Posts by IjazKhan:
Pakistan: The Question of Afghan Refugees
August 30th, 2016By Ijaz Khan.
The government of Pakistan has extended the stay of Afghan refugees by another six months. There are criticisms of the decision from two opposite sides. One side, which appears to be more popular and also voiced by the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa government, opposes any extension while the other opinion is critical why just six months or even any period at all.
The question of how long can refugees stay is a fundamental one. The question in Pakistan has become more pronounced because of the deteriorating Pak-Afghan relations as well as Pakistan not being party to any international instrument on refugees in addition to having no clear domestic legislation on them. Afghan refugees have been dealt with administratively in line with agreements with the United Nations High Commission on Refugees.
Pakistan’s policy towards refugees has been influenced by political and security considerations. Probably, the most important factor for not becoming a party to any international legal instrument and not legislating on them is a result of the government’s policy to keep its hands free.
This brief addresses the diplomatic cost of this policy as well as international and domestic legal obligations despite no clear specific legal instruments. The practicality and politics of refugee repatriation is also discussed. The need for a clear policy and legislation with Pakistan’s interests and international obligation is argued for.
Pakistan is host to the largest refugee population due to the Afghan crisis since 1980s. Depending on the situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan and their bilateral relations, they have been welcome and unwelcome at various times. A third generation of Afghan refugees is growing up in Pakistan whose parents too have never seen Afghanistan. Afghans in Pakistan have been calculated to be around 3 million, with 1.6 registered and approximately 1.4 unregistered. Mostly concentrated in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, they are spread all over the country, including Punjab and Sindh, with a sizeable presence in Karachi.
There is no formal restriction on the movement of Afghan refugees. They are living in cities, villages and towns in rented properties and are mostly engaged in different types of businesses as well as daily wage labour to earn their livelihood. No economic support is being given to them by any organisation, Pakistani or international. Till recently, they could move freely to Afghanistan and return. There have been instances of inter-marriages between Pakistanis and Afghans. There are also those who share tribal identity with Pakhtun tribes of Pakistan.
The international conventions directly dealing with the refugees are 1951 Convention on Refugees and 1967 Protocol on Refugees. Other conventions dealing with them are Civil and Political Rights Covenant 1966, which declares right to asylum as a basic human right, Convention Against Torture that prohibits return of individuals to jurisdictions where they fear torture and Convention on the Rights of Children, which protects children. Pakistan is not a party to the first two but is a party to the latter all three.
Pakistan is under legal obligation under customary international law arising out of Universal Declaration on Human Rights that declare asylum as a basic human right. These laws have many details on their treatment, rights, definition and the principle of ‘Non Refoulement’ — meaning refugees cannot be sent back by force.
International law does provide that when the situation making people take refuge ends, they should return. However, who decides the situation has ended remains a debated point. In the absence of any clear authority to decide this issue, the person of the refugee remains the final authority to make the decision. This may not sound very attractive to many as it can be abused by refugees too. But it seems, in the choice between abuse by states which may send back refugees by force due to political considerations on the premises that the situation has changed and abuse by refugees claiming the right to remain as refugees despite the actual change, international legal opinion favours refugees rather than states.
Pakistan’s policy towards Afghan refugees has been determined by its political/foreign policy and relationship with Afghanistan as well as relations with the international community through UNHCR. Formal legal documents do not refer to Afghan refugees as ‘Refugees’, but ‘Afghan Nationals’. They are issued Proof of Residence (POR) Cards not Refugee Cards. Pakistan considers the principle of non-refoulement does not apply as Afghan presence in Pakistan is renewed on a yearly basis (now on six-month basis) as a result of an agreement with UNHCR. Though it has not used force to evict Afghan refugees, it claims the authority to do so. This claim is at best a fiction that only Pakistan believes in.
This claim is in direct violation of its obligations under the principle of non-refoulement and provisions of other conventions as explained earlier. One reason it has not become a party to the International Legal Instruments of Refugees and has avoided domestic legislation on the subject is to keep its hands free and use force when necessary, which is wrong.
The political cost of such an exercise both domestically and internationally will be enormous. Just imagine the pictures and videos of police and other law enforcement agencies rounding up millions of men, women and children, throwing them in trucks and taking them towards Durand Line on TV channels and social media all over the world. It will be a diplomatic disaster in addition to being in violation of law.
The practicality of such a gigantic exercise is another issue. In addition to economic costs, the issue of identity will create serious problems. The government’s drive to verify NIC since 2015 has left many Afghans with Pakistani NICs untouched while thousands of Pakistani nationals have been declared as non-nationals, meaning Afghans. Even if Pakistan starts forceful repatriation, it will end up leaving behind many Afghans and sending away a large number of its own citizens.
Some argue that these refugees should be confined to camps. Yes Pakistan could have done that initially, but again due to political considerations it did not do so. At this stage, the economic cost of doing so is simply beyond the capacity of Pakistan. In the wake of APS Peshawar tragedy, the state had carried out a survey for the purpose and dropped the idea finding it impossible.
Another popular concern is that Afghans are doing business without paying any taxes. You can stop refugees from earning their livelihood but then you must provide for them. Can Pakistan do so? The concern is genuine, but rather than banning their businesses they should be taxed and special rules governing refugee business can be made.
All said, willingly or not all Afghan refugees cannot go back. Pakistan needs to make laws and procedures laying down some criteria for giving Pakistani citizenship to some of them. The repatriation of Afghan refugees should be peacefully pursued in continuous consultations with UNHCR and the Afghan government.
Absence of specific legislation does not free Pakistan from any obligations towards Afghan refugees, but it creates more confusion and problems both for itself and refugees. Pakistan must go for clear legislation keeping in mind its international obligations, international best practices and its own national interests and capacity in sight.
The policy of ambiguity and a constant threat of forceful repatriation may give Pakistan some limited advantage in diplomatic bargaining with the Afghan government and/or the United States, but it has created a gulf, a negative perception among Afghans about Pakistan and among people of Pakistan about Afghanistan. It negates any advantage in terms of public opinion Pakistan could have accrued from hosting Afghans for such a long time. These perceptions are a serious hurdle in establishing friendly relations with Afghanistan, thus defeating the main goal of Pakistan’s Afghan policy to have an Afghanistan which is in no way a source or medium of any security threat to Pakistan.
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Brinksmanship Renewed: The Current Phase of U.S.-Pakistani Relations
August 26th, 2016By Ijaz Khan.
It is clear that relations between Pakistan and the United States are deteriorating once again. The May 2016 drone strike that killed Mullah Mansour in Balochistan ushered in another round of questions about the life expectancy of the bilateral relationship amid harder bargaining and brinkmanship between the two countries. These relations have been zigzagging from high to low for a long time. Both states have managed to avoid complete breakdown since resuscitating the relationship after 9/11. Even if the United States and Pakistan are able to avoid a complete breakdown, it will only postpone the reckoning for a future date. Neither side has given any indication of making a fundamental change in its approach to the other or on the policies and actions over which the two countries disagree.
A History of Mistrust
Pakistani-U.S. relations have always been based mainly on opposition to other actors rather than trust and commonality of long-term goals and interests. Throughout the Cold War, the on-again, off-again alliance was against the Soviet Union, though Pakistan used it to balance against India. This trend has continued and arguably gotten worse in the post-9/11 era. The relationship has most frequently been referred to tactical or transactional. Both side have managed their bilateral relations rather well considering the mutual suspicions, mistrust, and divergence of views on the region and on the purpose and scope of counterterrorism cooperation. Pakistani decision-makers look with suspicion at growing U.S. relations with India and view this relationship through the zero-sum dynamics of the region. America’s policy of keeping its relations with Pakistan separate from its relations with India is neither understood nor accepted in the Pakistani establishment.
Pakistan has always feared being sandwiched between two hostile states: India to the east and Afghanistan to the west. As a result, its Afghan policy has always been driven in part by the desire to keep India out of Afghanistan. The Taliban era is the only time in modern history when Pakistan managed to accomplish this objective. Pakistani decision-makers believe that the U.S./NATO presence in Afghanistan has facilitated Indian influence in Afghanistan and view the U.S. targeting of the Taliban through this prism. Pakistan thus finds it difficult to give up totally on the Afghan Taliban, though fears of a domestic backlash are also relevant. This reluctance feeds U.S. mistrust of Pakistan, to say the least.
In U.S. foreign policy circles, there is an ongoing debate whether to continue partnering with Pakistan or give up on it. The view from Pakistan is that those who argue for dumping the relationship gained strength after the Taliban took control of Kunduz. It was retaken only with active U.S. military support and the whole affair probably contributed to the decision by the United States to abandon its planned 2016 complete withdrawal from Afghanistan. This incident must be viewed within the context of ongoing U.S. anger over Pakistani support for the Haqqani network and frustration about Pakistan’s failure to deliver on a peace settlement in Afghanistan. After Afghan President Ashraf Ghani and the United States banked on Pakistan’s cooperation to deliver the Taliban, the continued Taliban offensive and the Quadrilateral Group’s failure to make any breakthroughs in negotiations have led the United States and Afghanistan to give up any hope for a settlement in the near term.
Mounting Tensions All Around
The targeting killed of Mullah Mansour followed two other points of friction: the U.S. refusal to subsidize the sale of F-16 fighters and the brief closure of the Torkham border in response to armed skirmishes. Although the skirmishes and border closing are technically a matter between Pakistan and Afghanistan, these incidents have direct bearing on Pakistan’s role in counterterrorism. The United States also cares about bilateral relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan, because improved relations are necessary for reducing violence and ultimately reaching a peace settlement. The refusal by the U.S. Congress to subsidize the sale of F-16s after others in the government promised to do so was a sign of U.S. frustration and contributed to tensions. The same is true for decisions to once again condition a portion of U.S. reimbursements on action against the Afghan Taliban, specifically the Haqqani Network.
Then came the drone strike on Mullah Mansour. Independent analysts considered close to the military and government spokesmen saw this as clear evidence that the United States wanted to pressure Pakistan. After announcing an enquiry into how an Afghan got a Pakistan National Identity Card and passport, Interior Minister Chaudhry Nisar reiterated the original Foreign Office condemnation of the drone strike as a violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty. Sartaj Aziz, a senior advisor to the prime minister, called the United States a selfish friend, and Chief of Army Staff General Raheel Sharif demanded the United States launch drone strikes against the Pakistani Taliban inside Afghanistan. These condemnations and demands should be seen as evidence of tough bargaining by Pakistan intended to blunt U.S. pressure and a sign that Pakistani decision-makers will not budge when it comes to action against the Afghan Taliban or its approach to a peace settlement in Afghanistan.
The question is whether both sides will stop short of total breakdown or control the worsening relations as they did on a number of occasions since 2001. The last glaring example of this tightrope walk was the Salala episode in 2011. In November of that year, U.S. jets bombed a Pakistani guard post, killing 24 Pakistani soldiers and resulting in a serious crisis in bilateral relations. Pakistan refused permission of the use of its territory for NATO supplies to Afghanistan until the United States offered a formal apology. The crisis ended after what I termed then an episode of hard bargaining between the two sides. Although Salala almost caused a full rupture, current conditions may be ripe for an even bigger crisis that would be harder to diffuse.
This is not just a two-player game. Tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan are also mounting. In May, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani withdrew requests for Pakistani assistance on negotiations and instead demanded action against Afghan Taliban. Pakistan for its part sought to pressure Afghanistan by fencing and enforcing their shared border at Torkham, triggering a military confrontation that included cross-border fire and the aforementioned border sealing for a few days. This episode ended with the direct intervention by Gen. Sharif. The return of Afghan territory at Angoor Adda (also directed by Gen. Sharif), an action which could have helped thaw relations, was forgotten amid the tensions.
These tensions grew amid new border management practices initiated by Pakistan at Torkham in June. The new practices entail putting a stop to centuries-old free movement of tribes divided by the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. This traffic increased considerably after 1990, when Afghan refugees started visiting Afghanistan, but not returning completely. Many Afghan men also began going to work in Afghanistan, but kept their families inside Pakistan. A large number of patients also started coming to Peshawar without visas. While Pakistan did not close the Torkham border crossing and had just started implementing normal and legal border crossing, the suddenness of these new actions without any reasonable warning created ill will. The latest round of clashes started when Pakistan began constructing a gate after first refusing entry to anyone without a visa. Pakistani policymakers calculated that pressuring Kabul would result in pressure on Americans.
Differential Leverage
Despite new pressure, Pakistan feels confident the United States will not cross the red line and totally give up on the bilateral relationship. The United States not only needs Pakistan for its Afghanistan and global counterterrorism policies, but it also cannot afford the collapse of Pakistan, a state larger than Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria put together and in possession of nuclear weapons. The collapse of the Pakistani state would create challenges requiring far more resources relative to American engagement in Afghanistan, Iraq, or Syria. Pakistan’s confidence has been beefed up by an increasing Chinese stake in its security as a result of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, which is central to China’s policy covering 60 countries. The caveat in this calculation is that United States and China share concerns about terrorism and Taliban. They also both want a peaceful Afghanistan under the current constitutional dispensation.
Pakistan could have improved its position with support from Russia, which considers the Islamic State a bigger threat than the Taliban. However, Russia is not a comparably sized player to China and the United States in the region. More importantly, Russia would not give up on India for the sake of Pakistan regardless of its concerns about the Islamic State.
Pakistan and the United States appear to be moving to manage bilateral relations without letting go of mutual mistrust. Senator John McCain’s (R-AZ) visited Islamabad just after Gen. Sharif’s statement about not permitting Pakistani soil to be used against Afghanistan, which was followed by a U.S. airstrike against a Pakistani-wanted terrorist. The U.S. Congressional hearing that asked “Pakistan, friend or foe?” strengthened the argument inside the United States to be stricter with Pakistan and not just postpone the breakdown if Pakistan does not relent. The blocking of $300 million of Coalition Support Funds in response to Pakistan’s inaction against the Haqqanni network is a further message of U.S. resolve to make Pakistan change its policy.
The crisis in U.S.-Pakistani bilateral relations has up till now been postponed, but never resolved. Both sides are calling each other’s bluff without wanting a complete breakdown of relations. The United States has to calculate which course of action costs more; staying engaged in Afghanistan and relying on Pakistan help while using sticks and carrots to increase Pakistani cooperation, or giving up on Pakistan and trying to find other alternatives. Pakistan continues to bank on the United States’ believing that giving up is too risky. In this diplomatic brinksmanship or bargaining, if the United States backs down, the two sides will continue postponing rather than resolving their issues. Life will go on until the next such stalemate, though each stalemate will be more serious than its predecessor. At some point, the relationship will break down with far more serious consequences for all. If Pakistan backed down on its policy of not acting against the Afghan Taliban, this would change the entire dynamics of the region. Pakistan has not given any indication it is willing to consider this course. Instead, like the United States, it is trying to manage the relationship as best as possible and postpone the impending crisis rather than resolving the factors that will trigger it.
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The Afghan Scenario
June 30th, 2014
By Ijaz Khan.
THE second round of the Afghan elections is due on June 14. The first round has thrown up Dr Abdullah Abdullah and Dr Ashraf Ghani as the front runners. The second round is required by the Afghan constitution, which states that if no candidate secures more than 50% of the votes cast, a second round should be held among the top two contenders.
The Afghan elections are being watched very closely as the whole process and its final result will have an impact on future developments in Afghanistan and the region. Observers, especially Kabul’s neighbors, have interest in the way the situation develops as it will have a direct bearing on the post-December draw down of US/NATO forces.
Pakistan wants a government in Afghanistan that it can influence to whatever level possible, and an Afghanistan in which India has little to no presence. Its own history has taught it to consider religious extremists as its best guarantee to achieve these aims. It has pursued a policy of supporting Talibanised Pakhtuns in Afghanistan instead of traditional or secular nationalist Pakhtuns.
The non-Pakhtun population has viewed Pakistan suspiciously in its power struggle with Pakhtuns. The feeling is reciprocated by Pakistan, which considers non-Pakhtuns friendly to Iran and India.
Pakistan is finding it difficult to adjust to changes in Afghanistan.
Pakistan’s policy relies on the ethnic division in Afghanistan. Rather than wanting Ashraf Ghani, an ethnic Pakhtun, to win, it appears favourably inclined towards Dr Abdullah, an ethnic Tajik. Its preferences are apparently based on the simple calculation that Abdullah’s victory will push Pakhtuns to rise against him, pushing them towards the Afghan Taliban. Pakistan seems wary of Ashraf Ghani, a secular modernist Pakhtun. His victory may mean decrease in the support of Pakhtuns to the Taliban.
This calculation seems to be simplistic and exaggerates the ethnic divide in Afghanistan. No one can deny the existence of ethnic tensions in Afghanistan, but looking at the tickets of both the leading candidates, Dr Abdullah has an ethnic Pakhtun and Dr Ashraf an Uzbek as running mate. Zalmai Rassoul, a Pakhtun (who was a presidential candidate in the first round) has announced support for Dr Abdullah while the brother of Ahmad Shah Massoud, the legendary Tajik Mujahideen leader, has announced support for Ashraf Ghani.
Whatever the result of the Afghan elections, Pak-Afghan relations will not undergo much change. Neither Dr Abdullah nor Ashraf Ghani will be able to remove suspicions of Pakistan in the Afghan mind, so both will continue to cultivate relations with India. Neither will be shy of signing the bilateral security agreement with the US. Similarly, neither of them would have a much different attitude towards the Taliban.
More important is the impact of the election process than the results. The first round surprised most Afghan watchers by the level of participation, peace and relative credibility. Most in Pakistan were not expecting this. There was a general perception among Pakistani commentators, especially those considered close to the establishment, that the polls would be disastrous. The elections have created confidence both in the Afghan people and the state, with the Afghan security forces playing a significant role.
The election was organised and provided security by the Afghans themselves, under watchful international eyes and support, both financial and technical. The first round has created an atmosphere of trust that will help the Afghan state deal with the insurgent challenges with more confidence.
It has also attracted many of those sitting on the fence, not sure of what will happen and afraid of a Taliban comeback. Yet chances of a Taliban comeback after 2014 appear almost negligible. This is not to say that peace is around the corner. There is still a long way to go, but the election process has proved to be a big leap forward.
If Pakistan continues to be guided by its India-centric security policy looking to religious extremists as tools in pursuing its Afghan policy, we may witness its regional isolation increasing and also greater internal intolerance, extremism and violence posing a serious threat to the fragile democracy in this country. If Pakistan changes (and some argue that it has) and takes the much-delayed across-the-board action against the local Taliban and other terrorists, it may be able to arrest the increasing lawlessness.
However, there are those who still are not ready to believe there is enough evidence of change in Pakistan. The best evidence will be if action is taken without differentiating between the good and bad Taliban.
Pakistan is finding it difficult to adjust to the new and changing Afghanistan. There is still a role for Islamabad; however, its ability to influence the outcome has been reduced.
Pakistan can still be part of a solution and become a relevant and significant player post-2014 if it adjusts to the fast-changing situation in Afghanistan as well as in the region.
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