Posts by PierreAntoine:
- Demographic evolution
- High unemployment in some Member States & the “Optimum Monetary Zone” theory
- Skills shortages
- Knowledge of other cultures & languages / development of European identity
- Access to best potential training/learning/universities / Erasmus +
- The educational challenge
- The integration challenge
- Competition between “social systems”
- Discrimination between domestic and migrant workers
- Social benefit tourism
- Brain drain
- i. Limit immigration
- ii. Attract qualified migrants (selective immigration)
- iii. Save migrants’ life
- iv. Fight against organised crime (human trafficking, prostitution, etc.)
- v. Distribute responsibility among Member States
- vi. Integrate migrants
- i. Sanctions
- Against criminal organisations
- Against immigrants?
- Against people/businesses who employ undeclared migrant workers
- ii. Rules on how to expulse migrants
- iii. Prevention in migrants’ home countries
- iv. Integration policies & rules on the acquisition of the nationality
- v. Supervision of borders. How? Who pays?
- vi. Rules on skilled workers’ immigration
Making the case for free movement in the European Union
October 22nd, 2014
By Pierre-Antoine Klethi.
Free movement of workers is one of the founding pillars of the Single Market and, by extension, of the European Union. Free movement of citizens then followed in the 1990s, much supported by the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) during the past decade. Free movement can be seen is one of the concrete and visible faces of a European citizenship.
This key achievement of the European integration nevertheless has its critics who point to social dumping and benefit tourism and stir up anti-migrant and anti-EU feelings. In a context of economic crisis, populist speeches find a stronger echo, which is why pro-Europeans like JEF Europe must strongly make the case for free movement. This should, however, not simply take the form of a short catalogue of positive consequences of free movement for European citizens; we must go further than that by admitting that free movement of citizens also generates challenges, and it is our duty to think about potential solutions to these challenges.
The below constitutes an attempt to set a basis for reflection by identifying a number of reasons why intra-EU free movement should be upheld and a number of issues to be addressed if we are to effectively tackle the Eurosceptic discourse. Of course, it is not a comprehensive list and this basis should be enhanced through exchanges, academic research and readings, etc.
1. What are the benefits of free movement in the EU?
For the sake of clarity, it is appropriate to divide the list between economic and non-economic arguments.
1.1. Economic arguments
An ageing population and a demographic decline in nearly all Member States mean that the shrinking workforce will not be able to guarantee the sustainability of the public pension schemes without the help of immigrant workforce (and a significant reform of pension systems).
According to the OMZ theory, labour mobility is a key factor in ensuring the success of a single currency area like the Eurozone. Indeed, when a particular industry in a particular Member State is declining, generating rising unemployment, people should migrate to one or several Member States where the unemployment rate is low and where their skills would be needed.
In this regard, it is worthy to mention that free movement reduced unemployment in EEA countries by 6% in the aftermath of the economic crisis, according to an OECD and EU Commission report.
While some Member States struggle to reduce unemployment, other Member States report (sometimes severe) skills shortages in some sectors and industries. Free movement can contribute to solve this problem by allowing unemployed people with the adequate skills to move to the countries where their skills are needed rather than remaining unemployed or taking jobs below their skills level. That being said, many migrant workers are employed “below their skills” also in their host Member State.
For the Member States receiving migrating workers, free movement also represents an opportunity to attract highly skilled people.
1.2. Non-economic arguments
This is a key point for pro-Europeans: the integration should not be limited to its economic dimension; instead, a European community of people should be developed and then put first. Quite obviously, the development of a European identity requires knowing the citizens of other Member States, acknowledging and respecting our differences, but also identifying our similarities and what holds us together.
For students, free movement enables access to the best universities or training places in their respective disciplines. Admittedly, this will not benefit all Member States’ institutions, but the effects on the people’s skills and knowledge.
The benefits of student exchange programmes such as Erasmus + are linked to the precedent argument about the knowledge of other cultures and languages.
2. An open list of issues to solve if we want to preserve free movement
As stated in introduction, we cannot simply be satisfied with a list of good reasons to support free movement within the EU. Some problems are undeniable and require us to think about answers.
Free movement means, for example, that students will all try to access the best universities. This may put a strain on some Member States’ spending for (higher) education, social benefits (e.g., financial help for housing), etc. Indeed, “mass” education entails costs.
– How to share the “burden”?
– Or how to ensure the Member State where students come to study will reap some benefits of its investment?
Furthermore, an on-going issue is the lack of mutual recognition of qualifications, which continues to be an obstacle for many workers wishing to start a career in another Member State, despite the EU efforts (including case law of the CJEU) to finally solve this issue.
– How to incentivise Member States to fully mutually recognise qualifications?
Let’s not turn a blind eye on this: even when people have decided to move to another Member State and maybe realised the move, they still face obstacles, such as:
– Language (which is why some countries with a low unemployment rate do not attract more people).
– Administrative requirements / bureaucracy.
– The attitude of the population in the host Member State may be hostile.
– Family migration: moving with a whole family is even harder than moving alone (finding a school for children, social security benefits, etc.).
– Some migrants also lack the will to properly integrate in their new State of residence.
Free movement of workers also means that Member States could compete to attract workers (and companies) by adjusting social norms and social security contributions.
– A linked issue is the posting of workers. What is our assessment of the adjustment to the relevant rules, starting with the Posted Workers Directive?
Also EU law has already done a lot to progress on this issue, it cannot be excluded that more needs to be done.
This is one of the mantra of anti-EU, anti-immigration populist parties: lots of immigrants would move to countries offering generous social benefits and become a burden for these countries. However, several studies have shown this is just a myth: migrant workers often rely less on social security systems than local people do! But maybe we can figure out some way to improve the fight against a phenomenon which, even if marginal, nevertheless exists.
Free movement may incentivise the higher skilled people to move where they can find jobs. The risk is then that some Member States lose a workforce that is very important for the further economic development of these Member States. This may prevent them from closing the gap to the richest Member States.
– How to compensate the effects of a potential intra-EU brain drain?
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Thinking a reform of the European immigration policy
October 28th, 2013
By Pierre Antoine Klethi.
The repeated tragedies in the Mediterranean Sea, with hundreds of migrants drowning in the recent weeks not far from Lampedusa’s and Malta’s coasts, have prompted calls for a reform of the European immigration policy. Other cases widely discussed in the media, e.g., the “Leonarda affair” in France, strengthen the need to address this issue which must not be abandoned to populists and far right politicians.
This paper does not intend to give a single solution to the problem; it rather points to key questions regarding the purpose and the instruments of a European immigration policy which policymakers have to answer. Let us remember that, according to Article 67(2) TFEU, the Union “shall ensure the absence of internal border controls for persons and shall frame a common policy on asylum, immigration and external border control, based on solidarity between Member States, which is fair towards third-country nationals. […]”
Which purposes for the European immigration policy?
Let us look at several purposes that the European immigration policy could have. Two remarks: they are not mutually exclusive and they are presented in a random order.
The fear of the stranger is always present in a society, but because of the economic crisis and a feeling of uncertainty due to the pace of change in the world this feeling is even more widespread today. A mix of nationalists, populists and anti-globalisation people currently try to capitalise on this situation. EU leaders must decide whether they want to follow this trail or to offer another solution to soothe people’s fears while guaranteeing a relatively open and welcoming Europe.
Europe has an ageing population. Birth rates have fallen in nearly all EU Member States below the ratio of population renewal. This has various problematic consequences for Europe’s economies: there are fewer workers on the job market (potential consequences are lower tax revenues and lower economic growth) and public pension schemes face ever deeper deficits. A solution is to increase the retirement age, but this only defers the skills shortage. Therefore, it is important to let skilled migrants in. Some countries, e.g., Germany, already recognise the urgency to address the issue. Others fear that migrant workers may take jobs away from national workers.
Saving migrants’ life is actually what sparked the current debate. The EU is totally allowed to decide to limit immigration and to send back illegal immigrants to their home countries, but it cannot let people die close to its borders. So, coordinated action must be taken to better monitor the borders and prevent human disasters from happening. Both Member States (in particular, Italy) and the EU (regarding Frontex and Eurosur) have announced new actions; they will have to be concretely implemented and their efficiency will have to be checked.
Illegal immigrants often pay thousands of euros to enter the EU by illegal means, either by sea (crossing the Mediterranean) or by land (the “Balkan route”). This benefits boatmen who do not hesitate to let migrants die if they risk being caught. Furthermore, illegal immigrants are particularly vulnerable to exploitation as they are afraid to go to the police. Therefore, human trafficking and prostitution thrive at the expense of illegal immigrants, in particular women and children. This is humanly unacceptable. Moreover, it poses a security problem in the host country (an EU Member State). Therefore, the EU, as a space of free movement between Member States, cannot ignore this issue.
The current rules – the Dublin II Regulation 2003/343/EC – determine which Member State is responsible for examining an asylum request: in principle, the competent State is the one where the asylum seeker “first lodged his application” (article 5(2)), which is usually the State through which the asylum seeker entered the EU. The purpose of this rule is to prevent a situation where migrants would apply for asylum in different Member States or a situation where migrants would apply where they have statistically the highest probability to be accepted. However, this regulation is criticised by human rights bodies and organisations and by southern European countries, because it places the biggest part of the burden on border countries. The economic problems currently affecting Greece and Italy further deteriorate the already precarious situation if migrants in these countries. These countries would like the other Member States to accept a bigger share of the migrant’s inflow.
Last but not least, an immigration policy cannot only deal with illegal immigration; it must also discuss the fate of those who legally enter the EU. An integration policy is very important both for the migrants, to help them feel at home, and for the host State’s population, to reduce their fears about immigration.
Instruments
The choice of the instrument depends on which purpose(s) will be pursued by the EU immigration policy.
Sanctions are an instrument that seems appropriate for 2 of the 6 potential purposes listed above: limit immigration and fight against organised crime. At the same time, we must note that this instrument is already quite developed and failed to fully reach its goals yet.
This section is already quite developed in existing domestic law. But current rules do not stop the migrants’ inflow. It is important to insist on increasing the cooperation between the national forces of different Member States, and it is also vital to look at data regarding other activities (e.g., prostitution, drug trafficking) to have a clearer picture of sophisticated criminal organisations for which illegal immigration is only one branch of activity.
Illegal immigrants are victims of human traffickers, but if the purpose of the immigration policy is to reduce the current migration flows, they also offend the law of the host Member State by illegally entering its territory. Currently, migrants facing expulsion are often detained in bad conditions. Furthermore, the risk of sanctions and expulsion does not seem to stop the migrants from trying to cross Europe’s borders. So, even if sanctions against illegal immigrants may be part of a solution aimed at reducing immigration, they are certainly not enough.
This is probably a key issue. Such sanctions already exist, but they are sometimes (very) weakly enforced. Indeed, illegal immigrants are a cheap labour force and therefore allow businesses who employ them to cut costs. But authorities should realise that undeclared jobs are bad not only for the illegal workers (who are exploited by their bosses and cannot denounce them for fear of being arrested) but also for business competitors who respect the rules about workers’ pay and therefore face unfair competition. So, authorities have a human rights and an economic incentive to act.
As a complement to sanctions, EU-wide rules of procedure to expulse migrants should be adopted, e.g. which criteria can prevent an expulsion? And how should a country deal with people waiting to be expulsed? Adopting such rules is necessary to spread ‘good practices’, to prevent violations of the Human Rights of the migrants, and to avoid that migrants are not treated the same across Europe.
This instrument also already exists in form of cooperation and repatriation agreements negotiated bilaterally with some of the migrants’ home countries. It aims at limiting immigration from the outset. Sometimes, it contributes to selective immigration, e.g., by making it easier for students to get a visa to attend university in the EU. The effectiveness of this instrument of course depends upon the home State’s good will and administrative and police capabilities. It would probably be worth having a thought about whether this instrument should be reformed and developed, maybe by strengthening legal migration possibilities.
This is an instrument dedicated to the fifth and sixth purposes outlined above. These policies and rules would determine how to cope with the inflow of immigrants if it is decided that they are allowed to stay.
Indeed, one “solution” to illegal immigration is to legalise the presence of those already arrived. But the risk is to attract far more immigrants, if they have the impression that they will always be accepted despite entering illegally the EU.
Integration policy and rules on the acquisition of the nationality are, however, also instruments applicable to legal migration. If legal migrants are better integrated, European societies will become more cosmopolite, more tolerant and open, and maybe richer.
This instrument is related to the distribution of responsibility between Member States, but also to the aim of saving migrants’ life. The current situation is unsatisfactory for many stakeholders, so European leaders have the duty to think again how to share the burden and whether the budget of existing instruments like Frontex and Eurosur should not be increased. In addition, the means of supervision should be redefined, to improve the effectiveness of the control and minimise the risk that tragedies like in Lampedusa happen again.
At EU level, there is already the Blue Card Directive (2009/50), which allows highly qualified migrants to work in any EU Member State except the UK, Ireland and Denmark. But it may still be too restrictive and all Member States have not implemented properly the text yet. Elaborating such rules should not only involve ministers for Home Affairs, but also ministers for Economics.
Reforming the EU immigration policy should not be done in a hastened manner with the sole aim of gaining media coverage and pretending to address people’s fears. It is an important issue and, as such, deserves some cool-headed thinking before adopting precise rules. One thing is certain: there is no easy solution!
Pierre-Antoine KLETHI
Analysis of the 2013 State of Union speech delivered by José Manuel Barroso
September 16th, 2013
By Pierre Anthony.
J.M. Barroso’s 2013 State of Union (SOTEU) speech
On Wednesday 11 September 2013, José Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission, delivered the last State of Union speech of this legislature. In this article, we deconstruct the speech and point out its key elements. The length of the speech has probably made it boring to the media looking for catchy titles and sentences, but we believe it was more interesting than has been claimed in general. However, this does not prevent us from formulating criticism on certain issues. Here is our belated (sorry!) analysis.
The content of the speech can be articulated in 3 parts: a review of what has been achieved in the past years, an overview of the challenges and projects for the coming months, and a long-term vision of the European integration based upon the founding principles and purposes of the EU.
I/ Defending the action of the EU to face the crisis of the recent years
Although J.M. Barroso mentioned it towards the end of his speech, we want to note from the outset that he was right reminding that the EU is not the cause of the crisis. Of course, the actors on the financial markets cannot be blamed alone, nor can the USA and their housing market bubble: European national regulators have failed to prevent European banks from being over-exposed to risk and some governments have recklessly managed their public finances. But it is important to note that the EU itself is not the cause of the crisis: it was not competent for banking supervision and the attempts to enforce the rules set in the Stability & Growth Pact were hindered by the Member States, starting with France and Germany. The EU was only competent for monetary policy (via the ECB).
So, as Mr Barroso said, what we can do is to “explain how Europe has worked to fix the crisis”. In his own words, the EU and its Member States have achieved something “we would never have thought […] possible 5 years ago” when Lehman brothers collapsed. New rules to make the financial markets safer and force their protagonists to act more responsibly have been adopted. Fiscal discipline and structural reforms have been (painfully) pushed through in many countries that needed it (although the appropriate speed of spending cuts is questioned).
Moreover, more than €700 billion have been mobilised to stabilise the financial situation of Member States on the brink of bankruptcy, so that no one was expelled from the Eurozone. On the contrary, the EU welcomed its 28th member, Croatia, and Latvia will join the Eurozone on 1 January 2014. J.M. Barroso underlined the inter-institutional effective cooperation, in particular between the Commission and the European Parliament that allowed achieving all this.
He praised the legislative work of the MEPs and the decisive role they played all over the past four years, and regretted this effort was not more widely known by the citizens. The President of the Commission also called upon his listeners to “draw confidence from [the progress achieved] to pursue what we have started”.
Finally, Mr Barroso pointed out what has improved in the recent months and expressed hope that this progress would continue in the future. He declared that instead of receiving lessons at the G20, European efforts had been appreciated and encouraged this year. Not only the international partners were convinced; on the basis of various indicators, the European Commission’s President also claimed that investors’ and consumers’ confidence was rising.
He also noted that the countries “most vulnerable to the crisis and [which] are now doing most to reform their economies” start earning positive results of their policies: Spain regained competitiveness; Portugal’s economy returned to growth; Greece will achieve a primary budgetary surplus; Cyprus implements the aid programme as schedules; and Irish companies, are re-hiring staff while the country’s economy is likely to grow for the third consecutive year. For Europe as a whole, “recovery is within sight”. However, Mr Barroso is right to say that “this should push us to keep our efforts”.
II/ An outline of the program for the coming months
Consequently, the second main element of the speech is the programme set for the coming months. The President of the European Commission insisted on continuing our efforts to stimulate the recovery, so that the young and the unemployed regain hope and benefit from the recovery. He spoke about completing the banking union, considered as a priority.
The first phase (a single supervisory mechanism under the responsibility of the ECB) is nearly completed, but another pillar, the single resolution mechanism, progresses very slowly because several Member States (in particular, Germany) are reluctant to adopt it. Mr Barroso also linked the banking union to “restoring normal lending to the economy, notably to SMEs”, reminding that sound and stable banks are necessary to support businesses and stimulate the economic activity.
Growth is indeed “necessary to remedy today’s most pressing problem: unemployment.” At European level, an important leverage for growth is completing the single market where it does not yet exist, e.g., “communications, energy, finance and e-commerce”. To succeed in reaching this goal, the Commission presented a legislative package on telecoms to bring down prices and “present new opportunities for companies”.
In addition, the “broader digital agenda” will be accompanied by legislation on data protection, which is indeed necessary to protect citizens’ and businesses’ interests and gain their trust. The Single Market Act I and II also need to be completely implemented. Moreover, the Horizon 2020 framework programme aims at stimulating innovation, technology and scientific research, and there is also a focus on investing “in skills, education and vocational training” via programmes such as Erasmus Plus.
Furthermore, the Commission will make new proposals in the coming months. So, J.M. Barroso announced “further proposals for an industrial policy fit for the 21st century”, “concrete proposals for our energy and climate framework up to 2030” coupled with diplomatic action to find a “legally binding global climate agreement by 2015”. The President of the Commission also announced the necessity to sometimes go beyond the Europe 2020 economic agenda. Here, one must wonder whether it is a good idea to question yet another time the validity of a long-term strategy and why Mr Barroso does so: is it too ambitious or not enough? Is it realistic? Why is it not good enough? And why are its results insufficient?
To get these various ideas and proposals implemented, the Commission’s President insisted on cooperation and on subsidiarity. Institutions need to cooperate to adopt the multiannual financial framework (MFF) 2014-2020, so that the programmes can start on time and the citizens can see tangible results of European action. So, despite the fact that the level of resources is insufficient in both the Commission’s and the EP’s view, Mr Barroso asked the MEPs and the Member States to quickly adopt an amended proposal that will be presented later this month by the Commission.
Apart from praising the cooperation between the Commission and the European Parliament, J.M. Barroso reminded that “not all [instruments] are at European level, some are at national level”. Indeed, major decisions, e.g., on youth employment need an implementation at national level. He called upon Member States to “speed up the pace of structural reforms” on the basis of the Country Specific Recommendations delivered each year by the Commission. Finally, restoring growth will also be spurred by international cooperation, e.g., by negotiating trade agreements such as those with the USA, Canada and Japan.
The implementation of the various proposals outlined above will take place in “challenging times”, with a structural rather than cyclical crisis to tackle. As the EU is in a situation where “the path of permanent and profound reform is as demanding as it is unavoidable”, J.M. Barroso decided to devote some time to discuss political reforms that will have to take place in the coming years if the EU is to be an actor rather than a victim of the deep changes which are already taking place.
III/ Thinking further: Europe as a political entity
A first relevant observation is that the EU is unavoidable because of the high degree of interdependence between Member States and between regions. As Mr Barroso rightly noted, “there is a direct link between one country’s loans and another country’s banks, between one country’s investments and another country’s businesses, between one country’s workers and another country’s companies.” Therefore, “we have to tackle [our challenges] together.”
Moreover, the EU is more than a market, an economic area; the EU is also based on political and social values and on certain economic and social standards. And the EU is necessary to protect these values and standards in today’s world.
J.M. Barroso devoted a part of his speech to Europe’s external policy. He asserted that the impact of European action in support of development and humanitarian causes was always stronger when it was done in common rather than separately by multiple national bodies. He also expressly mentioned Syria, stating that it was “precisely with our values that we address the unbearable situation in Syria”: he strongly condemned the use of chemical weapons and welcomed “the proposal to put Syria’s chemical weapons beyond use”.
Furthermore, Mr Barroso also spoke about the enlargement policy and the role of the EU in “healing history’s deep scars”, reminding that Europe is experiencing its longest ever period of peace and that the EU has been created as a project of peace which was consecrated by the obtaining of the Nobel Peace Prize last year. Despite the crisis, the European economic and social model still attracts neighbouring countries, such as Ukraine, and the EU should welcome and support them on their way towards more democracy, freedom and prosperity. This section on Europe’s role in the world was important, since “our internal coherence and international relevance are inextricably linked.”
Finally, let us focus on J.M. Barroso’s words about improving Europe and going towards a stable political union. We must welcome his declaration that now is the time to “bring a truly European perspective to the debate with national constituencies.” The President of the European Commission recognised that the current EU was not perfect, “as any human endeavour”, and challenged its critics to be constructive and make proposals to improve it. He recalled a key principle of the European integration: subsidiarity. In his own words: “Europe needs to be big on big things and smaller on smaller things.” The “big things” include the Economic and Monetary Union, which needs to be determined at European level and needs a credible “political and institutional construct”. Therefore, Mr Barroso called for a political union, claiming that it “needs to be our political horizon.”
He indicated that he would “present, before the European elections, further ideas on the future of our Union and how best to consolidate and deepen the community method and community approach in the longer term”, so as to have “a real European debate”. This initiative must be welcomed, although I believe that the campaign for the 2014 European elections cannot only be about the future political and institutional structure of the EU but needs to give a large place to concrete issues mattering to the citizens. J.M. Barroso also outlined some principles that should govern a reform: political unity (“the European Union must remain a project for all members, a community of equals”), economic unity (“Economically, Europe has always been a way to close gaps between countries, regions and people. […] strengthening the social dimension is a priority for the months to come.”), and the respect of the rule of law and of the union’s values. Finally, he also praised the Commission’s role as “an independent and objective referee”, which does not constrain national sovereignty or democracy but guarantees the respect of “basic common principles”.
Conclusion
Although it was not a particularly charismatic speech, José Manuel Barroso defended the action of his Commission to face the crisis over the past years. He also insisted on what remains to do and outlined the priorities for the coming months. In addition, he tried to give a broader perspective of the future of the Union, by pointing the ways towards a “political union”, in the carefully selected words of the Commission’s President, which may actually mean a federal Union.
Mr Barroso also directly challenged the Eurosceptics to make concrete proposals to improve the EU, rather than just criticising it, and he underlined that not all potential of action lies at Union level. He tried to show that the EU is not an abstract bureaucratic monster, nor “a foreign power”, but is instead “the result of democratic decisions by the European institutions and the Member States”. And he highlighted that “in some areas, Europe still lacks the power to do what is asked of it”, something “that is all too easily forgotten by those, and there are many out there, who always like to nationalise success and Europeanise failure.”
José Manuel Barroso did maybe not sound as a visionary, but this was not his job (his mandate is about to end and the deepening of the European integration needs a broad and mediatised debate) and he was right to remind the MEPs and the citizens of some basic truths about European politics and policies.
Towards a federal Union: Reflections on a roadmap
September 10th, 2013By Pierre Antoine.
Dear federalist friends, dear supporters of the European integration process, dear readers,
Since the failure of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (TECE) to pass the French and Dutch referendums in 2005, we keep on repeating that Europe is in crisis and requires a deep institutional reform that the Lisbon Treaty failed to provide. Therefore, many among us consider 2014 as the ideal occasion, or even the last opportunity to renew the integration process and achieve a federal Europe. While I share the objective of a federal union provided with a “Constitution”, I wish to express serious doubts regarding the tight schedule we would like to set. This article will discuss only the organisational aspect and will not enter into the debates about the content of a potential reform; this will be the topic of future articles, in due time.
I/ The risks of fixing ourselves on a 2014 target
I have read claims of some federalist colleagues stating that 2014 would be the year of a “historic turning point” offering the choice between a quasi-definitive choice between carrying on the integration process and, on the contrary, limiting ourselves to inter-State cooperation. I have read their criticism towards “long-termists” who would “block any reformer impulse […] in the name of a short-sighted realism”. I have read their proposal of uniting pro-European parties for the European elections taking place next year, the true stake of which would allegedly be an opposition between “supporters of a nationalist retreat on one side and supporters of European unity and solidarity on the other side”. Finally, I noted with great interest the focus on the symbolic character of 2014: “200th anniversary of the opening of the Wien Congress”, “100th anniversary of the start of the first great European civil war” (i.e., World War I), and other events as well, which will not have a round number anniversary in 2014. The document I am referring to is accessible here (in French). It contains a number of very interesting proposals which are not discussed in this article, but I cannot endorse its conclusion.
It may be true that the “good moment” rarely appears; however, this does not mean that the “wrong moment” does not exist! The European Union is stuck in its deepest economic crisis since World War II, and the citizens’ interest in politics and trust in institutions is particularly low. How can we imagine that citizens will focus on institutional or even constitutional issues while their first concern is to have a job and a decent earning to support their families? It is true that by doing one’s civic duties, one can influence the choice of the policy which seems best suited for improving the situation, but this regards the content of policies, not the political and institutional organisation.
This leads me to my second point: let us be mistaken about the true issue! The European elections are an opportunity to influence the content of European policies, they are the moment when candidates for MEPs must offer solutions to Europe’s and to their constituents’ problems; they do not represent the ideal opportunity for an institutional debate. By the way, if we want that a convention be in charge of elaborating a “European Constitution” for a federal union, then I do not really see why MEPs, who will not be in charge of writing the text, should be elected on the basis of their proposals for institutional reforms. Correspondingly, a “union of pro-Europeans” would be a mistake.
The issues that should dominate the electoral debates (economic policy, cohesion policy, etc.) are far more complex than an alternative between pro- and anti-EU. The latter would actually favour the simplistic approach promoted by political extremes and opponents to the EU (whose sole common platform is precisely their opposition to the integration process). A union of pro-European parties could be considered during a referendum campaign on the federal Constitution, but would not meet the citizens’ expectations in the European elections’ campaign.
Our work, as federalists, is therefore not so much setting up of a pro-European alliance, but rather mobilising citizens to have them voting. This requires a political explanation of the EU’s role in their daily life and active use of various media – e.g., this Facebook page–, preferably appealing to the citizens’ intelligence (rather than showing Monica Bellucci with a half-naked breast, which will surely catch the eye but not incentivise anyone to participate in the election…). Furthermore, directing the campaign towards European issues comes without our remit; indeed, we should try to avoid that, once more, national politics become the main issue of the European elections.
To sum up about 2014, I am convinced that it is too early for the “great federalist leap”. Furthermore, by sticking to that deadline, we face the risk of excessive rushing and a possible failure would kill our project for many years. In my opinion, the campaign for European elections rather opens a “window of opportunity” to mediatise our organisations and our objectives, with the prospect of a future debate on institutional reforms.
II/ For a convention in 2016 or 2017
I hope that by 2016 or 2017 Europe will have overcome its economic vows. If the economic situation has indeed improved, then we may try to mobilise citizens around a major political and institutional project. I insist on the necessity to mobilise citizens, and not only “civil society”, which does not (or so little…) represent the majority of the public.
We support the idea of a convention. Several issues will need to be determined: the designation mode of its members (by the competent European institutions and/or the Member States), the best manner of involving external people (not only law experts…) and the best way of mediatising the work of this convention in order to familiarise citizens with the project and convince them of its necessity. We would be involved in the latter task.
Another advantage of 2016 or 2017 would be the possibility to coincide with the promise of a referendum in the UK. We would have negotiated, all together, a new “European Constitution” and the British voters, like their counterparts in the 27 other Member States, could then directly decide upon whether they support the project or not. I won’t enter here into the details of what could happen if voters from some Member States reject the project; we could imagine that those approving it would form a federal union that would substitute the federated Member States in the current European bodies for the issues falling within the federation’s remit.
For those who care a lot about symbols, 2016 would mark the 100th anniversary of the battle of Verdun, the 70th one of Churchill’s Fulton speech and the 30th one of the Single European Act. As to 2017, it would be the year of the 70th anniversary of the Marshall Plan, the 60th one of the Rome Treaties and the 10th one of Romanian and Bulgarian membership.
Finally, I wish to insist on a fact that we must be aware of: we, pro-Europeans and/or federalists, will all share some ideas (a deepening of the European integration, leading to a federal union enabling, e.g., the emergence of a true European economic government, etc.), but we will not necessarily agree on what should be a common policy (because of different beliefs as to what should fall within the scope of public action), let alone the content of these federal common policies (knowing that a constitutional text is anyway not the place to determine policy content).
III/ Our role until then
This last part is mainly for my federalist friends, but can contribute to the mobilisation of all readers willing to partner with us with the aim of bringing forward the integration process in an orderly manner and on the basis of concrete proposals. So, don’t hesitate to join the Young European Federalists (JEF), the Union of European Federalists (UEF) and the European International Movement (EMI).
It follows from the elements presented above that we need to elaborate a strategy over 3-4 years. If we want to reach our goals, we also need to act more like a lobby, rather than a political movement.
We will need to lobby the national political parties and their elects. An idea would be to get pro-Europeans (or even federalists) occupying the position of “person in charge of European and international affairs” within national political parties and their youth sections and becoming members of national Parliaments’ “European affairs” committees. National political parties must become places where our political agenda is discussed and promoted, rather than the opposite (i.e., that national sections of JEF be an instrument of promotion of the European policy of such-and-such national party). As to the elects, we will need to show them the advantages of a federal union both for them, political actors, and for their electors.
Our communication effort towards citizens will also require a significant amplification. This means, e.g., a steadier presence in media with a wide audience. Indeed, having our own media (webzine, blogs…) is a good initiative, but their audience outside from federalist circles remains pretty insufficient to lead a major campaign, e.g., in favour of a European federal Constitution. Therefore, we should do some networking with media, so as to encourage journalists to invite us more often to talk about European issues. It would be a “win-win” situation, because journalists would a priori have a pool of voluntary competent speakers to participate in their broadcasts.
Finally, we would need to ensure support (included financially) from the world of business, thanks to communication towards businesses showing them how a federal union would be beneficial for their development. The business community is no stranger to the European integration process; the existence of the ERT (European Round Table of Industrialists), which spurred behind the scenes the process leading to the Single Market, proves it.
To sum up, we can succeed and progress towards a federal union. But this requires a thorough and adequate planning before starting a long-term campaign; setting the deadline in 2014 seems unrealistic and it would be better to envisage an action plan over 3-4 years.
Pierre-Antoine KLETHI
Reflections on a European foreign policy in times of austerity
August 28th, 2013By Pierre Antoine.
The Treaty of Lisbon reformed the previous rules applying to EU foreign policy, determining that the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (hereinafter ‘the High Representative’) was both vice-President of the Commission and head of the Council ‘Foreign Affairs’ (one of the multiple configurations of the Council of the EU), in an attempt to give more coherence and visibility to European external action. Moreover, a European External Action Service (EEAS) was to act as a true European diplomacy under the lead of the High Representative.
Unfortunately, the reality has not been up to the expectations. The President of the European Council and the President of the European Commission also play a role in representing Europe. Thus, we have more a trio than a single voice for EU foreign policy. The European diplomacy is further made inaudible by the incapacity of Member States to quickly agree on common positions when required by the circumstances. Now, as the United States has started a fundamental shift towards Asia, Europeans must change their attitude towards a common foreign and security policy if they want to continue counting on the international stage. This article will first provide a brief description of the problems currently afflicting the European foreign policy and then suggest some ideas of improvement in the short term.
I/ Problems
Among the existing obstacles to the development of a European foreign and security policy, there are notably the difficulties to define EU foreign policy aims and the lack of military power (with no prospect of improvement in a near future).
Defining the aims of the EU foreign policy is complicated. It seems evident that in order to determine a European foreign policy, there must first be an agreement on the purpose, on the objectives of that common policy. This is made difficult in the EU by various factors such as the different sizes of Member States, their different histories and cultures, and the degree of importance given to foreign policy (both in the political and media debate and in the government action). The United Kingdom is the former imperial power par excellenceand has kept relatively powerful armed forces, in addition to being a nuclear power. It is known for its closeness to the United States of America. Recently, the Cameron government has also tried to forge tighter links with Commonwealth members, the Commonwealth being an association whose members are nearly all (save rare exceptions) former colonies of the UK. France, the other big European military and nuclear power, has focused its foreign policy on the friendship with Germany (though, from a European point of view, this is an internal matter), aiming at forging a European defence and foreign policy in a bet to reduce American influence on the continent. It is also particularly involved in foreign policy issues regarding its former African colonies (French have invented the word “Françafrique” to describe the relationship that emerged after the independence of the former colonies, characterised by a French tendency to interventionism in African internal matters). Germany, after being defeated in 1945, was prohibited from forming a permanent professional army and converted itself to neutrality and pacifism, which explains its reluctance to intervene in foreign conflicts such as in Libya and, now, in Syria. Finally, to take a last example, Central and Eastern European countries are mainly concerned about avoiding a repetition of history: an aggression coming from the East, i.e., from Russia. Therefore, these countries were very attached to the NATO, which grants them American protection, and were suspicious towards French attempts to set up a “European defence” seen as opposed to the NATO because of French occasional anti-Americanism. With the policy shift taking place in the United States, these countries may reconsider their position as to the means of guaranteeing their homeland security, but the latter will remain their foremost priority. As we can see, there are huge differences to overcome if we are to create an effective European foreign policy.
There is also a problem with the instruments of a potential European foreign policy, in particular the lack of military power (with no improvement in sight). A credible foreign policy requires instruments of power to support it. Member States of the European Union are far from meeting the pledge of spending 2% of their GDP on defence expenditure. Among the big European countries, only France and the UK meet this requirement (despite of current and forecast budget cuts in defence), and Poland is getting closer, being one of the rare countries to have increased its defence spending (see this interesting article by The Economist of August 17th, 2013). This situation was bearable as long as Europe’s security was a priority for the USA, the latter providing the surest protection to the continent during the cold war, but now that America is turning its focus to Asia, Europeans will have to increasingly care for themselves. Moreover, American administrations have already been talking for several years about a fairer “burden-sharing”, especially since they have to face the huge costs of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.
A different instrument of foreign policy is economic influence. Here, the European Union seems better armed, being the richest economic area and the biggest trader in the world. The lack of military power and the economic strength led to a distribution of the tasks with the USA: in a conflict, fighting would mainly be done by America, and the EU would mainly take care of the reconstruction and civil assistance efforts. But at least three problems appeared: first, as said above, the USA want a better military burden-sharing; second, the EU ended up paying without having much influence on the initial stages of the settlement a conflict; and third, the EU now has less money to give away because of the permanence of the economic crisis. Therefore, the EU should really start thinking about widening its array of foreign policy tools.
II/ Reflections on the future of the European foreign policy
It follows that an urgent improvement is to intelligently build up military resources The Economist, in the article referred to above, provides interesting information on Poland. It says that old weapons, many of them still from the Soviet era, are in the course of being replaced. Poland intends to acquire even more modern material, including “unmanned aerial aircrafts” (better known as “drones”). Moreover, the army became professional in 2009, replacing a formerly army of conscripts. All this, concludes The Economist, gives the Polish army more flexibility, which is necessary to face the modern threats to security and participate in current foreign operations such as the NATO intervention in Afghanistan.
The Economist stresses another advantage that would result from improving military capacities (the example of Poland can be extrapolated to the whole EU): getting a better “place at the decision-making table”. If the EU pretends to play an international role corresponding to its economic weight, it needs to deserve that role; otherwise, the USA (maybe joined by China, in a near future) will dictate alone when and where a military intervention takes place. And the EU will continue to play its traditional role of providing support to civilians after the war.
The second characteristic of the current situation is that the EU, stuck in the economic crisis, now has little financial resources to provide support. This reduces its leverage on protagonists of crisis. So, for example, Egypt receives more foreign aid from Qatar alone than from the whole EU; therefore, even if the EU had decided to cut its foreign aid to the country, the generals would have been moderately affected from an economic point of view – the political consequences could be more important, with potential damages in terms of image. Another example that is worth mentioning is the case of Ukraine, a country which Russia has threatened with a trade war because of Ukrainian attempts to get closer to the European Union. Of course, the EU cannot and must not grant unjustified financial advantages to countries in order to keep them as allies and influence their internal policies (like Russia does, for example). But it could try to use short-term economic arguments to face Russia’s ones, e.g., facilitating the import of some Ukrainian products to offset potential Russian trade sanctions. Therefore, the EU should protect foreign and development aid in order to keep an economic instrument of foreign policy at its disposal.
This was about the instruments; now, it is time to come back to the other problematic issue outlined in the first part: the definition of the aims of a European foreign policy. Knowing the differences of political and economic interests between the Member States, the common denominator that appears to remain is the shared civic values which form part of the European identity such as human dignity, democracy, individual freedom, and political and economic freedom. It may seem candid to suggest a EU foreign policy relying on noble principles, but in the long run, it is by being true to its own principles that the EU will build a moral force able to promote its values across the world. As stated in a previous article giving news about the Egyptian crisis, “European leaders should understand that each time they keep a close eye on a violation of the principles they advocate and want to promote worldwide it will get more difficult to spread these same values in other areas (e.g., Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, etc.) where opponents to democracy and individual freedom remain strong”. Therefore, a violation of a fundamental value such as human dignity (e.g., the use of chemical weapons in Syria) calls for a strong answer.The Economist addressed the same message to Barack Obama in an article from the edition of August 24th, 2013: an intervention in the Syrian conflict entails significant risks, but it is also a matter of principle and credibility.
As a conclusion, basing our foreign policy on our shared values may have political and/or economic short-term costs, and it is probably insufficient when dealing with the complexity of some foreign issues, but it could represent a starting point for a nearly inexistent European foreign policy, it is the best way to stay coherentwhen speaking to different foreign partners, and moral force is cheaper than subsidies and corruption.
Pierre-Antoine KLETHI