Middle East.

    Noje airbase, otherwise known as Hamadan Air Base, is located in western Iran in an isolated area. The base has two runways –one is 12,915 feet long; the other is 14,300 feet. Both runways are made of thick asphalt and are well maintained, even though the air base, which is strictly military, does not support Iran’s main fighter aircraft. The Russians are now using this airbase formally to carry out air operations in Syria where it is supporting Tu-22M3 strategic bombers and Su-34 twin-seat strike fighters. That was made possible by an agreement between Moscow and Tehran. Noje is now primarily a new Russian base in the Middle East.

    (2)

    There are some important advantages to Russia in having the Iranian base for its bombers and strike aircraft. Without the base in Iran, either Russia has to fly from its air base at Khmeimim in Syria or from airfields back in Russia. In fact, last year the same Tupolev bombers were flying fromMozdok air base in Russia. Mozdok, located in northern Ossetia, is more than 2,000 km from likely targets in Syria; Noje is less than 900 km. In all, the time to target has been reduced by more than 60% thanks to the Iranian base.

    Why didn’t the Russians fly directly from its Syrian airbase and skip intermediary stops? Khmeimim’s runway cannot handle the Tupolev which is too heavy. The Tu-22M3 has en empty weight of 119,000 lbs. Other Russian bombers such as the Tu-95MS (empty weight of 198,000 lbs) and the Tu-160 (242,505 lbs empty weight) can’t currently fly from Khmeimim. The alternative, Damascus International Airport can support these aircraft, but here they are exposed to enemy mortars and ground attack, making placement of strategic bombers there unacceptable to the Russians.

    There is another reason, according to press reports from Moscow, why the Iranian base carries an important advantage. The Russians apparently believe that the US-Saudi backed rebels are being tipped off about Russian long range air operations and are disbursing ahead of any Russian strikes. It is well known, and a frequent Washington complaint, that the Russians are attacking US-sponsored rebels more than ISIS. Thus the Russian worry is not unfounded. Since an air flight from Mozdok to targets in Syria is over 2,000 km, flight time is on the order of two hours or more ( to conserve fuel the planes are not flying at top speed over friendly territory). The flight from Iran is between 30 to 45 minutes tops. If, therefore, the US is warning the rebels of impending Russian air strikes, the time to get the message to them and to actually be able to move their forces out of harms way, is far less and maybe too short for finding effective cover.

    The Russians are not the first to move strategic aircraft into the Middle East. The US has deployedB-1B Lancer bombers in Qatar which have been used to bomb targets in Afghanistan and Iraq and, after sending the B-1B bombers home last April, replaced them with B-52 bombers. The US strategic bomber deployment has been at least since the first Gulf War, on and off.

    (3)

    Perhaps the main thing that is new is that US sole power dominance in the Persian Gulf and Middle East is coming to an end. The Russians are now in the game, with assets in Syria and Iran, and growing influence (via Iran) in Iraq. What does this buy for Russia and Putin? For the Russians strategic posture and oil are closely linked, as for the United States. What is, perhaps, bizarre is that both Russia and the United States themselves are self-sufficient in oil, meaning that their attempts to control oil are more closely related to their effort to dominate elsewhere, namely in Europe and Asia. That is why the base in Iran makes strategic sense to Russian strategists and why Washington should be concerned.

    The Russians are playing a hard-nosed poker game.  Looking ahead, and given the squandering of US resources and manpower in Iraq and Afghanistan,  the US should be strengthening its alliances in the Middle East with substantial strategic agreements with partners such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Israel that benefit US big picture interests.  The seeming inability for Washington to even grasp this idea is a stunning demonstration of the failure of national security policy as well as evidence that Washington is foolishly preoccupied with secondary issues and otherwise paralyzed.  You can’t engage in poker without playing the cards you have.

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    Take Advantage of the Reserves for Innovation

    May 25th, 2016

    By Stephen Bryen.

     

    With the establishment of the Defense Innovation Unit Experimental (DIUX), Secretary of Defense Ash Carter is putting a lot of effort into building a relationship with Silicon Valley, hoping some — but not too much — of the region’s entrepreneurial, cutting-edge methods rub off on the US military.

    There are many good things to be said for Silicon Valley, its weather and its methods, but it is not known for its patriotism or its interest in national security. Indeed, it is known for its international workforce, which may be directly inimical to national security in certain cases. But mostly, the valley is known for its interest in profits, big multiples on investment and expanding markets.

    After a slow start, Carter is doubling down on the bet by starting a second center in Boston.

    Instead of “outposts” in locations that have little affinity for national defense requirements, the Defense Department would better exploit capabilities it already has but barely uses. That is, DoD should start redefining its use of the National Guard and reserves, where patriotism, national security, and scientific and technological “smarts” converge.

    Over the past decade, the Guard and reserves in all services served in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. While their service has put a considerable strain on the system, it has also exposed thousands of trained and dedicated soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines first-hand to problems that confront our fighting forces. When they return to their civilian occupations, they work in business and industry, in R&D, and in academia. They have skill sets that, if properly channeled, can be a bonanza for the Defense Department. Carter has approached this idea by creating a reserve unit specifically for DIUX, led by a Navy Reserve commander who is also an Apple vice president.

    Thus far, however, while there are a few units focused on cyber security and intelligence, there is no direct path for converting military experience into products and technology for national security. We need a coordinated approach to the reserves and Guard that works for the 21st century.

     

    1. Virtual Reserve High-Tech Units

     

    Reserve units are largely constructed by geography but increasingly, we live in a virtual world based on the Internet, high-speed connectivity and Cloud systems. An engineer in Seattle can work with a counterpart in Texas and another in New Jersey with ease. And he can work from his office, from home, or on the road. The virtual model would be a terrific way to organize reserve units by providing secure platforms and secure Cloud connections to reservists investigating specific subjects or jointly working on specific projects. On top of creating collaboration among reservists, virtual high-tech units can also integrate the participation of national laboratories and contractors, creating a holistic approach to problem solving and engaging the best talent regardless of geography. Virtual reserve units don’t have to travel — they could log time spent, and the money and time saved can be wrapped into productive work.

     

     
    2. Venture-backed Reserve Spinoff Enterprises

     

    Reserve units will inevitably generate new products and intellectual property that can be turned over to a contractor or form the basis of a new enterprise that could be run by reservists. These will often be directly aligned with Pentagon requirements, and the military services or DoD will be an immediate customer, making them very attractive in venture capital circles. The Foreign Comparative Testing Program (FCT) already practices the principle. FCT will support a foreign technology if, in advance, a military service has agreed to buy it if it meets expectations after testing. If this can be done for foreign technology, why not for technology developed by American military reservists?

    Venture capital companies can be invited to join into a DoD-approved consortium. In exchange for advice to reserve spinoff startup enterprises, venture capital companies would be given a chance to invest in these enterprises. DoD would ensure terms and conditions consistent with industry standards, ethical, and in DoD’s long-term interest.

     

    3. Special Reservists

     

    There are many patriots in industry with a lot to offer in the form of mentoring and leadership, as well as scientific and technical know-how. In past years, when the US mobilized it often recruited top executives, some of whom were put in uniform and served magnificently.

    David Sarnoff, chairman and president of RCA, served in the Army at the start of World War II and was called up three times. He was commissioned a brigadier general in 1945, and performed many services of great wartime importance. He regarded becoming a general as the highlight of his life. When he died in 1971, he was buried with his general’s star, so much did he regard the honor afforded him.

    More recently, Silicon Valley’s Bob Noyce (sometimes called the “statesman” of Silicon Valley) helped Stephen Bryen when he was director of the Defense Technology Security Agency. In 1982, Bryen visited Intel, which Noyce co-founded, to learn about Intel’s success in microprocessors. But in the wide-ranging discussions held there, Bryen asked Noyce to lend his expertise to help better protect the technology of the Minuteman ICBM program. This he did — as a volunteer — and his help was invaluable. While there was no formal program to support Noyce’s work, the idea of special reservists makes great sense because of what it can do for national security. If properly organized, special reservists can serve by helping evaluate projects and programs, giving valuable management advice and acting as mentors for reserve organizations.

     

    4. National Registry

     

    DoD should create a national registry of the specific expertise of currently serving reservists and retired members of the Guard and reserves. This would allow the Pentagon to enlist their support to cover specific needs, such as artificial intelligence for robots, making weapons smarter, improving intelligence gathering, enhancing cybersecurity, working with new materials such as nano particles, etc. In addition, a national registry could be expanded to include non-reserve experts and managers who are willing to volunteer their services to our country.

    One reason the DIUX model is problematic is the security model of the America’s high-tech industry. Silicon Valley and Boston are filled with foreign nationals and much of the development work is outsourced — including to nationals of countries whose national aims may be different from ours, including China. For civilian applications that are nonsensitive this may be an acceptable paradigm — provided it does not shortchange American workers, but when it comes to security it is a nonstarter.

    Hiring thousands of people and spending billions to mitigate the security weaknesses of Silicon Valley-produced electronics and software is not the best course of action for DoD. Instead, let’s use the reserves to power America’s innovation in defense systems and enhance the security of products and technology needed for national defense.

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    In Hacking Motive is Everything

    December 19th, 2014

     

    By Stephen Bryen.

     

    m techno “experts” that the Sony hack cannot definitively be laid at the door of the North Koreans, or their cohorts like the Iranians. The “experts” say it is not completely clear that the Koreans did this, that the trajectory of the hack doesn’t prove it, and that some of the graphical designs and use of language may not be authentically Korean. The “experts” also say that the Sony hack could have been an inside job, and might be a lone wolf who has a grievance with Sony.

    These arguments have a certain validity and can’t immediately be dismissed. But none of them are sufficient to get North Korea off the proverbial hook.

    Let’s start with the insider issue. There is no doubt that every organization faces an insider threat. Sometimes the insider uses his knowledge to steal money or contracts. Sometimes the insider is liked to outside organizations. Sometimes he acts for political and ideological reasons. Sony could have had an insider operating against it, but even if such a person could be discovered, one must still figure out the motive.

    Was the insider a paid informant? Was the informant a spy? Was the informant linked to outside organizations and acting on political and ideological grounds? Was the informant working with the competition? Was the informant offered a lucrative job if he provided critical information? Was he (or her) a disgruntled employee? Since no one yet has fingered who such an informant is, nothing concrete can be said.

    Hackers notoriously try to hide their operations from law enforcement and intelligence organizations. This means it takes a huge effort to try and figure out where the hack originated, and even then that may not be enough to be sure that the hacker was connected to any organization or foreign government.

    Foreign government sponsored hacks and hackers also want to create “plausible deniability.” They want to leave enough questions about whether or not they were the responsible agents in order to make it harder for a victim to retaliate. The Sony hack is no exception, and the level of sophistication of the operation suggests that a good deal of effort was expended to make it possible for the North Koreans to say they had nothing to do with it, although they were not afraid to warmly praise the operation.

    A final complicating issue is that a hack can be a fraud. If you want to start a war you forge a hack accusing the other side of planning a grievous attack, and then you respond to the provocation. The use of provocation is something well know to historians going back in time thousands of years (you didn’t need the Internet to get the job done).

    Having said all of the above, the best measure is to figure out who benefits from the hack and to confront the source directly. This is difficult if the threat is coming from a country you don’t talk to, like North Korea; but there are plenty of channels to use to send a strong message. If the response is not satisfactory, the next step is to begin with retaliatory measures, increasing the pressure in each step. Motive is everything and pressuring the presumed source is the only way that future events can be prevented.

    The White House recently said that if we do anything to respond to the Sony hack no one will know about it because it will be a secret.

    Having said that the American government, the military, our critical infrastructure have been pounded by escalating cyber attacks and there is no evidence the US had done much more than issue warnings to the victims instead of threatening the perpetrators. So the White House “secret” actions don’t appear credible. Meanwhile the axis of cyber-evil, China, Russia, North Korea, Iran, Syria and Jihad organizations operate freely.

    Deterrence can only work if those who sponsor the attacks are punished, and the punishment should be meted out based on the only factor that can help us discern the source, and that boils down to motive. For state and Jihad sponsored cyber terrorism retaliation is the only answer. For non state actors law enforcement is the right approach.

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    China and Taiwan: All Shook Up

    December 6th, 2014

     

     

    By Stephen Bryen.

     

     

    Article cover image

    China has been running a campaign to convince Taiwan to surrender its independence. To get this done, China attracted Taiwan business to the Mainland, generating big profits for them and in some cases shifting the bulk of their manufacturing over. A great example is Foxconn, the manufacturer of iPhones and iPads.

    Foxconn is the Hon Hai Precision Industry Company which is based in Taiwan and is the world’s largest electronics contract manufacturer. Along with the iPad, Foxconn has produced Blackberry products, Kindles, Playstations and Intel-branded motherboards. Foxconn has 13 factories in China spread out over 9 Chinese cities and employs close to half a million workers. There have been a string of controversies, worker suicides, and reports about bad work conditions in Foxconn factories. Even so, Foxconn is the largest private employer in China.

    China found a good friend in the current Taiwan government. Taiwan is headed by President Ma Ying-jeou who also leads the Kuomintang Party. The Kuomintang was founded by Sun Yat-sen on the mainland and often was known as the Nationalist Party.

    But the era of President Ma has an entirely different emphasis reflected in efforts to continually improve and deepen ties with China and driven by big business that seeks opportunity on the mainland. Taiwanese companies continue to invest in the mainland and the Ma government continues to support them, though the annual rate of investment has dropped significantly because China is now growing its own private sector.

    The Ma government is deeply unpopular and its loss of support in the Taiwan electorate was dramatically demonstrated in the so-called 9-in-1 elections that just took place in the country. The Kuomintang suffered heavy losses leading to the resignation of the Cabinet and a temporary caretaker government.

    Voters shifted to the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which emphasizes Taiwan independence and social reform, although its own corrupt politicians caused it to lose strength in Taiwan until recently. If anything, China hates the DPP and so does Washington, because Washington and China see the DPP as an impediment to a political solution between Taiwan and China.

    To get an idea of Taiwan’s political situation, recent polls done by the Taiwan Thinktank tell a lot. Last June the handwriting was on the wall for the Ma government with 66.8% of the electorate voicing dissatisfaction with the Ma government. That level of dissatisfaction grew even more with the 9-in-1 election, and rose to 74%.

    Even worse, between June and December, the Ma government approval rating dropped from a mere 14.2% to 9.8%. No American leader could survive under such conditions, and there is little chance either the Kuomintang or Ma can survive the hatchet.

    Even more interesting is the youth vote. Youth turnout in the 9-in-1 election was very high, at 74%. Concern among young people in Taiwan is very high. Young people are deeply sympathetic with democracy protesters in Hong Kong, are concerned about complicity between the Ma government and China that could impose a similar fate on them, and are unhappy over Taiwan industry investments in China and business neglect in Taiwan.

    The DPP is now running around Washington trying to convince Congress and the administration that the election had nothing to do with so-called “cross strait relations,” that is relations between Taiwan and China. This campaign is not credible and the DPP would be well advised to stop telling such stories. No one will believe them, certainly not China.

    For a long time Washington has been putting the screws on Taiwan, even under Ma, by systematically weakening the Taiwan military and overly-coddling China. A great example is Washington won’t consider selling Taiwan a more advanced version of the F-16, an obsolete airplane, while China is already producing more advanced jet fighters and will soon have two stealth interceptors, one like the F-35 Joint Strike fighter and another one that resembles the F-22 fighter-bomber.

    Leaving Taiwan in the lurch as Chinese power increases is a dangerous game but Taiwan won’t roll over and play dead. Washington still takes a colonialist view of its so-called clients and thinks they are incapable of standing up on their own. But Taiwan is a democracy and people there have registered a strong objection to the lurking Chinese solution that would erase their freedom. Perhaps policy-makers here should sit up and take notice and stop undermining Taiwan.

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    US Policy and Cyber Attacks

    November 7th, 2014

     

    By Stephen Bryen.

     

    The Pentagon put in place Plan X to deal with cyber attacks. Apparently Plan X creates the mechanism for the Pentagon to counter attack against a cyber intruder. Unfortunately, the rules of engagement for Plan X are classified. As a result, Plan X is perfectly useless.

    DHS reports there is a Trojan Horse malware lurking in America’s critical infrastructure computers that could cause an economic catastrophe. It comes from Russia. But are we doing anything about it? You bet! DHS issued a Memo on November 6, 2014! The threat has been there since 2011!

    The United States needs an explicit, public plan to deal with cyber attacks on the critical infrastructure of the United States. The critical infrastructure includes banking and finance, government, defense plants, energy, communications and health and safety systems. All of them have been attacked by outside powers, the most reckless attacks from China and Russia. But Plan X does not seem to have been activated. This should tell us that Plan X is not the answer to the problem that threatens our national security.

    To the degree we have any policy, it seems it is to sit on our hands and watch as our defense secrets are stolen, our technology compromised and our commercial, transportation, energy and banking systems threatened. Do we want to watch attacks on nuclear power plants when the result could be another Three Mile Island or Chernobyl?

    The policy we have is purposefully defeatist and highly dangerous. The idea that Secretary of State Kerry would go off to talk to the Chinese and ask them to be nice about cyber attacks is absurd on its face and demeaning to the United States. The time to talk to the Chinese is after we slap down a cyber intrusion that came from Beijing.

    The policy I advocate is a byte for a byte. It is biblical. If you mess with our power plants, we can mess with yours. If you strike at our banking system, we will hobble your banking system.

    This message should go out to the Chinese, Russians, Iranians and anyone else who thinks they can attack us without penalty.

    If we had a policy we would put it openly on the table: We will not tolerate attacks on our critical infrastructure. If you are so brazen as to do it anyway, we will respond in kind and more.

    The word in Washington is that no one wants to confront China because, after all, they are sort of paying our bills these days. If that is the sum of our foreign policy we are dead ducks. When we talk about national security, we cannot turn the other cheek.

    Clearly the United States is in a great position to win any cyber confrontation. We have the talent pool and much better capability than any of our potential adversaries. This won’t always be the case: even the Pentagon is taking notice that our edge is slip slip sliding away.

    The new Congress should demand a tough policy of retaliation for cyber attacks. Happily the new Congress is closer in tune with the outlook of the American people. Appeasement is not an answer to cyber attacks anymore than it is an answer to military invasions.

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    The StealthGenie Complaint: Is It Real?

    October 7th, 2014

     

     

    By Stephen Bryen.

    Two US Assistant United States Attorneys, Kevin Mikolashek and Jay Prabhu have filed a civil Complaint (Civil No. 1:14-ev 1273) against Hammad Akbar for selling a spyware product called StealthGenie. StealthGenie is an APP that works on a variety of smartphones.

    The APP surreptitiously records incoming and outgoing phone calls, allows the purchaser to intercept calls in real time without the knowledge of the smartphone user; allows conversations in a boardroom or bedroom to be recorded without the knowledge of the smartphone user, allows incoming and outgoing email, SMS (text) messages and voicemail to be recorded and read; steals the user’s contact list, photos, videos and appointments.

    StealthGenie works through a commercial server. StealthGenie used Amazon Web Services located in Ashburn, Virginia. All the intercepted information from StealthGenie is stored on Amazon’s server.

    Hammad Akbar and his employees are Pakistani citizens and Akbar lives in Lahore. The chances of catching up with him are precisely zero. Amazon is not a defendant in the case, although clearly Amazon Web services facilitated StealthGenie operations.

    The US government view is this kind of APP is an “interception device” under US Code and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the sale, marketing, advertising of mobile spying applications is illegal. The US Attorneys evinced specific concern that the spread of this kind of APP would help stalkers, although as the Complaint says, the product was advertised as a means of dealing with spousal cheating, which according to StealGenie’s owners, a company called InvoCode Pvt. Ltd., constituted 65% of the purchasers of the APP.

    This is the first case brought in a Federal court against spyware APPS. It is unlikely to ever be successfully prosecuted, so the civil Complaint really amounts to a warning to others who make similar products.

    Today there are hundreds of companies in all parts of the world producing products that resemble StealthGenie. These products are available on the Internet. Some of them are free; others can can be purchased. The simplest of them require physical access to the target’s phone to install the malicious APP. More sophisticated stealthy spyware can get downloaded on a phone without the need for physical access.

    One way is to embed the spyware into a legitimate product and offer it to the user. Another is to plant a Trojan or other bug in the hardware of the device. Recently some Chinese phones have been found to have built in spyware. There are plenty of other techniques available for professional spies. StealthGenie was meant for amateurs.

    Whether the government’s legal argument is sound is less than clear. There are many cases where intercept software can be sold where its use is legal. Two examples come to mind: the sale of intercept software to law enforcement and government; the sale of intercept software to business.

    Business has a right to monitor its employees, and this right has been generally supported in US courts. This right extends to smartphones, computers and other electronics (such as GPS trackers). It would seem, therefore, that if StealthGenie advertised its APPS for certain business spying, there would not have been any grounds for an indictment.

    Another use of spyware APPS is for parents monitoring children. The US Government Complaint does not address this point. But, again, if an APP is advertised for this purpose, is it legal?

    Spyware is also extensively used by companies spying on their competitors. Certainly this is not legal, but the government has not bothered to act on such spying? Why?

    One thing is certain, the government’s action, no matter how well-intentioned, misses the mark in important ways. The widespread spying going on in our society, some of it easily accomplished by monitoring social APPS like Facebook and Twitter, is a real scourge.

    So too is the monetization of personal information by many of the tech-giants, who are making a fortune exploiting our privacy. We have a very long way to go before any of this is brought to a halt.

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