Posts by DavidIsenberg:
When the Going Gets Tough, the Tough Don’t Fire
March 22nd, 2016by David Isenberg.
The performance of private security contractors (PSCs) working for the U.S. government in war zones is a mixed bag. Sometimes the PSCs operate very well, but the accountability and oversight of them leave something to be desired. Sometimes the oversight is excellent, but the PSCs are not effective.
A good example of this is a formerly classified audit report just released by the Department of Defense Inspector General, in response to a FOIA request I filed on April 8, 2012. As the title spells out—DoD Oversight of Private Security Contractors in Iraq Was Sufficient, but Contractors May Not Deter Attacks on Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq Enduring Sites—oversight was good, but performance was lacking. Or, as the old medical cliché puts it, the operation was a success but the patient died.
Fortunately, nobody actually died, but the report does puncture some claims that the PSC industry often makes.
Claims of Cost-Effectiveness
The core conclusion of the report is:
DoD officials provided sufficient oversight of private security contractors in Iraq; however, those contractors may not deter attacks at the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq enduring sites. Specifically, at 5 of 30 installations using PSC guards, U.S. military commanders supplemented the guards with military personnel during times of heightened threat. In addition, the Security Support Services-Iraq contract, which provides private security contractor services at the enduring sites, removes the private security contractors’ responsibility to defend the enduring sites.
The important takeaway here is: “U.S. military commanders supplemented the guards with military personnel during times of heightened threat,” One of the oldest claims made for PSCs is their presumed cost-effectiveness, that using them is less costly than using regular military forces for the same purpose. But if you have to use regular military forces to do the job the private sector is contracted to do, any cost savings go out the window.
Admittedly, the report focused only on the use of PSCs for providing static security, such as protecting fixed installations like Victory Base Complex and Forward Operating Base Hammer, and not the provision of mobile security services such as convoy escorts and personal protection details.
Still, static security was a considerable chunk of PSC work. As of May 2011, PSCs provided security at 33 U.S. installations in Iraq, according to the DoD IG audit. The security was provided through task orders placed against the Theater Wide Internal Security Services (TWISS) multiple award contracts. They were awarded to four companies: Triple Canopy, EOD Technology, Torres, and Special Operations Consulting. At that time approximately $582 million was obligated against the TWISS contracts.
When the DoD IG was doing its audit in 2011, the United States was in the final year of its withdrawal from Iraq, a process that had started after the end of the U.S. troop surge in 2007 and was completed by December 2011. By this point, the control and oversight of PSCs in Iraq was as good as it was ever going to get.
PSCs in Iraq
And, to its credit, the Defense Department did a good job. The audit found that “DoD officials adequately administered and provided oversight of PSCs at Victory Base Complex and Forward Operating Base Hammer. In addition, U.S. Forces-Iraq had adequately planned for the use of PSCs during the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq.”
But it also found that:
the PSC guards did not always deter insurgents from attacking military installations in Iraq as the security requirements in the private security contract were not adequate. Specifically, U.S. military commanders at 5 of 30 installations using PSC guards supplemented the guards with military personnel during times of heightened threat. In addition, PSC guards did not return fire on insurgents during two separate attacks.
Exactly why this happened is due to the complexities and often inflexible nature of contingency contracting.
The U.S. military augmentation occurred because the PSC staffing level is based on the threat level at the time the contract is awarded and does not allow increased staffing commensurate with the changes in the threat level without a contract modification. In addition, contract restrictions and international agreements limited the PSCs’ ability to react to threats and place the PSC guards under Iraqi jurisdiction for acts considered to be criminal, which may cause the guards to delay in returning fire on insurgents. As a result, U.S. Government and contractor personnel and assets will likely be at an increased risk.
These complexities and restrictions usually have more to do with the government than contractors. For example, on July 26, 2010 Jerry W. Torres, president and CEO of Torres testified before the Commission on Wartime Contracting. He noted:
Due to circumstances beyond its control, Torres has faced challenges related to compliance with U.S. government contracting policies. At JSS Shield, for example, government-caused delays prevented Torres from starting performance on January 1, 2010, as required under the JSS Shield Task Order. Torres’ proposal for JSS Shield indicated that Torres needed 30 days of lead time to ensure operational readiness by January 1, 2010. The Task Order, which was expected to be awarded on December 1, 2009, was awarded two days later on December 3, 2009; but, the Government did not change the period of performance to account for the delay. Problems related to the reduced lead time were compounded when the Government delayed our access to land for building out the LSA. If the Government had provided us timely access to suitable land, we would have assigned security personnel earlier in the process and, thus, would have avoided delays attributable to arming authorization.4 In this case, Government action that was out of our control prevented us from performing in accordance with our proposed timeline.
Although no major attacks against U.S. forces occurred during its withdrawal from Iraq, the presumed ineffectiveness of PSCs protecting the remaining Americans working for the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq, the office maintained by the U.S. Embassy in Iraq to help equip and train Iraq’s military, was a real concern.
Military officials expressed concern that once the U.S. military completes its withdrawal, the PSCs may not be able to deter attacks on the OSC-I enduring sites in Iraq, putting U.S. personnel and assets at increased risk. In addition, the Security Support Services-Iraq contracts that will provide PSC services at OSC-I enduring sites removes the contractor responsibility to defend the sites against attacks, further exacerbating the security risks at the enduring sites.
Failure to Fire
The history of PSC use in Iraq to date shows that the times they fired their weapons when they did not need to was far more than the times they didn’t when they should have. Yet the audit showed that the latter had, in fact, happened.
On January 4, 2011, and March 20, 2011, attacks at Joint Security Station (JSS) Loyalty, insurgents fired rocket propelled grenades at guard towers, causing damage to the towers and injury to the PSC guards. In both instances, the PSC guards did not return fire on the insurgents.
During both attacks, the PSC guards immediately took cover and were found on the lower level of the guard towers. In the first attack, the guards stated that they did not have time to prepare their weapons for firing. Military officials questioned whether the PSC guards would return fire, even if they had time to prepare. Officials also stated that the PSC guards are familiar with the RUF and aware that they would be subject to Iraqi jurisdiction if they fired their weapon even if in self defense. Military officials stated that they believed this caused the guards to hesitate firing their weapons, and they viewed the PSC guards as only an “early warning system” that would report attacks or suspicious individuals. As a result, U.S. military personnel were used to augment the PSCs in guarding the installation.
After the first of those attacks the Base Defense Operations Center Commander stated:
the major concern arising from this attack is the culture that is present in the [PSC] organization. A culture of hesitation and even an unwillingness to fire their weapons. There are many examples throughout the SOP that discourages the use of deadly force. This hesitation and weapon posture aided the enemy’s successful attack on [Joint Security Station] Loyalty. The mentality needs to be changed if this contract is to be beneficial to United States Forces. Otherwise they are just an early warning system and not the first line of defense for [Joint Security Station] Loyalty.
“Hesitation” and “unwillingness” are not the hallmarks of the supposedly experienced professionals the PSC advocates commonly depict, in supposed contrast to the stereotype of the pimply faced young men just out of high school they say is the alternative to PSC use.
At the time the DOD IG report was published on April 16, 2012, the problems it described were serious, but already somewhat historical, given that U.S. military forces had completed their withdrawal. True, there were still thousands of Americans in Iraq but that was considered a problem for the State Department, as it had taken charge.
But with the emergence and growth of the Islamic State and the return of U.S. military forces and PSCs, the security weaknesses the audit described remain a potentially serious problem
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From Russia, With War
March 18th, 2016by David Isenberg.
Photo: Unidentified gunmen at the Simferopol airport in Crimea.
Although largely unrecognized by the rest of the world, Russia already has a substantial private military and security industry complex. Ironically, in the past the United States has even availed itself of its services. Before Russian arms dealer Viktor Bout was caught in 2008 in a sting operation and subsequently convicted, the Pentagon used his airline, Air Bas, to fly equipment into Baghdad airport for the use of U.S. military forces.
To date, Russian private military contractors (PMC) were largely an instrument of Russian state power. But that may be changing. In the future Russian PMCs may be able to operate more independent of state control. If that happens, global efforts to better control and regulate the private military and security contracting sector may become much more difficult.
The military affairs oriented website War is Boring recently reported that on January 28, the Duma began discussing the possibility of legalizing private military companies in Russia. This is not the first time the issue has come up in Russia. Last fall, the Russian cabinet rejected a bill, sponsored by Gennady Nosovko of the center-left party Fair Russia, to regulate the work of private military companies because of legal weaknesses and security fears.
The rejection of this bill last fall seems to have led directly to the current discussion. Nosovko, disappointed at its rejection, promised to rework the draft and submit it again last November. If the reworked piece of legislation was rejected again, he promised to bypass the government and send it directly to the State Duma before the end of 2015.
Russian reasons for regulating contractors differ from those of Western countries. In states like the US and the UK, concerns are largely about how to do proper oversight and accountability of PMCs operating in war zones like Iraq and Afghanistan.
But Russian concerns are more oriented toward internal security. According to Nosovko:
Izvestia quoted an unnamed source in one of Russia’s “power agencies” who said the government had rejected the bill because a section concerning state regulation lacked detail. “The main question is which organization, the Defense Ministry or the Federal Security Service of the Interior Ministry, would control tens thousands of “Rambos” to make sure that they would not turn their arms against the state itself,” the source said.
Even the most vehement critics of PMCs in the West have never had that fear.
The Russian public, meanwhile, is not enthusiastic about PMCs. A poll conducted in 2014 by the Public Opinion Fund found that 18% of respondents were in favor of their use, while 78% were against.
But Russian authorities are right to be wary, even if they have been instrumental in their creation and growth.
According to some news reports, Russian PMCs have acted in a far more combat-oriented role in the Ukraine than US or UK counterparts did in Iraq or Afghanistan. Last November, Inform Napalm, a “volunteer initiative to inform both Ukrainian citizens and the foreign public about the crises in Ukraine” published an article about the history and use of Russian PMCs. It noted that 10 private Russian military companies have conducted a range of operations in Ukraine, including training, demining, working with the FSB (the successor of the KGB), selling military goods, delivering “humanitarian aid,” and protecting cargo. In addition, operatives from ATK GROUP, Slavonic Corps Limited, and Vizantiya have been encountered in both eastern Ukraine and Syria. A delegation of the United Nations Working Group on the use of mercenaries will visit Ukraine from March 14 to 18 to gather information on the activities of alleged mercenaries and foreign fighters, as well as private military and security companies.
Just like their counterparts from other countries Russia contractors have taken casualties. Last December up to nine Russian contractors reportedly died in Syria. Also like their Western counterparts Russian PMCs have been reportedly involved in scandal. Last July the British Guardian reported that:
The United Nations has spent half a billion dollars on contracts with a Russian aviation company since discovering one of its helicopter crews in the Democratic Republic of the Congo drugged and raped a teenage girl in a sexual attack.
Senior UN officials considered terminating the company UTair’s contract after concluding that the incident, in which the girl was dumped naked and unconscious inside the helicopter base, was indicative of a wider culture of sexual exploitation at the company.
If PMCs become a legitimate market sector in Russia they won’t lack for work. As the St. Petersburg Times reported in 2014, “One area where Russian PMSCs would be in certain demand is foreign projects by Russian transnational corporations such as Gazprom or RusAl, which currently employ Western PMSCs.” UN contracts for logistical and infrastructural support of UN peace operations are another bright prospect, according to the Times. “Russia used to be the UN‘s second-biggest overall contractor for infrastructural support for such operations (even without PMSCs), though it has dropped out of the top 10 in recent years.”
If Russian PMCs enter the global market in large numbers, it would mark the end of the international status quo where most PMCs come from just a handful of countries, namely the United States and the United Kingdom. In a sense it would be similar to the few years after World War II when the United States was the only country in the world to have nuclear weapons, until Russia held its first nuclear test on August 29, 1949. France and China have also sought to help their PMCs get a bigger piece of the global insecurity and conflict market. If Russia breaks the US and UK stranglehold on the market, others are sure to follow.
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Now, That’s Chutzpah!
September 26th, 2014
By David Isenberg.
There are times, when reading about current world affairs, that I wish my Yiddish speaking grandmother was still alive, if only so I only hear her say again, “that takes real chutzpah,” when listening to some outlandish claim by some vainglorious twit.
Case in point was a recent eyebrow raising assertion by Erik Prince, former Navy Seal officer and cofounder and former head of the legendary private security firm once known as Blackwater, then Xe Services, then Academi, and now part of Constellis Holdings.
As reported by the Daily Beast, in a recent talk before the conservative Maverick PAC, he said:
It’s a shame the [Obama] administration crushed my old business, because as a private organization, we could’ve solved the boots-on-the-ground issue, we could have had contracts from people that want to go there as contractors; you don’t have the argument of U.S. active duty going back in there,” Prince said in an on-stage discussion featuring retired four-star Gen. James Conway. “[They could have] gone in there and done it, and be done, and not have a long, protracted political mess that I predict will ensue.
Why is this outlandish? A little history is in order.
After Blackwater was sold to a group of investors Prince moved to the United Arab Emirates, where he helped build up a force of several thousand commandos for Sheik Mohamed bin Zayed al-Nahyan of Abu Dhabi, according to a 2011 report by the New York Times.
Subsequently he helped establish Frontier Resources Group, a “Private Equity Investment Firm focused on natural resource development in leading edge regions,” where he is now chairman. By regions, they mean Africa, where they are helping Chinese companies set up shop.
Last year, he also published a memoir, which is his attempt at a payback at the critics in both the U.S. government and civilian society who he feels “misconstrued and misrepresented” Blackwater’s work.
To be fair, he is somewhat right. Blackwater’s work was often casually condemned by people who had never been in the military, let alone been in a war zone. Sloppy reporting, general unfamiliarity with the private military and security contracting industry, not to mention the influence of popular culture, also played a role. The U.S. State Department, with which Blackwater had large contracts, did prevent him from defending its actions in public.
On the other hand, Blackwater hugely benefitted from its work for the U.S. government. In “Shadow Force,” my 2009 book on private security contractors working in Iraq, I noted that at the end of 2006 the total value of all of Blackwater’s federal contracts was $1 billion. That was a percentage growth since 2001 of 80,453. Prince didn’t have a problem working for the U.S. government when it hugely benefitted him financially. If his treatment by the U.S. government was so bad, he could have just walked away. He chose not to.
More importantly, Blackwater did do things wrong in Iraq. Beyond well-known tragedies like the 2004 killings of Blackwater contractors at Fallujah, who were unprepared and under resourced, or the 2007 killings of Iraqi civilians at Nisoor Square by Blackwater contractors, four of whom are awaiting verdict at a recently concluded trial, there were many instances of improper behavior.
A significant, unrealized, problem with Blackwater was simply that it tried to do too much, too quickly and Blackwater’s often unresponsive and clueless management was not up to the job; often being more concerned with winning contracts than properly implementing them.
This point is documented in the newly published book “The Bremer Detail” by Frank Gallagher, the Blackwater contractor who headed up the personal security detail for Ambassador Paul Bremer, back when he headed the Coalition Provisional Authority from 2003 to 2004. It’s worth reading this, if only to remember that Blackwater contractors were there to defend their clients, not to engage in offensive combat operations.
Given that history, one must wonder exactly when Erik Prince decided that private security contractors are the same as regular soldiers. He certainly didn’t think so when he wrote his book. Quite the contrary, he wrote:
At home, armed private security guards help protect airports and banks and office buildings. They staff checkpoints at military bases across the country and they’re stationed at government offices in Washington, DC. Meanwhile, the private sector supplies the U.S. military with bullets and bulletproof vests, rifles and communications gear, tanks and ships and jets. The general public—much less Congress-never really questions whether or not those duties should be outsources. Yet Blackwater became famous—some might say infamous—for combining the two. We were a private company providing armed guards to a war zone.
Prince is a former U.S. military officer, so even allowing for the fact that he was in the Navy, not the Army, he has to have a better idea than most in what is involved in actually fighting an opposing army, for however ill-trained and disorganized ISIS is, that is what it is and it needs to be taken seriously.
The U.S. Army certainly does. It just announced it is deploying a division headquarters to Iraq, which will be responsible for coordinating the efforts of the 1,600 troops President Obama has sent to Iraq.
If anybody seriously believes that Blackwater, especially given its own past troubling history, of insufficiently supporting people working on various contracts, ranging in number from a handful to a few dozen, is capable of coordinating the actions of a few thousand battlefield soldiers, which is what contractors would have to be, we’re all in trouble.
This, by the way, is no slam of the security contractors who did work in Iraq, most of whom conducted themselves professionally and acquitted themselves honorably, under conditions that would give most people nightmares.
It simply recognizes that what is needed in Iraq and Syria to fight ISIS requires a fundamentally different skill set. The TOE (Table of Organization and Equipment) that is going to be required there is not what a private security company such as Blackwater does. Fighting ISIS will require soldiers, not armed guards.
In fact, there is only one private company in recent times that could have done something like this. That was the South African company Executive Outcomes which closed its doors in 1989.
EO initially trained and later fought on behalf of the Angolan government against Jonas Savimbi’sUNITA after it refused to accept the election results in 1992. In March 1995, EO contained an insurrection of guerrillas known as the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone. The RUF’s signature brand of atrocities — including amputations of hands, arms and legs of tens of thousands — rivals the horrific crimes of ISIS.
Now, if Eeben Barlow, the former South African officer who founded and headed EO, wants to organize a private army to fight ISIS I’d at least be willing to consider it. But, to paraphrase what was said in the 1988 United States vice-presidential debate by Democratic presidential candidate Senator Lloyd Bentsen to Republican vice-presidential candidate Senator Dan Quayle, Erik Prince is no Eeben Barlow and Blackwater is no EO.
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