Posts by HaythamMouzahem:

    Uighur “Jihadis” Role In Syria War

    May 26th, 2016

    By Dr. Haytham Mouzahem.

     

     

    On 21 April 2016, China’s Special Envoy on Syrian crisis Chai Cho Yan visited Damascus and met with the Syrian Minister of Foreign Affairs Walid al-Moallem, and the head of the Syrian government’s delegation to the Geneva talks, Bashar al-Jaafari.

     

    Al-Jaafari stated that “the presence of terrorists Uighurs in the ranks of the ISIS and al-Nusra Front constitutes a common denominator between Syria and China in terms of the need to fight global terrorism.”

    For his part, the Chinese envoy stressed the importance of follow-up coordination, especially in the field of combating terrorism, noting the role of the Syrian government and its cooperation with regard to the Uighur terrorists who are in the ranks of terrorist groups in Syria.

    It is worth mentioning that this envoy has been appointed to this position the end of March – March 2016.

    There is no doubt that the presence of Uighur “Jihadis” in Syria, is worrying the Chinese government, and is the first reason that pushed them to appoint a special envoy to Syria, and increased China’s interest in a peaceful solution to the Syrian crisis that may return security and stability of the country.

    A number of media reports have confirmed the existence of thousands of Chinese Uighur fighters in Syria, fighting with al-Nusra front (Jabhat al-Nusra), Ahrar Al-sham and ISIS. The fighters are of the Muslim Uighur minority from Xinjiang province in Western China and they belong to “The Turkistan Islamic Party”, also known as the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM).

    Muslim Uighur used to call Xinjiang province as “East Turkestan” before its occupation by China in 1949.

    In April 2016, Syrian Prime Minister Wael Nader al-Halqi revealed that more than 5,000 Jihadis travelled through Turkey on their way to Idlib and the outskirts of Aleppo.

    Asia News reported on April 22, that a large number of “Jihadi” fighters from the “The Turkistan Islamic Party”(TIP), have been deployed in the village of Al Bawabiya (southwest of Aleppo), and they received weapons and ammunition from the “al Nusra Front” and “Jund al-Aqsa” groups.

    According to al Arabiya English correspondent, Mohanad Hage Ali, there are a few thousand Uighur fighters, and many of them arrived with their families from China. They are based in Idlib province, northern Syria, as well as in Lattakia countryside, while other sources said there are Uighur fighters in Manbaj town and Riqqa province with ISIS. The Uighur have been seen in large numbers in many regions of Idlib, including the strategic town of Jisr al-Shughour, Ariha, and the highlands of Jabal al-Zawiya. The Uighur have settled with their families in deserted Alawite towns in Jisr al-Shughour.

    Most of the Uighur fighters, belong to the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP). Which is allied with the Al-Nusra Front, the Syrian branch of Al-Qaeda.

    Sources estimate at least 2000 – 2500 Uighur fighters are in North Syria with TIP, while there are about 500 to 1000 of them with ISIS, under “ Wilayat Khurasan”, a broad region including parts of Afghanistan and Pakistan that ISIS has claimed as its own province.

    According to Al-Mayadden TV channel, There are nearly 4000- 5000 Uighur citizens(men and women) who live in Jabal al-Turkman in Latakia province and in Zunbaki village near Jisr al-Shughour in Idlib province. Those families have been settled there under the supervision of the Turkish intelligence in an attempt to change the demographic nature of the area and augment the Turkish race there.
    Uighur militants that good ties with Nusra Front, Al Qaeda branch in Syria, a continuation of their historical ties with al-Qaeda, and their allegiance to the Taliban movement and its founder and late leader, Mullah Omar.

    TIP fighters have played a crucial role in “Jaysh al-Fateh” (Army of Conquest) gains in Idlib province in 2015, especially in Jisr-Ashughour and AbuZuhur airport battles. They also released videos that show them fighting in al-Ghab plains in Hama’s western countryside, and in Jib Al-Ahmar in Latakia Province.

     

    Although, there are hundred of Uighur fighters with ISIS in Syria(Riqqa province and Manbaj) and Iraq, but Hage Ali report said that TIP have strained relations with ISIS, due to the clashes between ISIS and Nusra (Al Qaeda) in Syria as well as the tensions between ISIS and the Taliban in Afghanistan, because of their allegiance(bay’aa) to Taliban’s leader and they consider him the true Caliph.

    The Videos released by the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) show the Uighur leaders and militants are fighting alongside al-Nusra front and Uzbek brigades. In these videos, the Uighur have praised attacks in China, and Chinese authorities believe that those “Jihadis” seek to gain independence for Xinjiang and create their Islamic state there or as an extension of the Islamic Caliphate of Taliban or ISIS.

    Some analysts believe if the TIP continues to gain power within the “Army of Conquest” that is an umbrella of various al Qaeda affiliates and salafist Jihadis, Xinjiang may become the next Afghanistan and follow the pattern of Syria and Iraq, with local militant forces/cross border havens attracting foreign fighters, and enjoying material and diplomatic support from Turkey and other outside powers with shared ideology/interests.

    The TIP fighters have played a crucial role in AbuZuhur airport battle in September 2015 when “the Fateh Army”(the Army of Conquest), that includes Nusra Front and “Ahrar –Asham” and other Salafi groups, managed to control the airport base in Idlib province.
    The most prominent TIP fighter in the Jisr al Shughur videos was the spokesman for TIP’s “Syria branch” since 2014, Abu Ridha al-Turkistani. In the videos he led fighters to take over a building, and planted a flag on which “Turkistan Islamic Party” was written in Arabic.

    It is worth noting that Turkey supports this “Army of Conquest”.  The numbers of Uighur fighters were about 700 in this battle only, and that indicates that their numbers in North Syria has been increased last year. They lost nearly 300 killed in the battles of Gap plain, Idlib and Latakia provinces.

    Turkish media sources revealed that Uighur fighters have got weapons and technical supplies, from the Turkish intelligence.

    Dr. Christina Lin, a Fellow at the Center for Transatlantic Relations at SAIS-Johns Hopkins University, wrote in a study, that Chinese Uighur fighters are backed by Turkey and are gaining a stronghold in Syria from which to launch attacks on China.
    Lin relied on al-Mayadeen TV report that 3,500 Uighurs are settling in a in Zunbaki village near Jisr-al Shugour, close to the stronghold of Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) that is a part of “Jaysh al-Fateh” (Army of Conquest). She added that they are allegedly under the supervision of Turkish intelligence that has been accused of supplying fake passports to recruit Chinese Uighurs to wage jihad in Syria.
    Lin believes that through Turkey’s support for the “Army of Conquest”, TIP has risen to prominence within the “Jihadis” coalation and played a key role in defeating the Syrian army at Jisr al Shughour.

    It is worth noting that Uighur “Jihadis” have claimed a series of terrorists attacks in China in 2013 and 2014, with some Uighurs calling for a revolt against the Chinese communist regime to get their independence from China.

    Syrian sources said that the Syrian government had informed the Chinese government about those fighters and their role, and urged China to play a role in fighting them and supporting the Syrian army.

    Damascus discussed with the Chinese government the potential of playing a role in the battle to regain Idlib. That would help both of them, they will get rid of those Uighur fighters and Syrian regime will regain Idlib, the strategic city, near the border with Turkey, so it can control most of the infiltration of foreign fighters and weapons from Turkey.

    Lin said that China will have to follow through with its 2013 recommendation “Take fight to ETIM before threat grows” and deploy troops to Syria. She explained that it “is not difficult for China to take action when its core interests are threatened–that means violation of its sovereignty, territorial integrity, economic development and regime survival.”
    Chinese analysts believe that the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is using the Uighur “Jihadis” to wage a proxy war on China, to achieve his ambitions to reconstitute the “Turkic world from the Adriatic Sea to the Great Wall” of China.

    Lin believes that if Syria requests aid and grant permission, China can send its troops to Syria to fight the Uighur fighters there, while other analysts pointed to China’s non interference principle as an impasse to action.
    Although, China will not tolerate to protect its national security and for that reason the Chinese parliament passed in December 2015 a controversial new anti-terrorism law that allows the military to venture overseas on counter-terror operations. Chinese officials justified the law that their country faces a growing threat from militants and separatists, especially in Xinjiang.

    However, I believe that China would not intervene militarily as the Russians did, but they may support the Syrian army with some developed weapons and more political support in the UN Security Council and other international organizations.

    China is a very cautious to not take a side in the regional war, it does not want to upset Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states to preserve its investments and interests there from one side, and it fears its intervention in Syria would lead to escalate the tension with Muslims in Xinjiang province on the other side.

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    The Israeli Labor Party 1968-1999

    July 28th, 2015

     

     

    By Dr. Haytham A. Mouzahem.

     

     

    The Israeli Labor Party 1968-1999 (In Arabic) reviewed by Professor Adham Saouli .

     

    In this book, H.A. Mouzahem sheds light on the historical, ideological, political,organizational, and electoral features of the Israeli Labor Party. Divided into three parts and an introduction, the study’s first part discusses the ideological and organizational basis of the party, the second part talks about the social and electoral foundations of the Labor, and, the third part analyzes the position of the Labor Party vis-à-vis the Arab-Israeli conflict.

    Before moving into the major parts of the study, the author sheds light on major characteristics of the Israeli party system. One of the major and distinguishing aspects that characterize Israeli parties is that most of the present political parties in Israel have deep historical roots and that they have been engaged in the establishment of the Jewish State during the British mandate, in where the Labor party was the forerunner. Another feature that characterizes the party system in Israel is the high number of political parties.

    This, Mouzahem attributtes to the division on ethnic, religious, political, and socio-economic issues. According to the author, Israeli parties may not be divided on the classical distribution of Left and Right, rather the Arab-Israeli conflict and the relation between state and religion are what generally define the party spectrum in Israel.

    In the part on the “ideological and organizational foundations of the Labor”, the author pierces deeply into the emergence of Zionist labor movements in Palestine and the historical background of this emergence. The role of Mapai ( The Workers’ Party of the Land of Israel) in the establishment of the Israel and its merger with other socialist movements to form the Labor Party in 1965 are discussed. Since 1965, the Labor’s ideology has developed from that of Marxist socialism moving to the center of the political spectrum, with the emergence of a liberal trend within the party, while preserving the Zionist nature of the party throughout of the century.

    The Labor, however, distinguishes itself from parties of the right in its perception of the state, which in principle believes it should be secular. This part of the study, also, reflects on the first electoral defeat of the Labor in 1977 and moves further to analyze the circumstances that kept Labor out of power until 1984, the year Labor entered into a political coalition with the Likud Party, before discussing the conditions which brought the Labor back to power in 1992, its defeat in 1996 and return with Ehud Barak in 1999.

    On the social basis of the party, the author maintains that, historically, the second and third waves (1905-1914 and 1919-1923) of Jewish emmigration from Eastern Europe were to form the popular basis of Mapai. However, due to socio-economic development in Israel, the Labor began to attract supporters from other social stratas. Thus, the party’s social base transferred from this of workers and peaseants to middle class and petty bourgousie. Ethnically, the party includes members of all ethnic groups, whether Western , Eastern , or Palestinian Jews.

    The last part of the book analyzes the position of the Israeli Labor Party on the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Challenging the conventional belief that Labor is more lenient on the settlement of the dispute with the Arabs, the author maintains that Labor, regardless of its pragmatism, preserves the “Zionist principles” that were formulated in the Basle Conference in 1897. Yet, the author observes a development on the position in regards to the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

    During the period between 1948 and 1967, the party refused all international plans for resolution, starting with the U.N. Resolution 181. However, twenty years later and due to the eruption of the first Intafada and increased American intervetion for the settlement of the dispute, the Labor party was to engage itself in negotiations which led to the conclusion of the Oslo Agreements. This development led to the elimination of the “Jordanian Option”, which was proposed by a concervative trend and which entails a Jordanian-Palestinian state in Jordan and areas in which Israel will withdraw.

    The Oslo Agreement, led to the recognition of Israel by the PLO and vice-versa. However, the agreement didn’t provide a solution for the key and historically controversial issues on the status of Jerusalem, return of the Palestinian refugees, and the nature of the Palestinain state, which the Labor party, as compared with Likud by the author, is not ready to provide any concessions on. The Barak tenure as Prime Minister, eruption of the second Intifada and the severe situation reached until the time this review is being written make this argument a sound one.

    In his conclusion, Mouzahem maintains that regardless of the divisions within the Israeli Labor party, the party preserves the principles and goals of the Zionism. The author sees the Labor party as a major party in the establishment of the Jewish State, its economy, and the army and in the safeguarding and expansion of Israel in the wars which its governments have directed (1948, 1956, 1967, and 1973 wars).

    Other than being a good reader of geo-political changes, whether regional or international, the Labor Party did not fall hostage to its ideology whether Marxism or Zionism. It was able, pragmatically, to maneuver ideologically to maintain its position in government.

    This book may be of great interest to the general reader or observer and to students and scholars in Political Science, for it sheds important light on the Israeli Labor Party and general politics in Israel particularly their connection to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Some definitions of parties and party systems may have brought the book further into academic writing.

    On the part on the social and electoral basis of the Labor, the discussion may have been advanced to shed light on the Arab minority in Israel and the “Arab Minority Lists”, which Mapai has established in 1948. Furthermore, the book tries to demonstrate the Zionist nature of the Labor, which the latter doesn’t negate, nor any specialist in Israeli of Middle Eastern politics, finally Labor is an Israeli party brought to power by the votes of the Israelis and would certainly not behave in contrary to Israeli interests.

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    Sufism in UAE: A short history

    February 7th, 2015

    By Dr. Haytham Mouzahem.

     

     

     

    There are few sources that talk about the history of mysticism in the Arab Gulf states and particularly in the United Arab Emirates. G.G. Lorimer, who is considered one of the best historians and geographers that described the Arabian Gulf at the beginning of the Twentieth century said in his book “The Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf : Oman and Central Arabia”: There is no Sufis in the (Arab) Gulf”.

    That can be explained by two reasons: First reason is the absence of the stories of Sufism in the local manuscripts or the foreign historical documents in English, Portuguese and Dutch that talked on Oman’s coast, UAE today.

    The second reason is the lack of historical local of books on the country in general and on its religious history in particular. The Emirati researcher, Rashed Ahmed Al-Jumairi, has written a study entitled “Sufism in Dubai from Al-Afghani to Abderahhim al-Mareed” has been published in a book on “Sufism in Saudi Arabia and The Gulf” in 2011 by Al- Misbar center for studies in Dubai.

    Al-Jumairi has introduced a historical track of Sufisim roots in the UAE and its relation to “Seer” Sufism (Seer is Ras Al – Khaimah now). He studied three Sufi figures that represented the Sufi experience in UAE, relying on narratives of the last Sufi figure, Sheikh Abderrahim Al-Marid(1902- 2007), who lived in Dubai and died in 2007. Al-Marid reported from his father Sheikh Abdullah Al-Marid the story of the Sayyed Mohammad Omar Al-Afghani, the first figure of those tree Sufi figures mentioned above, while Abdallah Al-Marid and his son Abderrahim are the two other figures.

    The roots of Sufism in UAE or Oman’s coast go back to 300 years ago in the seventeen century in Seer, Ras Al-Khaima today, when some Sufis came up from Hadramout, Yemen, with the Alawite Hadadi Sufisim order.

    There is a local manuscript that talks about the Sufism’s history in the Eastern South of Arabia in the eighteen century. It reported the fact of the Alawite Hadadi order in Seer area as a part of the Sufi Yemeni experience. The Yemeni writer of the manuscript, Alawi Bin Ahmad Bin Hassan Al-hadad, had talked about his grandfather’s virtues and his memoires in UAE during the late of the eighteen century. This text shows that the Sufism had strong foothold in Ras Al-Khaima and  in particular in the ruler family al-Qassemi and Al-Zuaabi tribe. Also, the Sufi rituals including the consecration and the visits of the saints or Sufi sheikhs graves.

    However this Sufi experience has been ended by the rise of Sheikh Mohammad Bin Abdul Wahab’s call and the expansion of Al-Saud State. The Saudi forces have encircled Seer and forced its inhabitants to follow the Wahhabi school and to destroy the Sufi shrines.

    The Hadadi order has disappeared in Oman’s coast and few grandsons of its founder remained in UAE and Bahrain.

    Sufism emitted again in the UAE in the late nineteenth century by an Afghani immigrant , Al-Sayed Mohammad Omar Al-Afghani. There is no accurate information about Al-Afghani and where he came from. Some say he came from Mecca with people from Dubai and some say he came from Bahrain with people from Bani Yass while others reported that he came from Afghanistan through Egypt heading to AbdelKader Al-Jilani shrine in Baghdad. So, he studied in Al-Azhar institute in Cairo then he came to Abu Dhabi and later to Dubai.

    Al-Afghani became an Imam of mosque in Abu Dhabi teaching the religious studies to his followers and spreading his Sufi order. He moved later to Dubai, that was ready to welcome a Sufi Sheikh due to its historical experience with Sufi orders and its Maliki school that does not reject the Sufi rituals as the Wahhabi Salafism and Hanbalism.

    Despite the objection of some Hanbalis in Sharjah and Dubai on Al-Afghani rituals as heresy, the rulers of Dubai have adopted his Sufism and treated him very well during the rule of Sheikh Hashr Al-Maktoum . Even, Sheikh Saeed Bin Maktoum Bin Hashr has received Al-Afghani support for his claim of rule following the death of Sheikh Butti Bin Suhail Al Maktoum in 1912.

    Even, Sheikh Saeed was attending the Sufi rituals of Al-Zikr and Al-mawlid and he was practicing them.

    There are narratives that Al-sayed Al-Afghani, who had a social and political recognition in Dubai and Abu Dhabi, was involved in smuggling arms into Afghanistan to the revolutionaries against the British colonialism.

    In 1915, Al-Afghani bought 100 guns and sent them to Afghanistan. Then, he left Dubai to Makran(Balochistan Province, Pakistan) but the British authorities found out his role in sending arms to the Afghani rebels, and there are reports that they sent two spies to kill him in Makran in August 1916.

    After his death, his successor was Sheikh Abdullah Al-Marid who added the Rifai order to the Qaderi order which has been brought by Al-Afghani.

    The Rifai Sufi Order takes its name from Ahmad al-Rifai (1106–82), a Shafii legal scholar and mystic from the marshlands of southern Iraq. He was a contemporary of Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani (d. 1166), the eponymous founder of the Qadiri Sufi Order.

    Sheikh Al-Marid died in the late 1960s and his son Abdurrahim succeeded him.

    The Sufi order of Dubai has been known of piercing the body with skewers.

    In 1958, the National Geographic has published photos of Ronald Codrai who has shot the Sufi rituals in Dubai in the 1950s, including the piercing the body with skewers.

    However the rituals that persevered by Sufis in Dubai such as Al-maled or Al-mawlid which means celebrating the birth of the prophet Muhammad, by chanting the Dhikr, the remembrance of Allah.

    It is worth noting that the ruler of Dubai, Sheikh Mohammad Bin Rashid Al-Maktoum has banned piercing the body with skewers and Sheikh Al-Marid ordered his followers to stop this ritual, as an obey of the ruler.

    After the death of Sheikh Abdulrahim Al-Marid in 2007, Sufism was taken into recession due to the divisions between his followers regarding his successor. Some are following now the Omani Hamdan Al-Ma’amari who was Al-Marid’s pupil and he is reviving Sufism’s rituals, while others are following the family of Bin Hmaydan in Dubai.

    The question today is: Can the Sufism survive in UAE with all these socio-economic and cultural transformations and political and religious challenges, especially with the dominance of Wahhabism in the Gulf states and the rise of Salafi jihadis and political Islam, who all refuse the Sufi rituals.

     

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