December 12th, 2015
By Elena Marchetti.
The Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) published an item on Kim Jong Un’s visit to an historic arms factory, founded by his grandfather, President Kim Il Sung. During the visit Kim supposedly extolled the North Korean arms industry and used language that the media has reported as indicating North Korea has a hydrogen bomb.
Below is reproduced what Kim said, in English translation:
‘The Phyongchon Revolutionary Site is a birthplace of the Songun (i.e., military first) arms,” Kim said. “Every gun, produced thanks to the tireless efforts of the President, has formed a forest of arms defending the Party and the revolution, the country and its people and the historic gun report made by him at the site turned the Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea (DPRK) into a powerful nuclear weapons state ready to detonate a self-reliant (i.e., homemade) A-bomb and H-bomb to reliably defend its sovereignty and the dignity of the nation. If we struggle in the same spirit with which the workers produced submachine guns by their own efforts just after the liberation of the country when everything was in need, we can further build up our country into a powerful one no enemy dare to provoke.” He also stressed “the need to steadily put big efforts on the development of the country’s munitions industry associated with devoted efforts of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il,”
The KCNA article used different Korean words for A-bomb and for H-bomb, indicating that the writers were aware that there is a difference. Nevertheless, the run-on sentence is difficult to understand in translation. It attributes the nuclear weapons program to Kim Il Sung who once said North Korea should never have nuclear weapons. The trajectory from making machineguns in the Phyongchon factory to producing nuclear weapons pretty much omits President Kim.
A second point is that the North’s readiness to detonate is separate from its ability to detonate. The North also is ready to launch an ICBM against the US, if it had one that worked. It is not clear that readiness to detonate is the same as possession. The North lies whenever it is in its interest especially when the international community is not paying it much attention.
Still, the comments attributed to Kim Jong Un are the first time that KCNA has published an item mentioning the terms DPRK and H-bomb in the same article, but that does not mean Kim actually spoke the Korean word for H-bomb. Everything published by the official media is heavily edited. Only the people who accompanied Kim on the inspection tour know what he actually said, if anything. The North Korean propagandists, however, had to have received approval from Kim himself or from his personal secretariat to publish any remarks supposedly said by the North Korean leader. Everything he says or does is a national secret. The article is evidence the North’s leadership and propagandists understand the impact on their audiences of the language in the KCNA article.
It could just be that the writers conflated existing capabilities (A-bombs) with planned capabilities (H-bombs). Nevertheless, the article supports an inference that North Korean scientists have done at least some research on thermonuclear weapons. The timing of the KCNA article, relative to the high-level meetings in Kaesong on 11 December, is meant to assure all parties that the North’s willingness to engage in discussions does not signify weakness. Concern about its public image seems to be a North Korean concern whenever it engages in negotiations with South Korea or the US. There is no reason to doubt that North Korea would like to develop thermonuclear weapons as the next step in its nuclear weapons program. If it had them, it would certainly be ready to detonate them in defense of North Korea. No thermonuclear detonation has been detected. No weapons expert, who studies North Korea, judges it has developed an H-bomb.
Chinese reaction. At the daily press conference, the foreign ministry spokesman received a question about the KCNA article.
“Reporter: It has been reported that the leader of the DPRK said that the DPRK has become a powerful country with nuclear weapons and that it is capable of detonating atomic bombs and hydrogen bombs developed with independent research. What is your comment on that?”
“Foreign Ministry spokesman: I have taken note of the relevant report. The Chinese side has always called for adhering to the realization of non-nuclearization on the Korean Peninsula, adhering to the maintenance of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, and solving the problem through dialogue and consultations. We hope that all parties concerned will make constructive efforts to maintain the peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and to restart the Six-Party Talks at an early date.”
The government spokesman’s response is as close to a reprimand of North Korea as the Foreign Ministry is likely to go. The Chinese position has been quite consistent, but the target of non-nuclearization has changed. Fifty years ago, China wanted the US to remove nuclear weapons from the Peninsula. North Korea had none. In the past nine years, since the first North Korean nuclear test, North Korea has become China’s target of non-nuclearization.
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December 9th, 2015
By Elena Marchetti.
On Monday night, 7 December, Taliban forces stormed a Kandahar police station and engaged in a firefight in which three police officers and two of the attackers were killed.
The Kandahar airfield complex is the southern citadel of the government and its foreign support. It is fortified and defended. Thus, even a minor penetration of the security system required inside assistance.
The last significant Taliban action in Kandahar was a suicide attack in early November. The security situation in Kandahar does not seem dire. Suicide attacks seem to be unpreventable, but the government and the Allies have found ways to limit the damage and casualties they cause.
Nevertheless, yesterday’s attacks represent an escalation from the attacks on district centers in nearby provinces and from the temporary capture of Kunduz City in October. This was an attack at the heart of the government’s strength. Cumulatively, such attacks weaken public confidence in the government’s ability to protect the populace.
In Shindand District in western Afghanistan (Herat Province), local Afghan police said on 8 December that rival Taliban factions engaged in a gunfight in which 54 men were killed and 40 wounded. The fight was between local commanders loyal to Mullah Mansour and others loyal to Mullah Mohammad Rasool Akhund, who rejects Mansour’s legitimacy as overall Taliban leader. On 8 December, suicide bombers attacked Kandahar airport, penetrating the outer security ring. Simultaneously, other Taliban fighters attacked residential housing that is used by foreign military personnel. At least 9 people plus ten suicide bombers died and 15 were injured.
This is the first report that factional rivalry has affected Taliban groups in western Afghanistan. Prior to this clash, most of the reports of factional fighting have mentioned locations in the east or at Taliban safe havens in Pakistan. It lends credence to reports of factional fighting among the leadership because it exposes the gravity of the leadership dispute. While the factional clashes benefit the government, they also offer opportunities for recruiters from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) to attract Afghans who are anti-government and not tied to the Pakistan-based leadership.
The factional fighting influences who receives finances and other support and how much. ISIL’s appeal is that it has the resources to fill shortfalls that local Taliban groups experience.
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July 16th, 2015
By Elena Marchetti.
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) – the title of the nuclear agreement between Iran and six powers, among which the United States – presents a few obvious points have been missed in most news coverage of this plan of action.
First, the agreement is not a non-proliferation agreement. It is an agreement that approves limited proliferation of nuclear technology. This characterization means that the US and others states surrendered or abandoned their longstanding position of banning any Iranian nuclear program, peaceful or not.
It also is not a nuclear containment agreement. At most, it postpones some aspects of Iranian nuclear infrastructure development. In other areas, Iran can continue to develop and modernize to keep up with technology. At the end of 15 years at most, Iran has no more restrictions on its nuclear program, with the approval of the UN and the other powers, by implication.
This compromise of the longstanding programmatic ban for Iran is curious because that remains the US objective for North Korea. The US insists that North Korea, which already has nuclear weapons, must dismantle its nuclear program, not just its weapons program. That is the premise of the Six Party Talks.
The difference in the negotiating positions is even stranger because the Iranian and North Korean weapons programs appear to be essentially variants of the same program. The North Korean variant is more advanced. Nevertheless, North Korea has assisted Iran’s ballistic missile programs since the Iraq-Iran War. Iranians have been reported as observers at North Korean missile and nuclear tests. The cooperation continues as does the North Korean program.
The second point is that it is a very one-sided deal. It lacks mutuality. By an overwhelming margin the burden of performance is on the UN, the European Union and the US. Its economic implications far exceed its nuclear restrictions. From the Iranian viewpoint, the JCPOA is primarily an economic agreement.
In return for some reduction in the Iranian nuclear programs, the UN and the US will remove the entire architecture of sanctions imposed by any party on any Iranian party. In addition, they will allow Iran to buy and sell conventional weapons and they will help Iran get access to trade, technology, finance and energy. According to the text, this is one paragraph in which Iran “agreed” to the actions by the UN and the US.
One of the implications of this is that Iran stands to emerge quickly as a regional economic power. Using Germany as a model, that condition is far more enduring and consequential than a delayed nuclear program. Once Iran’s economy starts to rebound, it will be free from the threat of sanctions to ensure compliance. There is no credible enforcement mechanism.
A third point is that the text is a plan of action, as it is entitled. Significant by their absence in the text are the words “promise” and “agree” which are the cornerstones of enforceable agreements. The text uses the formulation that the parties “will” do things. Those could all be done independently or not. There is no bargain evident.
An enforceable agreement is an exchange of promises of performance. A plan of action implements those promises. The performance of one party is conditioned on the performance by the other party, by the language of the agreement. The terms of the JCPOA are independent.
This plan of action implements no agreement because no such document exists. An agreement can be implied from the language of the plan, but the language must establish a “meeting of the minds.”
Fourth, a strong argument can be made that there is “no meeting of the minds,” a classic term of contract law that is the basis for every agreement. The awkwardness of the structure makes clear that the intentions of the parties are not congruent and the goals are even farther apart.
Fifth, the JCPOA text contains no definition of terms, such as explanations for the various time terms. A plan of action requires some agreed definitions of terms. One plausible theory for a ten year time period, for example, is that Iranian strategists might have concluded that Iran faces no existential threat for at least a decade, as long as Iran did not provoke a regional nuclear arms race.
They also might have judged that after ten years Iran must be prepared for an even more uncertain strategic environment than the present. If this theory is accurate, Iran gave up little in return for a chance to be the regional economic hegemon. The emergence of an economically powerful Iran would alter strategic power relationships.
Finally, the six powers did not include a term requiring Iran to affirm or promise that it possesses or has access to no nuclear weapons now, in Iran or elsewhere. That seems to be a significant omission in crafting. If Iran already has nuclear weapons, the JCPOA would be a strategic victory for Iran.
Assuming Iran abides by the JCPOA to the letter, the JCPOA will empower Iran economically and that will shift the balance of power in the region, regardless of the nuclear program. The Iranians do well to celebrate.
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July 9th, 2015
By Elena Marchetti.
International news outlets have extolled the news that representatives of the government in Kabul and of the Taliban met in Islamabad, Pakistan, over the past few days, to discuss conditions for peace. There have been so many false starts on talks that this latest initiative hardly deserves much comment. On the other hand, the new factor in the security equation in Afghanistan is the emergence of groups that have pledged allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL or ISIS, the Levant being the “Sham” in Arabic).
The emergence of such groups has changed the nature of the security situation. The Taliban’s leaders in Quetta, Pakistan, can no longer pursue passive aggressive policies, awaiting the final departure of Western forces. The activities of ISIL adherents compel the Taliban leaders to be more assertive and aggressive against ISIL. Assuming the talks are authentic, the emergence of ISIL in Afghanistan has provided a unique impetus for the government and Mullah Omar’s Shura to work together so that Afghans remain in control of Afghanistan.
Also on the news these days: after talks in Pakistan, Pakistani and Afghan spokesmen said the Afghan government delegation and the Taliban delegation agreed to resume talks after Ramadan, which ends in ten days. The positive tone of official statements does not look genuine because the Taliban issued no statement about the talks.
Afghanistan and Pakistan did. Both have strong interests in successful talks that would encourage them to put a positive spin on the talks. The lack of details, however, undermines their upbeat tone. Pakistan is brokering these talks. It stands to lose its stature as an honest broker – which it never has been – if the talks fail. China and the US sent observers to the talks.
A strong bias seems justified against Pakistanis involved with Afghanistan affairs. Pakistan has done nothing to suppress the Afghan Taliban who operate from Pakistan. Pakistani counter-insurgency operations have targeted Pakistani Taliban who seek to overthrow the government in Islamabad. Pakistani intelligence continues to aid and abet Afghan Taliban who operate against the Kabul government from safe havens in Pakistan.
Now the Pakistanis are hosting peace talks that would not be necessary were Pakistani officials honest about their Afghanistan policy.
When Pakistani generals, such as Chief of Army Staff General Sharif, brag about eliminating the terrorist threat in northwestern Pakistan, they are only referring to Islamic miscreants who want to replace the Islamabad government with an Islamic tyranny. General Sharif, for example, never said that the Pakistan Army and security forces evicted Mullah Omar from Quetta or suppressed the Afghan Taliban leadership that operates from Quetta.
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April 17th, 2015
By Elena Marchetti.
Jane’s Intelligence published a readout of recent commercial satellite imagery that shows Chinese engineers are making significant progress in constructing a runway on Fiery Cross Reef in the Spratly Islands – these islands are disputed between the People’s Republic of China, the Republic of China (Taiwan), and Vietnam, with Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philippines claiming parts of the archipelago.
When completed, the runway will be 3,000 meters in length and have a parking apron and support facilities. China has had a weather station on the reef since 1988. In 2014 Chinese engineers began land reclamation. That work has converted the reef into one of the largest islands in the Spratlys.
The Chinese also appear to be building a runway on Subi Reef, but it is less advanced than that on Fiery Cross Reef. China was considered the only claimant to South China Sea islands and structures that had no airstrip.
That condition is about to change. Construction of a 3,000m runway signifies that the Chinese are building a remote airbase. That means that the entire train of support capabilities will be present.
They include air defense missile systems, radar systems, navigation aids, ordnance storage, fuel storage and facilities for air and ground crews. The Reef already hosts 200 Chinese troops. Eventually, there will be more air strips with radars and air defenses.
The Chinese are deadly serious about asserting and defending their claims. As the Chinese continue to improve their holdings in the Spratlys, the prospects for negotiating meaningful compromises among the claimants diminish in direct proportion to the completion of China’s improvements and upgrades.
If Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam want to hold onto the islands they now occupy, they must be prepared to defend them.
The logic and energy of China’s consolidation of its claim to own the South China Sea and its structures require China to demand the removal of Philippine, Malaysian and Vietnamese outposts and troops in the Spratlys. Such a demand creates the condition for confrontation that needs to be carefully monitored.
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April 15th, 2015
By Elena Marchetti.
Operation Decisive Storm, Yemen. Country Commitment: Saudi Arabia 150,000 soldiers 100 combat aircraft, United Arab Emirates 30 combat aircraft, Bahrain 15 combat aircraft, Qatar 10 combat aircraft, Kuwait 15 combat aircraft, Jordan 6 combat aircraft , Sudan Unknown number of soldiers, Egypt 4 navy ships/ aircraft, Morocco Willing to participate, Turkey Supports the operation – statement: “We support the military operation that has started against the Houthis. We believe this campaign will help prevent the risk of a civil war and chaos that has surfaced in the country, and will restore the legitimate state”, Pakistan “Will defend Saudi Arabia if attacked”
Total of 11 Countries. More committed than against the (Sunni) Islamic State, perhaps?
The Saudis apparently would like to avoid a ground invasion of Yemen, if possible. They remain open to negotiations with the Houthis, but the Houthis must cede everything they have gained since last September as a condition for negotiations.
US: The US issued the following official statement, “In support of Gulf Cooperation Council actions to defend against Houthi violence, President Obama has authorized the provision of logistical and intelligence support to GCC-led military operations.
While U.S. forces are not taking direct military action in Yemen in support of this effort, we are establishing a Joint Planning Cell with Saudi Arabia to coordinate U.S. military and intelligence support.”
Decisive Storm is not sustainable without American logistic support.
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