December 12th, 2015
By George Protopapas.
Russia and Turkey seem to compose the two sides of a “communication game” in order to expose each other as culprit in international diplomacy. The shooting down of Russian Su-24 bomber from Turkish fighter jet F-16 in Syria could be interpreted as result of the different national interests which are defined from the course of Syrian civil war. The Russian – Turkish bilateral rift could be analyzed on the broader context of internal policies and Middle East geopolitics.
On the one side, Moscow focuses on the secret relations between Ankara’s government and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Russian strategy attempts to display that Turkish and ISIS have mutual geopolitical and commercial interests. Russian President Vladimir Putin has accused Ankara’s government of “collusion” with ISIS, alluding to accusations that Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan benefits personally from the illegal oil trade with ISIS.[1]
On the other side, Turkey claims airspace violation and accuses Russia for Soviet style propaganda. We could say that Ankara’s strategy uses the card of violation of state sovereignty in order to prove that Russian engagement in Syria is not selfless but serves its imperial ambitions for domination in the Middle East. Moscow has traditionally criticized American interventionist policies in the Middle East which took place under the pretext of non-proliferation of weapons mass destruction (WMD) and the war on terrorism.
Internal policies
Presidents Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdogan are considered from the international community as two powerful leaders. They control their state mechanisms, military, media and they are based on increased nationalism to maintain their high levels of popularity. Putin defends the rights of the Russian diaspora and Erdogan has declared himself as “protector” of all suppressed Sunni Muslim populations in the Middle East.
Vladimir Putin has restored Russia to the status of great power after almost two decades of disdain in the international arena. Putin is continuously criticized from the West for infringement of human rights and violation of the freedom of press.
Recep Tayyip Erdogan eradicated the traditional bulwarks of the secular state in Turkey and became a “new Sultan” attempting to re-establish an “Ottoman Empire”. He adopted a pre-election tough rhetoric against the Kurdish PKK and his Islamic AKP party easily won the second snap elections on November 1st 2015. Erdogan has also jailed several journalists and has silenced others through intimidation.
However we could say that Putin and Erdogan internal policies are commented differently from the West which follows a “double standard” policy. Putin is a traditional target of the West for his human rights records – the West increased criticism and imposed economic sanctions against Russia (as a result of Ukrainian crisis). However, Erdogan avoids the Western criticism due to Turkey’s role on European migration crisis (it could reduce the influx of refugees to the European soil) and the vital role of Turkey within NATO.
Syria and gas – geopolitics
The Syrian civil war is an arena of important conflicting geopolitics interests between Russia and Turkey, which have supported Shiite and Sunni sides respectively.
The Russian military engagement is steadily changing the rules of Syria civil war in favor of Bashar al Assad regime against ISIS and Syrian Sunnis rebels. Moscow is a close ally of Syrian President Bashar Assad. The Russian aim is to secure its geopolitical interests in a post-war Syria and to preserve Russian naval base in Tartus at any cost (it gives access to Mediterranean Sea).
On the contrary Turkey is a staunch opponent of Bashar Assad and has supported Sunni rebels and desperately wants to avoid the creation of an autonomous Syrian Kurdish state which will undermine its vital geopolitical – energy interests.
The natural gas is considered an essential reason for the outburst of the Syrian civil war as “the most of the foreign belligerents in the war in Syria are gas-exporting countries with interests in one of the two competing pipeline projects that seek to cross Syrian territory to deliver either Qatari or Iranian gas to Europe”.[2]
In 2009 Qatar announced a proposed gas pipeline to deliver North Field gas reserves northwest via Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Syria to Turkey in order to supply the European markets, but President Assad rejected the plan. In 2011 he accepted an alternative Iran-Iraq-Syria gas pipeline.
Turkey strongly considers that Qatari pipeline serves its geo-economic interests helping to diversify its gas supplies away from Russian gas and to become gas hub between Asia and Europe.
The Qatari pipeline’s materialization could seriously threaten the Russian energy interests in Europe and Gazprom gas monopoly. In 2014, Gazprom exports supplied 146.6 billion cubic meters of gas to European countries. Western European countries accounted for approximately 80% of the company’s exports from Russia, while Central European states took 20%.[3]
ISIS Syrian regions prevent the unification of Syria Kurdish areas along Turkey’s borders. Ankara’s government exploits ISIS threat and pushes for the creation of a buffer zone from Aleppo to Kobani in order to set the conditions for a future construction of the Qatari gas pipeline. The establishment of a Syrian Kurdish autonomous state undermines the perspective of a Sunni proposed pipeline.[4]
Moscow could offer support to Syrian Kurdish fighters and PKK as it has maintained close ties to Kurdish tribes.[5] The Syrian Kurds have established their own government in areas of northern Syria and have proved their combat effectiveness against ISIS.
Conclusions
Russia and Turkey seem to have be engaged in a “chicken game” [6] using media outlets, and propaganda tactics in the minefield of the Syrian civil war. Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdogan remain steady on their fierce rhetoric and avoid showing signs of weakness and concession.
Moscow can use the “energy weapon” in order to castigate Turkey as it imports about 60 percent of its natural gas from Russia. However the question is if Moscow is truly ready to risk its gas revenues when low oil prices have already hammered its economy.
The course of Russian- Turkish relations is going to be clearer in the next weeks and Putin and Erdogan will be obliged to take serious decisions for the future of their bilateral relations.
[1] Vladimir Putin: Turkey’s Leaders Are ‘Stuffing Pockets’ With ISIS Oil Cash, NBC News, December 3 215, http://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/russian-president-vladimir-putin-warns-turkey-over-war-crime-n473316
[2] M. A. Orenstein – G. Romer, “Putin’s Gas Attack: Is Russia Just in Syria for the Pipelines?”, Foreign Affairs October 14 2015, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/2015-10-14/putins-gas-attack
[3] Gazprom Gas supplies to Europe 2014 , http://www.gazpromexport.ru/en/statistics/
[4] Christina Lin, “Syrian Buffer Zone – Turkey-Qatar Pipeline”, ISPSW Strategy Series: Focus on Defense and International Security, No. 367 ,August 2015
[5] Keith Johnson, “Will Putin Use the Energy Weapon Against Turkey?” Foreign Policy November 24, 2015, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/11/24/jet-downing-will-threaten-but-not-derail-putins-pivot-to-turkey/
[6] Two drivers drive towards each other on a collision course: one must swerve, or both may die in the crash, but if one driver swerves and the other does not, the one who swerved will be called a “chicken,” meaning a coward.
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October 14th, 2015
By Nikos Arvanites and Georgios Protopapas.
Ankara deadly terrorist attack – the worst in Turkey’s history- provokes sentiments of rage and sadness to the online Greek public opinion affecting the Greek-Turkish relations.
The workspaces Ankara bombing and Greek-Turkish relations gather totally, according to the tool paloPro 4.217 mentions in the Greek – speaking internet during the period between 10/10 – 12/10 2015. Ankara bombing gathers more mentions on sites and blogs and Greek-Turkish relations collect more mentions on twitter.
Ankara bombing provoked negative sentiments to the online Greek public opinion. In addition the sentiments for Greek-Turkish relations characterized by neutral sentiment, which express mostly the opinion of the Greek users of twitter.
Topics of the Greek-speaking internet
The topic of the Greek speaking internet for Ankara bombing and Greek – Turkish relations focused on the news of Ankara terrorist attack, the reactions of the Turkish government and the opposition parties and the condolences of the government of Athens:
• The support – demonstration to the Kurdish and Turkish people which organized Monday at Syndagma.
• The condolences of the President of Greek Republic Prokopis Pavlopoulos to the President of Turkey Tayyip Erdogan during telephone conversation.
• The condolences of the Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras to his Turkish counterpart Ahmet Davutoglu, during a telephone conversation.
• The Nobel Prize winner Orhan Pamuk accused the president Tayyip Erdogan that has “a plan against Kurds”.
• News and comments for the next day of the terrorist attacks on the fields of policy and society.
Conclusions
The quantitative and qualitative data of paloPro display that social media played a constructive role on the Greek- Turkish relations because of Ankara’s deadly terrorist attack. The grief for the victims and the rage for the terrorists put aside the traditional confrontations for a moment.
In comparison with our previous analysis for Turkey and Greek Turkey relations, we point out that the negative sentiments have dramatically reduced in our current data analysis.
Kurdish minority creates sympathy sentiments to the online Greek public opinion. On the contrary Greek social media react negatively to Turkish provocations in the Aegean Sea and Cyprus.
The qualitative data of paloPro also displays the opinion of the Greek –speaking internet for Turkish political and social developments. Greek social media believe that Turkey is entering in a period of political and social polarization in front of 1 November general elections.
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July 11th, 2015
By Georgios Protopapas.
The government of Athens submit a detailed hard proposal in order to stay in euzone. The European lenders will give their own verdict and do not seem to bluff when speak for Grexit. Therefore, the moment of truth approaches and will be revealed who said lies, who was honest and who made negotiations.
The Greek Prime Alexis Tsipras undertakes full responsibilities as a leader of the state. His moves will justify the majority of Greeks who trust him or will justify the political opposition who accuses him for secret plan of Grexit.
The referendum “NO” on July 5 “solves the hands” of the prime minister who has the support of 61.3% of people and is the only powerful ruler in the country. The leaders of the Greek pro – European political parties consent to negotiate a deal in order to remain Greece in euro (within the framework of the joint communiqué issued after their meeting under the President of the Republic).
The referendum disentangled Alexis Tsipras from his party SYRIZA. The new finance minister Euclid Tsakalotos said that “the program of institutions would not be voted in the Parliament and the government could fall, so we decide a referendum.”
SYRIZA contains components such as the Left Platform (its leader the minister of Energy Panagiotis Lafazanis) who intensely advocates the rupture with European lenders. The question of the referendum it was not too clear as the European lenders withdrew their proposal.
The question of the referendum was interpreted from Greek pro-European opposition parties, an important segment of the Greek people and from European lenders, as “YES” in Europe and “NO” Grexit.
Tsipras has the opportunity to disentangle from the anti-European hardliners SYRIZA in order to keep Greece in eurozone. The “NO” made Tsipras powerful in internal political scene as the majority of Greeks trusted him despite capital controls and closed banks. The financial and social deterioration of the country compels the prime- minister to agree (to sign a new hard Memorandum) in order to put an end to insecurity, there are no alternatives. Tsipras has the opportunity now to approve any agreement in parliament with the consent of the pro-European opposition and without the approval of the hardcore SYRIZA MPs.
If the result of referendum was “Yes”, any agreement could pass in the parliament, but the prime minister would lost the support of the citizens and would be hostage on the hands of the Greek pro-European opposition.
The prime minister must try to convince the European leaders for his sincerity. Tsipras negotiating strategy isolated Greece the last five months. The Greek prime – minister received some negative comments at the European Parliament. The German President of the European Popular Party, M. Weber, said he had expected Prime Minister to apologize for calling (the creditors) terrorists. The German representative of the European Green’s Party, Rebeca Harms Undermining the Greek Prime Ministers’ claim to being a champion of democracy, she noted that “democracy and Putin do not go together.” Guy Verhofstadt, the Belgian representative of the liberal group, ALDE, asked from Prime Minister Tsipras to focus on reforms,
But what is the next step if European lenders say “NO” in Greek proposal? How Alexis Tsipras will cope with Grexit and its tragic effects?
Alexis Tsipras is criticized by political opponents that “has a secret agenda to Grexit, return to national currency.” In this case the reactions of the pro-European political parties and the majority of the Greek people are expected to be hard against SYRIZA government. According to recent poll (from GPO) 74.1% of people want euros, 24.5% Grexit, while 1.4% did not answer.
A Grexit may provokes the reaction from the President of Hellenic Republic Prokopis Pavlopoulos who has told in Real News, that “I will not tolerate to be president in a country outside euro” suggesting that he will intervene if Greece loses its European orientation (If the President resigns we have snap elections).
In the next hours Alexis Tsipras will be judged from the history for his actions. I wish to put into practice his commitment to keep Greece in euro and to justify the expectations of the vast majority of the Greek people. Greece belongs to European Union and West.
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May 16th, 2015
By Georgios Protopapas.
The cooperation of Islamic terrorists and organized crime could develop in to a significant threat for the security of the region of South East Europe due to some new weaker state institutions, corruption and the deteriorating economy.
The surge of Islamic fundamentalist ideology exploited the global war against terrorism and the ethnic tolerance of the Western Balkans. The transnational organized crime groups also found the preconditions to become a regional threat. The organized crime’s activities destabilize countries, increase corruption, extortion, racketeering, violence and sophisticated crimes at the local and international levels. [1]
The connection between terrorism and organized crime was facilitated by globalization, communication and the end of the “Cold War”. In this context, organized crime offers to terrorists the much needed channels, such as crime routes and access to weapons, thus enabling them to challenge public security as well as armed forces[2].
The links between Islamic terrorist cells and organized crime groups raise serious concerns for the European law enforcement authorities. Although they are different types of criminal activities and their actions are driven by different incentives, terrorism and organized crime cannot be examined as isolated and unrelated entities. The organized crime and terrorism operate on a global level and don’t recognize nationality and borders. The groups are only motivated by the rule of supply and demand which involves the strategies and tactics of an effective marketing.
The “Balkan route” serves the illegal activities of the aforementioned two groups. It is also well known that organized crime and terrorism usually develop links and interdependencies that increase the level of asymmetric threat. The interests of the organized crime may be connected with the aims of terrorists
Several spots in Balkans are operationally used as important shipment point for illicit trafficking due to the high flows of regional road traffic which favor illegal shipment to move undetected from the authorities of law enforcement. These activities are facilitated by the increased illegal migration flows[3]. The Western Balkans are not only deemed as a transit region but also as a significant source of firearms trade on the international weapons market, drug precursors (ephedrine) as well as ready synthetic drugs. Moreover, the weapons’ trade continues to supply international criminal markets. The Western Balkans are expected to remain a key source of heavy firearms trade into the EU, due to the large illicit stockpiles of the countries of the region[4] . The Western Balkans region is considered as “safe haven” for a bundle of war profiteers, career criminals and Islamic fundamentalists due to the weak governmental structures and deteriorating economies[5].
The transport networks in Balkans are used also by militant Islamic groups for logistical support. The Islamist militants can enter the Schengen area through Croatia or Serbia which are open to the European Union’s member – states. For instance, it is reported that the Al Qaeda of the Islamic Maghreb uses the heroin trade via West Africa en route to Europe. Moreover, the militant Islamic groups participate in the criminal actions in order to gain financial and logistical support. They are encouraged by the need for self-finance and the requirement to independently organize their terrorist operations. The defining characteristics of the alliance between terrorism and organized crime consist of, but not limited to: (a) access to specialized knowledge (e.g. money laundering), (b) access to specialized services (e.g. counterfeiting), (c) operational support and (d) financial support [6].
The level of cooperation between terrorists and organized crime is determined in many cases from the nature of geographic region. According to Study of the European Parliament “in transitional states, the nexus includes the operational and conceptual plane, with evidence of convergent motivations dominating groups operating in regions such as the Balkans. Historically, poor border security, weak law enforcement, corrupt public officials and established smuggling networks have facilitated the emergence of hybrid groups that simultaneously sought political aims and profit maximization.
The fighting of the Islamic terrorism and organized crime require from EU and also NATO the adoption of an effective strategy that would combine counter – terrorism and anti – crime strategies.
The EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy (2005) proposed four pillars to combat radicalization and recruitment of terrorists: (a) PREVENT people from turning to terrorism and stop future generations of terrorists from emerging, (b) PROTECT citizens and critical infrastructure by reducing vulnerabilities against attacks, (c) PURSUE and investigate terrorists, impede planning, travel and communications, cut off access to funding and materials and bring terrorists to justice and (d) RESPOND in a coordinated way by preparing for the management and minimisation of the consequences of a terrorist attack, improving capacities to deal with the aftermath and taking into account the needs of victims. Moreover, the ΕU has outlined an Internal Security Strategy (ISS) 2010 to counter the organized crime based on three concrete actions: (a) identifying and dismantling such networks, (b) protecting the economy against criminal infiltration, and (c) confiscating criminal assets.
References
[1] See more Georgios X. Protopapas “The Combined Threat of Terrorism and Organized Crime for and in South East Europe” in Comprehensive Approach as “Sine Qua Non” for Critical Infrastructure Protection Ed: Denis Čaleta, Vesela Radović, pages 215 – 231, NATO Science for Peace and Security Series – D: Information and Communication Security, Vol. 39, 2015
[2] Schori Liang C. (2011), Shadow Networks: The Growing Nexus of Terrorism and Organized Crime, Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP) Policy Paper N° 20.
[3] European Parliament Study (2012) Europe’s Crime-Terror Nexus: Links between terrorist and organized crime groups in the European Union, Directorate General for Internal Policies of European Parliament.
[4] OCTA – Europol (2011), EU Organized Crime Threat Assessment.
[5] Arsovska Jana and Basha Dimal (2012), Globalizing the Western Balkans: Transnational Crime, Fundamental Islam and Unholy Alliances, Etudes Caribeennes.
[6] European Parliament Study (2012), op.cit.
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April 5th, 2015
By Georgios X. Protopapas.
The view from Athens
The negotiations between the Greek government and Greece’s European creditors have become unpredictable, while the Greek economy remains stagnant and the state desperately needs cash to avoid default. Athens has two choices: to make compromises in order to receive bailout funds or to decide a rupture with Brussels.
In addition, the government in Athens is playing the “card” of Russia as an alternative to European pressures and as part of a new, multi-level foreign policy. The Greek Energy Minister, Panagiotis Lafazanis, recently returned from Moscow and the Prime Minister, Alexis Tsipras, is going to visit Moscow on 8 April.
Mr. Tsipras seems unable to control his party, SYRIZA, especially the far-left faction “Left Platform” (led by Lafazanis), which reacts to any compromise and rejects privatizing state assets. However, the Greek negotiating team must produce very soon a list of reforms (including privatizations) for Greece to receive bailout funds from its creditors.
The government in Athens seems to be playing a communications “game” using the will of the people in its negotiations with Brussels. This communications strategy aims to exert pressure on Brussels decision-making centers to make concessions based on the fact that Greek citizens have rejected the austerity policies. The government invokes the national pride against the austerity policies of the Eurogroup attempting to shift the burden of the decision to the Greek citizens. A possible scenario foresees a referendum with “Euro YES” – “Euro NO” options, or snap elections. According to recent polls, the main government party, SYRIZA, has the support of 41.9% of the respondents and the main opposition party, New Democracy, of only 18.4%. However, the government should not ignore that the majority of Greek citizens want the country to stay in Eurozone. The polls show that 84.6% of the respondents want the Euro and only 13.8% of them favour a return to the Drachma.
SYRIZA won in the 25 January 2015 snap elections using a populist agenda and criticizing German austerity policies. The SYRIZA government continues to fiercely criticize the former governmental coalition New Democracy – PASOK for the austerity policies. At the same time Greece’s financial situation has significantly deteriorated. The uncertainty about the bailout has spurred a spike in bank withdrawals and tax revenues have dropped.
The government in Athens insists that the list of reforms that it will submit to the Eurogroup will not include “recessionary” measures, such as cuts to salaries and pensions. Some ministers do not exclude the possibility of a break-up with the European creditors. The Greek Minister of Finance, Yanis Varoufakis, mused publicly about the possibility of a “rupture.” Furthermore, the Greek Alternate Minister for International Economic Relations, Euclides Tsakalotos, said that if negotiations don’t go well the government is prepared for a “rupture” with its partners.
Merkel – Tsipras meeting
The 23 March meeting between Prime Minister Tsipras and Chancellor Merkel in Berlin was characterized by goodwill but also confirmed the differences on Greece’s debt negotiations. The meeting dominated Internet traffic in Greece and attracted a huge amount of comments from social media. According to our analysis, on the basis of the quantitative and qualitative data produced by Palo Professional, Alexis Tsipras got 41908 mentions (Sites 4343, Blogs 2300, Opinions76, Facebook 2712, Twitter 32396, Youtube 81) in the period 19 to 23 March 2015. Angela Merkel recorded 24124 mentions (Sites 2759, Blogs 1442, Opinions 36, Facebook 1422, Twitter 18409, Youtube 55, Forums 1) for the same period.
Interestingly, the sentiments expressed by Greeks on the Internet were negative for both Alexis Tsipras and Angela Merkel. In particular, Tsipras recorded 13906 negatives sentiments against 11242 positive ones, and Merkel gathered 5962 negatives sentiments against 3457 positive. According to Palo Professional Greek internet users received with caution the result of the meeting between Tsipras and Merkel, as they know that it is the Eurogroup that decides about the Greek debt.
Multi-level foreign policy
The Greek government is pursuing a multi-level foreign policy, making openings to China and especially Russia. Athens uses the revival of Greek-Russian relations as a negotiations tool, to demonstrate to Brussels that Greece could abandon the European Union as Russia could offer it financial aid.
Energy Minister Lafazanis met in Moscow with his Russian counterpart, Alexander Novak, and with Alexei Miller, the Chief Executive of energy giant Gazprom. Lafazanis said Greece wants to upgrade its energy relations with Russia and supports the extension of the “Turkish Stream” gas pipeline to the Greek-Turkish borders.
The visit of Panagiotis Lafazanis and his statements for Greek-Russian energy relations provoked reactions on the Internet. According to the Palo Professional data, during the period from 28 to 31 March 2015, Russia collected a total of 3885 mentions (Sites 894, Blogs 613, Opinions 20, Facebook 272, Twitter 2080, YouTube 5, Forums 1) and Panagiotis Lafazanis collected totally 3425 mentions (Sites 449, Blogs 281, Opinions 13, Facebook 169, Twitter 2507, YouTube 6).
The data also shows that the sentiment of the social media, blogs and new media were negative towards Panagiotis Lafazanis and Russia. Lafazanis recorded 1110 negative sentiments against 982 positive ones, and Russia gathered 948 negatives sentiments against 924 positive. In parallel the most widespread topic in the Greek Internet (based on the data of Palo Professional tool “Top 10 Topics”) was Panayiotis Lafazanis’ statement that “the only way for Greece to end its crisis is through confrontation, if not conflict, with a ‘Germanized Europe’”.
The quantitative and qualitative analysis of the data concludes that Greek Internet users feel cautious towards the revival of Greece-Russia relations. They realize that the turn of Athens to Russia could push away Greece from the European Union. Furthermore, Lafazanis’ statements cause concern to the Greek Internet users, as they give an impression that he favours a rupture with European Union and a turn to Russia. Moreover, Greek Internet users seem to reject the term “Germanized Europe”.
Conclusions
The government in Athens has to realize that the Greek economy needs decisions based on a realistic agenda. Brussels and the Eurogroup demand a list of reforms with respective costs and benefits. The Geek foreign policy, which advertises the revival of the Greece–Russia relations, must take into consideration the antagonism between the USA and Russia because of the Ukrainian crisis. The two global powers seems to favour “Cold War” strategies in order to promote their national interests in Southeastern Europe, but Greece does not need to play along with that.
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February 16th, 2014
By George Protopapas.
The corruption’s scandal that has deeply wounded the Islamic government of Prime- Minister of Turkey, Tayip Erdogan, is a complex issue with important consequences to the politics, economy, society and the foreign policy. Turkey has become a “battlefield” between two powerful men, two former allies. PM Erdogan and the influential Islamic scholar Fethullah Gulen are in bitter power struggle. The old alliances are now void and new allegiances are being created. Erdogan re-approaches the old – enemy, the Army, seeking to review those convictions of whom have accused for conspiracy for overthrowing the Islamic government. In this analysis we refer to the domestic and foreign policy implications of this crisis.
The bribes’ scandal targets directly the Prime Minister and the core of leadership of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) seriously affecting Turkey’s political future. Erdogan adopted an offensive stance by removing the competent prosecutors and the Police officers from their positions.
Erdogan accused foreign governments of being implicit in the campaign against him. He claimed that the bribes’ scandal is a conspiracy directed by foreign organizations and dark forces that seek to undermine the international prestige of Turkey. Clearly, Erdogan may not have foreseen the domestic and international developments that turned the tide against him. The summer’s huge anti-governmental demonstrations for the commercial and Islamic reconstruction of Gezi Park gave the first blow to Erdogan’s profile.
The corruption’s scandal provided one more reason for a part of the society to rally against the government. Erdogan’s ambitions to become a nation- leader in the modern Turkish history (equal to Kemal Ataturk) have stalled. The “Sultan of Constantinople” may have forgotten that it is the public opinion that elects the governments. In view of the peripheral elections of March, he is now in pursuit of the endorsement of the Turkish society. The current movements of the Prime-Minister could determine the Turkish domestic and the foreign policies for a considerable time. The escalation of the domestic political crisis could provoke instability in Turkey and could influence its foreign policy as it prevents Ankara to play a significant role in Middle East.
Two powerful enemies
Erdogan and Gulen, the “student” and the “mentor” respectively, have become enemies. Gulen who lives in self-imposed exile in the US has created an international movement, the Hizmet. It means “the service” and promotes a tolerant form of Islam, by emphasizing in the education and the hard work. Hizmet attracts millions of followers in international level and its members have infiltrated in the Turkish bureaucracy, the Police, the Justice and the ruling Islamic Party AKP.
The corruption scandal is considered to be a part of a long-simmering battle within the AKP’s Islamist coalition.[i] There are two rival sides: On the one hand, Erdogan and his followers whose political roots lay in the transnational Muslim Brotherhood movement, and on the other, the Gulenists a secretive society whose religious ideology bears a more distinctly Turkish flavor, led by Fethullah Gulen.
The symbiotic relationship between the AKP and the Gülenists has been characterized by different views as regards the domestic and foreign policy affairs but they remained for a long time below the surface. This uneasy balance continued for some time. Then, in 2012, an Istanbul’s public prosecutor called Hakan Fidan, the director of the Turkish Intelligence Agency (MIT), for questioning.
The prosecutor wanted to find out about Fidan’s meetings with the representatives of the PKK in Oslo, in the context of peace agreements. Erdogan refused to allow Fidan to attend the court and passed legislation that prevents the occurrence of similar “contingencies” in the future. Erdogan continued to attack Gulen when stated that could close down the college preparatory centers that high school students attend to prepare for the university entrance exams. Gülenists are operating a vast network of these centers that besides bringing a major source of income for the organization, they also offer the opportunity to recruit new members[ii].
The battle between the two leading Islamic personalities is changing the political landscape and is creating new alliances and correlations. The Prime-Minister is approaching his old enemies, the Army generals. The government encourages judiciary to review these trials, a fact that could result the release of scores of military officers who were imprisoned.[iii] Erdogan’s tactic is the following: On the one hand tries to show that there is a “parallel state of Gulenists” within the judiciary that intends to shape the political scene, on the other he does not miss the chance to persuade the part of the judiciary he influences. Erdogan’s top advisor, Yalçın Akdoğan, recently made a remark implying that the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) had been the subject of a similar “conspiracy”. The General Staff of TSK was exploited the remark and filed a criminal complaint against the judges and prosecutors who had handled the “Ergenekon” and “Sledgehammer” trials.[iv] Erdogan tries to blame Gulenists and to attest that the “parallel state” of the Gulenists manipulated the evidence of the cases.
Inevitably, Erdogan’s strategy divides the Turkish society. When he took power in 2003 he appeared as a leader who wanted to unify the Turkish citizens and change the political stage (controlled by the secular and military establishment). The election of Erdogan in the premiership gave an impetus to a moderate Islamic political model and also enhanced Turkey’s economic and international profile.
In this context, the Turkish newspaper “Today’s Zaman” summarizes the domestic and international circumstances of the last 10 years, describing also the assistance the Turkey received from the international community: “(a) The global capitalists were channeled to Turkey and money started to pour into the country; (b) Turkey was backed by an incredible diplomatic and political support in the international scene; (c) Europeans were forced to revitalize the EU membership process; (d) assistance was provided for the purging of juntas that would periodically stage coups, and the military tutelage regime was “suspended” but not demolished; (e) Serious fiscal and political relations were established with nearby countries, and with the “zero problems with neighbors” policy, joint cabinet meetings were held; and (f) a corridor was opened to Africa”.[v]
From “zero problems” to “zero allies” in Turkey’s foreign policy.
Erdogan not only used the Islamic element as domestic connecting factor but he tried to expand this by creating a moderate Islamic model to the pre and post-Arab spring countries. Yet, paradoxically he encouraged anti-government revolutions, yet he refrained from condemning and isolating opportunistic radicals and extremists that emerged. Thus, in contrast to the “zero problems” strategy with its neighbors, currently Turkey is actually found to be in trouble with nearly all of them. Moreover, the internal (political, social and economic) crisis impedes any efforts related to geopolitical and foreign policy strategies, as it hampers the government’s efforts as a whole.
The scandals weaken Erdogan’s international profile as he now faces serious internal challenges that expose (from the opposition’s perspective) a no–ethical governing. In this context, the global powerful international decision – centers and many Middle East’s leaders start to consider that Erdogan is an inconsistent partner, who perhaps exploited their aforementioned financial and diplomatic support. The Prime-Minister implemented Ahmet Davutoglu’s strategic thinking: the doctrine of “zero problems with neighbors” and the “Neo-Ottomanism” as the “New Mideast Order”. Simply, the said “neo-Ottomanism” has always been a paradox and it did not take a lot of time to be revealed that Erdogan’s moderate Islamic agenda may not have be so appealing and convincing to everyone in the region. For instance, the liberal, the left and the moderate Islamism Turkish citizens criticize Erdogan for an authoritarian leadership.
In particular, the doctrines of “zero problems with neighbors” and the “Neo-Ottomanism” did not manage to implement for the following reasons: (a) The “zero problems with neighbors” failed since Erdogan has enthusiastically supported the oppressed Islamist Sunni political movements that emerged from the “Arab Spring”. Turkish neighbors Iran and Syria belong to the opposite side as they are members with Iraq of the “Shia Crescent” (notionally representing the crescent-shaped region of the Middle East where the majority population is Shia or where there is a strong Shia population).
The Syrian governmental elite and the president Bashar Assad are Alawites (a branch of Shia Islam) where the majority population is Sunni. The “zero problems with neighbors” was gradually reduced to “zero allies” and (b) the vision of the “Ottoman Empire” revealed Erdogan’s ambitions to dominate in the Arab Middle East, breaching perhaps that has been agreed between him and the international community[vi].
The success of Turkey’s international profile that was based on foreign support finally grew to a false self-confidence and independent attitude. The Foreign Minister Davutoglu claimed that Turkey, for the first time, has finally been back to the lands that were lost during the Ottoman times, and suggests that it’s time for Turkey to take the lead to set an order for these lands and re-connect them once again — “Without going to war, we will again tie Sarajevo to Damascus, Benghazi to Erzurum and to Batumi.”[vii]
Erdogan miscalculated the evolutions in the Middle East and overestimated the dynamic of the Islamic Sunnis movements. He immediately accepted the oppressed Sunnis who took the power after the fall of authoritarian regimes in Egypt and Libya. He became one of the most ferocious enemies of the Syrian President Bashar Assad, and refrains from condemning the extremist Islamic groups who are fighting even against with the Syrian opposition forces and Syrian Kurds. In parallel Erdogan cooperated with the ousted Islamist president of Egypt Mohammed Morsi (Muslim Brotherhood) and continued to criticize the Israeli policy against Palestine. However the developments after the “Arab Spring” did not favor Erdogan’s foreign policy. The first after Mubarak era islamist president of Egypt Mohammed Morsi was overthrown by the generals and the Syrian president Assad avoided an international intervention.
According to the Αl – Monitor,[viii] many leaders of the Middle East do not feel sympathy for Erdogan as he faces huge domestic problems because of the hostile feelings against him. The events show that Erdogan foreign policy has displeased the Iraqi Prime–Minister Nuri al Maliki because Turkey took the side of Northern Kurdish Iraq on the sensitive issue of the exploitation of Iraqi oil reserves. The unofficial ruler of Egypt Gen. Fatah Al-Sisi considers Erdogan a supporter of the Muslim Brotherhood, while the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu knows that Erdogan portrays as an ally of Palestinian Islamic movement Hamas who controls Gaza Strip.
The Syrian president Bashar Assad has managed to survive after the deal with the US and Russia for the destruction of his chemical weapons. The two powers are trying to prevent the spread of Islamic fundamentalism from Syria to the Middle East and the Northern Caucasus, respectively. According to the Foreign Policy Magazine a former Turkish diplomat said that “Turkey was right to side with the people against the dictator, but it could have stopped there…by burning all bridges with the regime, Turkey lost its leverage with Assad.“[ix] Moreover when the international community abandoned the plan for a military intervention in Syria, taking into consideration as well the side effects that could be caused by the jihadists fighters, the Turkish diplomat commented that “Turkey, to use a football term, found itself offside.”[x]
The crisis prevents Turkey to play a vital role in the Middle East and isolates Ankara from the international decision-making centers. The corruption scandal gives the opportunity to Erdogan’s rivals in Middle East to recover and also creates additional problems in Turkey’s ties with the West.[xi] Erdogan blamed foreign plots, lobbies, Americans, Jews, the foreign press and a variety of other menacing institutions. Turkish newspapers also named the culprits and demonstrate as responsible Israel and the US. One broadsheet stated that the American ambassador Francis Francis J. Ricciardone Jr be declared as persona no grata because he tried to punish Halkbank Bank for its relations with Iranian funds.[xii]
Conclusions
The scandal of bribes reveals obvious signs of weakness for both Erdogan and his party ΑΚP. According to British think-tank Open Democracy “Erdogan has never been this lonely in his ten years of rule as the Prime Minister of Turkey. In previous crises, he may have lost the support of liberals in Turkey, as well as minorities, Israel and the US. However, he still had the support of his own cabinet, the spiritual figure Fethullah Gulen, and many of the institutions (such as the police and the judiciary) arguably “infiltrated” by or representative of Gulen’s Hizmet network.
His prestige may have shattered those outside the Islamic movement, but inside, he was still impervious to criticism. The corruption case, however, has deprived him of all these lines of support. First, the people who were once his closest allies no longer hesitate in directing their critiques at the Prime Minister .When the Minister of Environment and Urban Planning Erdogan Bayraktar handed in his resignation he openly stated that his stepping down would also necessitate Erdogan relinquishing his position as the Prime Minister. Here was criticism coming from the inside, from one of the people close to the Prime Minister. Such an act, in AKP’s three-term rule, is unheard of”.[xiii]
He has been repeating mistakes and miscalculations. His political fortunes have been seriously weakened due to the fact that the widespread fear that induced in large swathes of Turkish society has been partially breached.[xiv] Furthermore, the Prime-minister loses one of his strongest “allies”, the Turkish economy. Its poor performance displeases the investors and businessmen. According to the American think–tank Stratfor “Turkey’s financial troubles have been greatly exacerbated by a deep-rooted power struggle that is only going to intensify in the lead-up to local elections in March, presidential elections in August and parliamentary elections in 2015. Turkey has been desperately trying to stem the plunge of the lira, which has declined about 10 percent against the U.S. dollar over the past year. With a dramatic hike in Turkey’s lending rate from 7.75 to 12.5 percent announced on Jan. 28, Turkish Central Bank Gov. Erdem Basci use interest rates as a weapon to defend Turkish lira”.[xv]
Although Erdogan has been successful in the beginning in giving an impetus to the economy and the society with the international aid and support, problems and issues were always lurking in the background. Being trapped in the paradox of the “neo-Ottoman” agenda, he failed to unite the country. The examples from this recent judicial, social, economic unrest are more than abundant.
Turkey is the epicenter of a new bitter struggle between two Islamic powerful personae. There are the following possible outcomes for Erdogan: (a) to use a conciliatory language when he understand that the instability is very close, (b) to escalate the crisis taking up all the thrown gauntlets[xvi], and (c) to cooperate with the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) under the new agreement in order to dissolve the network of the Gulenists. Erdogan faces difficult challenges. He appears to lose the moderate islamists and the minorities who had offered their support during the last decade. The Prime-Minister prepares for the key–battleground, the municipal and peripheral elections scheduled for March 2014 and is determined to do everything to secure the victory. Yet balances are very fragile in this divided, multiethnic, multicultural country.
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