By Silviu Craescu.
The evolution of the strategic situation in Europe has only the most obvious resort deficiencies and vulnerabilities that the command structure of NATO had been present for years. For this reason, in Warsaw, the allies decided to start an functional evaluation for then proceed to a reform that will make it more appropriate and in line with the level of operative ambition.
Any human activity requires a command and control system and for militaries, the system must to be very well structured and coded.
For NATO, the one designed at this time, was adapted to the evolution of the strategic situation, up to the last reform implemented in 2010, from then on Secretary – General Rasmussen, reform can be criticized in many respects.
The stated purpose was to save money and the number of staffs was reduced from about 12,500 units to just over 8,000, leaving unchanged the level of ambition, that is, to be able to handle two major operations and six minor operations.
In short, Rasmussen achieves the goal by transferring a series of vital functions to the Member States (come from NATO command structure, NATO force structure, Nfs ) and agencies who are not controlled by the Supreme Commander in Europe (Saceur) such as NATO Support and Procurement Agency (Nspa).
It was a reform that he saw seriously compromised Italian national interests because of the inexplicable decision of the pro-Russian minister La Russa to give Spain the Caoc Center, command of the aviation defense of Southern Europe, previously located in Poggio Renatic.
The deficiencies of the new structure did not delay, even as one of the assumptions was that the Member States provided the staff to cover the 100% staff, which is well looked after by the care. Talk deficiencies have become macroscopic with the evolution of the strategic situation in Europe.
