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- Countries with high participation: the number of foreign fighters may reach several hundred. They include the Balkans (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo), Belgium, Britain, Denmark, Germany, France, the Netherlands and Sweden. The largest number comes from France (with an estimate of more than 1550 jihadists), Germany and United Kingdom (around 700 each[xi]).
- Countries with medium participation: between several dozen and 100 fighters. They include Albania, Austria, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Spain, and Switzerland.
- Countries with low participation: ten or fewer mujahidiin. They include Bulgaria, Hungary, Macedonia and Romania[xii].
- Firstly there are Italian citizens (which comprise converts and second generation migrants); according to the most recent official report twelve fighters coming from Italy (of them, one is presumed dead and six others have double citizenship) went to Syria/Iraq.
- The second category involves those labeled by Lorenzo Vidino as “sociological citizens”[xiii]; in this category fit another eleven fighters coming from Italy.
- The third category includes visitors (workers or students with a temporary residence certificate) radicalized largely within the country. According to the last report to the Parliament, 64 fighters coming from Italy fall into this group, bringing the total number to 87[xiv]. To this group another 102 individuals should be added. They were arrested (45) or expelled (57) from the country from February 2014, before actively joining terrorist groups in Iraq and Syria.
Italian Foreign Terrorist Fighters: Numbers, features and case studies
November 16th, 2015By Alessandro Boncio.
Since the rise of the self-proclaimed Caliph Abu Bakr al Baghdadi[ii], the foreign terrorist fighters phenomenon acquired an exceptional interest in the law enforcement, intelligence and academic communities of the countries experiencing such anomaly. This is probably due to the unprecedented dimension reached (the number of combatants having surpassed that of the Afghanistan conflict in the 1980’s) and the correlated security threat for the countries of origin of the mujahidiin[iii].
This paper analyzes the Italian situation, underlining some particular features as well as shared elements with other European realities. The Italian condition in this context is fluid and constantly evolving; the official number of mujahidiin from Italy is less than a hundred, rather low if compared to elsewhere in Europe, but the trend is significantly rising. Moreover, as some findings point out, there are significant similarities between the Italian salafi-jihadist milieu and its counterparts in other European countries, despite differences e.g. regarding the ethnic communities of origin or the societal level of integration perceived.
The last part of the paper aims at highlighting several underrated topics related to the foreign terrorist fighters phenomenon with special reference to the issue of the “returnees”. It argues that it is necessary to build up structured de-radicalization narratives and programs working in parallel to the intelligence and security services and aimed at preventing and repressing possible threats in Italy and beyond.
Generalities
The Italian foreign terrorist fighters[iv] phenomenon is relatively small in its size if compared with the official figures of other Western European countries[v]. Nevertheless, the numbers and their significance are somehow different in value and quality and surely are worth some remarks due to the unique societal context of Italy.
The Italian society is historically and culturally deep-rooted in Catholicism; as a consequence, conversions to Islam in Italy are growing at a lower rate if compared to other European countries[vi], due to the huge leap of faith that a change of one‘s religious affiliation and the considerable social cost of this decision entail within the Italian context[vii].
The Muslim community amounts to around 1.8 of the 61 million inhabitants of Italy[viii] (the data are net of the illegal migrants flows); there is a steady growth in conversions, which is estimated at around 4000 per year[ix]. Just a microscopic percentage of the community embrace an extremist interpretation of Islamic principles, and an even smaller number join one of the various terrorist organizations in Iraq and Syria. There are some small “strongholds” of extremism in Italy, but overall, the Italian Muslim community lives a peaceful life in accordance with democratic principles.
According to a recent NATO workshop report[x] regarding the foreign terrorist fighters phenomenon, Europe can be grouped into three categories:
In the same workshop context, an Italian Carabinieri representative stressed the fact that Italy consider homegrown terrorism as the terrorist activities or plots perpetrated within a country or abroad by three different categories of individuals:
Italian features and comparison with other European Realities
The growth of the foreign fighters phenomenon in Italy follows the European trend, even though is slightly lagged in reacting to external stimuli. In May 2014 (before the establishment of the Islamic State Caliphate) there were some 30 Italian foreign fighters; in January 2015 the total was 53 (+76%); in May 2015 the number reached 74 (+39,6%) and the last estimate in September 2015 is of 87 individuals (+17,5%).
The percentage of Italians fighting in the Syrian conflict is also following the European standard; if we consider just the ethnic Italians we have a rough 14% figure of the total number, but if we include also the sociological citizens, the percentage increases to 26,4% of the total Italian foreign terrorist fighters phenomenon.
The Italian mujahidiin begun to follow the path to Syria and Iraq since 2013, rather late if compared with the rest of the European countries. This feature reflects the differences in the growth of the phenomenon in Italy. The age of the Italian foreign terrorist fighters ranges from 18 to 42 years[xv], with a majority of youngsters (18-26 years); the 29% of the fighters are converts[xvi] and the percentage of women makes up around 7% of the total.
The confirmed number of deceased combatants coming from Italy is eighteen, and there is a rough figure of ten mujahidiin who came back into the country.
The special element that raises some questions in this analysis is the foreign terrorist fighters ethnic composition, especially if related to the recent Italian history. There is an overrepresentation of ethnic mujahidiin from the Balkans, while the number of North Africans among the Italian foreign terrorist fighters is lower, an interesting fact given that Muslims with North African origin represent the historically bigger community settled in Italy and the biggest share of the recent migration wave that interested the country. The explanation for this situation is probably twofold.
The first reason is demographic; Italy’s first serious flow of North African migrants arrived in the 80’s. Many young people arrived in Italy from Maghreb countries searching for better life conditions, and their communities were mainly organized in suburbs of big metropolis like Milan, Naples and Rome[xvii]. The jihadist presence in Italy dates back to the early 90’s, with the first structured terrorist cells (GIA[xviii], SGPC[xix]) active in the country. Due to that reason, the second generation of this first flow of migrants is nowadays reaching adult age, thus delaying and influencing the rate of radicalized individuals.
Another cause for the lower rate of North Africans among the Italian fighters “battalion” is probably related to the so-called Arab Spring effect and the current tense situation experienced in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia. Ethnic North Africans are probably more concerned with the ongoing conflicts and tensions in their countries of origin, and there are reports of older Libyans and Tunisians who joined the conflicts there. ISIS expansion into those countries (with the establishment of “provinces[xx]” in Libya, Sinai and Tunisia) gave these individuals a “short range” trip from Italy and for some of them an opportunity to avenge the past Islamist defeats at the hand of the Ben Ali, Ghaddafi and Mubarak regimes.
For this group of radicalized men and women, the Maghreb region is easier to reach as they already have connections and facilitators; they know the environment and the political situation and they probably consider it more important to join the fight there.
The Italian jihadist landscape is a fluid and evolving situation composed of heterogeneous realities with different features. The Italian converts are still a small percentage in the Muslim community, but the phenomenon is steadily growing and it is nevertheless significant if related to the country’s role as a cradle of Christianity. The Italian society and culture is deeply entrenched with the Christian faith and the leap to reach Islam is even bigger for an ethnic (or sociologic) Italian.
Among the jihadist first generation networks established in the country[xxi], the main role of sympathizers and/or associates was to logistically and financially assist the mujahidiin passing through Italy. The country was always considered as a kind of “safe haven” since the time of the al-Qaeda European Network, due to the porous shores and borders and the possibility to obtain high quality forged documents that were very useful in the Schengen area.
Maybe the most important feature is the strict ethnic composition of the Italian radicalized milieu; People coming from Bosnia or Kosovo are not mixing up with youngsters coming from the Maghreb area; Syrians are not associated with Pakistanis and so on. This element reflects the regional variegated composition of the various Muslim communities and their different paths towards radicalization and violent behavior[xxii].
With this framework, the Italian jihadist milieu is similar to the German one, with high number of unemployed and undereducated people among its ranks, often composed of individuals with previous criminal records; quite the opposite of the British terrorist battalion, usually better educated, with more qualified jobs and socially integrated, according to the researcher Daniela Pisoiu[xxiii]. These differences are in many cases related to diverging paths of migration and social integration policies, as well as the ethnic communities of origin.
Present and future issues
Although radicalism cannot be considered terrorism, the process that drives individuals to embrace radical ideologies is of paramount importance, as it can constitute the first step towards violent extremism[xxiv]. Yet, it is undoubtedly true that there is no single path to radicalization and that every country has its own particular features in “producing” radicalized youth[xxv].
However, there are some common denominators in all known case studies, no matter the origin or residence of the mujahid: the apparent lack of contacts between wannabe foreign fighters and the traditional qaedist structures; the massive use of the internet for indoctrination, training, communication etc; the existing interaction between the lack of socio-economic integration and the radicalization process.
Moreover, some persistent features, all of them interlinked and consequential, help to create a rough identikit of a “generic” foreign terrorist fighter: their young age and short radicalization process; a rather poor knowledge of Islam (due to their young age and and often lacking education in Islamic beliefs and jurisprudence); a fragile motivation (since they didn’t have the time or education to fully comprehend and accept the jihadist ideology)[xxvi].
All those factors should be addressed by a structured strategy aimed at the disengagement from jihadist narratives once we find the right interpretation of these phenomena. Moreover, opposing this narrative will also impact on the recruitment tendency: mujahidiin possess an aura of “sanctity” and righteousness among the extremist circles. In the virtual digital world, those faceless fighters have the authority once retained only by senior jihadist scholars and are now celebrated as the model to be emulated.
Regarding Italy, one of the key elements in need of an enhanced debate is related to the so called “returnees”. As of now, there are news of around ten foreign fighters who have returned to Italy[xxvii], (without mentioning Schengen passport bearers who could possibly travel to other European countries) but there is no clear policy on how to treat them[xxviii].
Apart from a penal discourse[xxix], a returnee is a different person (from his/her pre-jihad self) with enormous difficulties to reintegrate into the society. Former combatants often suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder and should/must be closely monitored and counseled if further violent problems want to be avoided. Contrary to preventive investigations, where the web is the main tool, direct contact is needed when wanting to de-radicalize and rehabilitate someone[xxx]. Mentors for such individuals should be preferably Muslims, possibly young and with in-depth knowledge of youth (sub) cultural codes (it is a known fact that many jihadists come from the rap/hip-hop scene); this will help returnees to relate to someone perceived as authentic and trustworthy to open up to.
Of course, there is a relevant difference between ideologically motivated foreign fighters and people fighting in Bilad al Shams according to a perceived religious obligation. The narrative and the de-construction of extremist beliefs of such people should be tailored to their trigger motivation to become a foreign fighter.
Homegrown terrorism and violent extremism are societal phenomena where issues like belonging, identity, group dynamics and values are important elements in the collective-identity construction process. Religion, as such, plays an important role, but for some it probably rather serves as a vehicle for fulfilling other goals[xxxi].
Countering radicalization is perceived differently across the spectrum of pertinent actors (law enforcement agencies, governments, academics etc.), but it must be understood that radicalization inexorably intertwines social and ideological factors and thus should be fought in a multidisciplinary way. A recent study on countering violent extremism (CVE) showed that logic and rationality are not winning elements; when you are trying to convince people, facts do not matter[xxxii]. Appealing to an individual’s value system seems to be the most effective way to change opinions and spur people to action[xxxiii].
The longstanding debate on radicalization between security services and academics could finally find a common ground exactly on this topic. Different priorities can be harmonized in the analysis and forecast of future trend. The law enforcement agencies are too engaged in the investigation and prevention of attacks in the short term; a strategic approach coming from the academic world, pointing to future threats is surely a valuable tool. On the other hand, scholars and researchers are always struggling for up to date information to analyze; if they would be provided with desensitized data, they could produce a theoretical model pointing in the direction of future menaces.
Italy, as other European countries, should enhance its capacity to analyze and prevent further radicalization, acknowledging the simple fact that Europe, willingly or not, will be the recipient for migrants in the near future and will have to absorb and integrate at least part of them into their society in the future.
A closing remark is related to transnational terrorist activities; the current jihadists strategy (highlighted also by past and current investigations in Italy) is to nurture an extremist religious ideology through self-created internet networks that often cross national borders[xxxiv]. The foreign fighters trend is not a national problem but a worldwide issue that should be addressed as such. This is another important reason why an international, multiagency approach is needed. Investigations alone can be useful in the short term period in order to prevent attacks or the escape of more radicalized youth[xxxv], but we need to find new encompassing ways to deal with the root causes that transform troubled youngsters into violent actors in this hybrid conflict[xxxvi].
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The enemy of my enemy is now my friend: The fight against the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant
September 23rd, 2015
By Edoardo Camilli.
The Middle East and North Africa have been increasingly characterized by weak and failing states, political vacuums and wide scale disorder. This has resulted in a decreased ability to thwart terrorist organizations and networks across the region. One such organization that has successfully utilized this environment to its advantage is the Islamic State (IS). This terrorist organization has successfully taken advantage of the region’s volatile environment to attain and sustain power and influence. IS “…is a brutal, capable enemy that seeks to break modern states and establish a worldwide caliphate.”[
To this end, it has acquired and strengthened its position through a violent, brutal and terror-laden strategy. In addition, it has immensely increased chaos and disorder in the region and as such has severely and detrimentally affected the security landscape. This terrorist organization has not only been a threat to the region’s security, it is also a security threat to the West. Given the complexities associated with IS, the U.S. approach to this challenge needs to be strategic, layered and multi-dimensional. In order to develop and successfully implement such a strategy the United States cannot undertake this massive task on its own and needs to work with key stakeholders through the use of alliances. It is important to understand that “in this complex environment, it is difficult for policymakers to discern the consequences of action or inaction even in the near future.”
However, not involving key stakeholders in the strategy against IS will likely increase the risk of failure. Acknowledging this, alliances have been forged that would once have been deemed impossible, such as those between the United States and Iran, which stems from a mutual interest in eliminating IS. While this strategy is not without risks, multilateral alliances are essential to countering IS’s complex strategy.
Background
The Islamic State is using terrorism as its instrument in changing the system of the Middle East and North Africa. Through the use of terrorism and territorial acquisition from both Iraq and Syria, IS rose to power and now controls vast stretches of land in both countries. Thus, linking both and creating a so-called Caliphate. However, it is not confining itself to this region alone. In order to expand its power, IS’s “…regional affiliates are seizing terrain, establishing training camps and launching increasingly effective attacks.”Moreover, it is attempting to preserve itself by extending operations outside of Iraq and Syria despite the military actions of the U.S. led anti-IS coalition. In addition, the Islamic State continuously promotes violence and terrorism against Western nations such as the United States, which makes it a major international security threat. According to FBI Director James Comey “…the group’s call to Western Muslims to kill at home has become a serious problem…”
As more areas in the region experience volatility and disorder, IS is able to utilize the environment to benefit and exacerbate existing fissures. As a result, it has been able to expand to other corners beyond the Middle East and North Africa, such as Nigeria, while sustaining itself in Syria and Iraq. The implications associated with the Islamic State’s activities including its declaration of a Caliphate are vast and highly detrimental to Iraq and Syria, as well as to the international community. As this terrorist organization continues its pursuit of power and territorial acquisition, it is ushering in a new era of international jihadism.“It not only threatens to create a major center of terrorism and extremism in a critical part of the Middle East, and one that could spread to threaten the flow of energy exports and the global economy, but become a major center of international terrorism.” Consequently, countering the Islamic State “…is a substantial task that involves coherent, yet geographically dispersed efforts, likely coordinated among multiple allies.”This has resulted in alliances being forged that would once have been deemed impossible, such as those between the United States and Iran as a result of their mutual interest in eliminating IS.
Alliances
It is important to recognize IS’s complex strategy and adopt pragmatic policies and strategies towards it. Acknowledging this, the U.S. has changed the way it frames its policies and strategies towards this enemy. This evolved approach includes the marshaling of divergent capabilities and priorities to sustain diplomacy and management, as well as highly effective hard power strategies such as air strikes. In the fight against IS alliances are vital to establish a strong and lasting counter offensive. This translates into the utilization of multi-lateral alliances with state and non-state partners. This combined action will foster a strategy in which each group’s core competencies will be effectively utilized to weaken and eventually eliminate IS.
The need to undermine IS’s appeal and counter its offensive has translated into a cooperative relationship between key stakeholders. The utilization of each stakeholder’s unique core competencies in a coordinated and consistent strategy at strategic and tactical levels will facilitate IS’s weakening. Alliances between the United States and Iran along with others, such as Iraq and Turkey, as well as Coalition Forces and non-state partners such as militias and community leaders can facilitate a coordinated, layered and multi-lateral strategy to counter IS’s attempt to preserve itself in Iraq and Syria. It can also successfully counter its operations outside this region. While this approach is essential it is not without risks. As such, it is important to have comprehensive understanding of each stakeholder’s interests and forecast potential challenges associated that may emerge as a result of the alliance. Nonetheless, alliances can heighten the impact of resource utilization. Furthermore, by working together to deter, detect, and disrupt surveillance, rehearsals and execution of operations by IS, these partnerships can help strengthen and secure key points in the strategy against IS.
Conclusion:The Islamic State has become a common enemy of many nations and millions of people. It has used terrorism as an instrument to disrupt a regional system to infringe upon the territorial integrity of nations and to inflict violence and terror on a massive scale. IS’s impact does not end at the borders of its so-called Caliphate. It is a major security threat to countries throughout the Middle East and North Africa, the West and beyond. Given the complexity associated with fighting IS and its threat to U.S. national security, it is in the best interest of the U.S. to strategically utilize the core competencies of key stakeholders. This approach can be used not only to counter the terrorist organization, but also curtail issues pertaining to instability, chaos and disorder, which IS takes advantage of to increase its power and influence
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European defense industry’s decreasing competitiveness
September 24th, 2013International Security Observer: By Marco Giulio Barone.
This article seeks to tackle how the European defense industry, while prominent and strong, is losing competitiveness in its domestic and international domains, in particular in favor of the United States and rising economies.
In the last three decades European defense industries have been joining forces, affording major relevant programs concerning sea, air and land systems. Programs such as the Eurofighter and FREMM class frigates demonstrate a high level of know-how and relevant production capability. Nonetheless, given the economic depression and the cuts in defense spending among European states, the consequent shortage of funds is deeply affecting research and development (R&D) capabilities[i]. In addition, programs such as the F-35 and the new NATO missile shield, based on the SM-2/SM-3 missile system, seem to drain further European resources towards investments which favor the U.S. industrial base rather than the European one, which is already threatened by the outcomes of the economic depression[ii]. While nowadays, R&D is the main booster of new generation equipments, Europe is over-constraining its structural investment in the field. Thus, it is no surprise that the industry’s ability to compete in the long term in international markets will be extremely endangered[iii]. On the one hand, some companies are still doing well, compensating for European underinvestment with exports overseas.
Electronics, space and civil aviation are still experiencing growing international presence and business development[iv]. But, on the other hand, there is a clear lack of new latest generation programs due to decreased defense expenditures, from 251 billion EUR in 2001 to 194 billion EUR in 2012[v]. Furthermore, the current trend is expected to continue in the following years, further diminishing public investment in defense. Such a trend is likely to result, in the midterm, in the shortfall of competitiveness and a reduction both in size and relevance of the European industrial base.
Given such a forecast, it is unlikely that the external market could represent a valid alternative to the narrowing internal one for a long time. In particular, the U.S. is going to become a greater competitor, rather than an ally, to European companies. After boycotting several European products which had already been selected by U.S. armed forces, the U.S. defense industry is disrupting European foreign markets[vi]. However, unlike many voices suggest, the U.S. might not be plotting to damage the European industrial system.
Rather, U.S. corporations are looking for worldwide opportunities, due to U.S. budget cuts that, in the last few years, have become truly upsetting for some of them. Nevertheless, unlike the European industry, the U.S. is strongly supported by a coherent national strategy and by the capability of politically sustaining the private sector’s efforts in finding new customers and reducing its reliance on national orders at the same time[vii]. Europe’s political split makes European industries weaker and often in competition with each other (e.g. Eurofighter vs. Rafale in India, Fincantieri vs. DCNS in Brazil, etc.). In addition, the average limited size of European brands severely affects their capabilities of exploiting economies of scale. Therefore, most European products are often more expensive than their international competitors and, at the same time, unavailable for immediate delivery and/or require prolonged acquisition programs[viii]. Thus far, with regards to developing economies such as India, Brazil, Turkey and others, technology transfers and licensed productions represent the “conditio sine qua non” for signing contracts[ix]. Hence, in the midterm, Europe might lose its prominence in the field if a new wave of innovation does not come.
The political realm within which European defense industry operates does not help in finding alternative ways of gathering funds and resources needed for succeeding. In particular, there is no shared European view of the defense market and its related dynamics. Moreover, there is no common political agenda for the pursuit of pooling investments and purchases by European states. Accordingly, state ownership of major firms often leads to duplication and therefore inefficiencies across the whole sector[x].
Public-sector’s influence makes major companies less attractive to the eyes of private investors, who may not want to accept the risk of remaining bridled by political instances, which often drive bigger contracts more than true competition[xi]. Also, states have not yet realized that “one size does not fit all”. In the last few years several technology advancements have come from middle sized enterprises rather than from big firms, especially with respect to the growing drone sector (UAVs, UUVs, etc.). Feeding industries because of their size only, instead of focusing on their actual capability of advancing innovation does not boost competitiveness. Perhaps, European states have demonstrated their eagerness to incentivize only those strategies that take into account the economic constraints more than forward-oriented approaches[xii]. This makes them blind to the dynamics through which the global defense market is evolving today.
The European Commission, already aware of hard times to come for the European defense industry, has tried to intervene by reshaping the regulatory framework in an attempt that favors an upward spiral of liberalization in order to revive competitiveness[xiii]. Joint ventures and mergers are likely to be favored in order to share costs and risks amongst the stakeholders, even if such a formula is no longer trusted by many member states due to increasing costs of the latest programs (e.g. Eurofighter, A-400, NH-90), which have grown far beyond the initial expectations. So, despite of growing concern on this issue, just a few structural changes are likely to occur. For now, no credible countermeasure has been planned or implemented at the strategic level. Rather, each company, with only a few exceptions, is trying to survive on its own, without any comprehensive European strategy.
What are the policy options available to the European Union, then? Until member States embrace a broader view on the issue, almost none. Yet, it is worth exploring what the viable pathways towards recovery look like.
First of all, States should decrease their commitment to big national companies and, rather, pledge funds into those companies which truly demonstrate they can pursue innovation (even if small or medium sized). That said, less State commitment would result into freedom for major industries to decide on their own according to the market, rather than to political considerations. For instance, the failure of EADS-BAE merger is the proof of how counterproductive State intervention can be. In this case, German fear of losing privileges and prominence, because of French leadership in the civil sector and British relevance in the defense sector, dominated the negotiations rather than the broader perspective of a huge European block which would be able to compete in international markets.[xiv].
Second, once again, pursuing coordination in defense spending, at the European level, is a viable way of optimizing available resources. This can be done only if at least the biggest members (Germany, France, Italy, and United Kingdom) agree on a shared strategy. For instance, regarding the aerospace sector, both the Rafale and the Eurofighter are excellent fourth generation products, but affording both projects has meant spending more, increasing the unit price and competing on the same limited market of advanced fighters. The same can be said, for example, for programs such as Horizon class and Daring class destroyers in the naval sector, and so forth.
Finally, finding a common European foreign policy pathway would make the defense industry be backed better (at political level), when promoting and selling its products abroad. Besides, implications of the unitary European foreign policy would include shared needs amongst European armed forces – in the long term -and thus concerning procurement and standardization as well. Consequently, common military requirements and operational similarities would encourage further pursuit of mergers and economies of scale within the European defense industry sector.
The perils of rising religious fundamentalism in the Maldives
August 26th, 2013
by securityobserver.
On April 19th a protest movement aimed at implementing Sharia as the sole source of legal guidance within the archipelago state manifested itself as hundreds of men and women took to the street calling for the full enactment of Islamic Sharia. Today the judiciary of the island state under article 142 of the constitution is required to turn to Sharia regarding matters where codified law is silent. Since judicial competency is at best inadequate, and judges in the past have predominantly been chosen along party affiliation and not expertise, they have become easy targets for forces within the country advocating a hard-line implementation of Sharia. Australia and India have offered assistance in form of legal training, but more needs to be done to ensure the establishment of an unbiased, independent judiciary. One crucial step in the right direction would be a full-fledged translation of legal texts and documents from English into Dhivehi, the national language of the Maldives. If the judiciary remains incapable of fulfilling its role within the state, principles of good governance and democratic values will continue to suffer from erosion. In addition, changes to the constitution should be made, if the Maldives wants to be regarded as a pluralistic and liberal society. Under the current constitution non-Muslims are not allowed to become citizens which is a strong violation of article 18 of the Human Rights Charter (Right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion). Furthermore, the line between codified law and Sharia is becoming increasingly blurry. On March 28th the parliament drafted a penal code bill which includes “Hudud” punishments, such as amputation for theft or flogging for fornication.
The danger of radicalization is not a mere “de jure” threat. There have been several examples in the past months which exemplify a rise in extremist attitudes and actions. Maybe the most shocking incidence occurred in February of this year when a 15 year old traumatized teenage girl, who was raped several times by her stepfather, was sentenced to 100 lashes for having engaged in pre-marital sex and fornication. Although President Mohammed Waheed condemned the sentence saying that the country had to “set up a commission” and that this “case should not have come to the courts at all”, these statements seem shady. Waheed’s comments are not in line with his decision to form a coalition with the “Adhaalath Party”(Justice Party), which backed the flogging, saying “the purpose of penalties like these in Islamic Sharia is to maintain order in society and to save it from sinful acts. We must turn a deaf ear to the international organization which are calling to abolish these penalties”. The “Adhaalath Party” is one of the major forces actively lobbying for a rigid and strict implementation of Sharia. The key proponent for more austere religious practices is the current Minister of Islamic Affairs, Shaykh Shaheem Ali Saeed, who has been quoted saying that music and singing are “haram” (forbidden) and that Christians on the island who he calls “freemasons” are “out to wipe out Islam from the Island”. Another troubling phenomenon is the education of many young Maldivians in madrasas abroad, especially in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Students who unknowingly attended more radical madrasas often return home to the Maldives, expressing their newly acquired fundamentalist views. Many link this new strand of radicalization to the increasing degradation of women, who in some cases are told to stay home and drop out of the labor market. The International Federation of Gynecology and Obstetrics voiced their concern in November 2011 over potential female genital mutilation occurring in the Maldives.
Democracy is above all the constructive interaction between differently minded sections of society. If certain opinions or beliefs are aggressively suppressed, and individuals or interest groups have to fear persecution and punishment for their views, democratic and pluralistic values cannot flourish. If instilling terror becomes an accepted “modus operandi” in everyday Maldivian politics and political forces turn a blind eye or even encourage discriminatory atrocities, the young democracy will not make it out of adolescence.
The Rise of Risk in International Security Policy
July 13th, 2013
By International Security Observer.
Risk is the defining feature of modern society. Citizens today are risk averse and the desire to ‘manage’ risk has become the lingua franca of business, politics, economics and public policy. It has also become the language of security strategy and war. Put succinctly ‘Risk and uncertainty are the hallmark of world politics at the dawn of the twenty-first century’[i]. But why is this? And what does it mean for international security?
At the end of the Cold War there was a transition in security strategy from the monolithic, state-centric viewpoint of a world conveniently split between two (Cold) warring ideological viewpoints to a world of unbounded known and unknown risks, able to spread easily from one part of the world to another, irrespective of state boundaries. From a western security standpoint the end of the Cold War, instead of making states feel more secure, had the paradoxical effect of making states feel more uncertain and at risk than before. The beast had been slain but now the security landscape resembled a jungle full of snakes.
Recognising this, NATO in the nineties changed its modus operandi to one of managing security risks openly acknowledging that the threats its members were up against were not static nation states but elusive and flexible non-state actors able to capitalise on the revolution in information technology and the shrinking of time and space brought about by globalisation. Its 1991 New Strategic Concept acknowledged that ‘In contrast with the predominant threat of the past, the risks to Allied security that remain are multi-faceted in nature and multi-directional, which makes them hard to predict and assess. NATO must be capable of responding to such risks if stability in Europe and the security of Alliance members are to be preserved’[ii]. Likewise the UK 1998 Strategic Review acknowledged that ‘stability based on the active management of risks’ was the challenge at hand[iii].
This shift stems from a wider sociological change to a risk society in which the ideas of controllability, certainty and security have collapsed[iv]. The result is state’s scrambling to re-take control of the uncertain future; to manage the risks. Whilst the future cannot totally be colonized, a policy of security risk management, allows states to ‘minimize or reduce factors which lead to risk occurring’[v]. French philosopher Michael Foucault referring to risk once stated the suitable metaphor for government was a ship: in our risk adverse society government attempts to manage risk can be seen as an attempt to steer society toward the safe harbour avoiding risks along the way. If a few targeted killings and pre-emptive strikes mean safe passage, so be it.
Risk in security policy is proving itself to be primarily an energizing principle. Politicians and security decision makers become increasingly reflexive as they endeavour to avert future risks through anticipatory measures. A critical feature of this security “Zeitgeist” is that knowledge and lack of knowledge become equally constitutive[vi] resulting in policy responses that treat them both on the same risk level. Whilst we know what some of the risks are, we also know that there are risks we don’t yet know about which need to be protected against as well. In trying to imagine what these risks are strategists undertake a process of premeditation; imagine the worst futures and then attempt to harness and“commodify” the risks and uncertainty through pre-emptive risk management policies. [vii]
When 9/11 demonstrated the notion of geographical space as a protective barrier was tragically false security, US security planners in response proposed ‘routinizing the exercise of imagination, thus turning a scenario into constructive action’[viii]. Take the publicly presented speculative justification for war in Iraq and Afghanistan where nightmare scenarios of despot leaders colluding with terrorist organisations like Al-Qaeda were “sold” as facts. Former British Prime Minister Tony Blair, referring to Afghanistan, stated that ‘whilst there are risks of action, we know the risks of inaction are much greater’ a rationale mirrored by former U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney regarding Iraq: ‘the risks of inaction are far greater than those of action’[ix]. Similarly the policy of drone strikes and targeted killings are a reflection of a security policy of pre-emption rather than reaction. Targeted killings are a form of ‘uncertainty absorption’ literally aimed at the elimination of threats before they can demonstrate their full potential. Individuals who may not have been responsible for a criminal act on foreign soil and might not even present an imminent threat are targeted owing to their status as a potential risk. A report by the Council of Foreign Relations on drones states that ‘the vast majority of those targeted via drones were neither al-Qaeda nor Taliban leaders rather most were low-level, anonymous suspected militants who were predominately engaged in insurgent or terrorists operations against their governments, rather than in active international terrorist plots’[x][xi]. The logic of objectification and imagining futures inherent in security risk management magnifies the non-innocence of low level insurgents to those of top leaders. As former President George W. Bush once said ‘If we wait for threats to fully materialize, we have waited too long’[xii].
The largest problem with making risk the heuristic device through which security policy is determined is that unlike risk management in business and economics, security risk is not objective and quantitatively rational. Risks are socially constructed phenomena meaning they can be whatever the decision makers of the day want them to be. This has real life and death consequences for when one selects a strategy of making presumed (lack of) knowledge the foundation of actions against risks the flood-gates of fear are opened and everything becomes threatening and everyone a potential risk[xiii]. The effect of this modus operandi within international security is that whilst simultaneously making citizens more secure by eliminating risks before they become active threats capable of destruction, the culture of risk-management perpetuates itself as, without a concrete enemy, new risks always have to be established and managed in order for societies to convince themselves they are secure.
http://securityobserver.org/the-rise-of-risk-in-international-security-policy/