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Europe, the Arab World and the Spring
January 8th, 2014
By Fadi Elhusseini.
When revolts sneaked in the Arab World, a number of regimes were toppled while other thrones were shaken. Among others, Europe was quick in its response and adopted a new approach to relations with its Southern neighbors. Nonetheless, despite the great efforts and numerous investments and projects in the region, the perception of Arab masses has not changed in a way that reflects the deep and serious commitments made by both the EU and European states.
By 8 March, 2011, Catherine Ashton and the European Commission proposed “a partnership for democracy and shared prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean.”[1] At a time when the EU is in deep economic and financial crisis, billions of euros have been budgeted for grant support to the Neighborhood. For instance, the European Commission has allocated €80.5 million to the refugee crisis in North Africa, while EU Member States have provided €73 million, as an immediate financial response to provide humanitarian aid.[2]
The European Investment Bank (EIB) increased its budget for the Southern Neighborhood from €4 billion to €5 billion for humanitarian aid. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) extended its geographical coverage to include the Southern Neighborhood and provided up to €2.5 billion per year to support public and private investments.[3] The EU has also endorsed programs like the SPRING (Support for Partnership Reform and Inclusive Growth) program, the creation of a Civil Society Facility for the neighborhood and an Erasmus Mundus program, and makes the total budget, to strengthen the capacity of civil society to promote reform and increase public accountability in their countries, more than €350 million for 2011 and 2012. Furthermore, in its budget for the period 2014-2020, the European Neighborhood Instrument (ENI) has allocated €15.433 billion to support the 16 partner countries of the Neighborhood.[4]
Distressingly, these significant efforts were not interpreted into tangible results. The perception of Arab masses favored other players and not the EU. This conclusion was put forward by several polls showing the rise of the popularity of others, compared to the EU, in the Arab World.
In a survey conducted by the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESAV) in 2011, 78% of Arabs saw Turkey “the most favorable” country.[5] Despite a slight decline, Turkey remained the most favorable country with 69% one year after the start of the Arab Spring, according to TESAV 2012 polls.[6] Although the way people perceived EU’s role differed from one country to another, the third Euromed investigation, presented to the European Parliament, showed that between December 2011 and February 2012 most of the opinions also favored Turkey, which could beat the EU as a “supporter” of the Arab Spring countries, while the European Union ranked second, and the United States third.[7]
A 2013 survey by TESAV has shown that the positive perception about Turkey in the Arab World has decreased, with 59% supporting a greater regional role for Turkey, but was not replaced by the EU. Turkey ranked third in 2013 in terms of positive perception, after the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia.[8] The TESAV poll has also shown an increase in the positive perceptions about Russia and China in the Arab World.[9]
In fact, many European officials have not seen these challenges facing the EU and its role in the region, calling it at times “weak”, as uttered bluntly by Dick Toornstra, director at the Office for Promotion of Parliamentary Democracy (OPPD) in the European Parliament in an interview with Euractiv on 6 May 2013, when he considered the Arab Spring ‘a wake-up call’ that revealed the lack of a coherent and consistently applied foreign policy.[10] In an attempt to identify the reason behind Arabs’ avertion to the EU or seeking a bigger role for the EU in the region, a number of explanations can explain this state of affairs.
First and foremost, the EU has been seen by Arabs as one of the key supporters of their former autocratic regimes, intensifying collaboration with Ben Ali in Tunisia, frequently visiting and receiving Mubarak of Egypt, heavily cooperating with Gaddafi in Libya, ostensibly turning a blind eye to Assad’s wrongdoings in Syria and plainly providing assistance for Saleh in Yemen. Such a perception cannot just vanish overnight.
Second, the EU continued its collaboration with NGO’s and organizations labeled for their loyalty to toppled regimes. All the projects and assistance the EU provides to the Arab World have been channeled through the same organizations during the reign of dictatorships. Choosing new channels and may be replacing some of these NGO’s by others at this critical transitional period, is deemed essential for not being caught complying with the old regimes.
Third, the European model is an appealing tool that demonstrates the strength of Europe’s potential soft power. Yet, this power has been, so far, neutralized by the lack of coherent policies and an ineffective role in the region. The crux of this state of affairs was summarized by the director of the Center for European Studies at the Interdisciplinary Center in Herzliya, Avi Primor, who described in 2004 European role in the Middle East Peace Process as “un coup d’epee dans l’eau” (a sword strike in the water) – not carrying any weight. [11]
In other words, as long as the European Union does not formulate a common, coherent foreign and defense policy, it will remain on the doorstep of the Arab World, unable to play a major role. This fact has been realized by Arab masses, which currently cannot envision a bigger role for the EU, given the enormous clouts the United States and others have in the region.
Fourth is the consecutive failure of EU’s efforts to embrace regional countries under one umbrella (think Barcelona Process in 1995, European Neighborhood Policy framework in 2004, the European Neighborhood Policy Instrument (ENPI) in 2007 and Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) in 2008). None of these efforts has borne fruit, making it more likely for any future efforts to get the cold shoulder from Arabs.
Finally, old memories of the era of colonization still persist in such a way that makes it difficult for many Arabs to digest a deeper European involvement in the region. However, the Arab Spring has unleashed a set of new dynamics. Given the depleting popularity of the United States and as Arabs’ compassion toward others has chilled somewhat (due to their controversial regional policies), a power vacuum is remaining and expanding. Europe’s odds for building influence and re-setting relations are on the rise, considering geographic proximity, its soft power and common history.
Nonetheless, as grim as the picture may appear, there are glimmers of light. Chief adviser to the prime minister of Turkey Ibrahim Kalin says: “the future of the nation-state depends on its ability to adjust itself to the new realities of a very complex and sophisticated process of globalization and regionalization.”[12] In this vein, one would argue that the EU may need to have its policies reviewed, adjusted and replaced by sound and realistic ones. For example, Europe has a lot to offer in the realms of education and democracy, noting that the current developments in the Arab World have highlighted the solid connection between education and sound democracy.
Moreover, solving the perennial problems of migration and radicalization can be realized through encouraging economic cooperation, which will not only help fight poverty, radicalization and migration, but would certainly embed democracy. Encouraging intra-regional interaction, job creation, investment, lending experience and know-how and promoting tourism are other key policies that would help solve desperate socioeconomic conditions that triggered Arab uprisings.
About the author
Fadi Elhusseini is a Political and Media Counselor in Turkey. He is an associate research fellow (ESRC) at the Institute for Middle East Studies-Canada and a doctoral candidate at the University of Sunderland in Britain. His articles have appeared in scores of newspapers, magazines and websites, including the Washington Institute, Foreign Policy Association, Middle East Monitor, International Security Observer, Geopolitical Monitor and others. Elhusseini is Arabic native speaker and he is fluent in English, and proficient in French and Italian, with basic knowledge of Turkish.
ENDNOTES
[1] The European Parliament: Joint Communication to the European Council (The European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, COM 2011), Brussels, March 8, 2011 “http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com_11_303_en.pdf”
[2] European Commission: The EU’s response to the ‘Arab Spring’, Press release – MEMO/11/918, Brussels, December 16, 2011, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-11-918_en.htm ”
[3] Ibid.
[4] The European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), accessed on 04/01/2014, http://www.enpi-info.eu/main.php?id=402&id_type=2;
[5] Mensur Akgün and Sabiha Senyücel Gündoğar, The Perception of Turkey in the Middle East 2011 (Istanbul: Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation, 2012), p. 5.
[6] Mensur Akgün and Sabiha Senyücel Gündoğar, The Perception of Turkey in the Middle East 2012 (Istanbul: Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation, 2012), p. 6.
[7] Helle Malmvig, Fabrizio Tassinari, “The Arab Spring and the External Actor’s Role within the Euro-Mediterranean Region,” European Institute of the Mediterranean, Euromed Survey 2011 (July, 2012), pp. 94- 95.
[8]Mensur Akgün and Sabiha Senyücel Gündoğar, Ortadoğu’da Türkiye Algısı 2013 (Istanbul: Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation, 2013), p. 6.
[9]Ibid., p. 9.
[10] EurActiv, EU official: The Arab Spring revealed our weaknesses, May 7, 2013, http://www.euractiv.com/global-europe/director-oppd-arab-spring-europe-interview-519151.
[11] Avi Primor, “The European Union and the Middle East – Mutual Indispensability,” Palestine- Israel Journal, (Vol.11 No.2 2004 ), retrieved October 21, 2013, from http://www.pij.org/details.php?id=186.
[12] İbrahim Kalın, “Turkey and the Middle East: Ideology or Geo-Politics?,” Private View, no. 13 (Autumn, 2008), p.26
Copyright © 2013 ISO | International Security Observer
Palestine, Israel and the Jewish state
December 1st, 2013By Fadi Elhusseini.
While analyses have abounded examining the details of the “secret” talks and evaluating the positions of the negotiating parties in the Middle East peace process, prominent Israeli writers have intensified their efforts, on “Israel’s imminent existential threat” with much fanfare.
Despite the fact that such writers are not officially members of the Israeli government, and their articles seem far apart, their works are in line and consistent with the official position of the Israeli government, which have added the recognition of Israel as a Jewish State as a sine qua non requirement to resolving the conflict. Those writers highlighted the existential threat to the Jewish identity on not only the state of Israel, but also Jerusalem, calling on the Israeli government in the meantime to embrace policies and measures to preserve this identity and sustain the Jewish majority.
In his article “Making the Jewish State a ‘Jewish State’”, Lahav Harkov tries to draw the attention on the importance of passing bills and instituting policies that ensure the Jewish uniqueness of Israel. However, Harkov concedes the difficulty of doing so and being democratic, especially with the presence of Muslim and Christian Arab Israeli citizens comprising nearly 20 percent. Similarly, writing in Al-Monitor in September 2013, Einat Wilf discusses Israeli domestic debate on how the State of Israel cannot reconcile the term “Jewish” with the term “democratic”. Better still, Michael B. Oren wrote four years ago in the Commentary magazine “…Israel will have to decide between being a Jewish state and a democratic state. If it chooses democracy, then Israel as a Jewish state will cease to exist.” Oren suggests seven ‘existential threats’, identifying Arab demographic as one of the threats facing the existence of Israel. When talking about Jerusalem, Oren warns that Israel is in danger of losing Jerusalem as it no longer boasts a “Zionist majority”.
Oren utilizes statistics to prove his argument, which is both erroneous and misleading. First and foremost, he uses the term “Zionist majority”, and not “Jewish” or “Israeli”. In fact, there is an obvious difference between those terms, especially when put in the context of Middle East conflict. Second, Oren says that “out of a total population of 800,000, there are 272,000 Arabs and 200,000 Haredim–ultra-Orthodox Jews who do not generally identify with the Zionist state.”
Here, Oren classifies Haredim-ultra-Orthodox Jews with Arabs, but if he classifies just Arabs (Christians and Muslims) alone compared to the total sum of resident Jews in Jerusalem, his own numbers would refute his argument. I tend to see Oren’s “existential threats” as nothing but challenges facing Israel’s role in the region, rather than threats facing its existence.
Despite some reservations, one of the most rational articles was written by Alon Ben-Meir, titled “The Jewish State of Israel.” In his turn, Ben-Meir highlights the demographic threat, yet he proposes a number of objective solutions, including the urgency of resolving the conflict with the Palestinians based on a two-state solution.
According to him, such solution would remove Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip from the demographic equation that Israel faces and would end the occupation and the expansion of settlements- as this “runs contrary to the need to establish a Palestinian state in order to prevent the creation of a de facto one state, which will obliterate Israel’s Jewish national identity.”
On the whole, such articles cannot be construed anything but a means for justifying a number of Israeli arrangements and policies that aim at preserving the Jewish identity of Israel.
While Western public opinion may find in these policies and measures “racism”, seeking rationalization is deemed crucial at this moment. Another possibility for the purpose of these articles would be a prelude to looming failure in the negotiations, due to stiff Israeli positions concerning the city of Jerusalem or/ and the intransigent stance on the recognition of Israel as a Jewish state.
At this juncture, it is noteworthy reminding that the first usage of the term “Jewish state” was by Theodor Herzl in 1896, giving birth to the Zionist movement. In 1917, the Balfour Declaration called for “establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people.” Hence, Israel was referred to as a Jewish nation state in the Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel on 14 May 1948.
It is also important to note that since its establishment in 1948 until today, Israel has no constitution and what defines its national goals and values is a collection of eleven basic laws, none of which defines Israel “as a Jewish state.” Moreover, the 160 countries that recognized Israel neither acknowledged its Jewish nature nor were required to do so. In the only peace treaties between two Arab countries (Egypt and Jordan) and Israel, there was no reference to Israel’s Jewish character. The underlying rationale and the unheralded intentions for Israel’s demand are clear: the association of Israel as a Jewish state and the waiver of any right of return for Palestinian refugees.
Tellingly, Netanyahu’s precondition to settle the conflict with the Palestinians pending their recognition of the Jewish state is based on number rationales. First, such recognition will -with no doubt- erase the right of return of the Palestinian refugees, and hence abolish one significant element of the final status issues for negotiations with Israel. In other words, if Israel is to be recognized as Jewish state, Muslim and Christian refugees will give up their right of determination and will become ineligible to return to their homes, from which they were uprooted decades ago.
It is unequivocal that Netanyahu’s subtle demand for recognition is in reality an effort to relinquish a cornerstone element in the conflict, and by default, squander any chance to achieve a peace agreement, through dictating the outcome of the final status issues outside the negotiations table. Second, this recognition would prepare the grounds for a long-awaited transfer plan, which was intended to transfer as many Christian and Muslim Arab citizens as possible from Israel in order to preserve Israeli’s Jewish majority.
According to the Israeli Ha’aretz newspaper, Israel admits to revoking residency rights of quarter million Palestinians since 1967.
Ido Blum, the head of Israel’s HaMoked legal team, said that while the policy of revoking residency no longer applies to the West Bank and Gaza, it is still implemented in East Jerusalem. Palestinians unable to provide documents including utility bills or school enrolment forms indicating Jerusalem is their “center of life” risk losing their permit to stay in Jerusalem. More so, in her article ‘‘Quiet transfer”, Elodie Guego, describes the Policies to revoke the residency permits of Palestinian Jerusalemites and to Judaize the city “as ethnic cleansing”.
Chief Palestinian negotiator Sa’eb Erekat said “when the Palestinians recognized Israel, they recognized the composition of the state”. He also said “for the Palestinians to recognize Israel as a Jewish state would adversely impact the rights of Palestinian citizens of Israel.” It is undoubtedly that Palestinians recognition of Israel as a Jewish State implies Palestinian consent to abandoning land, real estate and other property belonging to them in Israel.
In this respect, Ben-Meir lambasted Netanyahu’s “absurdity of linking peace with the Palestinians to their recognition of Israel as a Jewish state,” adding: “Recognizing Israel as a Jewish state by the Palestinians, as demanded by Netanyahu, is of no value or consequence, not any more than the four countries identified by their religious majority: the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Mauritania.” Yair Lapid, Netanyahu’s Finance Minister, announced in October that he opposes a demand set by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that Palestinian recognition of Israel as a Jewish state is a condition for any future peace deal.
Some Israeli officials evoke United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181 in November 1947 “UN Partition Plan”, which was a Plan to replace the British Mandate for Palestine with “Independent Arab and Jewish States”. The text of the resolution talked about two states, “Jewish” and “Arab”- presumably Palestine, where the latter shall take 43 percent of the total land of historical Palestine and the “Jewish” state 56 percent.
However, the current Israeli leadership insists that the Palestinians cannot negotiate in their peace talks for more than 22 percent of historical Palestine, but yet, have to recognize Israel as a Jewish State. The partition plan puts a “Special International Regime for the City of Jerusalem” administered by the United Nations, which Israel utterly refuses as it is aiming to be the sole responsible and the lone sway in the holy city of Jerusalem. So to speak, it would be bizarre to take one part of the partition plan (a Jewish state), and disregard the rest of its components.
It is axiomatic that in the presence of a leadership that is not willing to take bold steps and cede untenable demands; a leadership that adopts only gunboat diplomacy in the starkest terms, undermining the importance of achieving peace and prevaricating its responsibilities towards it- using the Iranian nuclear file, uncertainty lingers, untoward outcomes follow and any chances for the current tenuous peace talks are susceptible to utter failure.
Invisible Strife in a Moribund Middle East
October 10th, 2013
By Fadi Husseini.
In a fractious, rife-with-conflicts Middle East, nothing is spared; worship houses are attacked; sport clubs, schools and markets become unsafe with continued upticks in violence. Now, attention is focused on the Syrian dilemma, which has been colored in a sectarian hue: Sunni- Shiite/Alawi conflict. Nevertheless, another invisible fray is taking place in that region, but it is so very dim that one might barely be aware of it. Read the rest of this entry “
Colonial Middle East strategy: another complete fiasco
October 10th, 2013
By Fadi Hussseini.
In a region that has been described for long time as idle, sluggish and even immune towards transformations, revolts sneaked in, toppling some regimes and shaking the thrones of others. However, with the bloody course of events, doubt started to creep and uncertainty began to haunt hope, especially with the explicit and overt foreign scramble in the region after the current transformations.
Analyses began to heap in an attempt to examine this event: THE ARAB SPRING; some choose to factor in this context a new foreign conspiracy, aiming at dividing of what is left from the region. Others suggest that the revolts are a long awaited revolution of dignity and were ignited by plain domestic forces. Nevertheless, a fresh set of events has misrepresented newly anticipated course of transformation in the region, giving new prospects for hypotheses and theories.
Those who believe the current revolts are just the beginning of a new Sykes–Picot of 1916 and nothing but a new conspiracy target the Arab nation based their views on several events and remarks. For instance, Thomas Friedman has been calling repeatedly for a new Middle East that would reflect the new geopolitical transformations in the region. Other non-Arab intellectuals like Bernard Lewis and Theiry Meyssan published several articles suggesting a new delimitation of the so-called “Middle East”. On September 28th, Robin Wright proffers in his article “How 5 Countries Could Become 14” a new landscape of the Middle East.
On the official level, many terms and projects like “constructive chaos”, the “New Middle East” and the “Greater Middle East”, coined and uttered by “mainly” US officials, have led to further worry and distrust. For instance, in March 2004, the Bush administration adopted what was named “the Greater Middle East Project”. Such project did not bear any fruit and was complete fiasco, which led for new projects to follow like “the New Middle East”, introduced by U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in 2006. A starker example of this approach was reflected in the new map of the Middle East, presented in the U.S. military’s Armed Forces Journal in 2006 entitled: “Blood Borders: How a better Middle East would look”.
The harmony between U.S. administration and neo-Islamists gave the impression that a new approach has been adopted: “Moderate Islam.” Hitherto, promoting and encouraging Islamic parties and groups widespread struck a chord with public dissatisfaction and aversion to corrupt regimes and have become a priority.
“Moderate” Islamic movements, who were once deprived from their rights, expelled and may be executed by their own regimes, lined up to present their credentials as the new accepted “model” or alternative of the old fashioned and infamous dictatorships, which appeared in the eyes of Arab people as a stooge, too attached to the West and excessively dependent on the US.
According to this viewpoint, the rise of the current Arab revolts demonstrated the solemn declaration of this new American plan, by inserting democratically elected new “moderate” Islamic movements in power. The new Islamic regimes will serve as good as previous regimes, yet they will be more accepted by their people and hence interests, business and flux of oil will be secured. The warm relations between these Islamic movements and the US in particular, and being hosted by the West when they were escaping from the oppression of the previous regimes, bolstered such way of thinking.
On the other hand, many people tend to see in the Arab revolts a definitive outcome of an increasing frustration among Arab Youth. This generation, which constitutes the majority of Arab population, inherited stories of glory and magnificent history of modernity, development, advancement in civilization, arts, science and might.
But these stories hit day after day the wall of a frustrating reality as they (Arab youth) found themselves in fully dependent states (on the West), experiencing successive defeats and living bleak economic and difficult social conditions. This accompanied with the continuation of the oppression of their regimes and the lack of democracy and freedom of expression. The rulers exaggerated in their grip and confidence, and their hyperbole made Parliamentary elections a joke and a scene of irony, while the issue of inheritance of power to their sons (in “theoretically” Republican regimes) became a mixed material of comic and bitterness.
More distressingly, Arab youth saw progress, development and success in other countries, and coveted for themselves good economic and social conditions other nations experienced. With the assistance of internet social networks and the development in communications technology, such facts are not hidden anymore, and the new Arab generation started to share their findings, concerns, fears, ambition and dreams with each other through such platforms. Meanwhile, aged regimes were still busy with old fashioned techniques, undermining the effect and importance of such technology, which was described by one of their statesmen as “children toys”.
The moment of truth has arrived, catching every expert, analyst and politician off guard, as the eruption of the Arab Spring started from Tunisia the Green “the term Arabs call Tunisia”, which people are well-known for quite temper, calmness and gentleness. It was only few days until the spark of revolution spread as fever, and other people followed suit, turning the fantasy world on the Internet to a reality that ushered in a new era different of the previous distasteful epoch. Thus, the crux of this view is the rejection of any external role in moving or encouraging Arabs to change their regimes.
What supports this view a number of facts; the first is close relationship between the West in general and previous autocratic regimes. Another important fact is Western flopping and hesitation on the eve of the eruption of the revolutions. Michele Alliot-Marie, former French Foreign Minister, had to resign after expressing few days after the escape of former President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali the willingness of France to provide the Tunisian government expertise in the field of security.
U.S. position was also marked by confusion with the first spur of the Jasmine Revolution of Tunisia. BBC correspondent in Washington, Kim Ghattas described the first reaction of US State Department officials as “seemed to be caught unaware” adding they had not been briefed about Tunisia recently. Ghattas referred to the following reaction of the US administration as focusing mostly on the advisory issued to American citizens in Tunisia.
Personally, I opt to suggest a third opinion: “riding the crest of wave”. Combining the two opinions where time was ample, despite first-blush confusion, to make that foreign powers restore their balance and ride the crest of wave as they began to evaluate and reassess their positions based on these new developments, in a clear attempt to secure interests and cooperation with new emerging regimes. The US, along with many other powers, could adapt themselves with such changes, and build alliances with nascent regimes. However, the toppling of Egypt’s Morsi was another fiasco, manifested in US surprise and pique. This unforeseen change ushered unexpected and dramatic variation in newly charted scenarios that could put their updated plans into serious jeopardy.
Inter alia, one can say that the Arab Spring represented a glimmer of hope for Arabs, albeit alas the longevity, failure at times, and escalation of violence and bloodshed, along with unfavorable repercussions permeated the sense of frustration, leading to a loss of zeal, questioning the purposes, motives and even the goals of these revolts.
Egypt 2013: What can you tell?
September 2nd, 2013
By Fadi Husseini.
Genuine democracy requires practice and partnership, and cannot be realized aloof from people. Mobilizing crowds to replace the ballot box is very dangerous as the lust for power and authority can be cast in popular demands, and gain proforma legitimacy. In order to put forward a truthful analysis, one should call a spade a spade.
Coup d’état
First and foremost, what the army has committed in Egypt is nothing but a “coup”. Discharging a president who was democratically elected through fair elections (the first of its kind in decades in Egypt), the suspension of the constitution (voted for by referendum), the resolution of the Shura (legislative) Council and the closure of radio and TV stations in synch with scores of arrests without warrant or court orders are all signs of a coup.
Meanwhile, the attempts to draw an analogy between what happened on June 30, 2013 and January 25, 2011 is erroneous. In the revolution of January 25th 2011, the toppled regime did not derive its power from democratic and fair elections and its supporters didn’t have any real presence, on the ground, when compared to the rebels. As for what happened on June 30th, removing a president that took power through fair elections and who has evident presence and supporters in every city in Egypt is an entirely different case.
Moreover, the allegations the Egyptian army tried to make were marred by a lot of impurities. Talking about siding with the people in the face of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) is erroneous, especially if the classification criterion is the presence in squares and streets. This is because the bias and siding would be to one side’s advantage at the others expense. Additionally, saying that the performance of the previous government was one of the weaknesses of the degree that prompted the military action to stop this decline is misleading too. Evaluating the performance of a president or a government cannot be reasonable after less than a year in power, bearing in mind the difficult political, economic and social conditions Egypt suffered before and during this year, plus the continuous instability and demonstrations throughout this year.
Egypt 2013 and Chile 1973- Similarities and differences
In effect, the toppling of President Mohamed Morsi and the ensuing violence and human rights violations, committed mainly by the army in Egypt, retells the 1973 US-funded coup d’état in Chile.
The main difference between the two cases is the role of external and internal factors. For instance, in Chile, the coup was instigated by CIA and the following government was ostensibly supported by the US. In Egypt, poor economic performance, government wrongdoings, the state of polarization and the continuous incitement against Muslim Brotherhood (MB) were the main reasons behind the coup. In the case of Egypt there is no evidence of external involvement prior to the coup and even the welcoming reaction of the some Arab countries who have started to pour money in order to assist the new- de facto government, does not prove any external role either.
Despite such differences, overall the Egyptian coup appears as a repeated scenario of the Chilean Coup d’état. First and foremost, the two coups took place within the context of major global and regional events (Cold war, Chile’s case & the Arab Spring Egypt’s case). Freely elected presidents were civilians (Chile’s Salvador Allende was a physician & Egypt’s Mohamed Morsi is an engineer- PhD holder) and they came to power with narrow plurality. Both toppled presidents were overthrown by military commanders (Augusto Pinochet in Chile & Abdel Fattah el-Sisi in Egypt), who were promoted and assigned as Commanders-in-Chief of the army by Allende and Morsi respectively. Chile and Egypt were living constitutional crises and massive economic and social instability as a prelude to coups. Last but not least, the clash in both cases was between two ideological camps; conservative-dominate Congress of Chile (US supported) versus socialists (USSR supported), while in Egypt the conflict was between MB, as a representative of ‘moderate’ Islam, against liberals (secular) camp
Muslim Brotherhood in Power
Throughout one year of their rule, the MB failed to smooth Egyptians’ fears, and could not walk the walk of other successful Islamic parties in the region, like Turkey’s AKP whose political and economic success was striking and dubbed by many Arabs as a model. Thus, it can be inferred that the sole reason behind this current state of affairs is the lack of political experience of the MB, which was reflected in a number of controversial incidents.
The most striking mistake the MB fall in was passing the new constitution, despite opposition from Christians and civil society. This has caused a rift between the MB and the rest of civil and political actors in the Egyptian society. The rift widened after a series of changes brought about by Morsi’s government of Prime Minister Hisham Qandil, who appointed new governors and refused a national consensus government. The dismissal of presidential adviser Khaled Alameddine, a member of the senior leadership of the Salafi Nour Party, is a stark example of how the MB began to lose many of their allies.
While suspicions mounted, the political exclusion of non-MB actors became evident and new political appointments of MB members and their supporters and allies proved these doubts. Such actions and decisions deepened and increased uncertainty, and their attitude was interpreted as a rejection of any form of political partnership with other segments of the society, especially non-Muslim ones.
Furthermore, and following the hasty dismissal of Defense Minister Tantawi and Chief of Staff Sami Anan, discontent among security and military forces became prevalent. This led dozens of officers to support the revolution (June 30th), especially after Morsi’s accusations that the security forces where incapable of protecting MB headquarters.
Such tense environment came in tandem with poor political performance, the continued economic downturn, declining rates of employment and investment and accusations of marginalizing several segments of the society, all leading to a growing state of polarization. Tension and incitement escalated, fiery speeches, articles and feverish TV shows aimed to attack the other side became common, until the eruption occurred.
Prognosis
First, it should be underscored that disqualifying the MB, or any other political or social actor, from political life will have momentous repercussions. The longer violence, social hatred and exacerbated cultural polarization lasts, the less likely it is to develop into a sound democratic environment. For that, it is important for newly fledged democracies to understand that tolerance should replace hatred and partnership should overcome disqualification, and that this is the sole path towards more healthy and stable societies.
Another conclusion which can be drawn is that the longer coup-makers remain in power, the more likely their rule turns into dictatorship, even if they exercise some sort of democratic practices. The moment such regimes sense a menace to their reigns, they would start gritting teeth to protect and bolster their rule.
Simply put, the Egyptian experience was within striking distance to achieve sound democracy, yet this will not now be realized except with a peaceful transfer of power from military to civil institutions, in tandem with better educating people on how they can practice their democratic choice, peacefully, and accepting partnership and living side by side with the others.
Egypt: coup, or a course correction
August 12th, 2013By Fadi Elhusseini.
During the past few weeks, I have been dismayed at the degree of intolerance and rigidity in the positions of quarreling parties in Egypt, with both taking defensive attitudes, unwilling to listen to the other. Hearts stiffened and minds were sealed giving cause for further deterioration. In our article today, we discuss the Egyptian case, review ideas and analyze facts objectively, with the aim of creating sound plans and choices. Read the rest of this entry “
Another Spring: History of revolts and future geopolitics in the Middle East
July 23rd, 2013
By Fadi Husseini.
Regularly, when spring comes, people expect flowers and green shoots and optimism prevails. Alas, things in the Middle East are quite different. With every spring that comes, people recall the outbreak of the first spark of the current “Arab Spring” that started in Tunisia 2011 and swept Arab countries, wondering what will come after and where it will hit next.
After being caught by surprise, numerous scholars and observers have been writing extensively about the “Arab Spring”, trying to uncover its wellsprings and link it to other incidents and circumstances, in an attempt to read the portents of the rough and tumble of the Middle East. Yet, I contend, this pursuit is often a vain one especially given that the available literature is not yet adequate to explain the various aspects of what has gone before.
Fully aware of this gap, I aim to reveal first of all a number of the missing contours and dynamics in order to further articulate the term “Arab Spring”. In the same vein, I will also try to analyze the current political and geopolitical conditions in the Middle East in an effort to draw some relevant conclusions and provide a working prognosis of the future course of events in the region.
It can be said that the events of the current Arab Spring are molded within two composite layers, each with its own features, characteristics and hypotheses. The first layer comes within a global nexus. Arguably, the current spate of revolts in the Middle East might be considered as the fourth wave of democratization, with reference to the concept developed by Samuel M. Huntington in his book The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century published in 1991. According to Huntington, each wave was followed by a reverse one. Huntington argues that the first wave occurred between 1828-1926, with its roots in the recent French and American revolutions.
This wave swept Europe and Latin America, and was marked by military coups. It lost momentum in the interwar period between World War I and World War II when a number of dictators rose to power, which led to a shift away from democracy toward traditional authoritarian or new ideologically-driven, mass-based totalitarian regimes.
The second wave took place from 1943-1962, and featured coups and the establishment of authoritarianism across Latin America, South and East Asia and allied occupation post- World War II. Huntington proposes that the beginning of the end of Western colonial rule produced a number of new states with democratic tendencies. Yet, he argues that political development, especially in Latin America, took on an authoritarian cast, and the decolonization of Africa led to the largest multiplication of authoritarian governments in history. Accordingly, one third of the working democracies in 1958 had become authoritarian by the 1970s.
The third wave between 1970s and 1980s manifested in the collapse of the former Soviet Union and swept Southern Europe, South America and Africa. In effect, a number of scholars (among them Dr. Ali Sarihan of Qatar’s Georgetown University) have opted to insert the current Arab revolts within this framework. They opine that with the onset of the current Arab Spring, the fourth wave of transformation or “Democratization of Communist and Islamic Regimes” began as per the fact that it has an impact on other regions and inspired revolts and demonstrations in Europe, Asia, Latin and North America, it gained its global contours.
The second layer operates within a regional setting. Within this framework, the current “Arab Spring” has proved to have its own characteristics and features which require further analysis. It can be argued that the current round of revolts now termed “Arab Spring” or “Arab Awakening” does not constitute the first manifestation of Arab mass protests that have led to a change in the social and political structure of Arab societies. In fact it comes as the third wave of Arab mass revolts each possessing its own grounds, circumstances, ideologies, slogans and outcomes.
The first wave of Arab revolts took place in 1914, and was called, “the Great Arab Revolution”. What characterizes this wave is that it had a leader, Sharif Hussein, who led the revolution and the main target was ending Ottoman rule in Arabia. This wave coincided with two major events, one global and another regional. World War I was the major global event, while the waning and finally the collapse of the Ottoman Empire (Pax-Ottoman) was the major regional event. The old adage of “the road to hell is paved with good intentions” was conspicuously manifested in the course of the events of the first wave of revolts in the Arab region as will be shown shortly.
It can be said that such a myopic wave was externally driven, as the revolutions were supported by the British, who were aiming to end and replace the Ottomans presence in the region. For all that, the effect of the revolts was ephemeral as they were bereft of their main goal of independence. This fact was referred to by Dr. Mehmet Sahin, Turkey’s Gazi University, in his article “1950-1960 Arab Revolutions and 2011 Arab Spring: Similarities and Differences”, where he pointed out the final result of the Great Arab revolution, “… was only a change of the master. Instead of Muslims (Turks) the new masters were Christians (British and French)”.
In this context, a number of slogans and ideologies were endorsed through this wave and the main slogan was nationalism. This slogan was deemed important in order to encourage Arabs to get rid of any other subordination, mainly Islamism, which inevitably meant yanking out any connection to the Ottoman Sultan and the warding off of any yearnings for the Ottoman heritage.
The second wave of Arab revolts took place in the 50’s and 60’s, and was called “the Arab Spring” by a French writer. In his book “Un printemps arabe” published in 1959, Jacques Benoist-Méchin describes the Arab revolts that took place in the “Arab” Middle East, and tries to link them to the European Revolutions of 1848, known as the ‘Spring of Nations’ or ‘Springtime of the Peoples’.
These revolts inspired new revolutions in former Czechoslovakia and led to what was best known as the “Prague Spring”. The Arab Spring of the 50’s and 60’s came after two major events, one regional and another global. The latter was World War II, which had a great impact on the revolts and caused them to be driven by external factors. In other words, foreign powers and forces encouraged and even stimulated these revolts as Communist powers wanted to fight the Western presence and colonization in the Middle East. For that reason, ‘Fighting Imperialism’ and ‘Progressivism’ were among other key slogans and themes of this period.
Yet, the major regional event was the establishment of the State of Israel in the center of the “Arab” Middle East. This led to the emergence of another slogan which became afterwards an ideology – “Arabism”. Arabism was coined, and adeptly promoted by the late Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser (hitherto, his combined notion of Arabism and socialism was called Nasserism).
His name was largely aligned with the second wave of Arab revolts, and his ideology widespread struck a chord with and inspired other leaders who steered revolts in other countries in the Middle East. In effect, Arabism gained popularity in Arab streets as it developed as a natural ideology and movement to counter the Zionism which attended the establishment of the State of Israel. The revolts targeted not Israel but the other colonial presence in the Middle East deemed to be the real instigator and creator of Zionism and hence the State of Israel. In this regard, a number of crowns, condemned by their alliance or reliance on Western “imperialistic” powers, paid the price and were toppled in Libya, Iraq, and primarily Egypt.
The current wave of Arab revolts, which erupted in Tunisia in 2011, has its own characteristics. First and foremost, and unlike the previous two waves, the current revolts have neither a well-known leader, nor an external provenance. They were stimulated solely by internal dynamics as proposed by Dr. Nadia Mostafa, Cairo University, at the ‘Second Annual Conference of Insight Turkey’ in Cairo on January 30, 2012. This view was also put forward by Prof. Ziya Onis in a workshop entitled: ‘Working Together for Democracy in the Arab World’ in Ankara on October 27, 2011.
Dr. Onis believes that the current Arab revolts are “internally driven”. Social, economic, youth bulge and the remarkable evolution in the means of communication were among many crucial factors that led to the eruption of the current wave of revolts. They were not instigated by a specific country or model.
Similar to previous revolts, the current wave came in the aftermath of global and regional transformations. On the global level, the collapse of the former Soviet Union produced unlimited repercussions as most maladroit Arab regimes were lying idle and could not adapt themselves to such massive changes. Against the emergent dynamism, they remained static, failing to sense the seriousness of these reverberations, and could not adjust their status quo ante policies, practices and affiliations. On the regional level, the major transformation was manifested in the US occupation of Iraq and the collapse of the first dictatorship in the region.
One of the important ramifications of the latter was the fading of the praxis of “Arabism”. To elaborate, Saddam Hussein of Iraq was one of the staunchest supporters and believers in “Arabism”, and when he was attacked by the US, other Arab countries either watched or supported the American invasion. This led to a great shock for those who still believed in “Arabism” and significantly helped to strengthen two main ideologies in the region: Islamism and liberal modernism. In addition to Islamism and modernism, the revolts produced social demands including human rights, democracy and independence (from foreign influence) that helped fuel the revolts targeted against corrupted regimes (Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Libya and Syria) which were deemed responsible for their stagnant social and economic conditions and known for their alliance with the West.
Inter alia, the collapse of the former Soviet Union, the fading of Arabism, toppling a number of Arab regimes and the waning of historical Arab leader states led to a power vacuum in the region and the intervention of foreign powers (either regional or global) became inevitable. Traditional super and global powers are still seeking a bigger, newer, role in the Middle East, in response to the changes. The US, Russia, China and Europe compete among each other in order to guarantee the larger scale of leverage and wider foothold in the region, at times using their soft power instruments, at others their historical cooperation, not forgetting economic incentives. In his article in the Russian Odanko magazine entitled ‘Obama et Poutine vont-ils se partager le Proche-Orient?’, the French writer Thierry Meyssan underscores this hypothesis and suggests a new scenario for the division of the Middle East between the U.S. and Russia.
Turkey, Iran and Israel, on the other hand, are the most favored regional powers with this end in view. However, Israel’s chances hinge greatly on a peace agreement with the Palestinians, not to mention the obvious fact that Israel is culturally different from the rest of the countries in the region. History, culture and religion outweigh Iran’s odds over Israel, as it has also succeeded in building a network of allies within the region. However, Iran does not seem to be an appealing model for many Arabs, especially when it comes to freedom, human rights, economy and relations with the rest of the world, especially the West. Turkey, who is part of the culture, history and religion of the region, appears to have the best odds in her favor. It presents an appealing model for its democracy, freedom and modernity, human rights, booming economy and relations with the West, along with the presence of Islamic elites in power. Yet, the term “the Turkish Model” has been overplayed and has put Turkey’s popularity on the line. In other words, and among other challenges, Turkey’s potential in the Middle East is marred by its explicit zeal and overt use of its soft power, which may lead to untoward effects.
Yet, treading the path into the Middle East should be charted carefully. It is well known for being one of the most volatile regions, and for its complexity is often described as “a Quick Sand”. At this juncture, it isn’t be difficult to fathom the feeling of frustration that permeates nearly every Arab, who believes that their destiny should not hinge on others, but remain in their own hands. Lamentably, this desired outcome will not materialize until historical Arab leader states rise and shake the dust of weakness and reluctance from their shoulders.
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Is it really a conspiracy?!
June 26th, 2013
By Fadi Husseini.
Revolts did not knock on the door, they just sneaked in the Arab region, toppling some regimes while shaking the thrones of others. Analyses began to heap in an attempt to examine this state of affairs; some choose to factor in this context a new foreign conspiracy, aiming at dividing of what is left from the region. Others suggest that the revolts are a long awaited revolution of pride and dignity and were ignited by plain domestic forces. As a prelude to this analysis, in today’s article we wish to address the common views, widespread not only among academics and politicians, but also amongst the Arab masses which started to question, doubt and lose confidence in the current spate of Arab revolts. in order to keep readers abreast of the latest developments, this article espouses a nuanced approach in addressing a third view which considers the events mere scientific material that can serve as a platform to examine existing theories of International politics in a region, described for long time as idle and sluggish towards transformations. Read the rest of this entry “
The Arab World And Democracy
June 12th, 2013
By Fadi Husseini.
The Arab Spring struck the Middle East to the core as popular uprisings landed in Tunisia then Egypt, Libya followed suit after Yemen, yet the course of events was doomed when the process was held up in Syria, bringing the issue of democracy in the Arab region to the fore.
Enthusiasm towards fully-fledged democracy has been mounting and demonstrators calling for freedom, human rights and democracy have never stopped, although the revolts succeeded in toppling a number of autocratic regimes and “fair” elections were held.
The parties, who failed in the elections, and their supporters, accuse the winners of cheating, fraud and falsifying the results. This is not an attribute unique to elections in the Arab region as many democratized societies behave the same way in similar circumstances (the latest case was in Bulgaria).
Nevertheless, the opposition sparked a new spate of demonstrations aiming to topple, obstruct or thwart the rule of the newly elected elites. On the other hand, the winners were accused of wrongdoings and practices that are deemed to enhance and consolidate their own rule. In an attempt to keep readers abreast, this article will try to explain the term democracy in the Arab world, tackling both historical and practical contours.
The first part will review the status of democracy in the Arab region from a historical perspective; while the second part will discuss its viability as pertains to the current state of affairs.
Democracy, as a term, is a system of government by which “political sovereignty is retained by the people and exercised directly by citizens.”[1] David F. J. Campbell referred to democracy in etymological terms, as it comes from ancient Greek δημοκρατία (dēmokratiā), which combines dēmos, the “people”, with kratos, meaning “rule”, “power” or “strength”. Hence, the literal denotation of democracy is “rule by the people”, culminating in a popular form of government[2]. The crux of democracy is that people choose who governs them and those elected rulers will be held accountable for their actions and decisions. There is no one definitive form of a government as democracy can exist in republics (e.g. France), kingdoms (e.g. United Kingdom or Spain), and empires (e.g. Japan) where powers of the king or the emperor are very limited.
Initially, democracy appeared as an alternative to ancient monarchies where kings and emperors reserved the right to rule and transferred their crowns to their heirs irrespective of their suitability. What matters was to keep the rule within the same dynasty. This norm has changed, and republics and constitutional monarchy appeared as a logical alternative.
The same norm was applicable in the Arab region, mainly in early times of Islam when the Caliph was chosen (elected) among other candidates. However, this trend had changed with the emergence of the Umayyad Caliphate (centered on the Umayyad dynasty) and lasted until the latest Sultan of the Ottoman Empire (centered on the dynasty of Osman I.). In spite of the existence of the Shura councils, the last word was the Sultan’s or the Emir’s, and no council would dare to question or remove the Sultan or Emir. Hence, it would not be of any surprise to learn about the numerous revolutions and coups, some of which were from inside the Palace of the Sultan himself, during that époque.
In the aftermath of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, colonial powers ruled most of the Arab region, and they started introducing their practices and life-style, inserting their culture and injecting their notions, among which was democracy.
More startlingly, they had “assigned” governments in the Arab societies that resembled their democratically “elected” governments. In 1992, Bernard Lewis referred to this in his “Rethinking the Middle East” piece. Lewis says: “the word ‘democracy’ in Arab political discourse has for long denoted the sham parliamentary regimes that were installed and bequeathed by British and French empires.”[3]
Post-colonial era witnessed the establishment of new republics in the Arab region and the new rulers inherited and swiftly declared their adherence to “installed” culture and practices. Hitherto, Arab leaders have included, at times defended, democracy in their daily speeches, even if their practices were far from democratic.
With the advent of the Arab Spring, everybody was holding great hope for democracy, the way it is practiced and implemented in the West. As such, calls for adopting Western, Turkish or an Islamic model of democracy started to resonate in every corner of the Middle East.
As per the second part of the article, one can say that path of democracy in the Middle East is going through sharp turns. After holding democratic and free elections, calls for democracy are still being heard. At times, calls have even surpassed the question of democracy when the opposition asked the newly elected rulers to step down and resign; with no major crisis the new governments bear the brunt.
The new rulers were also accused of enhancing and consolidating their rule indefinitely, through illegal practices, including the appointment of their members and followers in key positions in the state, and arming their supporters. Hence, the concept and understanding of democracy, on both sides, is distorted, and the exercise lacks the correct parameters. In this vein, I tend to disagree with those who limit the causes of these conditions to external factors solely. Although this argument is realistic, the main reasons behind this state of affairs are clearly internal.
Firstly, the communal environment in the Arab world is neither ideal nor ready for a proper application of democracy. Since the death of the fourth Caliphs Imam Ali Bin Abi Talib- 1352 years ago, the region has not practiced sound democracy, especially when it comes to choosing the rulers. Although rulers claim their staunch adherence and support of democracy, their actions were absolutely the opposite, which led to a deterioration of the conditions of democracy in the Arab world.
Communal preparedness is critical, and without the suitable environment in the communities that existed during Czechoslovakia’s Velvet Revolution and in the other Central and Eastern European states at the fall of Communism, revolutions would not have succeeded in transferring these societies into democratic states.
In her attempt to compare the successful Eastern European revolutions and the Arab Spring, Ziya Öniş says, at the “Working Together for Democracy in the Arab world” workshop organized by USAK; “the domestic nature of the political system, where the civil society had already been developed, and an elite convergence for democracy is absent in the Arab world.”[4]
The second reason is the haste and passion of Arabs to attain a democracy similar to that one in other countries. This candor was reflected in the demands for the adoption of foreign democracies, models, and at times constitutions and institutions of particular countries.
One can argue that taking historical short-cuts is not always successful as there is no guarantee that copying other models would bear fruitful results. In other words, learning from the experience of others is helpful, albeit each community has its own peculiarities and conditions which are reflected in the necessity of building one’s own experience.
Europe has paid a heavy price, including wars and revolutions, built on its own experience until it laid the foundations of its own democracy. Turks themselves have acknowledged this fact and have said that they have paid a big price to develop their own brand of democracy. Erşat Hürmüzlü, chief advisor to the Turkish president, said at the same USAK workshop that Turks have designed their own destiny, including democratic standards and institutions, to uphold the rights of individuals. Hürmüzlü also admitted that along the path to democracy in Turkey, many mistakes were made but that learning from those mistakes was the best tool to ensure better results[5].
In nutshell, one can say that democratic process is very similar everywhere but the nuance lies in the experiences of every society in developing a democracy of its own. As old habits die hard, it will take Arabs some time, flip-flopping and hesitation to overcome the problems caused by their infamous dictators and hence develop their own democracies.
The present upheavals in the Arab world are part of the process of Arabs building their own experience in exploring the path towards an independent democratic choice. But this is a mere drop in the ocean; the longer the process lasts and dawdles, the more susceptible the resources of moderation, enthusiasm and hope are to depletion. The current Syrian turmoil is just one case in point.
[1] “Democracy,” Wikipedia, accessed June 4, 2013, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democracy.
[2] David F. J. Campbell, The Basic Concept for the Democracy Ranking of the Quality of Democracy (Vienna: Democracy Ranking, 2008), 5.
[3] Bernard Lewis, “Rethinking the Middle East” (Lecture given by Professor Lewis at the “Henry M. Jackson Memorial Lecture”, Henry M, Jackson Foundation, University of Washington, Seattle, Washington, March 11, 1992): 25.
[4] Ziya Öniş, “Working Together for Democracy in the Arab World” (An intervention by Professor Dr. Ziya Öniş at the proceedings of the Working Together for Democracy in the Arab World workshop, International Strategic Research Organization ‘USAK’, Ankara, Turkey, October 27, 2011):47-48.
[5] Erşat Hürmüzlü, “Working Together for Democracy in the Arab World” (An intervention by Mr. Erşat Hürmüzlü at the proceedings of the Working Together for Democracy in the Arab World workshop, International Strategic Research Organization ‘USAK’, Ankara, Turkey, October 27, 2011):39-42.