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Taiwan Needs a Counter-Propaganda Strategy
August 14th, 2015
By J. Michael Cole.
Anyone who has spent enough time in Taiwan should be aware of the fundamental difference that exists between the Chinese and Taiwanese societies. Young Taiwanese — those who were born in the late 1980s onwards — have no other experience of citizenship than that of living in a democracy. Granted, their identity can be shaped by the experiences of their parents and grandparents who lived under Martial Law and the Cold War, but first and foremost, theirs is the life of citizens of a liberal-democracy. For young Chinese from the same generation, the experience is markedly different.
They grew up in an authoritarian system that fosters amnesia. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) doesn’t want them to know the past — or to put it better, it wants them to know a version of the past that lionizes the CCP and one in which discussing party mistakes is risky business.
For most young Chinese, a strong party-state that ensures stability, economic growth, and which fuels their nationalistic pride, is sufficient. Democratic ideals are unnecessary — and sometimes dangerous — intrusions by a West that wants to keep China “weak.” Those are the two narratives that exist in the Taiwan Strait today. However difficult it might be for young Taiwanese to articulate their version, there is no doubt that liberal-democracy is intrinsic to their identity.
A ‘new’ Taiwanese identity
So what do I mean by “Taiwanese”? It’s important that we get the definition right, as this will have a direct impact on how young Taiwanese can explain who they are, and what Taiwan is all about, to a global audience. Much of this can be self-evident to the people who live here. After all, their identity is their everyday life. But we should never assume that what is simple here is instantly understandable to people abroad who know very little about Taiwan and who are constantly bombarded by Chinese propaganda. Being a Taiwanese today transcends “ethnicity” (e.g., Taiwanese, waishengren, Hakka, Aborigine).
The Taiwan nation-state is therefore multicultural, and citizenship is defined by one’s participation in, and as a “subject” of, Taiwan’s democratic experiment. Thus, one can identify as “ethnically” or culturally Chinese (according to the latest NCCU poll those who do so account for 3.3% of respondents), and yet also regard him/herself as a Taiwanese. This is very similar to citizenship as it is understood in Western multicultural countries like the U.S., Canada, and the U.K. Taiwan’s definition of the nation is therefore very much rooted in Western traditions. Young Taiwanese seem to have internalized the multicultural definition of citizenship better than previous generations.
The composition of last year’s Sunflower Movement, or the fact that young “ethnic” Taiwanese were fighting for the civic rights of old Nationalist soldiers at he Huaguang Community in Taipei the previous year, is evidence of this. That is largely because the ties that tied many residents to China no longer exist — or only exist among elderly individuals. Home is where you sit, and for young Taiwanese, China may be the land of one’s ancestors, but this attachment has as much influence as, say, my own ancestors — from Ireland and France — on my own identity as a Canadian.
That is why many second- and third-generation “mainlanders” are truly Taiwanese in their citizenship, even if some of them might not know it or are afraid to say so. More and more, whether they are “blue” or “green,” what differentiates all of them from the Chinese is self-evident, at least to those of us who live here. Understanding this is crucial, because this is not how China understands citizenship and nationalism. For it, nationalism is civilizational; it transcends borders so that wherever one is geographically, he or she remains a Chinese with responsibilities and obligations toward the “motherland.”
That’s why you will find many more Chinese overseas who are proactively — and very vocally — advocating for their country’s position on territorial disputes, Tibet, Xinjiang, Hong Kong…and Taiwan, of course. This contrasts with how the many Taiwanese who live overseas often have become citizens of their adopted country first and are Taiwanese second. The challenge is to explain this to a foreign audience. But before Taiwanese can do so, they must also address the second divide, and this one, ironically, exists between the Taiwanese in Taiwan and overseas Taiwanese.
The Taiwanese divide
Over the years I have often noted a certain sense of “we know better” among overseas Taiwanese vis-à-vis the Taiwanese who are here in Taiwan. I’ve often heard criticism by overseas Taiwanese that the people here — especially young people — are “apolitical,” or worse, that they are being deceived or “brainwashed” by the Chinese Nationalist party (KMT). I think those accusations could be true if the Taiwanese here didn’t know who and what they are. But most of them do; they’re just very bad at demonstrating it, probably because that’s not an issue to them. If your identity is secure, no matter what the government or the media (or China) tells you, you’ll laugh it off and continue with your life.
That’s even more the case in an open society like Taiwan, where more and more people get their information outside the classroom — at home, among friends, on Facebook, PTT Board, et cetera. They may memorize what they’re told in class or what they read in textbooks, but that’s because they want to pass their exams, get good grades, and secure placement in good universities. Moreover, young Taiwanese here, especially those who are of voting age, must make “pragmatic” decisions because, unlike those who live overseas, they will have to live with the direct consequences of their decisions.
That is why they will sometimes vote in ways that seem odd to Taiwanese overseas, or not come across as “radical” enough in their defense of Taiwan. Taiwanese overseas tend to have an understanding of what it means to be a Taiwanese citizen that is closer to how their parents and grandparents saw it. And because of the traumas they experienced under martial law, it’s not surprising that the KMT, and “mainlanders” in general, would be regarded with suspicion.
While all of this is perfectly understandable, it also prevents many overseas Taiwanese from seeing the extraordinary change that has occurred in Taiwan over the years, and how the definition of what it means to be a Taiwanese has changed. Admittedly, this is something that is difficult to see unless you live in Taiwan long enough. Short summer visits are insufficient, in my opinion, to appreciate just how things have changed. Therefore, if Taiwanese here and those who live overseas are to present a “united front” to advocate for Taiwan, they need to better understand each other. Taiwanese here must better explain what it means to be a Taiwanese in the 21st century, and Taiwanese overseas need to be more open-minded about how identity and nationalism have changed and become more inclusive.
Taiwanese here must also be more open-minded when dealing with their counterparts overseas and avoid making the latter feel like they have been “tainted” by their exposure to a foreign society, that they are no longer “real” Taiwanese. The chasm that continues to exist between Taiwanese here and those overseas is what is preventing an effective counterpropaganda campaign. The support for the Sunflower Movement abroad that we saw last year gives us cause for optimism, but there’s still a lot of work to do.
If the Taiwanese cannot agree among themselves about what it means to be a Taiwanese in 2015, can you imagine how much more difficult it must be for other people to understand, let alone support, Taiwan’s aspirations? The first task, therefore, is for Taiwanese on both sides of the divide — those here in Taiwan and their cousins in the U.S., Canada, Australia and Europe — to better understand each other. Supporters abroad must bring themselves up to date on current realities in Taiwan, even if this means breaking with longstanding notions of identity and nationhood that were passed on to them by their parents and grandparents.
There’s been a generational shift in Taiwan, and it is having a major impact on politics here. A similar generational shift has to take place among overseas Taiwanese. Only once this is accomplished can the Taiwanese turn to the task of convincing the rest of the world about why Taiwan matters and why it is distinct from China. In other words, the Taiwanese need their own United Front and their own propaganda strategy. I propose five areas that need focusing on.
A counterpropaganda strategy
First, they need to demonstrate that the Taiwan “issue” is not merely a dispute pitting Beijing and the “pro-China” KMT against a “small group” of “pro-independence” people from the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Showing that the majority of Taiwanese, including most of the people who vote for the KMT, oppose unification with China, and explaining why that is so, should be a key element to any future counterpropaganda campaign. This would also demonstrate that the real enemy isn’t proximate, but that it is external. As long as the world believes that Taiwan and China are not “re-unified” only because “a small group of people,” abetted by the U.S. security umbrella, do not want it, they will not feel compelled to support Taiwan’s cause or to risk their relationship with China over the matter.
Second, it is important for the Taiwanese to let the world know that they are not “anti China,” a favorite term of CCP propaganda that connotes “irrationality” and “hatred.” For better or worse, Taiwan relies and will continue to rely on China, the world’s second-largest economy and now a major player on the international scene. Consequently, Taiwan has an advantage in China being successful, just as the U.S.’ neighbors have every advantage in that country being successful. But like any other country, Taiwanese must balance the benefits of dealing with China with the shortcomings and risks of doing so. The task for the Taiwanese is to convince the international community that Taiwan’s challenge when it comes to dealing with China is the same as theirs — one of balancing and hedging.
The Taiwanese must demonstrate that rapprochement and the desire for better ties with Beijing are not the equivalent of support for unification; rather, it’s a desire for normalization, for Taiwan to be treated as an equal. If Beijing refuses to do so, then that’s its problem, and it, rather than Taiwan, will be seen as the “irrational” side that threatens regional stability. Simply put, the second task is to counter the perception that Taiwanese represent that “irrational” side, that it undermines peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. Third, Taiwanese counter-propagandists must seize the opportunity that an increasingly repressive China is creating for them.
The crackdown on every aspect of Chinese society — the media, the Internet, churches, rights activists, lawyers, minority groups — that has intensified under President Xi Jinping has made it clear that economic liberalization and modernization have not led to the hoped-for political liberalization. In fact, the opposite has occurred. This makes Taiwan’s democratization even more exceptional and precious.
The same applies to what’s been going on in Hong Kong, which could very well be what awaits Taiwan under the “one country, two systems” formula that Beijing insists on. In other words, the task for the Taiwanese is to connect developments in China with Taiwan to show why Taiwan would inevitably suffer under unification, and why a free, sovereign and democratic Taiwan is good for the region and the international community.
Taiwanese need to ask the world: Do you want to reward the increasingly authoritarian regime in Beijing by “giving” it Taiwan, by subjugating more people to its repressive rule? However, it is very clear that if the Taiwanese are to use this tool, they will have to be more attentive to what’s going on in Hong Kong and China then they do at present. Even though for most of them what happens in China seems irrelevant because this is occurring in a different country, it is extremely relevant to their ability to tell the world why Taiwan is distinct.
Taiwanese who ignore developments in China do so at their peril. Fourth, while this applies less to Taiwanese who live overseas, Taiwanese in Taiwan must improve their communication skills. Unfortunately for them, the rest of the world does not speak Mandarin or read Chinese. Taiwanese must learn to communicate in a language that is understandable to their audience. I’ve been to far too many protests over the years where everything was in Mandarin, while all the placards, posters, and banners were in Chinese. How is the rest of the world supposed to know what’s going on? Why should they care?
Even less helpful are conferences in Taiwanese, where even the Mandarin-speaking journalists who are based in Taiwan have no idea of what’s being said. Learn English properly, or invest in translators. Make it less easy for the rest of the world to continue ignoring Taiwan. Sad to say, but the Chinese are doing a much better job at speaking to the world in a language that it understands. You cannot not care about the rest of the world and yet expect that the rest of the world will care. It’s a two-way street. Fifth, the Taiwanese must find creative ways to combat censorship in the traditional media and academia, which tends to reinforce Beijing’s position on Taiwan.
While it may be difficult to break the intellectual wall that has been erected — often because of economic or institutional interests — new media offer a way to counter this. Taiwanese overseas must also be creative in their campaigns for Taiwan and find ways to generate interest. Simple protests outside a government building by a few dozen individuals might no longer be sufficient. Escalate, but escalate intelligently, so as to avoid making enemies rather than friends. In the end, however, for all these strategies to be effective, Taiwanese in Taiwan and those who live abroad must be on the same page on what it means to be a Taiwanese. Like China, Taiwan must therefore have its own United Front.
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Is Xi Jinping Losing Control of China?
July 20th, 2015
By J. Michael Cole.
“Rarely is authoritarianism a signal of strength; instead, it stems from fear, paranoia, and panic.”
For a country that has accumulated great power and stupendous wealth in recent years, and whose “meritocratic” political system is supposedly leaving democracies in the dust, China’s behavior has been rather odd of late, its regime acting more like a fearful government than an in-group that has the situation well under control. Highly paranoiac and increasingly retributive, President Xi Jinping’s Beijing doesn’t inspire confidence—not among the Chinese people, and not among those who live on China’s “peripheries,” who have taken note of the erosion of liberties that has accompanied this slow descent.
Given its accomplishments over the years, from a booming economy that has lifted millions of people out of poverty to Beijing’s emergence as an indispensable player in global affairs, we’d have assumed that China would have become more self-confident and therefore more willing to accommodate different voices within its society. After all, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has performed rather well on most of the issues that presumably contribute to the legitimization of the party in the eyes of the Chinese people: economy, prestige, and respect.
A more self-assured party that has earned the respect of its people would perhaps even have considered taking the first steps toward political liberalization, a gradual opening up that, while not allowing for pluralism (which remains anathema to the party), could nevertheless have created more space for dissent, civil rights, and the free dissemination of information across society.
But it wasn’t meant to be. Instead, the world’s No. 2 economy has turned in the other direction and threatens to take the country back to an era that most Chinese believed had been buried. Consequently, China is looking increasingly like a police state. Mr. Xi’s anti-corruption campaign, while initially welcomed by the public, has acquired the flavor of a witch hunt in which potential opponents of Mr. Xi, real or imagined, are targeted for various “violations” of discipline and law. Given the often contradictory and certainly arbitrary nature of China’s legal system and tax code, the CCP has dirt on practically anyone and can use this pervasive ambiguity to take would-be opponents out of the game.
Whether the campaign has slipped from Mr. Xi’s control and taken on a life of its own, or was indeed designed to eliminate all his opponents, is the object of debate among China watchers. What is certain, however, is that the current environment, in which one can be part of the in-group one day and targeted for various crimes the next, has echoes of Mao’s China or the Stalin’s Soviet Union.
Even more worrying are signs of a hardening against society itself, as exemplified by the new draft Cyber Security Law, a crackdown on bloggers, and the just-passed new National Security Law, whose broad and vague definition of national security promises further restrictions on free speech and even engages in extraterritoriality by imposing “responsibilities” on the people of Taiwan, a country that has its own national security laws.
The recent detention and disappearance of more than 100 human rights activists and lawyers in a nationwide crackdown against what the authorities described as a “major criminal organization” also signals a marked escalation in state repression of civil society. The move, as well as the death of Tenzin Gelek Rinpoche in a Chinese prison, where he was reportedly denied medical treatment for his heart condition, sparked global condemnation. Along with the arrests, his death has sparked protests against various Chinese diplomatic missions overseas, among them the Chinese consulates in New York City and San Francisco.
All of this—the new stricter laws, the crackdown on non-governmental organizations, lawyers, bloggers, web sites, and journalists—is indicative of a government that does not have the situation under control, a situation that is unlikely to be helped by the recent stock market crash. Rarely is authoritarianism a signal of strength; instead, it stems from fear, paranoia, and panic—hardly the “meritocracy” whose merits Daniel A. Bell vaunts in his new, and not uncontroversial, new book The China Model.
Another problem for Mr. Xi is that the growing repression in China is being noted by people on the “peripheries” who are apprehensive about what this might mean for them. Chief among them are the people of Hong Kong, who under “one country, two systems” have already felt the effects of the mainlandization of the political sphere and whose liberties face further constraints under the new National Security Law, whose purview includes the Special Administrative Region (as well as Macau and presumably Taiwan). The intensification of repression in China proper will inevitably have an effect on civil society in HKSAR, which has already demonstrated its willingness to stand up to Beijing on issues such as genuine universal suffrage.
Whether the crackdown in China and the new regulations will cow the residents of Hong Kong into submission or encourage them to intensify their campaign remains to be seen. My bet is on the latter outcome, which if I am right presages future unrest in HKSAR.
Perhaps even more detrimental to Mr. Xi’s cause is the effect that the ongoing repression across China is having on Taiwan, which Beijing maintains is part of China awaiting “re-unification.” Although the two sides of the Taiwan Strait have joined in a process of rapprochement since 2008, opposition to unification among the Taiwanese public—from support for de jure independence to a desire to maintain de factoindependence under the “status quo”—has remained very high. Among the 15.5 percent of Taiwanese who, according to the latest Taiwan Mood Barometer Survey, support unification with China at some point, only 4.2 percent want such an outcome “urgently”—in other words, irrespective of the current political situation in China. The remaining 11.3 percent, who want the “status quo” for now and would consider unification in future, tend to make the democratization of China a precondition for possible unification.
With all the trend lines in China pointing in the opposite direction, it is difficult to imagine how China could succeed in engineering the “peaceful” unification of Taiwan that the recent détente was supposed to lead to. In fact, the crackdown on Chinese society is having the opposite effect and is hardening the desire among Taiwanese of all political persuasions (the 4.2 percent hardline pro-unification types notwithstanding) to maintain their nation’s independent status. Regardless of the outcome of the January 2016 presidential and legislative elections in Taiwan, the CCP’s intensifying assault on Chinese society will make it increasingly difficult for any government to enter political negotiations with Beijing, let alone on matters that pertain to the sovereignty of Taiwan.
A political system that was already unpalatable to the Taiwanese, who are proud of their rowdy democracy, has become even more unappealing thanks to recent developments in China. Ironically, the hard measures that have been implemented in China recently will make the dream of Chinese “re-unification,” another instrument of self-legitimization for the CCP, a far less achievable one.
Mr. Xi, undoubtedly a proud Chinese nationalist, is struggling to keep it all together, a feat that, given the complexities of China’s society and geography, would be challenging to any leader. But if his “meritocratic” advisers are as meritorious as they are said to be, they would perhaps counsel leniency and tolerance rather than the kind of institutionalized repression that will likely send ripples across China and beyond.
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/xi-jinping-losing-control-china-13366
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China’s New Flight Routes Rile Taipei
January 29th, 2015
By J.Michael Cole.
China has announced new commercial flight routes that run extremely close to Taiwan.
With China’s unexpected announcement on January 12 that four new flight routes running extremely close to Taiwan proper are to be launched on March 5, Beijing may have dispelled any lingering notion that relations across the Taiwan Strait in 2015 will continue to be as “stable” and predictable as they had been over the past six years of the China-friendly Ma Ying-jeou administration. Though sudden, this development is part of a series of signals that lead us to conclude that the era of détente in the Strait, during which Beijing and Taipei engaged in negotiations somewhat as equals, is over. We are now likely entering a period of Chinese unilateralism.
During the six years since Ma became president in 2008 on a platform that emphasized the need to improve relations with China, the two sides of the Taiwan Strait made good use of the many semi-official bodies and Track-1.5/2 forums at their disposal to negotiate a number of agreements, chief among them the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA). Over time, those efforts were supplemented by party-to-party and, in some instances, contact between government officials from the two sides, such as face-to-face meetings between the Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council Minister and his counterpart at the Taiwan Affairs Office. In other words, there has been no lack of communication channels between Taiwan and China, and the opportunities to negotiate various agreements were seemingly limitless.
Which makes China’s announcement on the air routes — M503, running on a north-south axis west of the centerline of the Taiwan Strait, and the east-west routes W121, W122 and W123 — rather alarming. Judging from Taipei’s reaction, Taiwanese authorities were either not consulted or negotiations on the matter had yet to have concluded. According to Bloomberg News, Taiwan and China had held two rounds of discussions to date.
On January 13, Taiwan’s Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) said that M503, which at its nearest point is only 7.8 km from the centerline in the Strait, was too close to the Taipei Flight Information Region, an important air transport zone in the West Pacific. More than 140,000 international flights pass through Taiwanese airspace annually. The CAA also stated that the three other routes, W121, W122 and W123, risked interfering with air transportation between Taiwan proper and the outlying islands of Matsu and Kinmen.
Taipei has called the announcement, done via the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the Montreal-based international organization that had no compunction in initially barring Taiwanese reporters access to its General Assembly in September 2013, stating its “one China” policy, was “hasty,” “unacceptable,” and a “flight safety risk.” The CAA has added it hopes that further negotiations will be held to resolve the matter.
According to York Chen, a former member of Taiwan’s National Security Council, China had attempted to establish new flight routes near the Taiwan Strait in 2007, but abandoned the move following strong pressure from the United States.
In some ways, the unilateral move is reminiscent of China’s declaration in late 2013 of an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea, which overlapped with a section of Taiwan’s airspace. Although China’s ADIZ was ostensibly targeted primarily at Japan, with whom Beijing was engaged in a dispute over the Diaoyutai/Senkaku islets, the zone would nevertheless be a factor in any Taiwan military contingency as it would effectively cut off U.S. forces based in Japan and South Korea from Taiwan. Military implications notwithstanding, Taipei’s reaction to the ADIZ, including that of its armed forces, was relatively meek.
Two factors help explain this reaction: (1) as we just saw, the ADIZ appeared to be aimed at Japan rather than Taiwan (a view that Beijing certainly emphasized); and (2) the context was different: Even in late 2013, when the identification zone was declared, the Ma administration still believed it had things under control and could continue negotiations on an equal footing with Beijing.
The mood in the Taiwan Strait today is markedly different. While Ma, re-elected to a second term the previous year, appeared to Chinese officials in 2013 as “their man,” with whom they could continue to deepen, and perhaps accelerate, the momentum of liberalization in the Taiwan Strait, 2014 was a disastrous year for the Taiwanese leader, who has seen his ability to set the agenda much weakened. The Sunflower Movement’s three-week occupation of the Legislative Yuan, which stalled implementation of the Cross-Strait Services Trade Agreement (CSSTA) and a follow-on trade-in-goods agreement, followed by the abysmal showing of Ma’s Kuomintang (KMT) in the November 29 “nine-in-one” elections, had turned Ma into a sitting duck president.
And Beijing, which had already been losing patience with Ma for the “slow” pace of progress in the Strait, knows this. Unable to deliver what Beijing wants, President Ma is no longer of utility to Chinese leaders, who consequently will not hesitate to take actions that undermine his image with the Taiwanese public. In other words, the finesse is gone: Ma, like his predecessors, is being punished — humiliated, even — for failing to fall in step to Beijing’s tune. In this context, the August 25, 2014 intrusions by Chinese surveillance aircraft into Taiwan’s ADIZ, make a lot more “sense.” Then as now, Beijing’s disregard for Taiwanese sovereignty took precedent over all considerations intended to give President Ma “face.”
If Beijing cannot obtain what it wants through “peaceful means,” it will simply take. The period of tranquility created by Ma’s election was but an interregnum, convenient while it lasted, but not an end in itself for Beijing, which has not relinquished in the least its sovereignty and political claims to Taiwan.
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