Posts by QamarSyed:

    Trump’s Pakistan Policy: Challenges & Strategies

    July 2nd, 2017

    By Syed Qamar Rizvi.

     

    It seems very much inconvenient at the part of Islamabad that despite Pakistan’s indefatigable role in the US-waged war on terrorism for the past sixteen years, Washington yet blames Islamabad for the ongoing state of turmoil in Afghanistan and presses to do more. It is also true that deviousness in this situation has not been a Pakistani display. While it has been insisting that Islamabad press on with attacks against the Taliban over the past year, the US has held secret meetings with Taliban representatives in Germany and Doha, Qatar—and kept Pakistan out of those talks. This only increased Pakistani insecurity and reinforced the idea that Washington will ignore its interests in the Afghan endgame. Needless to say, the US-Pak relationship undergoes some currents and cross-currents. Not realpolitik, but pragmatism must be the core of Trump’s policy towards Pakistan.

    Pakistan became the pivotal coalition partner of the US-led global war against terrorism as the geographical position on the Southern and Eastern border of Afghanistan was the best location of supporting the US coalition against the strongholds of Taliban. Pakistan was also in a position to provide the vital intelligence that made it necessary for the US to renew its military and diplomatic relations with Islamabad. Pakistan transformed itself from supporter of Taliban to a partner of an on-going war against terrorism and the US applied this leverage to achieve its own objectives. In the Post-Taliban scenario too, Washington continued to rely on Pakistan to root out Al-Qaeda terrorists who were suspected to operate from within Pak-Afghan border.

    Potential Trump administration responses being discussed include expanding U.S. drone strikes, redirecting or withholding some aid to Pakistan and perhaps eventually downgrading Pakistan’s status as a major non-NATO ally, the two officials said, speaking on condition of anonymity. A press spokesperson for Pakistan’s embassy in the U.S. said it would not improve the security situation, noting that Pakistan was carrying out its own efforts to tackle militants in the country. The United States is again poised to deploy thousands more troops in Afghanistan, an acknowledgment that U.S.-backed forces are not winning and Taliban militants are resurgent. Pakistan Army chief General Qamar Javed Bajwa on Saturday stated that it was about time for the other stake holders particularly Afghanistan to do more in the fight against terrorism.

    “Unfortunately our sacrifices against terrorism are not well acknowledged and we are often subjected to demand of do more,” the army chief was quoted as saying by the Inter Services Public Relations.

    Per se , there are some fundamental problems undergirding US-Pakistan troubles. First, instead of a boldly and fairly admitting Pakistan role in the war against terror, the US administrations Democratic or Republican have been demanding to do more from Pakistan. Second, the two countries have a one-dimensional transactional relationship centered along security concerns, i.e., the war against the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Many Pakistanis view the Washington demand of taking actions against Haqqani network differently as they argue since American Black Water treacherous activities inside Pakistan were not rightly tackled by the US administration as to how and why the Americans push us the Pakistanis to tack actions against those who may pose great security risks to Pakistan. Nevertheless, Pakistani government is cautiously taking action against the Haqqanis. In a way, General Jehangir Karamat, Pakistan’s retired Army chief and ambassador to the US, once underscored this point, saying that, in his assessment …..’’US-Pakistan relations are further complicated because of clashing security interests, especially vis-à-vis the Afghan Taliban’’.

    Third, Pakistani region remains unstable — especially because of India’s terrorist moves inside the Pakistani territories in Balochistan and TTP’s provoked attacks in the Pak-Afghan border . The mistrusts between India and Pakistan could damage the US interests in Afghanistan and Central Asia too. Stabilizing relations between Pakistan and India will be an important challenge for Trump. What is important to note is that Pakistan aspires for talks with India for revamping ties despite the hostile approach that India has currently adopted on the Line of Control and in occupied Kashmir. Recently, Pakistan tried to attract the world’s attention toward its issues with India especially Kashmir. However, India has delayed resumption of dialogue with Islamabad for one reason or the other. Trump’s expressed support for addressing the outstanding issues of Pakistan in the region is therefore a welcome step in the right direction.

    Fourth, counterterrorism strategy: including aid to Pakistan. As under the Obama administration and now under the Trump administration the counterterrorism  financial assistance to Pakistan have been gradually cut thereby having an emphasis onto ‘do more’—creates a new gray area of US-Pakistan relationship in the post- Cold War era.

    Fifth, the growing US-India ties in the post 9/11 world where the two sides Washington seem to have been two great economic, military and diplomatic partners, creates a new challenge of US-Pakistan relationship.

    Seen retrospectively, Pakistan experienced friendly relations with the US during the Cold War period. Despite convergence of many interests, the US has divergence of interests on several issues and policies. So there are frequent ups and downs in bilateral relations of the two countries. The attacks of September 11 transferred Pakistan from failing to a frontline state and reduced its status from the major recipient of the Western aid in South Asia. It soon became obvious to policy-makers that they had no choice of losing or preserving their strategic position in Afghanistan at the cost of Washington. They had no option but to support the American intervention.

    At the same time, India’s announcement of unconditional support and extending offer for logistic facilities to American troops further tightened the position of Pakistan. The US tried to balance its interest in the region and Bush administration assured Indian leaders that the military and economic assistance provided to Pakistan, was designed to assist the war against terrorism (Mohan, 2002-3: 144). India’s general importance to US interests after the Cold War has not been set back directly by the war on terrorism. The US perception of India’s future importance as a strategic partner remained as an inducement to cultivate further security cooperation.

    And it has been in this backdrop that the US tried to reorient its relationship dynamics with Pakistan. But the US administration changing Pakistan policy at the behest of India-US interests may pave for open conflict of interests between Washington and Islamabad. Without having a profound cost and benefit analysis, Trump’s administration’s pro India policy would invite many hurdles to US’s South Asia stakes. A stable Afghanistan cannot be possible without Pakistani support and nor an instable South Asia being under fire because of the ongoing Pak-India strained relationship cannot help produce conducive results for Washington in the region. Before Indian premier Narendra Modi’s state visit to Washington, the Pentagon has sanctioned a deal that provides 22 spy drones to India-a move that displeases Islamabad.

    These problems will not yield to quick diplomatic fixes. Barring a fundamental re-thinking, Washington and Islamabad should get used to making the best use of the positives imbibed so far in this relationship: A feeling persisting in the psyhe of the Pakistani public is that the US- -by using Pakistan to the best of its interests– Washington now treats Pakistan as a second or third priority state at the altar of growing its heroic partnership with India .  India-US adopted strategy of coopted interests in the Afghan game is making an alert in Islamabad.

    The ongoing war of competition over the endgame in Afghanistan seems to create a challenging situation in the region. The US wishes to have strong trade ties in the region — and it would not be fruitful if the Afghanistan. While the US-India partnership is unlikely to undergo major reversals, the rise of China and the security situation in Afghanistan are likely to remain the enduring filters through which a strident Republican Presidency seems reviewing its Pakistan policy and adapt its strategic interests in South Asia albeit not without some provoking challenges.

    Any seemingly policy review by the Trump administration to accelerate the drone strikes inside the Pak-Afghan territory would be counter-productive as has been accepted by some American policy experts. Not only these controversial strikes imperil the sanctity of international law but also promote in the Pakistani people a feeling of bete noire about the US administration since the said strikes violate sovereignty and territorial integrity of Pakistan.

    Keeping in view the above stated arguments, it is suggestible that the Trump administration’s policy managers give a serene thought while remaking US’s South Asia policy. During the current visit of Indian PM Modi to the US, the Trump administration must convince him to make a move forward vis-à-vis’ the Kashmir situation. Only a pragmatic collective approach to protecting peace in the region led by a pivot US-Pak counterterrorism cooperation can be instrumental in reviewing a new US- strategy. As for Pakistan, relations with the new administration and strategically plot a decisive roadmap for bilateral engagement as well as contingencies for Pakistan-US ties over whatever path Trump takes.

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    US-India-Japan Naval Trajectory & Australia?

    June 14th, 2017

    By Syed Qamar Rizvi.

     

    After making a pitch for an observer status during this year’s Malabar trilateral naval exercises  that were scheduled to be held in June, Australia had indicated that it is keen for a logistics support agreement with India along the lines of the one concluded with the United States last year.  As for US’s strategic calculation, China’s growing assertiveness and economic heft across Asia, combined with a newly reticent United States, is making countries in the region wonder if and when they’ll have to choose sides between Washington and Beijing. Against this a backdrop, the US administration mindset advocates that the US and Indian navies could carry out ‘benign naval and maritime activity’ during periods of diplomatic strain. But for New Delhi’s strategic reconsideration, Australian Naval venture could not be realized.

    That’s exactly what appeared to happen last week, after India rejected Australia’s request to send warships to participate in big naval exercises in the Bay of Bengal. News reports painted the rejection as a way for India to appease China, or at least avoid needlessly provoking Beijing.

    “New Delhi hasn’t forgotten Canberra’s hasty capitulation a decade ago,” said Nitin A. Gokhale, a New Delhi-based national security analyst, in an email to FP. “Moreover, the foreign policy establishment is aware of the deep economic and political relations that Australia and China have.”

    Since AUSINDEX in 2015, Indian Navy vessels have visited Australia for port calls, but not for exercises. Neither the Australian nor the Indian navies have clarified any operational focus for the upcoming exercise. This comes at a time when there is a lot of hue and cry in India about Australia scrapping its skilled visa program — the employer-sponsored temporary work visas, popularly known as the 457 visa. While the government of Malcolm Turnbull may have taken a short-sighted approach in its engagement with India by moving ahead with its new visa restrictions, New Delhi would be equally short-sighted if it just focuses on this issue at the risk of overlooking larger shifts in regional balance of power.

    India and Japan have an institutionalized trilateral strategic dialogue partnership with the United States. Initiated in 2011. Maintaining a balance of power in the Asian-Pacific as well as maritime security in Indo-Pacific waters became an important element of this dialogue. A similar dialogue exists between the United States, Japan, and Australia. Under Modi, such security trilateralism in Asia has received not only new momentum and is being expanded to incorporate other regional powers: in June 2015, India, Australia, and Japan held their first ever high level dialogue in New Delhi.

    These trilateral initiatives have a serious potential to transform into a ‘quad’ of democracies in the Indo-Pacific region. The roots of this potential partnership were laid in late 2004 when navies from the U.S., India, Japan, and Australia collaborated in tsunami relief operations all across the Indian Ocean. Japan has been the most vocal supporter of such an initiative. In 2007, Abe, in his earlier stint as Prime Minister, lobbied for Asia’s democracies to come together.  This was also actively supported by the United States. Such an initiative resulted in a five nation naval exercise in Bay of Bengal in September 2007 code-named Malabar 07-02. However, perceiving a possible ganging-up of Asia’s democracies, China issued demarches to New Delhi and Canberra, causing this initiative to lose steam, since both Australia and New Delhi felt it unwise to provoke China. As China becomes more aggressive in the region, there are signs that India and Australia may be warming up to the idea again.

    India and Australia are wary of China’s assault on maritime security and freedom of navigation in the Indo-Pacific region. These common concerns have strengthened the need for greater maritime cooperation between the two nations and the two have started conducting joint naval combat exercises. During Modi’s visit to Australia, a security framework agreement was signed by the two countries, further underscoring the importance of defense cooperation in the Indian Ocean region. India and Australia are leading powers in the Indian Ocean region. The two countries are also at the helm of Indian Ocean Regional Association (IORA), a formal grouping consisting of the Indian Ocean Littoral States. Australia is also a permanent member of Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, which brings together the local navies of Indian Ocean region. The extent of their regional cooperation in Indian Ocean can also be ascertained by their annual trilateral dialogues with countries like Japan and Indonesia

    So countering China, United States, Japan, Australia and India created Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QSD). China invested heavily in Australian mines. There are some author who suggested that China may attack Australia in war situation.

    Australia is less populous region. Japan security is based on US army, India is a powerhouse and have very good global firework index. US is distant from Asian mainland. Cost of deploying international army is very high. So all these four groups are friends of benefits. They can empower each other and secure each other and also counter growing Chinese army in South China sea. The below map illustrate how India, Australia and Japan can counter China.

    On the other hand India, Iran have good ties to counter Pakistan. India, Japan have good ties to counter China. US and Pakistan have good ties to counter India. The US Navl officer advocated that its navy and their Indian counterpart could undertake joint naval operations in Indo-Asia-Pacific region and pushed for quadrilateral arrangement between Delhi, Washington, Tokyo and Canberra with an eye on ensuring stability in the region amid China’s initiatives to unilaterally change rules of international order. 

    Addressing the Raisina Dialogue here Admiral Harry B Harris Jr, US Pacific Command, said India and the US are uniquely placed to provide security in the r .. “I’m sometimes asked why I always use the term “Indo-Asia-Pacific” versus the commonly used “Asia-Pacific” by smart people like those in the room today. My answer is simple – Indo-Asia-Pacific more accurately captures the fact that the Indian and Pacific Oceans are the economic lifeblood that bind India, Australia, Asia, Oceania and the United States together. Strengthening that economic connective tissue through security and diplomatic partnership is what America’s rebalance to the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. 

    In 2015,India hosted Japan and Australia for its first ever high-level trilateral dialogue in New Delhi and that some of the topics discussed were maritime security — including freedom of navigation patrols, he suggested, “One idea to consider is initiating a Quad-lateral Security Dialogue between India-Japan-Australia and the United States. Adding the U.S into this dialogue can amplify the message that we are united behind the international rules-based order that has kept the peace and is essential to all of us.” In view of a senior US Naval Commander ‘’by being ambitious, India, Japan, Australia, the United States and so many other like-minded nations can aspire to patrol together anywhere international law allows.

    “The idea of safeguarding freedom of access to international waters and airspace is not something new for us to ponder – this is a principle based upon the international and rules-based global order.”  And yet, India is also opposed, in principle, to military ships traversing through its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and seeks prior consent for military exercises or manoeuvres in its EEZ. This position is similar to that of China and some other maritime countries. Were India to participate in the US-led Fonops, it would have to rescind on this principle and also accept the possibility of other navies—especially Chinese navy—being present in its EEZ.

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    Palestine & Kashmir:The Unending Transgressions

    May 8th, 2017

     

    By Syed Qamar Rizvi.

     

    It goes without saying that there have been closed similarities in the policies practiced by both the Israeli and Indian authorities vis-à-vis Palestine and Kashmir. Intransigent-cum- belligerent occupation remains the core feature of Israel- India state policies in the Palestinian territories and Kashmir vale.

    Israel’s Settlements in the Palestinian Held Territories

    Notwithstanding the remonstrance shown by the Palestinian community, the reservations established by international legal community, the clear denouncements leveled by international human rights organistaions, and President Trump’s request to hold back on settlements as part of a possible new push for Israeli-Palestinian peace, Israel deliberately intends to build 15,000 new settlement homes in East Jerusalem, the Housing Ministry said on last Friday.  A formal announcement of the settlement plan, quickly condemned by the chief Palestinian negotiator, could come around the time Trump is scheduled to visit Israel this month.

    Israel views all of Jerusalem as its “eternal and indivisible capital”, but the Palestinians also want a capital there. Most of the world considers Jerusalem’s status an issue that must be decided through negotiations. The last peace talks between Israel and the Palestinians collapsed in 2014.

    Israel’s Housing Ministry is reportedly pushing forward with a massive plan that would add some 25,000 new homes to Jerusalem, including 15,000 units over the Green Line, in a move that may test the new US administration’s understandings with Israel over building in areas the Palestinians want for a state.
    According to a Channel 2 report recently exposed , the plan is set to be announced while US President Donald Trump is in the country in late May, coinciding with the 50th anniversary of Israel’s capture of East Jerusalem and the unification of the once-divided city.

    Housing Minister Yoav Galant (Kulanu) is unjustifiably pushing the initiative in meetings with Jerusalem city officials. According to the report, the plan will cost some NIS 4 billion ($1.1 billion).Parts of the plan were reported by Channel 10 earlier in the week. Galant’s office and the Jerusalem municipality could not be immediately contacted for confirmation. Israeli officials confirmed that Trump’s team is planning a visit on May 22-23.

    The White House told The Times of Israel that it is “exploring” the visit, but did not flesh out any further details. Jerusalem Day, which marks the capture of East Jerusalem during the 1967 Six Day War, begins on the evening of May 23.  Of the 15,000 units planned over the Green Line, the lion’s share would be in two new residential neighborhoods: Atarot in the north of the city and Givat Hamatos in the south.

    The settlements are illegal under international law. The Fourth Geneva Convention, which concerns civilian populations during a time of war, states in Article 49 that, “The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies.”

    United Nations Security Council resolution 2334, which the United States did not veto, and was passed in December 2016, angering Israel, reaffirms this position. It states that settlements have “no legal validity” and constitute “a flagrant violation under international law.” The resolution references previous Security Council resolutions 242, 338, 446, 452, 465, 476, 478, 1397, 1515, and 1850. Of these, 465, 476, and 478 established that settlements have “no legal validity” in 1980.

    The International Criminal Court (ICC) currently has a preliminary examination underway that is looking into Israeli actions, including settlements, in the occupied territories since Jun 13, 2014. The examination, which is meant to determine whether there is enough evidence to begin an official investigation, was launched on January 16, 2015.

    Israel, along with a few legal analysts, disputes that settlements are illegal. There are three primary reasons they use. Some cite religious reasons, claiming religious scripture gives Jews a right to build anywhere in Israel and the West Bank. Others use historical reasons, saying Jews have lived in the region for thousands of years, and it remains their land.

    Some others use legal reasons. In 2012, the Israeli government, under the direction of Prime Minister Netanyahu, published the Levy Commission Report, which summarized this legal position. The report rejected the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention to the West Bank, arguing that the West Bank was never a legitimate part of any Arab state. “Consequently, those conventions dealing with the administration of occupied territory and an occupied populations [sic] are not applicable to Israel’s presence in Judea and Samaria,” the report read.

    This is not a position that any country or international forum has accepted. Israel has withdrawn from settlements on a few different occasions. In 1982, Israel began withdrawing from settlements in Sinai as part of the 1979 peace deal with Egypt. In 1989, the withdrawal was completed, constituting a full Israeli withdrawal from Sinai. In 2005, Israel unilaterally withdrew from settlements in Gaza. At the same time, Israel also withdrew from some settlements in the northern West Bank. Under international law, settlements in East Jerusalem are no different than settlements in the West Bank. So why consider them separately?

    Former Secretary of State Kerry singled out Jerusalem as one of the most sensitive and complex points, as did President Bill Clinton when he offered his ideas for peace in 2000. Both Israelis and Palestinians claim Jerusalem as the capital of their state. The Palestinian statements warn Israel and the international community of the danger of this Israeli step, which could open the door for several options for the Palestinians. The Palestinians may not only resort to international diplomatic work, but could also threaten to turn the popular uprising into an armed one in the event that the international community fails to put pressure on Israel to back down.

    However, the Palestinians did not wait long before taking action. On Jan. 20, a group of activists from the popular resistance and foreign supporters of the Palestinian cause rallied in the park in Ma’ale Adumim, where they pitched a tent to protest against the Israeli government’s intention to annex the settlement and the E1 zone to Jerusalem. The Israeli police cracked down on the protesters and forced them to clear the area. Even so, this protest might as well be a prelude to further escalation by the popular resistance.

    Nevertheless the Israeli view also fully acknowledges that a military occupation is significantly different, both as a matter of law and politics, from building civilian settlements even in a territory that is legitimately subject to a military occupation. That’s why some of the Israeli experts have also opposed the building of settlements in the West Bank. They believe it has caused resentment and has given enemies of Israel an excuse to attack the legitimacy of the occupation in general.

    The Netanyahu advocated doctrine– which solicits the land for peace as it has done on multiple occasions over the last few decades—yet delivers no positive course to pacify the simmering Arab-Israeli dispute. In 2010, Israel announced its intent to build homes in East Jerusalem during a visit by then-Vice President Joe Biden, who condemned the plan. It caused huge embarrassment to Netanyahu, who suspended the plan before reintroducing it in 2013.

    As for true legal position about these settlements– the judicious perceptivity shared by the International Court of Justice accompanied by the EU’s disapproval, as well as the policy stand held by the UN via its celebrated resolutions, and most significantly the cultural, historical and territorial truth proclaimed by the Unesco resolution of December, 2016, branding Israel as an occupying power in East Jerusalem– all is tantamount to saying no to these settlements.

    India’s Intransigence and Belligerence in IHK

    Undeniably, the Indian security and paramilitary troops have been constantly killing/targeting the young Kashmiris. India’s security forces have started the search operation throughout the vale at a very large scale thereby undermining the fundamental norms of civility and human rights. Sadly enough, ruthless India’s role as an occupying power in Kashmir is being overlooked by the international community. India commits human rights violations without any remorseful feeling. The Indian army, Special Task Force, Border Security Force, and village defence committees, including the principal government forces — who operate in Jammu and Kashmir — have systematically violated the fundamental norms of international human rights law for the last six decades.

    In his latest state visit to India, Turkey President Tayyip Erdogan said India and Pakistan were both friends of Turkey and he wanted to help strengthen the dialogue process among the stakeholders for resolving the Kashmir issue which has been festering for the last 70 years. “We should not allow more casualties to occur (in Kashmir). By having a multilateral dialogue, (in which) we can be involved, we can seek ways to settle the issue once and for all,” he told WION news channel in an interview.

    Indian repression in IHK does not work. Repression may push dissent and resistance further underground temporarily, but they eventually rise back to the surface. Kashmir is fundamentally a political problem, not a security one the state of India cannot bludgeon its way to a new reality. Second, the Kashmir dispute is real and lies at the root of the dissent in the occupied territory and the troubles between India and Pakistan. Only a political settlement can pave the path to stability in all of Kashmir and general peace in the region a reality that successive Indian governments, whether right-wing or otherwise ideologically inclined, have eventually been forced to recognise.

    Arguably, article 42 of the 1907 Hague Regulations (HR) states that a territory is considered occupied when it is de facto placed under the authority of the hostile army. The occupation extends only to the territory where such an authority has been established and can be exercised. The Article 2 of four Geneva Conventions of 1949 says that it can be virtually applied to any territory occupied during international hostilities. They can also be applied in situations where occupation of state territory meets with no armed resistance.

    The government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi appears to be extremely stubborn: it does not accept the futility of repressive measures in IHK and it does not appear to endorse the inevitability of dialogue with Pakistan on the Kashmir dispute. This attitude has given rise to creating dangerous instability not only in the Kashmir region, but between India and Pakistan themselves. Unless Mr Modi is willing to reconsider his approach to both IHK and Pakistan, there is little hope of the situation becoming more stable across the region.

    It is against this background that the UN, the EU and the United States must mutually play such an instrumental role– to counter and deter both Israeli and Indian policies of unwarranted occupation, aggression and repression in Palestine and Kashmir– a role that these global players historically played in Kosovo.

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    India’s Nuclear Doctrine: The Changing NFU Strategy?

    April 28th, 2017

    By Syed Qamar Rizvi.

     

    There are current reflections that advocate the impression that India might be reconsidering its policy of no first use of nuclear arsenal. This revisionist approach echoing in the mind of Indian policy makers is a peace caveat for South Asian region that is already under fire because of Modi’s ultra nationalist-cum-extremist policy ventures in the region, particularly its ongoing tense relationship towards Islamabad.

    India’s no-first-use policy was originally declared by the BJP and the National Democratic Alliance government after it conducted the May 1998 nuclear tests. The prime minister at the time, Atal Behari Vajpayee, stated thereafter that India would pursue a policy of no first use of nuclear weapons vis-à-vis other nuclear-armed states and would not use these weapons against nonnuclear countries. This restraint was also embedded in the BJP’s draft nuclear doctrine, declared in August 1999, which took several years to be finalized. It was finally endorsed by the Cabinet Committee on Security and officially promulgated in January 2003. Consequently, India’s no-first-use policy and its nuclear doctrine are BJP formulations. The Congress party adopted them and, with Singh’s April speech, simply sought to extend no first use globally. This makes the BJP’s concern with its own no-first-use policy and nuclear doctrine part of the mystery of Singh’s proposal.

    India’s no-first-use declaration cannot be separated from the country’s overall nuclear doctrine as it has been articulated since 1999. Inadequate as it is, this doctrine deserves to be reviewed in the light of changes over the past fifteen years.

    The current nuclear doctrine dictates that nuclear retaliation against a first strike would be “massive” and designed to inflict “unacceptable damage” upon the attacker. This is an unrealistic certitude because, ethically, punishing large numbers of noncombatants contravenes the laws of war. Besides, threatening massive retaliation against any level of nuclear attack, which would inevitably trigger assured nuclear annihilation in a binary adversarial situation, is hardly a credible option. No doubt, it raises a ticklish question: Would India then favor a counterforce or countercity strategy? India’s stated adherence to an assured and massive second strike suggests the latter.

    However, in addition to the other infirmities of a massive retaliation response, the uncomfortable reality is that the trade winds in May–September associated with the southwest monsoon blow from Pakistan into northern India. Consequently, secondary and tertiary radiation from a nuclear attack launched by India against Pakistan in these months would blow back into India’s agriculturally rich Punjab and Haryana states and, indeed, into New Delhi. India therefore faces a huge time constraint to mount a massive nuclear attack into Pakistan. Operationally, too, destroying the territory in dispute is feckless.

    In a nuclear adversarial situation, moreover, the inevitability of mutual destruction must also be considered. Is a counterforce attack on the adversary’s military formations and assets the answer? The issue of uncontrollable escalation then arises, for which there is no reassuring answer. Leaving the problem of how India should retaliate to a nuclear first strike to the discretion of the prime minister would provide greater flexibility to mount the counterattack instead of threatening assured nuclear annihilation, which is just not credible.

    The possibility that India might use nuclear weapons first directly contradicts the key pillar of Indian nuclear thinking since the publication of its official nuclear doctrine in 2003: a no first-use policy. Successive prime ministers — including Narendra Modi, not exactly a dove — have affirmed this. Indeed, a major revision of India’s public doctrine will fly in the face of it’s long history as a reluctant nuclear power. On the other hand, the evidence Narang marshals to support this astounding claim is scant and centers around a couple of paragraphs from a book by a former Indian national security advisor Shivshankar Menon who retired three years ago, before Modi came to power.

    Despite Narang’s claims, we still do not have sufficient evidence that India has reversed its no first-use policy or — for that matter — any other major tenets in its public nuclear doctrine. Indeed, at a time when there are growing calls inside India to revisit its nuclear doctrine, it is worth keeping in mind that India’s doctrine already allows considerable space for innovation. As Menon put it to a journalist, “India’s nuclear doctrine has far greater flexibility than it gets credit for.” In other words, India’s extant doctrine can absorb the consequences of future Pakistan-related contingencies without any major changes.

    Former National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon’s take on India’s No First Use (NFU) pledge in his recent book has led some nuclear thinkers to offer an exciting interpretation of India’s changing nuclear doctrine. As Vipin Narang of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology recently suggested, India may conduct a preemptive first strike if the use of the Pakistani nuclear arsenal appears imminent. This first strike would decapitate Pakistani arsenal to the effect that its ability to retaliate further is taken out of the equation. In short, India’s NFU policy is up for major revisions.

    That has not been the official story, however. Critics are right in pointing out that since 2003, India has conditioned its NFU, its former strategic forces commanders have openly questioned NFU and Manohar Parrikar as Defence Minister had recently raised doubts on the desirability of NFU (in his personal capacity).

    Yet, in 2015, Prime Minister Narendra Modi had unequivocally asserted that India’s No First Use (NFU) policy is not open to change. In view of some policy experts, the most important take-away from the current debate is that such rethinking on India’s nuclear behaviour cannot be restricted to ideological leanings of any particular government in power.

    The current doctrinal shift appears to have been in place since 2008 when the UPA government was in power. Menon’s writings suggest that India’s national security considerations are not defined either by Hindu or by secular nationalism. They are merely a response to its changing security requirements. However, it also necessitates that the Indian government should officially review its nuclear doctrine in order to convey deterrence more effectively. Narang, a professor of political science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology who specialises in nuclear proliferation and strategy, said in his prepared remarks that there was increasing “evidence that India will not allow Pakistan to go first”. George Perkovich, vice president of Carnegie and an opponent of the 2008 India-US nuclear deal, said ultimately it was about “psychological mind games” and sending signals. He questioned India’s capacity to conduct a “comprehensive” strike while warning of the massive costs involved in developing such capabilities.

    Sameer Lalwani, deputy director of Stimson Center’s South Asia programme, said in an e-mail response that the risks of India changing its posture were worrisome. Pakistan would try to find ways to make its nuclear arsenal survive an Indian strike by “expansion of its missile arsenal, putting strategic nuclear weapons at sea, increasing arsenal readiness or reducing the timeline for launch”.

    Given the herein above-mentioned arguments, one thing is clear that what so ever remain the strategic exigencies or political expediencies regarding India’s nuclear doctrinal change, a revisionist Indian approach is a reflection on BJP’s realpolitik doctrine that has already been poisoning the peace future of South Asian region.

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    IMAFT’s built bastion against terrorism?

    April 11th, 2017

    By Syed Qamar Rizvi.

    Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition, is an intergovernmental– cum-intercontinental counter-terrorist alliance , the largest global military alliance of 41 Muslim countries( even lager than the Western military alliance of 28 Nato states), united having a bastion   against ISIL and other terrorist networks .  Its creation was first announced by Mohammad bin Salman Al Saud, Saudi Arabia’s Minister of Defense, on 15 December 2015. The alliance was to have a joint operations center in RiyadhSaudi Arabia.  Under much criticism and controversies, after all the emerging Islamic Military Alliance to Fight Terrorism (IMAFT) albeit with a notable missing that some of the states like Indonesia, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Tajikistan are not included in this alliance. But exclusion of these states must not be taken as a sign of resentment. It is all possible that subsequently some of these countries may join this club. IMAFT must be taken as Muslim Nato to guard against strategic and tactical terrorism.

    The alliance with its military Command Headquarters based in Riyadh was announced as an Inter- Governmental Alliance first by Saudi Defence Minister Muhammad bin Salman on 15 December 2015.Its mandate was to counter terrorism from organisations such as ISIL and their other variants. Pakistan’s Defence Minister in a press statement revealed that Pakistan’s ex-COAS General Raheel Sharif has been appointed as the Commander in Chief of that alliance.  

    Despite the fact that some of the critics view that IMAFT’s plan for destroying Daesh has a relatively limited stated objective, its creation would act as a caution to terrorist missions. To protect the Muslim countries from all terrorist groups and organizations (irrespective of their sect or name), and to fight terrorists in “Iraq, Syria, Libya, Egypt, and Afghanistan”. Essentially, due to the dominance of the states having Sunni-majority populations (with the notable absences of Iran and Iraq), IMAFT in view of few analysts, is a coalition with a sectarian agenda. But in reality, this impression is grossly based on wrong perception leveled by those who lack neutral perceptivity.

    There is the argument that Daesh deceitfully presents itself as a representative of authentic Islam, commonly known as Salafism, as practiced by the early generations of Muslims. It includes the special brand of Wahhabism adopted by Saudi Arabia, whereby many Islamic principles of the dominant Sunni and Shi’ite sects are considered polytheistic—such as philosophy, spirituality, the spirit of sharia, and use of metaphors. But this argument is painted by those who are brushed by ethnic orientation. There is need to look into this alliance by having an objective appraisal and assessment. Until there is greater recognition of the interplay between the ideas and politics, many observers will likely continue to misperceive Daesh’s ideology. Ultimately, while most non-Arab Muslim-majority member countries such as Pakistan are unanimously in favor of preserving the sanctity of the holy sites of Mecca and Medina, they are not necessarily in favor of “re-Sunnifying” both Iraq and Syria and flipping the existing power structures-this outlook strategically demands to be anchored.

    When the coalition was announced there were 34 members. Additional countries joined and the number of members reached 41 when Oman joined in December 2016. On 6 January 2017, Pakistan‘s former Chief of Army Staff, General (Retd.) Raheel Sharif was named the IMA’s first Commander-in-Chief. Later his appointment was confirmed on 9th March 2017 by Pakistan’s Finance Minister Ishaq Dar in a press release. According to Pakistan’s Defence Minister Khawaja Asif NOC for Raheel Sharif is issued on 25 March 2017 and he will sign contract on first week of April.

    The answer to above may lie in the IMAFT aping a Western model with a dominant country accompanied by two or three serious and several token allies wreaking havoc on countries with or without UN sanction. The view shared by some polarized thinkers holds that IMAFT would mainly be brandishing the military muscle of countries like Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia with several countries on the fence caviling at the need and appropriateness of such military interventions. And then there is the knottier question of the military alliance’s strategy and tactics against an amorphous enemy wielding asymmetric tactics. Before joining the IMAFT, Pakistan fully took into account the future ventures and challenges that could be posed to this alliance.

    Though apparently appointment also contradicts Pakistan’s national commitment towards neutrality with regard to the Yemen crisis after a parliamentary resolution was passed in April 2015,yet pragmatically,this unfolds the underpinning exigencies that strongly advocate for participating in this.The strategist argue that  the Yemen intervention, also known as Operation Decisive Storm, was a Saudi Arabia-led crackdown against Houthi rebels and was more about a power struggle centering on reinstating Yemen’s dictatorship of President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi rather than cracking down on terrorism.

    However, it is an overgeneralized impression that the IMA will assume a sectarian character. Last month, the kingdom scored another victory by bringing in a new member: Oman. For the sultanate, which has traditionally distanced itself from Riyadh’s efforts to isolate Tehran, joining IMAFT raises important questions about Muscat’s foreign policy agenda as Arab Gulf-Iranian tensions escalate. Saudi voices were quick to hail Oman’s decision to become the Saudi-led alliance’s 41st member as a sign of strong Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) strength and “a new chapter in regional and Muslim unity.”

    As neighbors and fellow GCC states, Oman and Saudi Arabia have long maintained a close alliance, yet Muscat’s close ties with Iran have created friction in Omani-Saudi relations. By hosting secret talks between American and Iranian officials in Muscat, which led to the historic 2015 Iranian nuclear deal, Omani officials unnerved their Saudi counterparts. More recently, members of the Saudi government have accused Oman, which has thus far maintained neutrality in the Yemen civil war, of permitting weapons smuggling across the Oman-Yemen border into the hands of Houthi fighters — a claim denied by officials in Muscat.

    The procedural aspects of the former Pakistani chief of army staff’s appointment aside, the fact that the alliance seeks to carry out counterterrorism operations in Iraq, Syria, Libya, Egypt, and Afghanistan, particularly with Syria witnessing the consolidation of power of an Alawite government under President Bashar Al Assad recently, hints at how geopolitics in the region will play a significant role in shaping the IMAFT’s role. The catastrophic effects of regimes being toppled throughout the Middle East had led to great instability in the form of rebel movements and insurgencies that ultimately have assumed a sectarian character. As for the Iranian reservations for the alliance, one fact is clear as rightly clarified by Islamabad that the alliance is by no means a coalition against Iran. It is an Islamic coalition against global terrorism. And naturally the Muslim community at large expects that Iran should join this coalition without chartering unwarranted reservations.

    For Pakistan, tackling terrorism at home is a top priority for civilian leadership and the military establishment. That said, if the preconditions of joining the alliance are not met, Sharif will most likely withdraw from command of the IMA. His appointment, however, will continue to be questionable on grounds of neutrality. By endorsing the appointment of Gen Raheel to head IMAFT, Islamabad shows its unflinching resolve against global terrorism. While evaluating the scope of the IMAFT and its future role, we may pragmatically conclude that despite many controversies and misfits, the seemingly establishment of IMAFT to fight regional and trans-regional terrorism should be viewed as an encouraging development.

     

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    Russia’s Role In Afghanistan: Myths & Orientations

    March 29th, 2017

     

    By Syed Qamar Rizvi.

     

    Moscow is holding an Afghan peace moot. But Washington has declined the Russian offer to participate in this conference.  The other twelve regional actors are determined to attend this event. An increased Russian involvement in Afghanistan has surprised many observers. While Moscow has invited Washington to the upcoming talks scheduled for mid-April, the optics of the U.S. merely being a participant at a Moscow-led gathering would send a signal of diplomatic weakness in the region. What does Moscow want to achieve in the war-torn country? After Syria, is another US-Russia conflict being played out in a different arena? A new wave of skepticism/propaganda about the Russian perceived objectives in Afghanistan is being blown in the western media.

    Lately, Russia has increased its involvement in Afghanistan. For many experts, this is surprising, because Moscow had maintained an apparent distance from the Afghan conflict for many years. In fact, Russia even supported the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and the subsequent toppling of the Taliban regime. At the time, former Afghan President Hamid Karzai rightly said that Afghanistan was probably the only place where the interests of Moscow and Washington didn’t clash.

    But a new geopolitical situation is emerging in the region, and it seems that Russia has decided not to remain “neutral” in the protracted conflict wracking the Asian country. The recent tripartite meeting in Moscow involving China, Pakistan and Russia to discuss Afghanistan’s security is just one example of Russia’s growing interest.

    Russia first established contacts with the Taliban leadership in 2007 to discuss the issue of drug trafficking through Central Asian countries that share borders with Afghanistan. Now there are reports that Moscow is again in contact with the Taliban. But this time the Moscow-Taliban contacts are not limited to talks on drug trafficking, according to analysts. Russia, they say, realizes the US policies in Afghanistan have failed, and therefore wants to intervene.

    As Afghanistan has drifted closer to India, Pakistan is seeking to forge closer ties with China and Russia to counter New Delhi’s growing influence in Kabul. India and Afghanistan have been extremely critical of Pakistan’s role in Afghanistan. They accuse the Pakistani military and spy agencies of backing Taliban insurgents and destabilizing Afghanistan so that Islamabad can have an upper hand in geopolitics.

    Speaking at the sixth Heart of Asia ministerial conference earlier this month, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani urged Pakistani authorities to act against the militants’ sanctuaries in their country’s northwestern tribal areas. Ghani said the $500 million (478 million euros) in aid that Islamabad pledged for the reconstruction of Afghanistan would be better spent on eradicating terrorists that continue to launch attacks in Afghanistan from Pakistani soil.

    “We must confront the specter in the room,” Ghani said in the Indian city of Amritsar, referring to what he said was a fresh wave of terrorism and political violence affecting the region. Stanford political scientist Kathryn Stoner says that Russia does not want U.S. military forces to stay in Afghanistan, 

    “Responses of states on this have been significant, but some states provide sanctuary and tolerate these networks,” Ghani said, adding that a Taliban leader had said recently that if the group did not receive sanctuary in Pakistan, it would not last a month. “Russian leaders point to the fact that heroin trafficking was less under the Taliban than in the past five years under the U.S./NATO coalition,” noted Stoner, adding that narcotics were reaching the Russian population.

    Meanwhile, Russia is exploring the possibility of moving additional troops to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan as well as re-equipping those countries’ armies to provide a “defensive zone in Central Asia against Afghan radical or narcotics incursions into the Russian heartland,” according to Stoner.

    Islamabad denies allegations that it is not cooperating in the fight against the Taliban. “Pakistan has suffered a lot in the war on terror but Washington blames us for the turmoil in Afghanistan,” Mushahid Ullah Khan, a close aide to Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, told DW. “The US has failed to bring peace to Afghanistan, so now we are trying to engage with other regional countries to work for Afghanistan’s stability, which is essential for peace in the entire region.”

    According to Andrew Weiss, vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

    “I think the Russian government is unlikely, as they say in Russian, step into that river twice. But we are seeing, I think, is a revival of Cold War-style thinking. There was a great interview the other day in TASS, the Russian state news agency, with their main envoy for Afghanistan. And in this interview, Ambassador Kabulov really portrays the entire question of the U.S. presence in Afghanistan in Cold War terms. He talks about how the U.S. used to have these big bases in Iran, we got kicked out of Iran after the revolution. We then seized on Afghanistan as a pivot point to project influence toward the Middle East, toward China, Pakistan and Russia. And he sort of talks about, you know, ‘We lived through the Cold War, we know what this is all about,’ and there’s this really larding it quite darkly in terms of being geopolitical great-gain competition. I think that kind of talk is a reflection of what policy’s all about, which is if they can do things to squeeze out the United States or to make the U.S. lose, that’s gotta be good for Russia. I think that’s a misguided way to think about a problem as complex as Afghanistan, but it clearly holds a lot of sway at senior levels in the Russian government.”

    Russia, Pakistan and Iran are working to “legitimize and support” the Taliban in Afghanistan, according to the top U.S. military commander in the war zone, who told lawmakers Thursday that thousands more American or NATO troops are needed to break the “stalemate” between Afghan forces and the insurgent group while the Islamic State also remains active in the nation.

    Army Gen. John W. Nicholson Jr. told the Senate Armed Services Committee that outside powers led by Russia have increased their interference in the Afghanistan fighting over the past year, greatly complicating the task for the U.S.-backed government in Kabul.

    The general offered a sobering assessment of the 15-year-old U.S. mission in Afghanistan at a moment of growing uncertainty over how the Trump administration may seek to reshape U.S. strategy in the conflict.

    President Trump so far has focused heavily on fighting the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq. He has mandated that a fresh plan be developed within 30 days to defeat the terrorist group but has said little about Afghanistan despite the ongoing battle against a defiant Islamic State affiliate there and a growing surge by the Taliban. Some people believe that Russia has started supplying the Taliban with weapons and equipment, and repairing the group’s weapons, including tanks and vehicles.

    According to Russian officials these reports are false.

    On Feb. 10, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs dismissed allegations by General John Nicholson, Commander of the U.S. and NATO Forces in Afghanistan, of Russian supplies of weapons to Taliban. 

    There is no doubt, that Russia needs a communication channel with the Taliban and other armed groups inside Afghanistan. The release of its pilots from the Taliban’s captivity explains that the main role for this channel is to help Russian citizens.

    As for the Russian common interests and dialogue with Taliban, these possibilities will remain cloudy due to the Taliban inability to stop both terrorist activities inside Afghanistan and neighboring countries and involvement in drug production and trafficking.

    If the relations between Russia and the United Sates improve, Moscow will most likely keep the communication channel with the Taliban open, but it will not raise questions about common interests with the movement. If the U.S.-Russian relations go bad, Moscow will probably try to challenge every part of U.S. policy towards Afghanistan, and Russian statements about the Taliban will be used for this purpose.

    But the fact of the matter is that US own policy failures in Afghanistan have paved the way for other regional actors, particularly Russia to take on its prescribed policy interest to meddle in the Afghan politics, thereby defending its own geostrategic peace concerns and trying to infuse its own leverage in the Taliban network without whom the future stakes of peace cannot meet with prompt results. And it would be not wrong to estimate that a negatively woven India-US-Afghan policy has made a closer union between Turkey-Iran-China-Russia and Pakistan.

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    Reflections on Erdogan’s foreign policy

    March 14th, 2017

    By Syed Qamar Rizvi.

     

    Much is being discussed in the Western print media about Turkey’s President Tayyab Erdogan’s foreign policy ventures. But it appears that what Erdogan is doing, he is trying his best to defend his country’s strategic interests. However, a look– into the following discussed foreign policy reflections—provides much food for thought.

    On two separate occasions, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan criticized the Treaty of Lausanne, which created the borders of modern Turkey, for leaving the country too small. He spoke of the country’s interest in the fate of Turkish minorities living beyond these borders, as well as its historic claims to the Iraqi city of Mosul, near which Turkey has a small military base. And, alongside news of Turkish jets bombing Kurdish forces in Syria and engaging in mock dogfights with Greek planes over the Aegean Sea, Turkey’s pro-government media have shown a newfound interest in a series of imprecise, even crudely drawn, maps of Turkey with new and improved borders.

    Turkey won’t be annexing part of Iraq anytime soon, but this combination of irredentist cartography and rhetoric nonetheless offers some insight into Turkey’s current foreign and domestic policies and Ankara’s self-image. The maps, in particular, reveal the continued relevance of Turkish nationalism, a long-standing element of the country’s statecraft, now reinvigorated with some revised history and an added dose of religion. But if the past is any indication, the military interventions and confrontational rhetoric this nationalism inspires may worsen Turkey’s security and regional standing. Erdogan, by contrast, has given voice to an alternative narrative in which Ataturk’s willingness in the Treaty of Lausanne to abandon territories such as Mosul and the now-Greek islands in the Aegean was not an act of eminent pragmatism but rather a betrayal. The suggestion, against all evidence, is that better statesmen, or perhaps a more patriotic one, could have gotten more.

    Mr. Erdogan, the country’s leader for 14 years, is the one chiefly responsible for putting the Ottoman Empire at the center of Turkey’s collective imagination. The Ottoman sultans are often hailed as the caliphs of the Muslim world. This is not lost on the supporters of Mr. Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party – the A.K.P. The chairman of the A.K.P’s youth wing recently declared Mr. Erdogan “president of all the world’s Muslims.” A Muslim Brotherhoodcleric echoed similar sentiments when he declared, Turkey’s president as “the hope of all Muslims and of Islam”.
    These ambitions seem to have had a distinct effect on Turkey’s Middle East policy. After Syria’s civil war began in 2011, Ankara sought to topple Assad’s regime by bringing in Islamist allies. For this purpose, it funded loyal armed groups to do its bidding- groups named after Ottoman rulers -the Sultan Murad Brigade being one example. Nonetheless, recently Erdogan has displayed political maturity by being an integral part of the recent Moscow Declaration with Russia and Iran- the joint eight-point statement of principles calls for the extension of a ceasefire throughout Syria and a negotiated settlement between the Syrian government and its opponents.

    In August, the Syrian Kurds, with American support, were poised to gain control of a long strip along the Turkish-Syrian border. Once this became clear, Turkey, together with its Syrian proxies, launched a military operation to push back the Kurds and the Islamic State.

    It was a success — of sorts. Turkey and its proxies gained control of an area that they used to create a buffer zone between two Syrian Kurdish-administered territories. Iran and Russia, too, were happy to see the American-backed group’s ambitions checked. If Syria’s Kurds were to achieve independence with American assistance, Moscow and Tehran feared, they could be counted on to remain an American ally and perhaps even to host American military bases, threatening Iranian and Russian interests. Accordingly, by using Turkey to beat the Syrian Kurds, Moscow and Tehran hope to drive them away from the United States and into their own arms.

    Turkey’s rapprochement with Russia goes beyond Syria. Lately, Mr. Erdogan has been openly toying with the idea of joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a pact led by Russia and China that is meant to rival the European Union. In doing so, Turkey is turning away from potential partners in the West that still — at least for now — value democracy and human rights, and toward another world of autocrats, pseudo-monarchs and aspiring czars.

    “Due to the active action of Turkey and Russia we managed to bring the rival forces together, and due to our joint effort the Syrian ceasefire continues,”  Putin told reporters on Friday, hailing Ankara’s  “exceptional cooperation” in keeping the truce.

    For his part, Erdogan said that there are “no doubts” about the “very successful” Syria talks sponsored by the two countries, adding that Turkey was cooperating entirely with Russia’s military. Erdogan also praised the two countries’ friendship, saying it is “strong enough to overcome their differences”, even as he urged Russia to lift all sanctions it imposed on Ankara following the downing of a Russian plane in 2015.

    The increasingly close cooperation on Syria between Russia and Turkey marks a sharp turnaround for the two nations, which have  also coordinated their operations against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) armed group in Syria.

    Russia has an active military presence in Syria in support of Assad’s forces, while  Turkey, which backs anti-Assad groups, launched a military operation in August to create a safe zone along its border inside Syria.  Tensions between the German and Turkish governments, triggered by the arrest of Die Welt’s correspondent Deniz Yücel and culminating in Erdoğan accusing Germany of “Nazi practices” over banned rallies in German cities, had merely strengthened his allegiance, said 20-year-old Mehmet. “To be honest, when America, Germany and France tell me to vote no in the referendum, then I am going to vote yes.”

    Both said no German party represented their interests: “We are just foreigners to them.”

    The heightened fervour of support for Erdoğan even among younger members of Germany’s population with Turkish roots – a community of about 3 million, of which roughly half are entitled to vote in April – has scandalised the country’s public and media.

    German politicians allege that the AKP is trying to influence the diaspora vote not just through public rallies but by covertly pressurising and threatening its opponents in Germany via religious and business networks. In January, Turkish-German footballer Hakan Çalhanoğlu was publicly criticised by his club Bayer Leverkusen for posting a video on social media in which he declared his allegiance with the evet (yes) camp.

    Nevertheless, being highly frustrated over the European Union’s exclusive behavior regarding Turkey’s EU’s bid; and being dejected from German ‘s orthodox foreign policy behavior, and being extremely  dismayed over US’s backing of the Kurds in Syria and Iraq, President Erdogan has been trying to reorient Turkey’s foreign policy keeping in view the current geostrategic and geopolitical dimensions of the region. His tilt towards both Russia and Iraq seems to warrant the fact that he wants to protect Turkey’s interests both regionally and globally.

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    The Border Management & Pak-Afghan ties?

    February 28th, 2017

    By Syed Qamar Rizvi.

     

    Pakistan has recently decided to seal the 1800 km Pak –Afghan border at significant points owing to the worst situation hemmed in by the cross-border terrorism. Borders, around the world, are physically managed by the border police or paramilitary forces, and in certain cases by the armed forces, in conjunction with immigration departments. However, it is a complex national responsibility involving a host of agencies. It also calls for efficient communication with the corresponding agencies of the neighbouring countries.

    ‘’Border management takes care of two different aspects; the negative and the positive. The negative facets include illegal crossing of each other’s citizens, drug trafficking, the trafficking women, children and labour, and smuggling of weapons and explosive, etc. The positive aspects include legal immigration and movement of goods as part of the trade agreements, etc.

    Pakistan shares 7,092 kilometres border with other countries; 2,611 kilometres with Afghanistan, 523 kilometres with China, 2,912 kilometres with India and 909 kilometres with Iran, besides 1,046 kilometres of coastline. Amongst these, the porous and volatile border with Afghanistan poses a great challenge. The border with Afghanistan is unique from many angles. A total of 11 out of 34 Afghan provinces adjoin three federating units of Pakistan to include Balochistan, Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Ethnically, the Pashtun population bestrides the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. There are a number of tribes living on both sides of the border.’’

    Besides, there are 23 divided villages, six in FATA and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and 17 in Balochistan, which are split by the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. However, practically, it is neither possible to stop their movement nor is being done so. The people from the divided villages move under the Rahdari System. An important point that must be kept in mind by the readers is that the Pakistan-Afghanistan border is not like the Pakistan-India border. Pakistan and Afghanistan are two brotherly countries, and the border between them has to be managed, not closed, controlled or defended. An effective border management would certainly benefit both the countries in all spheres such as political, social, economic and security. The need for security ought to be balanced with the liberty of movement of people in keeping with the anthropological realities of the region.

     

    Pak-Afghan Border Routes

    ‘’In addition to the routes serving the three trade corridors, there are about 100 frequented and unfrequented routes. A few of these are notified. Many of these routes are smuggling prone. Some 10,000 to 30,000 people cross the Chaman and Torkham border points daily, which include legal immigrants, traders, personnel from NGOs and NATO assets. Besides, 5,000 to 6,000 illegal crossings take place daily using both frequented and unfrequented routes. This happens despite the fact that there are hundreds of border posts held by Pakistan’s security forces on the Pakistani side of the border and a few by the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan Border Police (ABP) supported by ISAF/ NATO. This shows the magnitude of problem. Certainly it is not desirable to completely seal off the border. The best answer to the predicament is to carry out a joint, effective and integrated border management’’.

     

    Cross-Border Attacks and the Foreign Terrorists

    ‘’During the last few years, this has emerged as one of the most serious border issues. The terrorists from Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) are hiding in and operating from their sanctuaries in Kunar and Nuristan provinces of Afghanistan since 2010. During the last about four years, there have been 17 attacks by TTP using its sanctuaries in Afghanistan wherein dozens of civilians and soldiers embraced shahadat. The menace is not receding anyway and needs stern action by the Afghan government and the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Another issue is that of the foreign fighters e.g. Uzbeks. These terrorists come to Pakistan via Afghanistan and cross over the less-than-well managed border. A better managed border is likely to provide answers to some of the questions.

     

    Drug Trafficking

    One of the gravest threats along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border is from the movement of drug traffickers. Whereas Pakistan is a poppy-free country since long, narcotics virtually make up for 50 percent of Afghanistan’s GDP according to international sources. About 2.5 million Afghans depend directly on the narcotics production and trafficking. Approximately 94 percent of world opium production transits the region, Afghanistan being the main source. It poses a health security threat not only to the Pakistani populace but other countries beyond Pakistan, too.

     

    Pak-Afghan Politico-Military Communication

    There have been ebbs and flows in Pak-Afghan military and political relations.Despite security challenges marred by the terror acts on both sides due to the nature of border, Pakistan and Afghanistan have been able to evolve a functional sense of bilateralism over the last few years.  Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif visited Kabul on November 30, 2013. During his meeting with President Hamid Karzai, he said, “Achieving peace and stability in Afghanistan is in Pakistan’s interest. Islamabad desires friendly and good neighbourly relations with Afghanistan based on mutual trust‚ respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity.” The visit by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s special envoy, Mehmood Khan Achakzai, to Kabul on June 20, 2014 was a positive step in the same direction.

    He held a meeting with the Afghan President to seek Kabul’s cooperation in eliminating terrorism while Operation Zarb-e-Azb had already been launched. He was also accompanied by Foreign Secretary Aizaz Ahmed Chaudhry. Media reports suggest that Mehmood Achakzai sought extradition of the TTP chief Mullah Fazlullah from Afghanistan. This was immediately followed by Afghanistan’s National Security Adviser Dr Rangin Dadfar Spanta’s visit to Islamabad on June 26, 2014. He led delegation-level talks with Sartaj Aziz, the Adviser to Prime Minister on National Security and Foreign Affairs. These meetings have been respectively scheduled during the years 2015-16.

    The peace process in Afghanistan and bilateral cooperation has a concrete linkage with the situation on border. This calls for a military level answer, which lies in sound and trust-based mil-mil relations between the two countries. To this end, several meetings and rounds of talks have been held heretofore, the latest one held during the month of Feb.2017, as Pakistan Army Chief Gen.Qamar Bajwa affirmed on promoting bilateral security ties with Kabul. Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Qamar Javed Bajwa on Friday(Feb-17) also phoned US General John Nicholson, Resolute Support Mission (RSM) Commander in Afghanistan, and expressed his concerns over continued acts of terrorism in Pakistan with impunity from Afghanistan, ISPR DG Major General Asif Ghafoor said in a tweet.

     

    The Ashraf-Ghani unity government: New Challenges

    ‘’This change in Kabul’s Pakistan policy sparked enormous reactions in both Afghanistan and Pakistan.

    Sartaj Aziz, Pakistan’s foreign affairs adviser and top representatives at the Heart of Asia Conference, slammed Ghani’s remarks as “baseless accusations.” He said, “It is simplistic to blame only one country for the recent upsurge in violence. We need to have an objective and holistic view.” When Aziz returned home, he told reporters in Islamabad that “Ashraf Ghani’s statement was meant to please India.” He added, “India’s efforts to divide us [Pakistan and Afghanistan] will not go very far.”

    Reactions in Kabul, however, were mostly positive. The Pakistani reaction can be clearly understood by a look into Pakistani print and electronic Urdu and English media, where Ghani’s snub was covered widely initially and then vanished from headlines as media turned their attention to news of singer-turned-preacher Junaid Jamshid’s death in an airplane crash.

    Unfortunately, when it comes to Afghan, Indian, and Pakistani foreign policies regarding each other, they do not look through the prisms of bilateral relations. There is always a triangle, which deeply influences their policies. Pakistan’s Afghan policy is very much India-centric; Indian policy in Afghanistan is heavily influenced by the desire for a security and psychological advantage over Pakistan. Meanwhile, Kabul uses the Pakistan-India cards in a manner similar to Afghan leaders balancing Czarist Russia and British India during the “Great Game.” From the Cold War through modern-day, Kabul has varied in its closeness to India and Pakistan, with gains by one side coming at the expense of the other.

     

    Operation Zarb-e-Azb and the Border Management

    ‘’Operation Zarb-e-Azb has been an important venture (started by former army Chief Gen. Raheel Sharif) in the context of border management from many angles. First, the terrorists of various hue and colour – TTP and foreign terrorists etc – fleeing from North Waziristan would go across the border, not to live in the shadow of barren boulders of Tora Bora, but somewhere in the populated area of perhaps the Eastern and Southeastern Afghan provinces, and in certain cases in Kabul, Balkh, Badakhshan, Herat, Kunduz and Mazar-e-Sharif depending on their lingo and linkage.

    The Afghan government can play an important role to check the movement of terrorists across their border into their country. The Pakistani government had already asked the Afghan government to seal the escape routes from North Waziristan into Afghanistan. NATO and ISAF share this responsibility. Second, Mullah Fazlullah, the topmost leader of the TTP, along with some of his companions, is living in Afghanistan. He has complete liberty to move around in Afghanistan and plan and conduct terror acts in Pakistan.

    His group is being routed in North Waziristan. Certainly, he would endeavour to provide support to them. Third, the displaced persons (DPs) from North Waziristan have been largely moved to the Frontier Region (FR) Bannu in Bakka Khel area albeit most of them have shifted either with their relatives or in their own hired or second homes. Some of the families, mainly of Afghan origin, have reportedly crossed over to Afghanistan. Some of those going to Afghanistan from North Waziristan are reported to have returned via Khyber and Kurram agencies. The Afghan government needs to register all those moving across the border in any of the two directions.The military high command has also made necessary coordination with the Afghan counterparts at various levels.’’

     

    Operation Raddul Fasad

    “THE armed forces under the command of Gen Qamar Bajwa, on Wednesday, launched a country-wide crackdown code named ‘Raddul Fasad’ (Elimination of Mischief) against terrorists and extremists. The operation, initiated in the backdrop of latest wave of terrorism, envisages involvement of all wings of armed forces, paramilitary organisations, civilian law enforcement agencies and intelligence agencies. It has four main elements — operation in Punjab by Rangers; continuation of operations in other parts of the country; border management and de-weaponisation and explosive control.
    As the operation is being led by armed forces, which have track record of delivering, there are reasons to believe that it would prove to be a remarkable success and lead to complete elimination of terrorists and hard-core criminals. There should be no mercy against those associated, in any way, with terrorism and serious crimes as both our religion and laws of the land envisage no leniency for such elements. Islam ordains strict punishment for those indulging in ‘Fasad fil Ardh’ (spreading mischief in the land)’’.

     

    Pakistan-Afghanistan Border Management System (PA-BMS)

    ‘’Notwithstanding the challenges, keeping the border stable and managed is the strategic priority of the two countries. Modern methods can help overcome the challenges. Integrated Border Management (IBM) – a concept embraced by the European Union (EU) – offers a modern template for coherent and coordinated handling of border affairs. This entails multi-agency cooperation on both sides of the border.

    A border coordination mechanism based on IBM system can evolve only through political will, sound military planning and right execution on the border. Four levels of planning and execution are envisaged for PA-BMS as follows:

              Political Level (PoLvl). This may also be called the decision level. Success is contingent upon the political will exhibited by both sides at this level. Mutual trust and belief in each other’s sincerity is imperative to bring the two polities to the table of consensus to take and retake important decisions. Narrowing the communication gap through frequent interactions can be of great value in this regard. When trust at political level would be able to survive the heat of practical situations, it would turn into people’s belief in each other’s sincerity and seriousness. Pakistan and Afghanistan need to prevent foreign intervention into their affairs. This can happen only if the notion of bilateralism works with trust at the PoLvl.

               Military Level (MiLvl). This may also be called the planning level. It is the level of interaction between Pakistan Army and Afghan National Army (ANA). The decisions taken at the political level should be evolved into a functional border management strategy at this level.           Operational Level (OpLvl). This may also be called the coordination level. It should work at the level of headquarters of formation and forces deployed on the border to include Pakistan Army and Afghan National Army, Frontier Corps Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, and the Afghan National Police (ANP) and Afghan Border Police (ABP). This level should ensure implementation of the border management strategy and steer the under command units.’’

               Border Outpost Level (BoLvl). This may also be called the execution level. Much of the issues relating to border management can be resolved and decided right at the point of occurrence on the border if the officials on the border outposts of the two countries are aware of the politico-military policies and know as to what they need to do under what circumstances. This level should receive guidelines from the operational level and get back to the same level for clarification, yet without causing delay or disruption to the routine management. It is at this level that various kinds of border violations must be prevented and, if not, at least correctly reported to the superior channels. The violations could be of kinetic nature such as terror attacks or movement of weapons or explosives across the border, or military breaches such as fire or movement across the border. Else, they could be non-kinetic such as the movement of drugs or illegal crossing by the commoners.

     

    Conclusion

    Pakistan and Afghanistan are two conjoined twins as articulated by the Afghan President Hamid Karzai in March 2010. They share religion, history, geography, ethnicity, culture, language, border and even sentiments. They share economic prospects, political future and thus the destiny. Pakistan and Afghanistan have been together throughout the history of mankind. Thus, it is imperative for both nations to work together for security and stability in the region. Effective management for friendly borders with well regulated human and material flow can contribute a great deal towards to bringing back security on both sides of the Hindu Kush. Bilateralism not skepticism is the order to restore strategic peace in the region. It must be hoped that through viable diplomatic discourse– between Kabul-Islamabad-Beijing-Moscow-Tehran– can provide the best response for all kinds of conflicting regional situations and national aspirations. Yet the border management is the core to resettle the underlining misunderstandings and complexities.  But this hopeful scenario, is only possible via good will diplomacy between Kabul and Islamabad- a driving and inevitable imperative of present times.

     

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    Trump’s endangered Mideast policy?

    February 18th, 2017

    By Syed Qamar Rizvi.

     

    After resuming his office as the 45th president of the United States, Donald Trump is being seen as playing with political jugglery richly reflected by his Israeli tilt as he has been thinking of shifting the Israeli embassy to Jerusalem and now he is caught in delivering his current orientation of looking beyond the scope of a two state- solution. For international peace community and the Mideast policy experts these developments are unworthy and alarming signs to the future of Mideast peace dialogue.

    In a press conference with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, he said that he would not insist on a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. That means no longer committing to the creation of a Palestinian state; one that would exist peacefully alongside Israel.

    “I thought for a while the two-state looked like it may be the easier of the two, but honestly, if Bibi and if the Palestinians — if Israel and the Palestinians are happy, I’m happy with the one they like the best,” Mr. Trump said.

    With Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at his side, President Trump on Wednesday dropped the decades-old U.S. position that Middle East peace requires the creation of a viable Palestinian state. The unpredictable commander in chief also watered down campaign-trail pledges to move America’s embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem and dismantle the Iran nuclear deal.

    The so-called two-state solution, under which Palestinians would get their own state, has underpinned Middle East peace efforts for a generation. In January 2001, Bill Clinton became the first sitting U.S. president to explicitly declare that “there can be no genuine resolution to the conflict” without one. Nine months later, George W. Bush became the first to make this official U.S. policy. Since taking office, Trump and his top aides had omitted it from public statements. The Palestinians are unlikely to accept a peace agreement that does not give them an independent state.

    While the remarks appeared to delight Netanyahu, Trump seemed to surprise his guest by calling publicly for a pause in Israeli home building on Palestinian land. “I’d like to see you hold back on settlements for a little bit,” the president said.

    “There are two prerequisites for peace,” said the Israeli prime minister. “First the Palestinians must recognise the Jewish state.

    “Second, in any peace agreement, Israel must retain the overriding security control over the entire area west of the Jordan River.”

    Trump bolstered his pro-Israel credentials by announcing that the US Embassy will move to Jerusalem, but he has also talked about the importance of being neutral in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. He urged Obama to veto the recent UN Security Council Resolution but suggested he could deploy his legendary negotiating skills to broker an Israeli-Palestinian deal. 

    None of this adds up to a coherent set of policies to achieve long term solutions to serious conflicts. But the analysts striving to understand how a coherent strategy can be carved out of this mess are missing this point. The Twitter President cares about image and impact, guided by his instincts. Trump is not interested in long term consequences and this approach is bolstered by his loose relationship with reality.

    Meanwhile the Palestinian presidency stressed its commitment to a two-state solution and an end to the Israeli occupation, Reuters news agency reported. Earlier officials had urged the White House not to abandon the concept of a Palestinian state.

    Trump bolstered his pro-Israel credentials by announcing that the US Embassy will move to Jerusalem, but he has also talked about the importance of being neutral in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. He urged Obama to veto the recent UN Security Council Resolution but suggested he could deploy his legendary negotiating skills to broker an Israeli-Palestinian deal. 

    None of this adds up to a coherent set of policies to achieve long term solutions to serious conflicts. But the analysts striving to understand how a coherent strategy can be carved out of this mess are missing this point. The Twitter President cares about image and impact, guided by his instincts. Trump is not interested in long term consequences and this approach is bolstered by his loose relationship with reality.

    Though president trump has shown his reservation now over Israeli policy of settlements, yet his call for not focusing on a two-state solution has created warranted and qualified doubts and apprehensions in the Palestinian community over his intentions to handle this issue of the Arab-Israeli conflict

    Seen by his power play tactic to reinvent a new American doctrine of change and development, Trump, an author of ‘the art of the deal’ has been losing a balance that is much required for such a sensitive office to regulate the global affairs. What important policy considerations and appraisals that Mr Trump severely needs to review are: his call for Muslim exclusivism in the United States; his overriding and gravitating tilt towards Israel; his policy style of jumping to the conclusions. By all justifiable imperatives, President Trump must evolve his foreign policy strategy on a paradigm of cautious pragmatism rather than trying adventurism in the US foreign policy. As for Middle East peace negotiating deal, no such emotional carriers could be successful to achieve a peace deal. Much thoughtful deliberations led by an insightful mediation needs to followed up.

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    The reset of US-Russia relations?

    February 9th, 2017

    By Syed Qamar Rizvi.

     

    Much is being trumpeted in the global print and electronic media that under the new administration of Donald Trump in American, a remarkable reset of US-Russia relations would be observed. But looking through the mirror of ground realities, it appears that not so much will appear to be changed except few venturing developments between White House and the Kremlin.

    In the eyes of the Russian leadership, no country signed any obligation to consider the United States the only superpower and therefore nobody should comply with its leadership. This logic explains the confrontations over Ukraine and Syria. For the Kremlin, both were used to demonstrate that there are “red lines” and that there is a need for a new world order. Russian foreign policy analysts have repeatedly claimed that the new US president might be ready to negotiate the creation of a new system of international relations to replace Yalta and the current unipolar model.

    The “new Yalta” would redistribute spheres of responsibility to recognised great powers. The Kremlin, of course, sees Russia as one of them (alongside with the US, China, and perhaps Europe).

    Time will be the right determiner about what direction US-Russian relations move on. But if history is to have any predictive value, we should not be too optimistic. Both George W Bush and Barack Obama started their presidencies with rapprochement between the two countries – Bush looked into Putin’s eyes and saw his soul, while Obama was eager for a “reset” policy. Both ended their second terms at a low point in relations (with the Russia-Georgia war in 2008 and with Syria and the hacking scandal in 2016, respectively).

    Trump has alo reiterated his intention to pursue good relations with Russia, pointing out that it would be mutually beneficial and would allow both sides to step up the fight against Islamic State (IS, formerly ISIS, ISIL).

    “I don’t know Putin, but if we can get along with Russia that’s a great thing, it’s good for Russia, it’s good for us, we go out together and knock the hell out of ISIS, because that’s a real sickness,” he said. Trump again reiterated his intention to pursue good relations with Russia, pointing out that it would be mutually beneficial and would allow both sides to step up the fight against Islamic State (IS, formerly ISIS, ISIL).

    “I don’t know Putin, but if we can get along with Russia that’s a great thing, it’s good for Russia, it’s good for us, we go out together and knock the hell out of ISIS, because that’s a real sickness,” he said.

    The Kremlin said the two men planned to meet soon to discuss “joining forces” in the Syrian conflict and “partnering” to solve global issues. The White House made no reference to a meeting, but said the “positive call was a significant start to improving the relationship between the US and Russia that is in need of repair”.

    The Kremlin and White House statements made no reference to a possible easing of US sanctions on Russia over the Ukrainian conflict. But Moscow said the two leaders agreed on the importance of “restoring mutually beneficial trade and economic links”. “When there’s a change of leadership and other interests coincide, then things can actually improve pretty quickly,” said Robert English, a specialist on Russia and director of the University of Southern California’s School of International Relations. “When there’s a change of leadership and other interests coincide, then things can actually improve pretty quickly,” said Robert English, a specialist on Russia and director of the University of Southern California’s School of International Relations. There’s been a pattern of Russian relations going sour in the past three U.S. presidential administrations, both Democratic and Republican. Some experts suggest Trump and Putin exchanging pleasantries is a positive step but may not be enough to fix the relationship that has suffered from long-standing differences over geopolitical issues.

    But the number of contentious issues between US and Russia is large, and goes well beyond fighting ISIS in Syria. Russia annexed Crimea, is involved in the separatist conflict in eastern Ukraine, and is actively challenging NATO by opposing its eastward expansion and threatening conflict in the Baltic Sea region. These issues don’t seem to be on the list of Mr. Trump’s foreign policy agendaS, but are important to Mr. Putin. Thus one can expect that at least Eastern Europe, if not NATO, will be used as a bargaining chip in achieving a deal over Syria. What will a US-Russia deal over Syria look like? This is so far unclear, but Russia is likely to lead.

    On the other hand Russia is an ally of Iran and China. These two countries do appear at the top of Mr. Trump’s agenda. In Mr. Trump’s seven point plan to rebuild the American economy China occupies three spots. Mr. Trump says he intends to have China labeled as a currency manipulator, “bring trade cases against China … [for] unfair subsidy behavior” and “use every lawful presidential power to remedy trade disputes if China does not stop its illegal activities, including its theft of American trade secrets.” Moreover, Mr. Trump has called the Iran deal the “worst deal ever made” and does not hide his distaste for Iran.

    In a recent interview when Mr. Trump was questioned on the nuclear threat emanating from North Korea, he responded that “China controls North Korea” and “the closest partner of North Korea is Iran.” It’s possible that the geopolitical and strategic considerations that shape the US-Russia relationship will dictate the pace and breadth of Trump’s engagement, regardless of his past statements or future intentions.

    “I think US policy especially with respect to a big geopolitical actor like a Russia or China is more often driven by the shape of the broader world and US and Russian interests in it than it is driven by the individual proclivities of a US president or a Russian president,” said Matthew Rojansky, a Russia expert at the Wilson Center.

    Conclusively, it appears that a new stream in the line of thinking between Moscow and Washington may be marked if Trump’s revisionist approach regarding in Nato’s eastward expansion camp is positively characterized. As for as the Ukraine issue is concerned, Washington may not give any lease to Russian leanings towards Kiev. Yes some trade ties between the two sides might improve therewithal a congenial approach towards searching a solution of the Syrian crises.

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    Trump’s lethal call for Muslim apartheid

    February 1st, 2017

    By Syed Qamar Rizvi.

     

     

    President Trump’s executive order– of Jan. 2017 , a heraldry of communal legacy, characterized by Muslim exclusionism– halted the entire US refugee programme for 120 days, indefinitely banned Syrian refugees, and suspended all nationals from seven Muslim-majority countries—Syria, Yemen, Sudan, Somalia, Iraq ,Libya and Iran. Trump’s order ushers in a new apartheid era towards Muslims. History will determine the futurity (a long-term impact of Mr Trump’s immigration order), but his early praise for its implementation will not easily be forgotten. What a Trump’s euphoria about his order!

    “It’s working out very nicely,” Mr Trump said in a brief response to a question on Saturday afternoon. “You see it in the airports, you see it all over. It’s working out very nicely, and we are going to have a very, very strict ban, and we are going to have extreme vetting, which we should have had in this country for many years.”

    On the ground at major US airports, things weren’t going quite so nicely, however. Immigration officials were having a difficult time implementing Trump’s order after receiving conflicting instructions on who to bar from entry into the US – and what to do with them once they were held. And as the day progressed, and word spread of the detentions, crowds of protesters at international terminals grew from dozens to hundreds to thousands.

    While on the campaign trail, it was easy for Mr Trump to roundly decry the US immigration system as broken and make a general call for bans and moratoriums. As president, however, his team has had to fill in the details – and it seems they faced some difficulty translating his pre-election rhetoric into policy. The White House overruled that guidance overnight, according to officials familiar with the rollout. That order came from the President’s inner circle, led by Stephen Miller and Steve Bannon. Their decision held that, on a case by case basis, DHS could allow green card holders to enter the US.

    There had been some debate whether green card holders should be even allowed to board international flights. It was decided by the Department of Homeland Security they could fly to the US and would be considered on a case-by-case basis after passing a secondary screening. President Trump’s executive order on immigration, parts of which have already been put on hold by several federal judges, is likely to face a series of new legal challenges about whether it violates a 1965 anti-discrimination law and the Constitution, scholars said Sunday.

    ‘’Trump’s order cites seven Muslim-dominant countries, and the president has signaled he favors Christian entrants over Muslims. Four federal judges have put various holds on the ban, and other courts are expected to consider similar stays. A group of 16 state attorneys general said Sunday they believe the executive order is unconstitutional, probably presaging an intense round of legal action against it.

    Ruthann Robson, professor of law at City University of New York School of Law, said the fact that all four judges who had reviewed the order by Sunday afternoon put various holds on it indicates that the measure faces serious challenge.’’

    “When the federal judges are ruling on the injunctions, one of the requirements is that they have to say that there is a substantial likelihood that the plaintiffs will prevail on the merits,” Robson said in an interview. Trump shows signs of being a compromiser. Apparently while writing the book: The Art of the Deal – a book that discusses his willingness to achieve goals through deals. The executive order is against the thought he narrated in his book. A group of Michiganders, including a Yemeni student and a Syrian seeking to become a permanent U.S. resident, are among those who Monday filed a legal challenge to President Trump’s order suspending the entry of refugees and others from several majority-Muslim nations.

    ‘’The lawsuit, filed in federal court in Virginia, wants a ruling blocking enforcement of Trump’s executive order signed Friday, saying it discriminates against Muslims and violates protections for the free exercise of faith and prohibitions on governmental establishment of religion. It also says people affected by the order are being denied due process of law.

    Referring to the order as a “Muslim Exclusion Order,” the complaint — which includes 27 plaintiffs from across the U.S. — says it “implements an impermissible religious gerrymander that divides foreign nationals, even those lawfully present inside the United States, into favored and disfavored groups based on their faith.” A group of Michiganders, including a Yemeni student and a Syrian seeking to become a permanent U.S. resident, are among those who Monday filed a legal challenge to President Trump’s order suspending the entry of refugees and others from several majority-Muslim nations.

    His executive order went into effect on Saturday which temporarily bans the entry of people trying to get into the United States coming from Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Sudan, Somalia, and Yemen. Trump said during his campaign that in order to combat terrorism he wanted to ban Muslims from entering the United States.The aforementioned countries are all predominantly Muslim nations.

    But included in the new president’s executive order are VISA holders, green card holders, and permanent resident’s of the United States who have a legal right to be here. Refugees and asylum seekers from the mentioned countries are also part of the ban. Even military interpreters can’t get visa’s, they must stay in their countries and face retaliation for working with the American Government’’.

    Trump’s strategy of making a communal divide between Muslims and Christians paves the way for enhancing the theory of the ‘clash of civilizations’ advocated by Professor Huntington.

    ‘’Huntington paid due attention to the Islamic World as a civilization field that has a strategic location in the world and has burning points of contact with the West. But he didn’t understand how Islam became widespread outside its birthplace in the Arabian Peninsula reaching the heart of Europe and the heart of China on one hand and how the European colonialism affected Islamic countries later and the effects this has left as a direct impact on the contact between the two parties.

    On one hand, the twentieth century has complicated the nature of these relations, for the creation of Israel due to efforts of European countries at the beginning before America adopting it and making its security its own objective, had its impact on poisoning the relations with the Islamic peoples with the West. On the other hand, millions of Arabs and Muslims moved to live in the West, which some estimate their numbers by forty million people. Between this and that the world knew the globalisation and the Information Technology Revolution’’.

    By no fair yardstick, Trump immigration order fulfills the pondering human rights values, rather it paves the way for an America, building more communal ghettos-an antithesis to the very semblance of the  Declaration of Independence, American constitution, and American credo of ‘exceptionalism’.

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    The plight of Rohingya Muslims

    January 30th, 2017

     

    By Syed Qamar Rizvi.

     

    The Currently held OIC moot in Malaysia has shown a touchy concern about the sufferings of Myanmar’s Muslims. The international community has acted as silent spectator since 2015, by watching the agony of the Rohingya Muslims at the hands of the Buddhist government in Myanmar. There are speculations too that such tyranny is being implied at the behest or the due to the corroboration of some neighboring states. It is only some days before that the newly elected UN chief has taken a diluted notice by deploying a special UN representative. Communal violence is not a new phenomenon, specially in this part of the world. Myanmar is a Buddhist majority country and the Muslim minority in Myanmar are the descendants of the Muslim immigrants from Bangladesh, China (Yunnan Province).

    The irony of the fact is that the Rohingya persons are also denied their right of citizenship which depicts the incapacity of the Myanmar government to ascertain the veracity of the citizenship claims. In this way, the Rohingya Muslims are becoming the targets of the state persecution as the government has miserably failed to check the human rights abuses including crimes against women and children.

    In order to avoid such distress and fearing increase in torments, influx has started to pour in the neighboring countries which has further resulted into disastrous news of sinking the boats of the refugees and the disappearance of the migrant’s boats. In retaliation to such a level of persecution the The Rohingya Muslims are not far behind to retaliate this by skirmishes in the severely affected areas. The Western state of Rakhine has been the epicenter of this deepening crisis.

    The situation was chiseled by the reports that the army is also involved in severe torture against the Muslims in the form of rape and child abuse.  As per the reports of the Human Rights Watch more than 400 buildings have been devastated as a well- planned and organized procedure is being adopted to seek this ethnic cleansing from the territory of Myanmar. Even in the Rakhine state, the Rohingya Muslims are living in terrible state in the refugee camps, deprived of basic health and sanitation facilities.

    With the Myanmar military preventing independent investigators from documenting the events taking place in northern Rakhine State, even after several commitments to open the area, there remains an ‘information black hole’. The most effective way for human rights groups to verify and document claims of abuses has been to compare photos, videos and personal accounts from the conflict zone to changes in the landscape using remote sensing analysis.

    Such kind of communal tensions do take place in such a society, however the magnitude of the souring problem literally goes out of control where state protection is not available to the minorities. The Rakhine Buddhists protected by the government have remained indifferent in this regard, rather have been instigating the tortures against the Rohingya Muslims. Rohingya groups said the killing in village of Duchiridan, locally known as Kilaidaung, was unlawful. Rohingya Vision TV reported that Myanmar Border Guard Police shot the man after their search for methamphetamine tablets in his home came up empty-handed.“The group of the BGP didn’t find out any illegal materials at the residence of U Hamid (55). Yet the BGP commander simply dragged him out and shot him at his back at a point-blank range”, an eyewitness told Rohingya Vision TV on the condition of anonymity.

    The most intricate issue in this regard is that the Nobel Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi can play a pivotal role in justifying her stature but the constitution of the country hampers her to do so. Another alarming situation is that militant groups which are well trained in the gruella tactics and have been funded from the outside countries like  Harakah al-Yaqin (Faith Movement, HaY), is justifying its existence only due to the idle handling of this multifarious problem by the government in addition to the supporting go ahead signals given by the clergy from outside the country.

    MEHROM( A Malaysian Human Rights NGO) has been echoing voice against human rights violations in Myanmar. Addressing a 5,000-strong rally in Kuala Lumpur, Najib Razak, Malaysian Prime minister said the Myanmar government must stop the bloody crackdown in its far west that has sent thousands of Rohingya fleeing, many with stories of rape, torture and murder.”What’s the use of Aung San Suu Kyi having a Nobel prize?” Najib asked a raucous crowd. While Aung San Suu Kyi sweet talked the nine other ASEAN foreign ministers about her government’s military operations in Rakhine State on Monday morning, a photo (graphic) of the bloodied body of a man killed in southern Maungdaw Township began circulating on social media.

    Now this situation is again being taken by the government as a plea to keep the cleansing operation going as the insurgents or terrorists have to be eliminated in any case, as they challenge the writ of the state. The government denies that any incidents of rape or torture or child abuse have taken place in this regard, (though the human rights organizations and their reporters or workers have been banned to visit the troubled areas to discover the probity of the facts.

    Discerning the facts without prejudice, it may rightly be concluded that it is not only the persecution which is the main problem, rather there is a multidimensional approach to calculate the agony; the denial of political and civil rights remains at the top which the Rohingya Muslims are suffering from. If such a situation continues for a long while, this crisis which involves human element in itself, would certainly result in screeching consequences, particularly in giving rise to Muslim insurrection.  

     

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    China’s growing South Asian role

    January 10th, 2017

     

    By Syed Qamar Rizvi.

     

    Given the imperatives of the rising of extremist forces that exercise ideological influence across the region and potentially in Xinjiang itself; or given the proxy battles in Afghanistan between India and Pakistan escalating tensions in South Asia, and given the exigencies of emerging economic order, China’s role in South Asia seems much emerging day by day.

    China’s current strategic interests in Afghanistan are coped with a series of negative outcomes that it wishes to avoid: that the country seems to have become a safe haven for Chinese Uighur militant groups again, as it was in the late 1990s; China also has an ardent interest in ensuring that there is no long-term U.S. military presence in Afghanistan, which it sees as an encirclement threat.

    China’s close relationship– with Pakistan, which is central to the security dimensions regarding its policy toward both India and Afghanistan– has been mediated through its military, intelligence services, and senior political leaders. The PLA’s influence stems from its comprehensive network of relationships with the Pakistani military, spanning each branch of the armed services, PLA-linked companies involved in joint production of supplies and equipment, continued cooperation on nuclear and missile technology, and military intelligence (2-PLA). The intelligence services’ operation has been focused on– the terrorist threat in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia since the 1990s, as well as involving the role of non-state actors such as the Taliban and has been mainly focused on counterterrorism concerns.

    Despite the fact that exposure to Pakistan and Afghanistan among Chinese business community has been significantly less than to India, Pakistan-china friendship seems much moored with good faith via strong bondage of people’s diplomacy.

    As for the Indians, India is often perceived as a regional power, but a closer look reveals that New Delhi is in a disadvantageous position vis-à-vis China in South Asia. The first reason is that Indian governments never utilized their political, economic, and military capacities to pursue their regional power ambitions with their neighbours in the long run. South Asian countries could always play and rely on their China card in order to evade India’s influence. Second, although India’s new South Asia policy with the focus on trade and connectivity has improved regional cooperation since 1991, but China still remains an economically more attractive and politically more reliable partner for India’s neighbours.

    In the present scenario, the geo-economic dictates reflect maximum radiation of CPEC economic flows in the South Asia region. The absence of this link restricts India-China trade to $71 billion and India-Pakistan trade to $2 billion. The absence of the link with India seriously constrains the trade volumes of other Saarc members. Their dividend would remain limited unless India fully partakes of CPEC. Goods from the landlocked Bhutan and Nepal cannot access the Pakistani markets through the shorter land route passing through India. It is pragmatically suggested that Indian strategists must exercise a forward looking approach towards the CEPEC phenomenon which could provide a multilateral boon to the regional economy.

     

    Likely, Bangladesh cannot access the shorter land route through India to Pakistan and onward to China or West Asia, North Africa and Gulf states. The island nations of Maldives and Sri Lanka can of course reach China through Gwadar. Bhutan and Nepal can directly link with China, while Bangladesh lies on the Southwestern route of the Silk Road linking it with Kinmin in Yunnan province of China. The one deriving factor behind India’s current move of suspending its participation in the SARRC is that New Delhi is does not want China’s leverage in the SAARC. This Indian parochial approach towards China and CPEC is detrimental to the future of SAARC economy.

     

    Veritably, China’s major interests in South Asia include promoting stability in both Afghanistan and Pakistan in order to curb the influence of Islamist extremists, and to facilitate trade and energy corridors throughout the region that China can access. It is in this back drop that China is also inviting Iran to join the CPEC. China has been enhancing its influence over other South Asian states, including Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives, to further help it secure energy and trade flows from the Middle East and Europe, and as part of a global effort to extend its diplomatic and economic influence. Furthermore, China seeks to contain Indian power by building close ties with Pakistan and bolstering Islamabad’s strategic and military strength. China likely assesses that, by tilting toward Pakistan, it can keep India tied down in South Asia and divert its military force and strategic capabilities away from China.

    China has a willingness to play a more active economic and diplomatic role in efforts aimed at stabilizing Afghanistan. Washington positively welcomes Beijing’s increased involvement in Afghanistan and views efforts such as the establishment of the Quadrilateral Coordination Group (made up of U.S., Afghan, Chinese, and Pakistani officials) as a rare opportunity for Washington and Beijing to work together toward a common security goal.

    Despite the fact that India–China economic relations have expanded in recent years, but India remains wary of Chinese overtures to its neighbors and efforts to expand China’s maritime presence in the Indian Ocean Region ( that connects to forty two states of the Indian Ocean). On the other hand, the unresolved border disputes continue to undermine relations, and there have been border flare-ups that raised bilateral tensions on at least two occasions in the last three years.

    More recently, China has agreed to join the U.S., Pakistan, and Afghanistan as part of the Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG) to facilitate peace and reconciliation in Afghanistan. The first meeting of the QCG was held on January 11, 2015 in Islamabad, where the participants valued the need for direct talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban, while also committing to preserving Afghanistan’s unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. It is noteworthy that China is now willing to be part of the U.S.-supported QCG peace effort. In the past, China did avoid any association with U.S. policies in the region, apprehending that doing so would land them in the cross-hairs of Islamist extremists. 

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    Europe and UK after Trump

    December 26th, 2016

     

     

    By Syed Qamar Rizvi.

     

    Seen from the post US-election 2016, much seems in opaque about the US-EU relations. There appears no doubt to predict that under the new administration of Donald Trump, transatlantic relationship would face new frontiers of challenges. Apart from myriad other corollaries, EU has ostensibly appeared on the face of the globe on the most critical position of the US elections. Europe is already at loggerheads with each other on the refugee dilemma and when it is combined with the simmering knots of economic and demographic challenges, the situation appears to be too critical.

    The political pundits and analysts in international relations are discussing the victory of Donald Trump in comparison with the coalitions and group formations early in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, however, on thing that has to be kept in mind is that now the global scenario has been changed out rightly in all aspects. The expectations of the public in general in terms of economic advancements have shooten up. The influx of information technology, communication and media advances have changed the mindset of the people in one way or the other. In this context, it may be observed that if the organizations, coalitions or political or economic configurations do come up with symmetry of the popular electoral inclinations, the outcome turns out to be Brexit.

    The departing President of the US has emblazoned the flourishing democracies in Europe and the array of similarities that have converted the transatlantic relations into a bliss. Nonetheless, the European media is being sceptic about the same line of role by the US, after the Trump entry. Though the contribution of the United States, has been outstanding (sometimes for its own political and economic motives) in the European arena, specially after the two world wars, after the abatement of Communism and then the restructuring of the East European countries, in addition to the settlement of the political issues around Balkan peninsula.

    In spite of all that has been said, the most important point that is roaming in the minds of many Americans  (which is revealed in the recent American elections) is that the American Economy can’t afford to promote, protect and sustain democracies all around the globe, that too at the cost of American tax payer’s bucks. This is the core point, whereby Donald Trump has been able to convince the people that the post war alliances, may be that military ones or the political, would be given a rethinking, a reconsideration.

    In this way, the American nationalism has come up with a new vigor and zeal, rejecting the idea of constant sticking to the agendas in Western Europe. The same views have also been expressed and endorsed by European powers themselves, especially Germany. European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, remarked “The Americans will not see to Europe’s security forever.

    We have to do it ourselves,” he said in a speech in Berlin. Former US Ambassador to Germany John Kornblum also expressed the same thoughts in an essay published by the German journalism consortium RND. “The American umbrella over Europe is gone forever. Trump’s election marks the end of the postwar order.” Apart from all these factors, the caution of the then-European Central Bank Chairman Jean-Claude Trichet warned that Europe was as tense as before World War I or II was worthy of given a thorough consideration. In addition to this, Germany also decided to endeavor its re-militarization drive, so that it might get itself free from the clutches of United States to initiate any military operation.

    And while Trump often contradicts himself, as Thomas Wright of the Brookings Institution has demonstrated, a core consistency has animated his understanding of foreign policy for decades. There are three pillars of his foreign policy thinking from which he has never wavered. The first is the idea that America is getting a bad deal from its allies; the second is that the American approach to free trade has impoverished American workers and weakened the United States; and the third is that as a strong leader he can secure better deals with authoritarian strongmen than by working cooperatively with European allies.

    Trump is set on securing a better deal from US allies. A better deal, in Trump’s version of the transatlantic alliance, involves European allies like Germany paying for the privilege of American protection. If they fail to meet their “obligations”, they will not be defended. More than this, Trump’s view is that allies should not need American protection at all. He will expect Europe to shoulder the burden for dealing with conflicts that are primarily European problems, such as the war in Ukraine and the refugee crisis.

    Trump had fervently endorsed the Brexit campaign during the UK’s EU referendum, thus distancing himself from the Obama administration’s stated preference for a strong and united EU. Obama seems affirmed that the UK could not expect favourable treatment upon leaving the EU and would instead be at the back of the queue for a trade deal, with TPP and TTIP given priority.

    Trump’s protectionist rhetoric and stances on major trade deals should give cause for concern about whether Trump will be committed to putting the UK to the front of the queue for a deal. Even if he does, there is every reason to expect that he will play hardball; Trump will be able to utilize the leverage of the US’s economic strength to ensure that the deal favors US interests, and his background as a businessman suggests that he will not allow sentimentality to result in unnecessary concessions to the UK. The British government needs to remember that it is now in a weaker negotiating situation than it was when part of the EU, and that they need the deal much more than the US does.

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    Cementing Ankara-Moscow ties

    October 19th, 2016

    By Syed Qamar Rizvi.

     

     

    Russian President Vladimir Putin arrived in Istanbul on Monday, an official said, on his first trip to Turkey following a crisis sparked by the shooting down of a Russian war plane over Syria last November, Agence France-Presse reported. A Euromed and Nato member Turkey is trying to rebalancing its foreign policy pendulum towards both the West and the East. Yet, the most driving factors to influence the future relationship between Ankara and Moscow are: the US factor; the Syrian factor, the European factor, the Crimean factor; and the economic factor.

    Putin and Erdogan demonstrated powerful personal chemistry in Istanbul, and both seemed at ease dismissing criticism from Western countries over human rights. In what appeared to be a careful piece of diplomatic choreography, during the energy summit Erdogan posed for photos flanked by Putin and another bogeyman of Washington’s, Venezuela President Nicolas Maduro.

    Many good hopes in ejecting bilateralism notwithstanding, powerful and conflicting forces continue to influence Russian-Turkish relations, analysts caution. “It’s a misnomer to characterize this as a rapprochement,” said Sinan Ülgen, a visiting scholar at the Brussels-based think tank Carnegie Europe. Ulgen pointed out the differences over the Syrian civil war that culminated in the downing of the Russian bomber remain unaddressed.

    In September, Erdogan rolled out the red carpet – although in Turkey, it is turquoise – for the Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Nayef bin Abdul Aziz, as Turkey continues to build ties with countries with goals contrary to Russia’s in Syria. The Saudi visit was the latest in intensifying diplomatic traffic between the countries. Ankara has again been calling for the immediate removal of Syrian President Bashar Al Assad, a demand that walks back a gesture to Moscow in which Ankara suggested the Syrian dictator could play a role in a transition of power.

    The Putin-Erdogan summit at St. Petersburg on Aug. 9 marked the beginning of a new era in relations between Russia and Turkey. Murat Yetkin, editor-in-chief of Hurriyet Daily News, in an Aug. 9 article provided details of the “secret diplomacy” that eased Turkish-Russian tensions. According to Pekin, the Homeland Party believes it played a critical role in improving relations, but in the diplomatic corridors of Ankara, there are suggestions that the party is trying to make a name for itself through political maneuvering.

    As Ankara’s relations with the United States soured over Turkey’s demand for the extradition of cleric Fethullah Gulen, Turkey was able to repair its relations with Russia thanks to quick, wise diplomatic initiatives. Just before his meeting with Putin, Erdogan told Tass, “The most important actor for bringing peace to Syria is Russia.” In late June, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan apologized to Moscow for the incident with the downed Russian plane that took place on Nov. 24, 2015 and triggered a seven-month-long crisis in bilateral relations.

    The thaw in two states was orchestrated following the apology: Putin and Erdogan had their first telephone conversation since the November incident, the parties agreed to meet in person in the near future, andrestrictions on travel to Turkey for Russian tourists were lifted.

    “In general, the situation should not have a negative effect on Russian-Turkish relations,”saidI lshat Sayetov, a Turkey expert and head of the Center for Contemporary Turkish Studies.

    “The country is headed by a leader who has expressed a clear intention to restore relations. However, the overall instability in Turkey – terrorist attacks, semi-coups, polarization of society and so on – is, of course, not to the benefit of the two countries’ relations,” said Sayetov.

    “The concentration of all power in the hands of the Turkish president increases the risk of ill-judged decisions, and the Russian authorities will be taking this into account,” he said.

    And yet it goes without saying that the current mode is one of waiting to see if Ankara will soften its red line and adjust the priorities of its Syria policy. Beyond its geographic proximity to the peninsula in the Black Sea, Turkey also has deep historical ties to Crimea, once an Ottoman province, and strong interests there, especially with regards to the fate of Muslim Crimean Tatars, who make up an estimated 15 percent of the population.

    Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu recently expressed his concern about how developments in Crimea might impact the Tatars and today his ministry issued a statement calling the upcoming referendum there on whether the region should become part of Russia as a “wrong” move. Meanwhile, Turkey and Russia will establish a joint investment fund with capital of $1 billion, Turkish Economy Minister Nihat Zeybekci was reported as saying by state-run Anadolu Agency.

    Many experts are of the view that the normalization of relations with Russia will help Turkey to revive its tourism industry. As reported by Turkish newspaper Hürriyet Daily News, Turkey’s “long-suffering” tourism sector might soon “reap diplomatic fruits” of ongoing efforts to improve bilateral relations.
    By all fair strategic calculations, the Turkish government has been making the case that it is best positioned, both geographically and politically, to find a solution to Europe’s energy problem — the continent depends largely on Russian natural-gas exports for energy, even as it is locked in a confrontation with the country over its role in the eastern Ukrainian war.

    Turkey seems to have been gaining from this Western conundrum. It has been participating in pipeline projects that benefit both Russia and the West. The proposed pipeline represented the Turkish Stream was catapulted into its next planning stage whereby Ankara and Moscow agreed on the route for the 700-mile pipeline, which could begin delivering oil as early as December 2016. It is assumed that the pipeline will run from Russia through the Black Sea to the Greece-Turkey border. The U.S. and its European allies are seen attempting to dissuade Greece and Serbia from signing on to the project as transport countries because they are worrying it would give Russia even greater energy dominance in the region.

    There is much likelihood that the growing chemistry of relationship between Ankara and Moscow would bring about the impact on the ongoing currents-cross currents not only in the Middle eastern politics but also towards Ankara’s relations with Europe and America.

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    US-Russia recourse to peace diversion in Aleppo?

    October 9th, 2016

     

    By Syed Qamar Rizvi.

     

    The ongoing interplay– of centripetal and centrifugal forces in Syria seems– to have caused the peace prospects more complicated than ever. The United States and Russia have grappled over plans to halt the fighting in Syria, as resurgent Moscow-backed regime forces tightened the noose around the beleaguered city of Aleppo.

    In Geneva, secretary of state John Kerry was once more locked in talks with his Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov, but US officials warned that negotiations could not be a sucess without a breakthrough. Washington views Moscow to help clinch a ceasefire, get humanitarian aid to civilians and — eventually — set the stage for political talks to end a five-year war that has killed more than 290,000.

    The twin powers backed- scenario reflects opposite sides in the civil war, with Moscow supporting Bashar al-Assad’s Syrian regime and Washington behind a coalition of rebel groups it regards as moderate. Senior US official travelling with Mr Kerry said he would not have flown out once again to new face-to-face talks with Mr Lavrov (the Russian Foreign Minister) unless he thought there was a chance of progress.

    A US official symbolises the talks as “crisp and businesslike”, focused on specific technical details of how the ceasefire would be observed. In a break in proceedings, the US delegation was to update Washington on progress. But officials warned there was no guarantee of a final agreement before both men return home later on Friday, just four days after the pair met in China and failed to narrow their differences.

    Ironically, Aleppo has served as a major rebel base since 2012, when the Syrian civil war really took off in earnest. In late September 2015, Assad’s forces began a concerted effort to retake the city. The above map shows their progress: By December, they had made significant advances around the city and, by February 5, had essentially surrounded it.

    Assad’s forces, weakened by attrition and serious recruiting problems, were unable to accomplish this alone. Russian bombing, as well as Iranian troop deployments, was absolutely vital to Assad’s offensive in Aleppo (as well as similar gains in southern Syria, near Daraa).

    “The operations in Aleppo Province have hinged upon heavy military support from both Russian warplanes and Iranian proxy fighters,” Christopher Kozak, a research analyst at the Institute for the Study of War, concluded.

    Retrospectively,on 10 September 2016, Russia and U.S. concluded a deal on establishing a cease fire between the Syrian Assad government and a US-supported coalition of so-called ‘mainstream Syrian opposition rebel groups’ including umbrella group ‘High Negotiations Committee’ (HNC), effective from 12 September, while jointly agreeing to continue attacks on Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (former al-Nusra Front) and Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that Russia and U.S. had configured five documents to enable coordination of the fight against Jabhat Fateh al-Sham and ISIL and a revival of Syria’s failed truce in an expanded form.

    But on 16 September, the heaviest fighting since weeks broke out at the outskirts of Damascus and air attacks elsewhere in Syria resumed. On Saturday 17 September, Russia accused groups supported by the US to have violated the ceasefire 199 times, and said it was up to the US to stop them and thus save the ceasefire. Later on 17 September, the US-led coalition with Danish, British and Australian aircraft bombarded the Syrian army near ISIL-dominated territory in northern Syria killing 62 Syrian soldiers, which for the Syrian government proved that “the US and its allies cooperate with terrorists”.While the US contended the bombs on Assad’s troups were by accident, Russia said it was on purpose.18 September, bombarding also in Aleppo resumed.

    Monday 19 September, Assad’s government declared the ceasefire as ended, mainly because of the US-led coalition’s attacks on Assad’s troops. Soon afterwards a UN food convoy near Aleppo was bombarded or shot at, unclear was by whom. On the 3rd of October, the US has formally declared the suspension of diplomatic contacts with Russia over the Syrian situation, marking the end of the cease fire deal.

    One week after the collapse of a tenuous ceasefire, tensions between the United States and the Russian-Syrian alliance appear to be at a boiling point, while the consequence of that political fall-out is “nothing short of a human catastrophe.”

    At an emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) on Sunday, western powers blatantly accused Russia of “barbarism” and aiding the Syrian government in committing “war crimes.”

    “What Russia is sponsoring and doing is not counter-terrorism, it is barbarism,” said Samantha Power, U.S. ambassador to the United Nations. “Instead of pursuing peace, Russia and Assad make war. Instead of helping get life-saving aid to civilians, Russia and Assad are bombing the humanitarian convoys, hospitals, and first responders who are trying desperately to keep people alive,” Power told the 15-member council.

    A spokesperson from the Kremin rebuffed those accusations as “unacceptable,” while the UNSC’s Russian ambassador Vitaly Churkin reminded the council that it was the U.S.’ bombing of Syrian government forces on September 17th, and its failure to convince so-called “moderate” rebels to disassociate with the al Qaeda-linked Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (previously the al-Nusra Front), that “sabotaged” the peace effort.

    This followed similar statements made by Syrian President Bashar Assad, who told the Associated Press last week that he “believe[s] that the United States is not genuine regarding having a cessation of violence in Syria.”

    According to Kyle Orton, a research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society, Syria’s revolution is now unequivocally in the balance. He further points out that Aleppo– the last major urban—seems to have been holding of the mainstream armed opposition in Syria. If the political process– is to amount to anything other than a regime victory in all but name– the rebels have to hold Aleppo City. For its part, the regime, with Russian and Iranian help, has severely lessened the strategic threat from the insurgency already — for them to retake Aleppo City would kill it. Orton is blunt: “In short, the course of the entire war is in the balance with the fate of Aleppo.”

    If the rebels succeed in breaking the siege then the pro-regime coalition will suffer a serious strategic setback. As Orton further notes, “the pro-Assad forces [are holding] out in northwestern Syria by some relatively tenuous supply lines through Hama and southern Aleppo.” If the rebel positions in Idlib Province and southwestern Aleppo are expanded to include areas of Aleppo City, Assad’s bases in the north come under serious threat, and with it Assad’s chance of crushing the rebellion entirely.

    Needless to say — if the rebels get minor gains or they become successful in articulating a strategy of  maintaining the status quo in the city — then once again it would be none but the Jabhat Fatah al-Sham group that benefits the most. In leading the charge to rescue the besieged population while the world looks on, it would have irretrievably bound itself to the armed opposition in Northern Syria. The Assad-supportive groups aligning with Russia may pose a new paradigmatic challenge to any peace prospects in Aleppo. And that is a scenario– that benefits no one : not the mainstream rebels and most of all, not Syria’s long-suffering people—and not those holding the prospects of any combined US-Russia operation against the rebels, and most of all, nor Syria’s long-suffering people.

    http://www.asianage.com/international/us-russia-tussle-over-syria-deal-474

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/U.S.%E2%80%93Russia_peace_proposals_on_Syria

    http://www.vox.com/2016/2/16/11020140/russia-syria-bombing-maps

    http://www.commondreams.org/news/2016/09/26/while-russia-and-us-point-fingers-aid-groups-warn-aleppo-slowly-dying

    http://www.rferl.org/a/islamic-state-syria-aleppo-siege-change-war/27900375.html

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    India’s controversial surgical strike

    October 7th, 2016

     

    By Syed Qamar Rizvi.

     

    It goes without saying that if the leadership of a country makes a wrong statement/claim or an impression just to gain its ulterior motive, not only damages its international image or clout but also punctures the morale of its nation both domestically and internationally. This is what has been a true case about India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi whose government’s fabricated claim regarding a surgical strike (on Sept.29) against Pakistan has caused a cringe worthy development for both its people and its military personnel.

    A surgical strike, according to a widely accepted definition, is “a military attack which results in, was intended to result in, or is claimed to have resulted in only damage to the intended legitimate military target, and no or minimal collateral damage to surrounding structures, vehicles, buildings, or the general public infrastructure and utilities”.

    But the circumstantial evidence gives no support to such an Indian held claim that it had made a surgical strike against Pakistan ( on Sept.29). Although one can better understand why it was so politically expedient for the Indian government to show its actions: the fact is that by doing such an act the Modi government has largely lost its credibility in the eye of its public.

    Following the refusal from UN to confirm the Indian claims of ‘surgical strikes’, Pakistan Army on Saturday took independent journalists to the Line of Control (LoC) at Baghsir 20 kilometers from Bhimber to show the situation on ground.

    Despite the fact that publicising such operations is tricky and devious, it logically appears that in today’s world of hyper media technology such concoctions and fabricated stories do leave a very negative impact. And furthermore, the publicity of such act confuses who the target audience really is, and sets unwieldy expectations of the public, i.e. a desire for “revenge” risks becoming an end unto itself.

    Now while analysing the Modi government’s motive behind such development, one may reasonably argue that if the message was meant for Islamabad—as it appears to have been—then it is futile to make it public without clear long-term strategic benefits. Pakistan has been not been deterred in the past, and is unlikely to change its approach based on such strikes, which its army is used to. This Indian ploy has intensified a feeling that people of India are no safer today than they were yesterday.

    The fact of the matter is: the success of any military conflict cannot be guaranteed. It might weaken India further and make it more vulnerable, if military action is unsuccessful. After 26/11, then prime minister Manmohan Singh had considered air strikes against Pakistan. But the air force chief had said India didn’t have accurate digital data on terrorist camps in Pakistan, and the army chief had said the Indian Army was not prepared for a brief, surgical strike. Military experts say it would take years for India to develop strategic capabilities for targeted cross-border operations. Politically, military action that is seen as a failure would hurt the Modi government more than not doing anything.

    Be it a surgical strike or hot pursuit, any military action against Pakistan is a bad idea. It appreciates to be impossible to achieve the desired results. On the contrary, it could backfire .Following are some diplomatic reactions demonstrated by the respective governments regarding the ongoing situation along with the line of control (LOC).

    With tensions escalating between the two neighboring countries, Britain asked India and Pakistan to “exercise restraint in the wake of surgical strikes by Indian troops across the Line of Control’. A spokesperson from Britain’s Foreign Office said: “We are monitoring the situation closely following reports of strikes carried out by the Indian Army over the LoC in Kashmir. We call on both sides to exercise restraint and to open dialogue.”

    China has said it is in ‘constant touch with both countries to reduce tensions’. Geng Shuang, a spokesperson of China’s Foreign Office, said: “China was in communication with both sides through different channels and hoped that Indian and Pakistan can enhance communication, properly deal with differences and work jointly to maintain peace and security.” China expressed hope that “Islamabad and New Delhi will resolve the issue through dialogue and maintain regional peace and stability by joint efforts”.

    The Russian Foreign Ministry issued a strong statement after the surgical strikes conducted by Indian troops. “We are concerned with the aggravation lately of the situation along the Line of Control between India and Pakistan. We are calling on the parties not to allow any escalation of tension and to settle the existing problems by political and diplomatic means through negotiations…..”

    Stephane Dujarric, spokesperson for UN Secretary-General, urged both India and Pakistan to exercise restraint and resolve differences through dialogue. He added that officials were following the increase in tensions in Kashmir with great concern. “UN military observers were in contact with both sides to try to obtain further information,” he said.

    Pragmatically, Modi must recognise that his agenda of enhancing regional cooperation in South Asia will remain unfulfilled without mending the fences with Pakistan. At a time when interconnectivity seems a glaring norm across the world, two neighbours-India and Pakistan cannot afford to be locked in a spiral of perpetual hostility and violence.

    But Modi’s decision to engage with Pakistan was seen by some in Delhi’s as India’s “on again, off again” inconsistent approach towards Pakistan. And yet some sections within his own party were against overtures to Pakistan. And then the Pakistani military also decided to reassert its supremacy on India thereby reasserting itself.

    Given the ongoing scenario of tensions along the line of control (LOC) between India and Pakistan, it seems a glowing imperative of diplomacy to use its course bilaterally and particularly the Indian leadership must adopt political acumen-cum- enlightenment to pacify the plight of the Kashmiri people thereby tabling a statesman- like solution of the Kashmir problem which could only viably possible while honouring the UNSC’s resolutions on Kashmir. Needless to say, both India and Pakistan must try to diplomatically engage each other so as to water down the boiling temperature in the South Asian region-an emerging alarm of peace and stability.

    http://www.huffingtonpost.in/2016/09/19/six-reasons-why-military-action-against-pakistan-is-not-an-optio/

    http://www.indiawrites.org/world-reacted-indias-surgical-strikes/

    http://qz.com/796996/narendra-modis-gamble-the-indian-armys-surgical-strikes-across-the-line-of-control-arent-a-brave-new-idea-and-they-wont-stop-pakistan-from-backing-terror/

    http://www.dailymail.co.uk/indiahome/indianews/article-3814687/Strategic-restraint-surgical-strikes-Modi-s-approach-Pakistan.html#ixzz4MI48QDM1

    https://en.dailypakistan.com.pk/pakistan/surgical-strike-a-lie-like-samjhota-express-drama-khawaja-asif/

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    India’s new game of water war?

    September 30th, 2016

     

    By Syed Qamar Rizvi.

     

    A day after Prime Minister Narendra Modi warned “blood and water cannot flow together,” Pakistan has declared that if India opts out of a key water-sharing agreement, it would amount to “an act of war.”Water sharing, transparency and collaboration are the pillars on which the unique Indus Waters Treaty was erected in 1960.

    Islamabad’s recently moved solicitation regarding the Indian violation before an international arbitral tribunal is an index of the Indian policy of playing with water shenanigans despite a treaty that is a colossus among existing water-sharing pacts in the world. The fact of the matter is that being an upper riparian state, India has to strictly adhere to the stipulations laid down under the said treaty.

    In Asia, the vast majority of the 57 transnational river basins have no water-sharing arrangement or any other cooperative mechanism. Though through this comprehensively drafted Treaty both India and Pakistan have a balanced water sharing mechanism, there yet appear some windowing misunderstandings between the two sides.

    Significantly, India’s treaties with Pakistan and Bangladesh are the only pacts in Asia with specific water-sharing formulas on cross-border flows. They also set a new principle in international water law. The 1996 Ganges treaty set a new standard by guaranteeing delivery of specific water quantity in the dry season. But unfortunately so far this approach has not been proactively adopted by India’s government as regard to the Indus Basin Water Treaty.

     In 1951, Indian Prime Minister Nehru, whose interest in integrated river management along the lines of the Tennessee Valley Authority had been piqued, invited David Lilienthal, former chairman of the TVA, to visit India. Lilienthal also visited Pakistan and, on his return to the US, wrote an article outlining his impressions and recommendations (the trip had been commissioned by Collier’s Magazine-international water was not the initial aim of the visit).

    After three weeks of discussions, an outline was agreed to, whose points included: determination of total water supplies, divided by catchment and use;determination of the water requirements of cultivable irrigable areas in each country; calculation of data and surveys necessary, as requested by either side; preparation of cost estimates and a construction schedule of new engineering works which might be included in a comprehensive plan.

    In a creative avoidance of a potential and common conflict, the parties agreed that any data requested by either side would be collected and verified when possible, but that the acceptance of the data, or the inclusion of any topic for study, would not commit either side to its “relevance or materiality.”

    The Indus Water Treaty seems to have addressed both the technical and financial concerns of each side, and included a timeline for transition. The main points of the treaty included (Alam, 2002): an agreement that Pakistan would receive unrestricted use of the western rivers, which India would allow to flow unimpeded, with minor exceptions provisions for three dams, eight link canals, three barrages, and 2500 tube wells to be built in Pakistan a ten-year transition period, from April 1, 1960 to March 31, 1970, during which water would continue to be supplied to Pakistan according to a detailed schedule a schedule for India to provide its fixed financial contribution of $62 million, in ten annual installments during the transition period additional provisions for data exchange and future cooperation.

    Although the two countries have been managing to share the waters albeit with some major differences that Pakistan government has so far been showning over India’s construction of Wuller Barrage, Baglihar Dam and Krishanganga dam that India has bulit , and has been building on the Indus tributaries that seat in the IHK.The experts say that the agreement is one of the most lop-sided with India being allowed to use only 20 percent of the six-river Indus water system. Pakistan has also recently sought an international arbitration if India sought to build hydro power projects on the Jhelum and Chenab rivers.

    Despite the fact that the agreement has been seen as one of the most successful water-sharing pacts, the current tension between the two South Asian neighbours might well lead to a flashpoint. The Security and Strategic affairs experts are of the view that future wars could well be fought over water. 

    But one cannot overlook the fact that the well defined characteristics of the Treaty set a precedent of cooperation between the two countries–accompanied by an emblem of confidence building measure–vindicated by the fact as it is the only treaty to have survived three wars and other hostilities between the two countries.

    India has developed different Hydroelectric Power Projects (HPP), with the cross installed capacity of 2456.20 MW after signing Indus treaty, however the total electricity demand of IHK is 1589 MW. India has also developed several run-of-the-river projects. Moreover, other four projects, MW Uri-II, 120 Sewa-II, 45 MW Nimo Bazgo and 44 MW Chutak Hydro electric projects that have been completed in early 2012.

    A strategy of implementing CBMs regarding the water dispute between the two sides, India and Pakistan can be virtually applied via invoking Article VII of the treaty which focuses on future co-operation between the two countries by mutual agreement to the fullest possible extent.

    To further translate this into the best practices in managing shared water and the Baglihar Dam Judgment in 2007 are the guiding principles to develop consensus to make treaty 100% transparent in order to avert any potential conflict and pitch a win-win solution for both countries.

    In this regards after efforts of three years and in-depth discussion and deliberation with Indian water and energy experts, intelligentsia, environmentalists and other experts during series of various dialogues held at New Delhi, Islamabad, Bangkok and Dubai, following recommendations have been unanimously reached that offer win-win doable, practical solutions, already replicated in Nile(Egypt) and Danube River Basins(a water distribution system between Central and Eastern European states):

    1-Recognizing that Indus Water Treaty is evidently the most successful Confidence Buildings Measure (CBM) between the two countries, India has the right to use provisions granted in annexure ‘D’ and ‘E’ nevertheless there is a need to make treaty more transparent by using state-of-art information communication technology tools.

    2-To remove mistrust on data exchange, install satellite based real-time telemetry system in IHK Kashmir at a minimum 100 loctions for monitoring water quality and quantity.

    3-There is a need to setup an independent office of Indus Water Commission(IWC) comprising neutral experts outside of South Asian region, having unblemished record and integrity. This may also include experts from various international agencies such as the World Bank, the UNEP and the EU, etc. This independent commission of experts shall work directly under the UN to monitor and promote sustainable development in Kashmir and HP.

    4-The Independent IWC will also arrange real time data of miner, major tributaries and at all head-works, dams, etc. by website including three dimensional models of dams, three-dimensional model to represent of geometric data of dams (flood storage+ Run of River Hydropower projects) for clarity for the global community.

    5- It was agreed that environmental threats do not respect national borders. During last three decades, the watershed in IHK is badly degraded. To rehabilitate watershed in IHK and Himachal Pradesh (HP), both countries are to take initiative for joint watershed management in these two states.

    6-To rehabilitate watershed in IHK and HP, an environmental impact assessment is the best instrument to assess the possible negative impact that a proposed project may have on the indigenous environment, together with water flow in rivers .The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe’s Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context provides the best legal framework for Transboundary EIA for sustainable flow in Indus Rivers System, so that India should share TEIA before physical execution of any project including hydropower.

    7-Glaciers are important and major source of Indus Rivers System. To preserve these glaciers, there is immediate need to declare all Himalayan Glaciers as “Protected Area” including immediate demilitarization from Siachen to preserve this second longest glacier of planet to fall in the watershed of the Indus River.

    Technically, India does not have the resources, capacity or infrastructure to handle the increase in water in case the Indus Waters Treaty is dissolved. Ashok Swain, a teacher at the department of peace and conflict research in Uppsala University Sweden noted that India did not have enough storage to create supply problem for Pakistan immediately.

    As for India’s revocation of the treaty, this seems an unlikely scenario since the treaty has survived three wars between the two countries. Although the Modi government in India has raised the issue, saying that for a treaty to work there had to be “mutual cooperation and trust” between the two sides, this seems to be more pressure tactics than any real threat to review the bilateral agreement.

    And the idea that India can intimidate Pakistan by threatening to cut of river waters is nothing new; past is honeycombed with such envious Indian reflections. It has arisen before every major conflict. And it goes without saying that a unilateral abrogation as India threatens to do would also attract criticism from world powers, as this is one arrangement which has stood the test of time. Nonetheless, an insight given into the preamble of the treaty gives enough light to the understanding that India cannot unilaterally exercise a revocation of the treaty.

    http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/research/case_studies/Indus_New.htm

    http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/brahma-chellaney-on-indus-treaty-securing-the-indus-treaty/article8943790.ece

    http://siteresources.worldbank.org/SOUTHASIAEXT/Resources/223546-1171996340255/BagliharSummary.pdf

    http://www.pildat.org/Publications/publication/FP/IndusWaterTreatybetweenPakistanAndIndia_PakIndiaDialogueIII.pdf

    http://www.darpanmagazine.com/news/international/what-is-the-indus-waters-treaty-and-can-india-abrogate-it/

    http://todayinpakistan.com/india-indus-waters-treaty/

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    India: Modi’s war mongering hysteria

    September 27th, 2016

     

     

    By Syed Qamar Rizvi.

     

     

    It goes without saying that from the very day Narendra Modi took charge as India’s new Prime Minister, it has been an idee fixe of Modi’s government to demonstrate a military misadventure against Pakistan without realising the harrowing consequence of such aggressive offensive.

    Since the September 18 attack on an Indian army base in Uri, India’s war hysteria has increased exponentially. Heuristically, Indian media, politicians and analysts didn’t even waste a single minute and as soon as the story of the attack broke the attack was blamed on Pakistan. The circumstances and the Indian story of how the attack unfolded are sketchy at best.

    The fact of the matter is that in some circles in India it is reported that that it was a false flag operation as the ‘alleged’ evidence provided by the Indian forces through which they are trying to link the attack to Pakistan is nothing but Indian tomfoolery– of concocting the story against Pakistan—vindicated by the fact that some in India are of the opinion that there was never any attack and it was merely an accidental explosion in some oil storage tanks. The relentless war mongering and propaganda against Pakistan by Indian media has well exposed Modi’s government’s policy evolving the negative Indian mentality and their love for violence and war-an RSS policy objective. And yet many Indian analysts took to Twitter to spew venom against Pakistan. Some were seen making polls whether a nuclear attack should be launched against Pakistan or not.

    By all fair calculations and deliberations, the Indian war hysteria is not only unfortunate but highly irresponsible reflected by the fact that some Indian anchors vocally demanded their Prime Minister to launch a military attack on Pakistan. The above mentioned reflections are suffice to expose India’s real face to the world community. Au contraire, the response from Pakistan’s government has been much responsible.  The Pak Army Chief Gen Raheel and the Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif made it clear that any Indian misadventure will be dealt with full force and India will have to pay for its miscalculation about Pakistan yet at the same time it has been made clear to the world community that as a peaceful country Pakistan wants to resolve all issue on the dialogue table.

    Politically too, in today’s surcharged atmosphere, it is improbable that any opposition party will want to support Modi’s leap of faith toward Pakistan. They will only see Modi as grandstanding in the run-up to the elections coming up in Bihar — and later in West Bengal and UP — or as attempting to distract attention from the ongoing Kashmir stalemate. It also looks that Modi would know he is trying to cut the Gordian knot, but then, what is the alternative? India is getting isolated in its own region as a result of the deadlock in the relations with Pakistan entailed by India’s unwarranted, unjustified and intransigent Kashmir policy. India has no locus standi regarding its Kashmir occupation; it has been reduced to a marginal player in Central Asia; and the China-Pakistan relationship is assuming global significance. India is walking back to the pavilion run out in the great game.

    Similarly, the resistance from within the establishment is going to be fierce. Strong vested interests exist within the Indian establishment. Besides, it won’t be surprising if sections within the ruling elite who militate (for their own reasons) against what Modi is attempting may quietly connive with the disgruntled elements within the establishment. Meanwhile, Modi’s own agenda of regional cooperation in South Asia is unable to take off because of India-Pakistan tensions. Most important, India lacks any leverage to influence Pakistani policies. The containment strategy pursued by India toward Pakistan seems doomed to fail. Obviously, the international community regards Pakistan to be a key regional power. Taken at face value, there appears to be some validity to this line of thinking. Indian defense spending has doubled in real terms since 1997, growing at an average of 6.3 percent per year. The Modi announced a further 11 percent hike, raising the 2015–2016 military budget to $39.8 billion. Moreover, India is presently the world’s largest buyer of conventional weapons, with upwards of $100 billion expected to be spent on modernizing its defense forces over the next decade.

    Modi faces a policy dilemma. It is true that he leads the BJP, which is not overly friendly toward Pakistan. But as the old saying goes, war stifles reform. If India gets distracted by war, it will stifle his program of forcing through tough economic reforms. That program means far more to him and his party’s future than posturing with Pakistan. Launching strikes inside Pakistan or initiating a military excursion using army, navy and air force should not be a problem for the world’s third largest military.

    Such an action may also cause a sharp spike in public approval of Modi government’s decision. But the major issue will be the outcome of crossing the Line of Control, or even violating the sovereign airspace which rests on India’s objective behind the move. Is it only to punish the alleged non-state perpetrators of the Uri attack or penalise Pakistan itself? The other fundamental question remains India’s capacity to zero in the target precisely and eliminate them in the shortest possible timeframe and with the least cost.

    Each country has a good military reason not to fight. The Indian military weaponry is, frankly, backward. India has been on a shopping spree of foreign arms purchases. But it still has a long way to escape its situation after the Mumbai terror attack by terrorists from Pakistani-supported groups, when India’s land forces were simply not in shape to strike back.

    Despite the fact that Pakistan has an internal war against militants, especially the Pakistan Taliban, the war is long past the point of full hostilities, And the Indian policy thinkers that it is perhaps an expedient time to intervene into Pakistan since by doing that Pakistan’s armed forces would face a two-front war if they took on India. Yet, this line of Indian thinking seems unfit since it must be admitted that it is never far from the minds of the Pakistani military that they might fight with India because of its negatively projected or adopted policy of military brinkmanship in Kashmir and clandestinely engaging its espionage to destablize Pakistan, and so they are probably ready to cope with India.

    There is little clarity as to how both the countries will be adhered to a limited war scenario. Will Pakistan deal with an Indian intrusion in Azad Kashmir as a limited conflict or a full-scale war? The most probable answer from the Pakistani point of view may be that they are not planning a war offensive against New Delhi .But If war is imposed on them (Pakistanis) they are ready enough to response to it in any manner that may suit to Pakistan’s military and defensive expediencies. Strategists in India have not been certain about the prospects of a limited war with Pakistan for years. Given the grandiloquence of Modi’s promise, the chances for a Kargil-like incursion are negligible. Pakistan’s response so far has been very explicit and prompt. The arm-laden fighter jets takeoffs and landings from motorways, mobilisation of other vital military resources and launch of a diplomatic offensive on the sidelines of UN General Assembly and elsewhere have exposed Indian plans regarding the Cold Start.

    Apparently New Delhi may be relieved by having a Rafale deal with France since the Indian air force must have had its anxiety about Pak air superiority over India. Evidently, there are no options available with Delhi bordering on good to appease the RSS cheerleader. The sabre-rattling may not satisfy Modi’s electoral, but fruitless if not humiliating incursion will cost him more dearly in every sense of the word. And yet the chances of a nuclear strikes between the two states cannot be overlooked keeping in view the uncertain psychological dynamics of war. The military strategists in India are well cognizant of nuclear capabilities of Pakistan.

    Though, it looks that India will much likely to depend on funding its proxies in Pakistan and to intensify its diplomatic assault on Pakistan than to really engage in a military offensive against Pakistan, but an unfair and devious India’s policy of sponsoring proxies in Pakistan will be opening more windows to promote hostility and polarisation in both government and people of Pakistan against India. In the present state of deadlock between India and Pakistan, the imperative to be engaged diplomatically is seen not only in India’s interest but broadly envisaging in the interest of 1.45 billion people of the South Asian region.

     

    http://dailythepatriot.com/indian-war-hysteria/

    http://www.forbes.com/forbes/welcome/?/sites/charlestiefer/2015/07/30/are-modis-india-and-sharifs-pakistan-sliding-toward-war-lets-hope-

    http://tribune.com.pk/story/1186493/analysis-indias-limited-war-option/

    http://nationalinterest.org/feature/could-indias-military-really-crush-pakistan-13247

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    India’s Kashmir faux pas & UN role

    September 12th, 2016

    By Syed Qamar Rizvi.

     

     

    Kashmir remains an international humanitarian, political and legal issue. Years after years both the governments and leaderships remained changing in India but what has not been changed is the toxic Indian policy or attitude in the Indian held Kashmir. Unfortunately the Indian thinking for the last 69 years has been that as longer as India delays a resolution on Kashmir the better. Yet what India cannot be changed is the irrevocable, unmutable and irrefutable truth: Kashmir legally, ethically, morally and culturally does not belong to India.

    The territory of Kashmir belongs to its people. India can suck every drop of Kashmir blood but it can never make the soul of Kashmiri people sick under its ‘tutelage’. This is why the truth of Kashmir is as live today as it was 69 years before. Same rest with the truth about the UN’s resolution on Kashmir. The ‘resolutions’ which are never moribund. As per the compliance of the UN’s Charter, the UN’s resolutions can never be inapplicable or ineffective.

    Today India has been deploying more than 80,0000 military troops in the Kashmir vale. About 3rd fouth of the Indian Army has been positioned in the valley. This holds sufficient warrants to the fact that India is terrified with the psyche of the Kashmiri people whose unflinching, unwavering and uncompromising commitment to the cause of Kashmiri freedom is the real might against the Indian military and its government. Every fragment of the Kashmiri community, man, woman and child is strongly determined to foil the Indian military occupation of Kashmir.

    But Kashmir, even according to India’s constitution is a ‘disputed territory’ and the more than six-decade-old bloody conflict in the region has so far claimed at least 98, 000 human lives, including civilians, Kashmiri and freedom activists. While the unfamiliarity of majority of Indians vis-à-vis Kashmir issue can’t be neglected, a major chunk, despite being aware of the legitimate rights of the kashmiri people, are playing deliberately attempted tactics because of their ‘ultra-nationalism’.

    On 1 January 1948, India brought the Kashmir issue to the attention of the Chairman of the Security Council of the United Nations. The ‘Presentation’ of the Indian case, the Pakistani reply, and the series of debates which followed over the years, have all tended to obscure the ‘original terms’ of that Indian reference. This was made under Article 35 of the Charter of the United Nations in which the mediation of the Security Council was expressly sought in a matter which otherwise’ threatened’ to disturb the course of international relations. The issue was an Indian ‘solicitation’ for United Nations mediation in a dispute which had transcended the ‘diplomatic resources’ of the two parties directly involved, India and Pakistan, and not, as it is frequently represented, an Indian demand for United Nations condemnation of Pakistan’s aggression.

    This point, despite much Indian and Pakistan rhetoric, can be determined easily enough by relating the contents of the reference to the ‘specifications of Article 35’ of the United Nations ‘Charter’. The United Nations was asked to devise a formula whereby peace could be restored in the State of Jammu & Kashmir so that a fair and free ‘plebiscite’ could be held to determine the State’s future. The matter of the Maharajah of Kashmir’s accession to India was not in this context of the slightest relevance.

    Pakistan’s army chief General Raheel Sharif has spoken about “raining” of bullets on people in Kashmir and made veiled references to India by talking of “covert and overt intrigues of enemies”.

    Describing Kashmir as Pakistan’s “lifeline”, he said the true solution to the Kashmir issue lies not in “raining bullets” upon people in the Valley but in “heeding” to their voices and respecting their aspirations. “Kashmir issue can only be resolved by implementing the UN Resolutions,” he said during a ceremony marking ‘Defence Day’ in Rawalpindi . “The international community, especially the permanent members of the UN Security Council and the European Union have an important role to uphold the principles of human rights and international humanitarian law,” said the adviser to the prime minister on foreign affairs Sartaj Aziz.

    The United Nations itself principally promised the people of Kashmir the opportunity to express their wishes regarding their governance and the international status of their country through a fair plebiscite. Even absent that express recognition of the right to determine their status, the Kashmiri people meet all international law tests for the right to self-determination.

    The right to self-determination is end-all and be-all of fundamental principle of human rights law, is an individual and collective right to freely determine political status and to pursue economic, social and cultural development. The International Court of Justice refers to the right to self-determination as a right held by ‘people’ rather than a right held by ‘governments’ alone. The right to self-determination is indisputably a norm of jus cogens.

    The two important United Nations studies on the right to self-determination set out factors of a people that give rise to ‘possession’ of right to self-determination: a history of independence or self-rule in an identifiable territory, a distinct culture, and a will and capability to regain self- governance.The cases of Kosovo and East Timor are the current examples.

    The Kashmiri claim– to the right to self-determination–seems an exceptionally strong. The area had a long history of self- governance pre-dating the colonial period. The ‘territory’ of Kashmir has been clearly defined for centuries. Kashmiri people speak Kashmiri, which, while enjoying Sanskrit as a root language as do all Indo-European languages, is clearly a separate language from either Hindi or Urdu. The Kashmiri culture is similarly ‘distinct’ from other cultures in the area in all respects — folk-lore, dress, traditions, cuisine.

    The war in Kashmir between the Indian armed forces and Kashmiri freedom fighters automatically invokes the ‘humanitarian law’. Humanitarian law will remain in effect for the duration of an armed conflict or as long as India occupies Kashmir, a territory to which it has no ‘legitimate claim’. Humanitarian law rightly became applicable in Kashmir in 1947 with the first military actions of the Azad Kashmir forces.

    The Kashmiri War is a war of national liberation in ‘defense’ of the right to self-determination. It is legally invalid, unfair and unfit to refer to this war as a ‘civil war’. Such a ‘characterization or frame of reference’ would assume that India’s occupation of Kashmir is legitimate and the Kashmiri resistance is composed of dissident or opposition groups within the meanings set out in the Geneva Conventions of 1949 Article 3 or Protocol Additional II to the Geneva Conventions. It is also legally incorrect to refer to resistance groups as ‘terrorists’, given their status as military resistors to foreign occupation in a war of ‘national liberation’.

    The Kashmiri people first ‘established’ military units in the late 1940s to defend themselves against the ‘maharajah’s forces’ and then the Indian forces and to vindicate their right to self- determination. At present there are manifold opposition military factions of Kashmiris resisting India of which the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) is one of the oldest and widely supported and espoused. It is reasonably reported that several other groups also enjoy wide following. Kashmiri armed militants operate under their own military commands. Since the Indian forces entered into combat against the Azad Kashmir forces in 1947, military actions against the Kashmiri people has continued to the present. It blatantly worsens in response to renewed demands by the Kashmiri people for their self- determination.

    The Modi government’s policy to suppress the cause of Kashmir freedom by dint of military might can no more be a successful tactic in preventing the Kashmiris to defend their substance of freedom granted and protected by the UN Charter.

    The herein abovementioned arguments are sufficient enough to draw the attention of the international community to play its ascribed moral, legal and ethical role in the Indian held Kashmir. In the upcoming session of the UN at its New York based headquater, the matter must be given an urgent consideration. And for course the issue has to be rightly upheld and tabled by the would-be Secretary General of the United Nations whose election is being currently processed and operated by the UN.

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