Posts by GarySick:

    Regional Implications of the JCPOA

    August 8th, 2016

    By Gary Sick.

     

    What are the regional implications of the Iranian nuclear deal (the JCPOA)?

    A good place to start may be to ask what has NOT happened since the JCPOA was signed:

    (1) The regional states have not rushed to acquire independent nuclear capability. You may recall that this was widely predicted at the time. I am aware of no evidence that any of the states who have expressed skepticism about the agreement have changed their nuclear policies or even hinted at their intention to develop a nuclear capability beyond the peaceful nuclear power plants that are in various stages of planning.

    (2) Iran has not dramatically increased its activities in Syria, Iraq, Yemen or elsewhere, despite the fact that they now have access to $50b or more in frozen assets. Again, you will recall that there were predictions that Iran would use these funds to enhance its support of Hezbollah, Assad or other regional surrogates and allies.

    (3) By the same token, however, Iran has not shown any signs of changing its fundamental policy objectives in the region. Iran continues to support the Assad regime, it continues to rely on Hezbollah as an important proxy force, it has not changed its rhetoric in opposition to Israel, and it makes no secret of its opposition to Saudi Arabia’s policies in Yemen, Bahrain, and Syria.

    The JCPPOA was about one thing – Iran’s nuclear program. It made no attempt to influence Iran’s behavior with regard to human rights or its foreign policy. There were hopes that an agreement with Iran would lead to a gradual moderating impact on its domestic and foreign policies.

    There is no question that President Rouhani wants to portray Iran in the most positive light possible, if only because he wants to attract desperately need foreign direct investment to reinvigorate the Iranian economy. That is also linked to his reelection campaign, with a national vote in June 2017, less than a year from now. He needs to show progress.

    But the Iranian hardliners are determined to demonstrate that they are still very much in charge, despite their loss on the nuclear issue. The Supreme Leader reluctantly validated the JCPOA against the wishes of the hardline conservatives in the Revolutionary Guards and in key domestic positions. But he is now giving those forces leeway to make life difficult for Rouhani and the reformist elements.

    So the long-term implications of the JCPOA for Iranian policy are being fought out by rival forces in Iran. We won’t know the outcome for some time. The first real marker will be the Iranian presidential election next year. Rouhani will be opposed by his hardline opponents, and the outcome will be a test of strength.

    To return to my list of things that have not happened since the signing of the JCPOA, there is very little talk today in the region about rising nuclear threat – from Iran or anyone else. That is a real change.

    In the years preceding the JCPOA, the so-called nuclear threat was at the center of almost all foreign policy discussion. You will all recall PM Netanyahu’s appearance before the UNGA with a cartoon drawing of an Iranian bomb. It showed an impending red line that at least implied that Israel or others would be forced to take military action.

    There is no such talk today.

    In fact, if you listen to the pronouncements of Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states, you would never know that their primary concern just a year or two ago was the Iranian nuclear threat.

    But as you know, this has not silenced their concerns about Iranian actions. On the contrary, they are now concerned that Iran’s successful negotiation of the nuclear agreement with all the major world powers has empowered it to play a much more influential role in the region, to the detriment of the other regional states.

    In the past, Saudi Arabia and its Sunni Arab allies relied on the United States to keep Iran contained. That began to break down when the Bush administration invaded both Afghanistan and Iraq, thereby eliminating two of Iran’s worst rivals – the Taliban and Saddam Hussein – and leaving it essentially unchallenged.

    That was reinforced by the Obama administration’s decision to pursue a nuclear agreement with Iran. As a result of those negotiations, the top leadership of both Iran and the United States have become accustomed to direct contact. John Kerry and Javad Zarif email back and forth, and they meet regularly.

    This new level of contact has had some positive impact, since it lets both countries maintain contact during periods of tension, such as the US Navy boat that strayed into Iranian waters and was taken prisoner by Iranian Revolutionary Guards.

    But these contacts have also stoked fears on the part of many regional states that the United States and Iran are returning to the days of the shah, when Iran was America’s leading ally in the Gulf.

    When these fears are combined with U.S. statements about rebalancing or pivoting away from the Middle East, there is something like hysteria that U.S. traditional allies are being abandoned.

    In my view, those views are hugely exaggerated. The United States may reduce our military footprint in the area, but we are not going away from the Gulf. Nor is there any likelihood of a new Iran-U.S. alliance. Just listen to the voices in Washington, on both sides of the aisle, if you have any doubt about that.

    So the bottom line, I guess, is that the JCPOA has effectively removed the so-called nuclear threat from the headlines in the Middle East. But those headlines have been replaced by fears about Iranian hegemonic ambitions and U.S. betrayal.

    So the tone of the foreign policy debate in the Middle East has shifted due to the JCPOA, but it turns out that plus ca change, plus c’est la meme chose – the more it changes, the more it looks just the same.

    Comments Off on Regional Implications of the JCPOA

    Ayad Akhtar’s Invisible Hand at NYTW

    December 21st, 2014

     

     

    By Gary Sick.

     

    New York Theatre Workshop’s world-premiere production of Pulitzer Prize winner Ayad Akhtar’s The Invisible Hand, directed by two-time Obie winner Ken Russ Schmoll, officially opens Dec. 8.

    This new play about an American banker in the hands of radical Islamists is hugely entertaining, but its message is a daring departure from the conventional wisdom. Although it is full of insights – about Americans, financial markets, money, and terrorism – the reviewers see it as a metaphor.

    Maybe. But it is also a brilliant portrayal of the terrorism business that is almost never acknowledged.First, a quick word to give this play its due. Ayad Akhtar is the only American (and yes, he is entirely American) playwright to have two plays presently appearing in New York at the same time.

    This has happened before with Tennessee Williams, Arthur Miller, Eugene O’Neill, A.R. Gurney and no doubt others. But that says something about the company Akhtar is keeping. His previous play, Disgraced, which we saw two days ago, won the Pulitzer prize in 2013. I really thought The Invisible Hand was better.As it happens, the British playwright Tom Stoppard also has two plays running now in New York.

    I have seen them both, and even as a die-hard Stoppard fan who once spent an entire weekend in London seeing one of his three play marathons, I think the Akhtar plays have a breath of life and explosive thrill that was missing from the (excellent) Stoppard plays now on display.

    Akhtar has a future.Akhtar should be compared to the Angry Young Men of the British theater in the 1960s and 70s. He is not experimental, and his writing is instantly accessible. But he lifts the mask of convention and confronts us with the uncomfortable realities below the surface.The Invisible Hand is about the clash of civilizations, but not in any way you have ever imagined it.

    Like Disgraced, it is not at all didactic or ideological. Akhtar manages to push all the cultural buttons, but he doesn’t take sides. Instead, the viewer is given all the gory facts and then challenged to make moral decisions. And Akhtar makes that process as hard as possible – just like real life. His message is moral ambiguity, and from the reviews I have read that may be the hardest to grasp.I did not see this play as a metaphor.

    Instead, it explored the fact that the market has no ideology and no morality. Terrorists have the capacity to move markets. They know when a dramatic event is going to occur, and if they are sophisticated they can short the market and then profit hugely from the results of their own actions.

    Saddam Hussein is widely reputed to have done this. He could issue a statement or a threat that would drive the oil market up or down. His brokers outside the country, who knew what was coming, could position themsselves accordingly and take a windfall profit when it happened. According to insiders, he was able to generate huge profits to compensate at least in part for the sanctions that had been placed on Iraq.

    The market was neutral. It didn’t care if the investor was a hedge fund trader in Brooklyn or a secret representative of Saddam Hussein. If you were adept and had sufficient capital to play the game, it paid just the same. Are contemporary terrorists oblivious of their power?Without giving away the plot, that is a recurring theme in this highly entertaining and exciting play.

    You will not nod off in the first act (as I have been known to do), and you will be kept on the edge of your seat and repeatedly surprised by the twists and turns of the plot.But you should remember that this is not just a symbolic exercise or a complex metaphor for modern life.

    There are subtle messages throughout the performance that make you think about high finance, personal relations, bureaucratic stratagems turning into existential threats, and dilemmas that will be familiar to anyone who has ever been an employee – or a prisoner.It is a world. Go!

    Comments Off on Ayad Akhtar’s Invisible Hand at NYTW

    Nuclear talks to focus on centrifuges, reactor: Iran

    February 17th, 2014

     

     

    By Gary Sick.

    File - The Arak heavy water production facility in central Iran, 360 km south west of Tehran is seen in this October 27, 2004. (REUTERS/Stringer)

    Gary Sick teaches Middle East politics at Columbia University. He was a member of the National Security Council staff during the Ford, Carter and Reagan presidencies.

    Thirty-five years ago, when the Iranian revolution overthrew the shah and our diplomats were taken hostage, I was in the White House. Many of those taken prisoner remain personal friends of mine.

    With this experience, it is difficult to watch the foreign policy calamity taking shape in Washington. A combination of domestic politics and misguided intrusion is on track to derail an enormous opportunity to halt Iran’s nuclear program. At worst, it could be setting us on the path to a third major Middle East war.

    Last November, five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and Germany — the so-called P5+1 — concluded a preliminary deal with Iran to resolve the long-standing dispute about Iran’s nuclear program. This agreement, set to take effect Monday, was possible because the election in Iran last year brought a fresh face, Hasan Rouhani, to the presidency in Iran. He replaced the belligerent Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, whose policies had isolated Iran as never before.

    The Rouhani factor

    decade earlier, Rouhani had been the chief negotiator of the nuclear issue. At that time, he basically offered to maintain Iran’s nuclear enrichment program at a low level in return for recognition of Iran’s right to develop peaceful nuclear power. European negotiators, with the backing of the Bush administration, rejected the offer, insisting instead that no deal was possible unless Iran halted all enrichment of uranium.

    After the talks broke down, two things happened. First, Ahmadinejad replaced the Rouhani team, accusing it of being too generous to the West. Second, Iranaccelerated its production and installation of centrifuges. To date, according to the U.S. intelligence community, Iran has taken no decision to build a nuclear weapon. However, Iran now has the technical know-how to produce a bomb. In short, we are still paying for our misjudgment of Iran and our own interests a decade ago.

    The agreement between the P5+1 and Iran on Nov. 23 basically freezes Iran’s nuclear program in place while talks proceed on a permanent settlement. During that time, the U.S. and its allies agree not to introduce any new nuclear-related sanctions on Iran, while providing some modest relief from the sanctions that they have imposed on Iran over the past few years.

    Now, a group of senators — some Democrats, more Republicans — is sponsoring a bill that would impose new sanctions and urges the United States to provide military support if Israel decides to unilaterally attack Iran.

    A deal-breaker

    This misguided bill threatens to derail the negotiations and sabotage progress. Our negotiators do not want or need this extra sanctions threat. They already have a strong hand, and new sanctions will almost certainly be seen by Iran as evidence of bad faith.

    A new round of sanctions will also send a message to our allies that the U.S. is not serious about achieving a negotiated outcome, and allied support is critical. In addition, if further sanctions are needed, they can quickly be imposed later.

    If negotiations do collapse, it will be hard-liners in Iran who will be the biggest winners. The failure of another round of talks will prove their claim that negotiating with the U.S. is pointless and strengthen their argument that those seeking to open Iran to the West are weak and naive.

    President Obama has threatened to veto the bill, but that might not be enough. Anti-Iran legislation is politically popular and, with powerful lobbying behind it, such bills often pass by veto-proof majorities.

    Today we are at the most hopeful moment of the past three decades. A final agreement has yet to be negotiated, and there are certain to be ups and downs. Even so, we have a real chance to cap Iran’s nuclear development and establish iron-clad measures to guarantee that it will not be used for military purposes.

    By contrast, the Senate bill attempts to inject the Congress into a delicate international negotiation. That only risks derailing efforts to find a peaceful solution, bringing us closer to another war in the Middle East.

     

     

    Comments Off on Nuclear talks to focus on centrifuges, reactor: Iran

    Ten facts you may have overlooked

    January 5th, 2014

     

    By Gary Sick.

    In the avalanche of reportage and commentary on the nuclear deal with Iran, here are a few tiny facts that may have escaped your notice:

    1.  France’s President Hollande made his triumphal trip to Israel (a hero because he put a speed bump in the way of an agreement); a few days later, France returned to the negotiations and quietly signed the text. Can he still wear his hero medal?
    2. Opponents of the deal denounce the “shredding” of the United Nations Security Council resolutions (which demanded that Iran stop all enrichment) but fail to notice that all five Permanent Members of the Security Council negotiated and signed off on the text. These are the same countries that passed those resolutions.
    3. Netanyahu just a year ago used a cartoon drawing of a bomb to illustrate that Iran was getting perilously close to a nuclear weapon; the agreement moves Iran far away from his famous red line. Is that a “historic mistake?”
    4. Netanyahu in 1992 said that if no one intervened Iran would have a bomb within five years – and he has been saying the same thing ever since. He has been consistently wrong for more than two decades.
    5. If you look carefully at the words of the opposition, you’ll see that they base all their objections on the supposition that Iran will renege on its commitments and the US will acquiesce. Do they have an alternative? Whining is not a policy.
    6. The dog that didn’t bark: since the last Iranian election there has not been one peep from our old friend Ahmadinejad. Several American politicians who relish conflict in the Middle East have said they miss him. I don’t.
    7. The other dog: the strangely silent Revolutionary Guards. Ditto.
    8. Have you noticed how many of the people opposing the nuclear agreement are the same ones who thought invading Iraq was a nifty idea? War good; talk bad.
    9. Iran is so determined to build a nuclear weapon that it renounces them under any and all circumstances, reduces its production of enriched uranium, and invites the largest group of inspectors in history to monitor its activities. Hmmm
    10. Iran has been able to build a nuclear device for at least seven years and has not done so. In the eyes of some that is absolute proof of their deviousness.

    No Comments "