May 2nd, 2016
By Rick Francona.
The city of Aleppo will fall in the near future – the anti-regime rebels in the remaining contested areas of the city will not be able to hold out much longer.
The graphic (left) epitomizes the pessimism that pervades the rebel-controlled areas of the city.
It is titled “Aleppo is burning – under the auspices of international organizations.” It is a direct criticism that the United Nations is doing nothing to stop the relentless air strikes being conducted by both the Syrian and Russian air forces.
The targets, according to the graphic, are civil defense (fire and rescue) services, hospitals, schools, markets and bakeries. The complaints are accurate – over the last two weeks, Syrian and Russian fighter-bombers have conducted a coordinated campaign against these target sets across northern Syria, particularly in Aleppo and Idlib governorates, areas in which the bulk of the anti-regime rebels are located.
The increased air attacks are being conducted in conjunction with increased pro-regime ground forces operations in these same areas – the troops are Syrian armed forces supported by units of both the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and now the regular Iranian Army, as well fighters from Lebanese Hizballah. Russian advisers are also on the ground with these forces, coordinating air attacks and artillery fires to great effect.
The timing of the renewed focus on Aleppo is somewhat surprising. Rather than press the attack on retreating forces of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) following the regime victory in the strategic city of Palmyra, most of the regime forces were re-tasked for an assault on Aleppo. Militarily, it does make sense – the regime needs to secure the Aleppo area and close off the ISIS resupply lines from Turkey that lie to the northeast of Aleppo.
The situation in Aleppo has changed dramatically since September 2015 – it was then that Russian forces entered the fight, while at the same time increased numbers of IRGC and Hizballah units were deployed to Syria. It was the liberal (some would say indiscriminate) application of Russian airpower to support the revitalized Syrian government operations on the ground, allowing the regime to virtually erase all of the recent gains of the anti-regime rebels.
Prior to the Russian intervention, Syrian forces were on the defensive, retreating south from Aleppo and much of Idlib governorate. Soon after Russian aircraft began providing direct air support, the rebels were pushed back into enclaves in and north of the city of Aleppo. It is those enclaves that are now under renewed – and increased – air attacks. The recent attack on the Médecins Sans Frontières hospital in the Sukkari district of Aleppo is symptomatic of the stepped-up air campaign.
The cessation of hostilities, by all accounts, has collapsed. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov are trying to revive the ceasefire, but it is doubtful that it will be any more effective than the previous failed agreement. In any case, the renewed ceasefire will exclude Aleppo – that is basically giving Bashar al-Asad the green light to press the attack and take the city.
It really does not matter if a new cessation of hostilities is enacted. Many observers, including me, believe any ceasefire is merely a ruse on the part of the Syrians (and Russians) to continue military operations, taking advantage of a loophole in the agreement that permits attacks on “terrorist” groups – specifically, but not limited to the al-Qa’idah affiliate in Syria known as Jabhat al-Nusrah (The Victory Front) and ISIS. The Syrian regime labels anyone in the opposition as terrorists, making them valid targets.
A look at the map above clearly shows the dire situation facing the opposition fighters in Aleppo. The regime has been able to pressure them from the west, south and east. It is obvious what the regime and its allies are attempting to do – continue the push on these same three axes and cut off the enclave, then pivot to the north and retake the entire city.
The fall of Aleppo will cripple much of the rebel activity in the northern part of Syria – it will also have significant psychological impact on both sides. The retaking of Aleppo will be a major morale booster for the regime, and a major blow to the opposition. It will be a hard fight – both sides realize the importance of controlling Syria’s largest city.
With the regime in control of the capital of Damascus and Aleppo, the perception will grow that the forces supporting Bashar al-Asad are on the path to defeating the opposition. It is analogous to controlling both Washington, DC and New York City.
I see no good options for the opposition in Aleppo – their military situation is untenable. With the Russian Air Force bringing effective airpower to the fight, and the Syrian Army refocusing its efforts on the rebels in Aleppo rather than on ISIS to the north of Palmyra, it is too much force for the opposition to withstand.
The coming battle might not be a rout, but it is only a matter of time until an army with the resources of a state, willing allies on the ground (Iran and Hizballah) and a committed air force (the Russians) capable of massing a large number of sorties in a concentrated area, wear down any resistance.
What does this impending defeat mean for U.S. interests? Cynically, it clears the way for all parties to concentrate their efforts against ISIS. Thus far, the U.S. coalition has limited its operations to attacks on ISIS and occasionally al-Qa’idah elements in the country.
Ironically, coalition operations have indirectly assisted the Syrian regime by relieving pressure on the government from ISIS, allowing the Syrians and their allies to focus their efforts on the rebels. The bulk of American support in Syria has been to anti-ISIS groups, not anti-regime groups. While there has been some support to anti-regime groups, it has been too little to make a difference.
It does not appear that the U.S.-led coalition is willing to provide protection or support for the rebels in Aleppo. They are on their own, facing the Syrian Army and Air Force, the Russian Air Force, Iranian IRGC and Army troops and Hizballah fighters.
How long will it take? Hard to say exactly, but time is running out.
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April 28th, 2016
By Rick Francona.
President Obama has ordered the phased deployment of an additional 250 U.S. troops to Syria to intensify the fight against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). It is expected that most of these troops will be special forces, primarily U.S. Army Special Forces and U.S. Air Force Combat Controllers.
The Army soldiers will be used to advise and assist the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in their fight against ISIS with training, intelligence, logistics, medical help, etc. This is a core mission of the Green Berets – forming coherent fighting units among the local population. Rather than having to introduce large numbers of American troops into an area, the concept is that the locals will do the bulk of the fighting, with American guidance and assistance.
The Air Force combat controllers will serve as what used to be called forward air controllers, now called tactical air control parties (TACP). This puts American eyes on the ground in direct contact with coalition aircraft – primarily U.S. Air Force fighter and bomber aircraft – flying overhead.
These “battlefield airmen” have the capability to designate targets on the ground via laser or GPS coordinates, and to feed targeting data directly into the guidance systems on weapons carried on board the aircraft. It is a proven tactic we have perfected over the years, devastating and accurate – no one does this better than us.
The recent deployment of the venerable B-52 to the Middle East – flying sorties from an air base in Qatar – fits into this operation. The B-52 has been transformed from a wide area saturation bomber (sometime inaccurately described as “carpet bombing”) to a precision guided munitions carrier, capable of releasing one GPS-guided weapon at a time from its huge bomb bay. (See my article on this, B-52 deployment to the Middle East – let’s drop the term “carpet bombing”)
Let’s address the “elephant in the room.” The President’s order expands the U.S. military presence on the ground in Syria – continued deployment of advisers reminds those of us who served in Vietnam how we got there. The words used in the description of the additional troops – “non-combat troops” deployed in phases – are troubling.
First, to label these troops headed for Syria as non-combat is not only ludicrous, but insults the courage and commitment of the men being sent into harm’s way. They will be on the ground fighting arguably the most ruthless enemy we have faced in half a century.
As for phasing troops incrementally into the fight, that too smacks of Vietnam. Last month, after a U.S. Marine was killed in Iraq, I wrote:
So, we have the incremental expansion of the size and scope of our military presence in Iraq. I fear we are sliding down a slippery slope with no clear mission or plan. If ISIS is indeed a threat to American national security, then let’s address it. Stop the half-hearted measures and make the tough decisions. Forget the “boots on the ground” myth – that die is cast, that lie is past.
Make up your mind, Mr. President – are we in this fight or not? If we are, go big. If we are not, go home. Read the entire article, More U.S. ground troops to Iraq – further down that slippery slope?
There is a plan, but I am not sure our political leadership is fully committed to its implementation. Over the last few years – since ISIS demonstrated that it is a threat rather than an aberration – the Obama Administration has gradually realized that the threat must be addressed.
President Barack Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry are wont to decree that “there is no military solution” to the situation in Iraq and Syria, yet they keep sending more troops into the region. While the ultimate solution to the problems may not be strictly military, it will be military action that leads the parties to that illusive political solution. Diplomacy only works when there is military force backing it up.
The new leadership at the Department of Defense – Secretary of Defense Ash Carter and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff U.S. Marine Corps General Joe Dunsford – seem to have gotten the ear of the President.
The plan must be – it’s just common military sense – to isolate the two cities that represent the centers of gravity for ISIS: al-Raqqah in Syria and Mosul in Iraq. Separate them and take them down, either simultaneously or sequentially. It is apparent that the current thrust of U.S.-led coalition operations is to cut the lines of communication between Mosul and al-Raqqah. The recapture of Sinjar, Iraq and the capture of al-Shadadi in Syria are part of that strategy.
The major problem remains – there is little to no coordination between efforts in Iraq and Syria. The situations are very different and very complicated. Iraq almost makes sense; Syria defies rationality.
The President’s decision to deploy another 250 troops to Syria is a good thing, and hopefully enough to start taking back ground from ISIS. That said, it will be a long difficult fight. ISIS will not easily surrender the ground they have taken in either Syria or Iraq – there will be no diplomatic solution to the situation on the ground. As in most of these situations, the ground will be retaken by force of arms.
I hope that realization has taken hold at the White House and the National Security Council. If ISIS to be defeated – I believe the President’s words were “degrade and ultimately defeat” – it will require force of arms beyond what has been committed thus far. I have no problem committing the force required to defeat ISIS – we have the requisite military power; all we lack is the political will to do so.
Again, Mr. President – are we here to win, to defeat ISIS? If so, call Ash Carter and order him to get it done. You will say it’s not that simple, that I don’t understand. Actually, it is that simple, and I do understand.
Go big, or go home.
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April 22nd, 2016
By Rick Francona.
It was a noble effort to staunch the bloodshed in Syria – by some estimates the war has claimed over 450,000 lives – but the truce was doomed from the start. The terms of the “cessation of hostilities,” as it was officially titled, were too vague, too open to interpretation, and did not apply to several of the major combatant groups. Ceasefires only work when all parties agree to stop fighting – clearly not the case here.
The agreement, brokered by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, specifically excluded the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the al-Qa’idah affliliated Jabhat al-Nusrah (“the Victory Front”), and “other terrorist groups” designated by the United Nations. That list of other terrorist groups was never clarified – hence the problem.
That last clause was a major factor in the failure of the truce. In several CNN interviews, I identified it as a huge loophole that the Russians and Syrians were prepared to exploit – and exploit it they did.
The term “terrorists” has always been used by the government of President Bashar al-Asad to describe any armed group that opposes it – the Russians adopted a similar definition. Thus, anyone not on the regime side was considered outside the scope of the agreement and thus subject to continued military action. The Russians and Syrians continued air operations against virtually everyone.
When the Lavrov-Kerry agreement was announced, I wrote: “I am afraid we have set up a long-term stalemate where hundreds of Syrians will continue to die while Russia and Syria diplomatically fend off accusations that they are violating the ceasefire – they will continue to strike any target they wish regardless of American and Western objections. They have done it before, and they will do it again. Well played, Messrs. Putin and Lavrov.” (Read the entire article, Syria: Cessation of hostilities – was John Kerry outplayed?)
The truce was conceived to provide an opportunity to reach a political solution to the five-year old conflict between the Syrian government and the myriad opposition groups seeking to overthrow al-Asad’s Ba’ath Party regime. Despite the ceasefire agreement, the fighting continued. The Russians followed up the agreement with an announcement by President Vladimir Putin that he had ordered most of Russian forces to withdraw from Syria.
What actually happened was not a withdrawal, but merely a rotation of forces – the Russian expeditionary force in northern Syria is as potent as ever, but with different types of aircraft. Rather than a large number of fighter-bombers, the force is now composed of mostly attack aircraft and helicopter gunships. When the Syrian Army liberated the city of Palmyra from ISIS, Russian air assets were heavily involved – and controlled by Russian special forces soldiers embedded with the Syrian forces.
While several rounds of talks did take place in Geneva, for the most part the two sides were talking past each other. The opposition groups’ primary demand was that any agreement include the removal of Bashar al-Asad from office. Syrian government officials insisted that the continuation of Bashar as president was a non-negotiable condition in any agreement. Neither side was willing to move away from those diametrically-opposed positions. Despite the maneuverings of John Kerry, neither side was open to compromise.
On April 18, the committee representing the opposition groups announced a “postponement” of the talks in Geneva, pointing to the lack of progress in the talks and the continued military buildup and operations in the Aleppo area. Not only is the Syrian Army moving more forces to the area, there are deployments of Lebanese Hizballah units, as well as forces from the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and now the regular Iranian Army, and not to be overlooked, Russian advisers and artillery troops.
It is likely that without the foreign forces, the Syrian Army would be hard pressed to retake the city. Without retaking Aleppo, the regime cannot reassert control over the country.
The day after the announcement by the opposition groups that they were leaving the talks, Syrian Air Force fighter-bombers struck the produce market in the rebel-held city of Kafr Anbal, followed immediately by an attack on the produce market in Ma’arat al-Nu’aman, just five miles distant. The death toll approached one hundred.
Two markets hit one after the other just five miles apart – that appears to be deliberate targeting of civilians to me. A high-casualty attack on two cities, each with the reputation of being “poster children” for the rebellion, coming just one day after the opposition pulls out of the talks – a coincidence? Hardly.
It is a harbinger of things to come. The Syrian regime, with its Russian and Iranian supporters, will continue to kill thousands of Syrians. The introduction of Russian forces into Syria last year saved the Syrian Army from having to cede a large portion of northern Syria to the rebels. The impact of virtually indiscriminate bombing by the Russian Air Force allowed the Syrians to retake most of the ground they had lost in Idlib province, move back towards Aleppo and begin an encirclement of the city.
At the same time, the Syrians pushed east in Homs province, retaking the strategic – and culturally significant – city of Palmyra. It was a major victory for the Syrians – both real and symbolic – and a major defeat for ISIS. The Syrians appeared to be poised to advance further east towards the oil center of Dayr al-Zawr and relieve the besieged Syrian military garrison at and adjacent to Dayr al-Zawr air base. Things finally seemed to be going the Syrians’ way – thanks to the Russian air umbrella.
However, with the collapse of the talks in Geneva, the Syrians have a tougher task. The focus for the next round of fighting will necessarily be Aleppo. Given the amount of military power being deployed by the Syrians and allies, I believe it is only a matter of time before Russian air strikes and artillery fire create the conditions by which the Syrian and Iranian ground troops encircle the city and eventually starve it into submission. We’ve seen this tactic work before.
It appears that the quagmire and bloodletting will continue unabated. Casualties will climb on both sides, but the majority of the dead and wounded will continue to be noncombatant civilians caught in the crossfire – most caused by the regime and its allies. Neither the Syrians, Iranian nor even the Russians are concerned about “collateral damage.”
The eventual winners? Syrian President Bashar al-Asad, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Iranian President Hassan Rouhani.
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April 14th, 2016
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| USAF B-52 bombers arriving at Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar |
The first U.S. Air Force B-52 heavy bombers deployed to the Persian Gulf to participate in Operation Inherent Resolve have arrived at Al Udeid (al-‘Udayd) Air Base, located just a few miles outside Qatar’s capital city of Doha. The huge jets from the 2nd Bomb Wing at Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana, represent the first operational BUFF* deployment to the Middle East since the Gulf War (Operation Desert Storm) in 1991.
For the record, this deployment does not represent an increase of U.S. forces in the region – the B-1 bombers now present in theater are being rotated back to the United States for maintenance and system upgrades. The B-1 Lancer** is credited for critical air support to Syrian Kurdish fighters in their successful defense of the border city of Kobani in 2014.
Al Udeid Air Base is home to the 379th Air Expeditionary Wing – the base sits about 900 air miles from the Iraqi city of Mosul (al-Mawsil), and about 1000 air miles from the Syrian city of al-Raqqah – both easy prey for the B-52. The two cities are the primary centers of gravity for the self-proclaimed Islamic State, more commonly known as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS).
At some point in the near future, the fight against ISIS will be waged in and around those two cities. In Iraq for sure and probably in Syria as well, American airpower – including bombers such as the B-52 – will play a key and integral role in those battles.
That role needs clarification.
Many people associate the B-52 with the term “carpet bombing.” Carpet bombing is a Vietnam-era term meaning wide-scale – some would say indiscriminate – bombing of areas suspected to be enemy troop concentrations or areas in which they have sought refuge. To be sure, the B-52 was used in Vietnam to bomb large areas where we believed either Vietcong or North Vietnamese Army (NVA) troops were present.
Much of that bombing was based on sketchy intelligence. By way of disclosure, I was involved in the collection of tactical intelligence on NVA troop locations – the threshold to select targets was not high.
That targeting paradigm changed with the development and deployment of precision-guided munitions (PGM). Granted, during Operation Desert Storm, we did what some might consider carpet bombing, although with great restrictions.
What we see in the photograph above from Operation Desert Storm is as close as we have come to carpet bombing since the end of the Vietnam War.
This is more accurately called “saturation bombing” against massed Iraqi troops in the deserts of Kuwait and southern Iraq in 1991. The targets were exclusively military and located far from civilian areas. Based on our interrogations of Iraqi prisoners of war (in which I participated) following B-52 strikes, the saturation bombing was very effective against entrenched Iraqi troops.
However, most of the American aircraft dropping ordnance on Iraqi cities and areas in which civilians might be present carried PGMs – bombs and missiles designed to be guided to their targets to maximize the effectiveness of the military objectives while at the same time minimizing collateral damage (military-speak for civilian casualties).
American use of PGMs as the routine method of delivery has changed the face of aerial attack – airpower is now almost required to be accurate and sterile.
Today’s employment of the B-52 was systemically defined during the 2001 American invasion of Afghanistan in the aftermath of the attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001.
In conjunction with U.S. Air Force tactical air control parties (TACP) or U.S. Army Special Forces teams on the ground, the B-52 provided a tremendous firepower advantage – accurate airpower on demand guided by American forces with eyeballs on the target.
The B-52 massive gravity bomb (also known as “dumb bomb”) carrier of Vietnam has been transformed into a huge flying magazine. The aircraft was modified to carry PGMs and drop weapons one at a time rather than the “bombs away” emptying of the bomb bays – the weapons are now guided primarily by Global Positioning System (GPS) guidance modules. The B-52 remains a key asset in modern air support operations.
That said, we no longer “carpet bomb.” It would be useful if that phrase was erased from the lexicon of the current presidential campaign – it does a gross disservice to the men and women who place themselves in harm’s way every day in the fight against ISIS. This includes flying the B-52 Stratofortress, the aircraft almost instinctively identified with the outdated phrase.
Despite its age and the fact that we now have more capable bombers in the inventory, the U.S. Air Force B-52 remains an iconic symbol of American military power, or as we said in my day, “when you care enough to send the very best.”
* BUFF is military slang for the B-52 Stratofortress. In polite company, the acronym expands to Big Ugly Fat Fellow. Those who have ever worn an Air Force uniform know the actual terminology.
* Lancer is the official name of the B-1, but the bomber is more commonly known in Air Force circles as “the Bone” – the letter B and the word 1 – “B ONE.”
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March 28th, 2016
By Rick Francona.
The historic archaeological-treasure city of Palmyra fell to the Syrian Army on March 27 (Easter Sunday in the West). Palmyra had been under the control of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) since the terrorist group seized the city in May of 2015 – the seizure of Palmyra was part of a larger military campaign in which ISIS made huge territorial gains as it advanced on the major Syrian cities of Hamah and Homs.
The retaking of Palmyra is the latest in a series of successful Syrian Army operations in the provinces of Homs, Hamah, Idlib and Aleppo. These are the very same areas that last summer the Syrian Army was forced to cede to anti-regime rebels – and in some instances, to jabhat al-nusrah (The Victory Front), the al-Qa’idah affiliate in Syria.
The Syrian regime’s change of fortune is directly attributable to intervention of Russian Air Force fighters and fighter bombers operating from Humaymim Air Base in northwestern Syria, long range bombers operating from bases in Russia, as well as cruise missiles launched from Russian Navy ships in the Caspian Sea. That intervention began in September 2015 with the deployment of Russian combat aircraft to Syria, and has continued virtually unabated ever since.
When Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered the deployment of combat aircraft to Syria, he claimed that his pilots were tasked with attacking terrorism targets – specifically ISIS targets. In reality, 85 to 90 percent of the strikes flown by the Russians targeted anti-regime rebels – the obvious goal of these strikes was to ensure the survival of the failing regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Asad. The rebels bearing the brunt of the Russian air strikes included groups receiving support – money, weapons and training – from the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.
In the recent operation to retake the city of Palmyra, the combined airpower of the Russian and Syrian air forces was the key factor in the success of the Syrian Army. ISIS has no air force and minimal air defense capabilities to use against Russian and Syrian fighters and helicopters. The two air forces were able to easily isolate the ISIS fighters in Palmyra from their logistics support about 120 miles to the north in ISIS’s self-proclaimed capital city of al-Raqqah.
In the battle for Palmyra, the Syrian Army acquitted itself fairly well, given its mediocre performance over the last year. The Army did suffer what many Western countries would consider an unacceptable level of casualties. ISIS can be a formidable enemy, especially when attacking lightly defended towns in rural Syria and Iraq, but when confronted with a real army supported by effective air power, it is at a severe disadvantage. There are reports of Russian tactical air controllers on the ground with the Syrians.
On one hand, ISIS’s loss of Palmyra to the Syrian Army is symbolic. It is another defeat – likely the most serious ISIS defeat thus far. They have been defeated now in Kobani and Palmyra in Syria, as well as Tikrit, Bayji and al-Ramadi in Iraq. ISIS leaders have to be concerned how this series of defeats might affect recruiting. Considering the high numbers of casualties the group suffers in its military operations, continued recruitment of new fighters is critical to its survival.
On the other hand, the defeat in Palmyra is operationally significant – the city is a major logistics hub and the gateway to al-Raqqah. Recapture of the city will allow Syrian military forces to push east towards the ISIS-encircled city of Dayr al-Zawr, about 120 miles away. There is a besieged Syrian Army garrison there at an air base. The garrison has survived only by continuous airdrops of food and ammunition.
The fall of Palmyra is not the end of the war against ISIS in Syria, although it may be a critical first step. Given the attempts by the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq to isolate the city of Mosul from the capital of al-Raqqah – by air strikes and ground operations by Kurdish peshmerga forces – ISIS may find itself divided into enclaves with no lines of communications between them.
It maybe not be the end of the war, but it might be the beginning of ISIS’s eventual defeat. Then we can focus on saving Syria.
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March 22nd, 2016
By Rick Francona.
A U.S. Marine was killed in Iraq on March 19 during an attack on an American firebase located on the front lines between Iraqi forces and the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). That same base was attacked again two days later, prompting headlines like this: “The Pentagon to Expand Secret Military Firebase in Iraq After Marine Killed.”
According to American military public affairs officers, the “secret” base is located near the Iraqi city of Makhmur. The base, along with other military garrisons in the area, will play a key role in the preparations for the military campaign to retake Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city. Mosul is only about 45 miles from Makhmur, and thus is a primary marshaling and staging area for the campaign to retake Mosul from ISIS.
The Iraqis are pouring large numbers of military units into the area, as well they should. This will be a major campaign, larger than anything the Iraqi Army has undertaken since the (premature) withdrawal of American forces in 2011. The battles for Tikrit, Bayji and al-Ramadi were good rehearsals, but Mosul is a much tougher challenge. It is larger and will involve long lines of communications.
It will take time to amass the required forces to liberate Mosul – ISIS has had two years to build defenses, including mines, booby traps, barriers, as well as pre-surveyed kill zones. I, along with other military analysts, are skeptical that Iraqi forces will be ready for an assault on Mosul this year.
There are several troubling aspects of this recent incident and the Obama Administration’s response.
First and foremost, we have the loss of a U.S. Marine – Staff Sergeant Louis F. Cardin, 27, of Temecula, California. I believe it important that I include the name of this young man who was killed in action in the service of our country. I hope the Obama Administration does not dishonor his sacrifice by attempting to describe this as anything other than a combat death.
The Marines are manning what is called Firebase Bell. They are on a firebase exclusively manned by Americans – there are no Iraqi forces present. These troops are manning four 155mm howitzers, providing fire support to Iraqi forces.
The Marines’ M777 155mm howitzers are effective and highly accurate weapons, capable of tremendous firepower at ranges up to 25 miles. Given the location of the firebase at the forward edge of Iraqi government control – in this case in the form of the Kurdish peshmerga – it is no wonder that ISIS wants to silence those guns.
That said, I fail to understand how these Marines are considered anything but “boots on the ground.” With no Iraqi forces present, how can their mission possibly be construed as “advise and assist?” It can’t – they are there to protect other American forces as well as Iraqi troops in the area. What bothers those of us who are old enough to have served in Vietnam is the perceived re-emergence of the “firebase mentality.” It failed then, and it will fail now.
More shades of Vietnam – the incremental escalation of the number of American forces on the ground, coupled with the gradual expansion of their role. What began as a few hundred advisers has grown into several thousand troops from all services, including a special forces contingent conducting direct action missions. That is called “mission creep.”
It was on one of these direct action missions last year that we lost a U.S. Army Special Forces noncommissioned officer. Master Sergeant Joshua Wheeler, 39, of the famed Delta Force was killed – again, the Administration attempted to create the fiction that his was not a combat death. Shameful.
In response to the two attacks, the Pentagon is deploying additional Marines from the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) to Firebase Bell, adding to the already almost 4,000 American troops on the ground in Iraq. The numbers can be deceptive, though. They do not include the thousands of American forces spread throughout the region – but not in Iraq – who conduct and support the air campaign, and maintain a robust naval presence in the Persian Gulf.
That naval presence includes the Wasp-class amphibious assault ship USS Kearsarge, with almost 2000 Marines of the 26th MEU embarked, and the helicopters to deploy them. These are combat troops, not advisers – yes, boots on the ground, despite the Administration’s word games to the contrary.
To complicate matters, an Iranian-backed Iraqi Shi’a militia (probably at the instigation of perennial Iraqi troublemaker Muqtada al-Sadr) warned that U.S. Marines would be considered occupation forces, despite the fact that they are fighting ISIS. We had a chance to neutralize Muqtada in 2003 – we should have availed ourselves of that opportunity. I digress.
So, we have the incremental expansion of the size and scope of our military presence in Iraq. I fear we are sliding down a slippery slope with no clear mission or plan. If ISIS is indeed a threat to American national security, then let’s address it. Stop the half-hearted measures and make the tough decisions. Forget the “boots on the ground” myth – that die is cast, that lie is past.
Make up your mind, Mr. President – are we in this fight or not? If we are, go big. If we are not, go home.
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January 22nd, 2016
By Rick Francona.
Now that the initial euphoria of the release of five Americans from Iran is beginning to fade, the magnitude of just what the United States had to give the Iranians to secure their return is beginning to sink in.
For the five American families, who are justifiably rejoicing as their loved ones return home, no price was too high. For the country, however, it may be a different story.
The good
Obviously, everyone is happy that the five have been released. Everyone believes that they were detained as political pawns by the Iranian regime, regardless of the drivel put out by the Islamic Republic’s tightly-controlled press.
This image shows how the four released Americans are being portrayed in Iranian social media. Note the description of the four as spies.
The Iranians contend that only four prisoners were part of the trade; the fifth, a student, was released as “act of goodwill.” Of course, there was no reason to detain the student in the first place – he was simply in the wrong place at the wrong time. (See my comments below for some thoughts on this.)
That’s the good; the only good – we got back five Americans who were in reality hostages.
The bad
In order to secure the release of these unjustly detained and imprisoned Americans, the Obama Administration agreed to release seven men who had either been indicted or convicted of actual crimes in actual courts of law – yes, unlike in Iran, due process in a legitimate criminal justice system.
These seven men were accused and/or convicted of crimes against the United States, primarily violations of the sanctions imposed by the United States on Iran for its refusal to adhere to international agreements. All seven were working in support of Iran’s illicit nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs. Of the seven, six hold American citizenship in addition to being Iranian citizens; the seventh is an Iranian national.
Not only did the Administration pardon seven indicted or convicted felons and agreed to deliver them to an airfield in Switzerland to exchange them for the four (which turned out to be five) Americans, but the US government dismissed charges against 14 other Iranians resident in Iran who were under indictment in the United States. Most of those were accused of sanctions violations, although there are unconfirmed reports that some of them were involved in terrorist activities.
Additionally, the Administration agreed to release $400 million of Iranian funds frozen in the United States since 1981. However, with accrued interest – you can’t make this up – it totals $1.3 billion.
Who is making these deals? None other than Secretary of State John Kerry, the same John Kerry that caved to virtually every Iranian demand that resulted in the unverifiable nuclear deal with Tehran.
The ugly
Six of the seven felons pardoned by the Administration are American citizens and thus can remain in the United States to resume their efforts on behalf of the Islamic Republic – including procurement of materials and technology for the illicit nuclear and ballistic missile programs.
It appears that this eventuality is closer to reality than originally thought. The agreement called for an exchange of prisoners/hostages in Switzerland, but none of the seven pardoned felons chose to board the flight for eventual repatriation to Iran. I know, it is hard to believe that none of them wanted to return to the paradise that is the Islamic Republic….
Yes, I said nuclear – if anyone believes that the Iranians are not covertly seeking a nuclear weapons capability, either alone or in concert with other pariah nations (North Korea comes to mind), they are deluding themselves. It is a capability the Iranians believe will give them strategic parity with Israel and its nuclear arsenal.
Although the Iranians and the Americans insist that the negotiations for the nuclear deal and the prisoner exchange were independent but parallel, no one believes there is no linkage between the two. The freed Americans were not permitted to leave Iran until the International Atomic Energy Agency certified Iran as being in compliance with the nuclear agreement.
One thing that this deal has not resolved is the status of former FBI agent Bob Levinson, missing since he went to Kish Island in 2007. The circumstances of his disappearance have yet to be determined, but I find it hard to believe that the Iranians are not aware of what happened to a former FBI agent visiting Iran.
In addition to the $1.3 billion gained from the prisoner exchange, Iran stands to reap a windfall of over $100 billion once the country is certified as in compliance with the nuclear agreement. Given the virtual capitulation of Secretary Kerry, the certification was a foregone conclusion whether or not Iran actually lived up to its commitments.
Bottom line
Let’s compare how this worked out. The United States pardoned seven of Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile materiel and technology procurement agents in American custody. The Americans also paid Iran $1.3 billion in cash. All seven Iranian agents chose to remain in the United States, possibly to resume their efforts on behalf of the Islamic Republic.
Further, the United States dismissed felony charges against another 14 Iranians resident in Iran, thus vacating the Interpol red notices (basically an international arrest warrant) preventing their international travel – they are now free to resume their nefarious activities on behalf of the Iranian regime.
On top of that, being in compliance with the ill-advised nuclear deal, European Union sanctions have been lifted, over $100 billion dollars will find their way to Tehran, and Iranian oil will again be on international markets, complicating a market currently experiencing an oil glut.
For all of that, Iran released five virtual hostages whose only crimes appears to be being Americans present in Iran.
It seems to me that the Iranians got the better of both deals with the United States.
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Comments
Why any American, even an Iranian-American, would go to Iran under the regime of the ayatollahs is beyond me. I have received several invitations from Iranian media outlets to visit the country – it usually coincides with the annual reporting on Iraq’s chemical weapons usage in 1988 while I was in Baghdad.
Given my declared (and now public knowledge) background as an intelligence officer, and revelations – thank you New York Times – of my role in the US provision of intelligence information to the Iraqi military intelligence service in the last year of the Iran-Iraq War, I might be a candidate for a stay at Evin prison.
When I heard that the fifth American to be released as a so-called gesture of good will was a young student, my first thought was, what possessed an American with what appears to be international and regional experience to visit a Shi’a theocracy – sorry, an Islamic Republic? Sometimes you cannot protect people from their own stupidity.
If any more Americans travel to Iran under this current regime, they should be on notice that they are on their own – we will no longer make these lopsided deals to save them from their preventable misfortune.
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January 11th, 2016
By Rick Francona.
Now that the Iraqi security forces have retaken the city of al-Ramadi (Ramadi) from the fighters of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the Iraqi leadership has set its sights on the liberation of al-Mawsil (Mosul), the country’s second largest city. Mosul has been in ISIS hands since the group seized the city in June of 2014 – with almost no resistance from a large Iraqi Army force in the city that collapsed in the presence of the ISIS fighters.
The battle to retake Mosul from entrenched, motivated ISIS fighters who have had 18 months thus far to prepare their defenses will not be easy. Although Iraqi senior military officers assert that they will recapture Mosul by the end of 2016, I have doubts that the Iraqi forces will be in a position to launch an attack that soon.
Before the Iraqis move north for a battle to retake Mosul, they first must consolidate their control over al-Anbar province. That means retaking the city of al-Fallujah (Fallujah), just over 35 miles west of Baghdad, and securing the strategic dam and city of Hadithah, 90 miles west of Ramadi. Almost immediately after ISIS began its retreat from Ramadi, the group launched an attack on Hadithah – the area is now contested. This underscores ISIS’s continuing ability to mount offensive operations despite recent setbacks.
Before we talk about the challenges the Iraqis will face in mounting an operation to retake Mosul, let’s look at some factors that worked in their favor in the battle for Ramadi.
The Iraqi Army has undergone a fundamental transformation since the virtual collapse of their forces in 2014. The American-provided training has refocused the Iraqi military from counterterrorism and asymmetric warfare to more conventional force-on-force fighting. Rather than treating ISIS as a group of terrorists, the new Iraqi model is to deal with them as an opposing army. Although ISIS uses terrorist tactics – suicide bombers and vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices in large numbers – they have been integrated rather effectively into conventional military operations to take and hold territory.
To complement the new operational focus, the Shi’a-dominated Iraqi government under Prime Minister Haydar al-‘Abadi has moved beyond the short-sighted policies of the Nuri al-Maliki administration, at least in the retaking of Ramadi. Unlike the earlier battles in Tikrit and Bayji, the Iraqis did not rely on the Iranian-backed – and I suspect Iranian-led – Iraqi Shi’a militias to do the bulk of the front-line fighting. In Ramadi, the Iraqi Army’s elite units and the independent Iraqi Counterterrorism Service were supported by Sunni tribesmen from the local area. Keeping the Shi’a militias out of the fiercely passionate Sunni heartland was wise.
This proved to be a winning combination – accommodation of the Sunni tribes is absolutely necessary for the political future of the country. If Iraq is to survive as a country in its current form, the disparate factions have to have a say in the governance of the country, despite pressure from Tehran to marginalize the Sunni Arabs and Kurds.
The fight for Ramadi is not over, but the Iraqis seem to be on the cusp of securing the area. The remaining pockets of resistance will be cleared, albeit slowly because of the hundreds of explosive devices left behind by the retreating ISIS fighters. With the inclusion of the local Sunni tribes in the operation, the Iraqis have an excellent chance of retaining control of the city.
That inclusion will be critical as the Iraqi forces turn their attention to the rest of al-Anbar province, specifically the key cities of Fallujah and Hadithah. Fallujah will likely be the next target for the Iraqis – the city sits on the Euphrates River just 40 miles west of Baghdad (Baghdad is on the Tigris River, not the Euphrates.)
Once al-Anbar is secured, or deemed secure enough that Ramadi and Fallujah are firmly under Iraqi control, the Iraqis will have to begin the effort to move north and recapture Mosul from ISIS. Mosul is ten times the size of Ramadi and 250 miles north of Baghdad on the Tigris River.
Retaking Mosul will require a huge logistics effort – virtually all of the military materiel will have to be moved up the Tigris Valley to an area south of the ISIS-controlled area. The Iraqis will then have to fight their way to Mosul and then begin the slow, painstaking operation to clear ISIS from a city they will have had over two years to prepare to defend. ISIS knew at some point they would have to fight to keep Iraq’s second largest city.
This will take much longer than the Iraqis think it will. However, there are things that will make it easier – mostly thanks to the Kurds. The recent operations by the Kurdish peshmerga forces to retake the city of Sinjar and pressure Tal’afar will strain ISIS’s supply lines between its facilities in Syria and Mosul.
Additionally, in Syria the newly-formed Syrian Defense Force – a loose alliance of Syrian Kurds and Sunni Arabs – has seized control of the Tishrin Dam on the Euphrates River east of Aleppo, again straining ISIS supply lines to the Turkish border.
Things may have turned around in Iraq – Ramadi is a good first step after rocky starts in Tikrit and Bayji. It will be a long, hard fight, but there is a reasonable chance that the Iraqi Army, Counterterrorism Service and the Kurdish peshmerga will prevail in time.
After the Iraqis re-establish control over their territory, then the fight to eradicate ISIS must turn to Syria – a much more difficult and confusing problem.
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October 8th, 2015
For the last week, Russian fighter and fighter bomber aircraft have conducted about 60 airstrike operations in Syria. Despite Russian claims that they are attacking targets of the Islamic State (also called the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, or ISIS), all but two of these strikes appear to have targeted anti-regime groups attempting to remove the Ba’ath Party government of President Bashar al-Asad.
On Wednesday, the Russians added a new weapon system to the mix, launching 26 “Kalibr” (U.S Defense Department designation: SS-N-30) sea-launched cruise missiles (SCLM) from as many as four frigates in the Caspian Sea. These missiles are the Russian equivalent of the U.S. Navy Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM) and flew almost 950 miles through Iranian and Iraqi airspace en route to their targets in Syria.
The escalation represented by the addition of SLCMs to the campaign is interesting. Thus far, we have seen an intense aerial bombardment campaign using more effective weapons than those employed by the Syrian Arab Air Force (SYAF), but very few precision-guided munitions. Most of the videos and photographs published by the Russian media or leaked from Humaymim air base south of the port city of Latakia show a lack of targeting pods or PGMs on the Russian fighters and fighter-bombers.
Most of the Russian weapons appear to be general purpose gravity bombs, more commonly known as “dumb bombs.” The SLCMs, on the other hand, are in fact PGMs, able to hit targets accurately from up to 1550 miles away from the launch point, depending on missile variant and size of the warhead.
Now that we have seen the initial series of Russian air operations, the type of weapons being used and the targets being struck, it is apparent that the Russians are preparing the battlefield for a Syrian military push to re-establish itself in west central Syria, particularly the main lines of communications between Damascus and Aleppo.
The rebels systematically pushed out the Syrian army from most of Idlib province, especially in an area known as the al-Ghab plain, only one mountain range away from the coastal enclave near Latakia that is home to the ‘Alawis, the sect to which Bashar al-Asad and most of the senior military and political leaders belong.
As shown on the map, the overwhelming majority of Russian strikes are focused on the area in Idlib province north of Hamah. These targeted areas are in the hands of either the Free Syrian Army or the Jabhat al-Nusrah (the al-Qa’idah affiliate in Syria) – the tan area on the map – who control the main Damascus-Homs-Hamah-Saraqib-Aleppo highway, while the regime controls the areas shaded in blue.
If the Syrian regime is to reassert control over its own territory, regaining control of this Damascus-Aleppo corridor is essential. The Russian bombing campaign is preparing this area for a renewed Syrian Army ground assault. Leaflets dropped in this same area north of Hamah have warned the local population of impending “anti-terrorist” operations.
This impending operation should come as no surprise to any military analyst. It is the same plan we would have developed – this particular plan is credited to Iranian Major General Qassem Soleimani. Soleimani is the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ elite Qods Force. On a visit to Russia in July, the general laid out his assessment of the potential for the collapse of the Bashar al-Asad regime in the absence of external assistance. He also laid out the plan that could turn it around – with Russian air support.
In response, the Russians moved an expeditionary force to Syria composed of three squadrons of combat aircraft – they have not been shy in conducting the offensive operations necessary to support a Syrian military push to retake the main lines of communications. Thus far, the Russians have only struck a few ISIS targets, probably to provide the fig-leaf that their operations are actually a campaign against the Islamist group.
Despite the Russians’ offers to cooperate with the United States ostensibly against ISIS, the U.S. Secretary of Defense refused and offered to only hold “technical” talks to deconflict air operations. His stumbling, almost nonsensical, response – canned remarks about Russia’s “flawed strategy” in Syria – underscores the perception in the region that the anemic U.S.-led air campaign against ISIS remains ineffective.
At the same time, Secretary of State John Kerry has again proposed a no-fly zone – a move supported by former Secretary of State (and presidential candidate) Hillary Clinton. With the Russians now in Syria with three squadrons of combat aircraft in direct support of SYAF operations, that ship has sailed. That idea may have worked in 2012, but not now.
What’s next? The Russians will continue to pound anti-regime targets, the Iranians will continue to move more of its Qods Force and Lebanese Hizballah troops in support of Syrian military operations. There will be a concerted Syrian Army operation to move into the area north of Homs. Failing any American support to the moderate rebels allied with the West, the Syrians, Iranians and the Russians will be successful in reestablishing Syrian regime control.
At some point, the United States will need to redefine its goals in Syria and its strategy to achieve them. The dual-track policy to remove Bashar al-Asad and to “degrade and ultimately defeat” ISIS now seems unlikely – the Russian presence has forced our hand. When Russian President Vladimir Putin saw what he assessed as a threat to his country’s national interests, he acted – decisively.
Not only have the Russian asserted themselves in Syria, they are now making inroads with the Iranians and even the Iraqis. Iraqi politicians are asking for Russian help against ISIS, supplanting the United States as the “go to” major power.
With clarity of purpose and decisive action, this round goes to the Russians
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September 23rd, 2015
By Rick Francona.
It has become painfully obvious that the United States’ policy toward Syria – and the entire Middle East for that matter – is not working. The Islamic State, or the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), still controls vast swaths of territory in both Syria and Iraq, despite over a year of an American-led air campaign.
The Syrian civil war which has claimed over 250,000 lives still rages on multiple fronts with no end in sight. The much-touted American program to train moderate Syrian rebels to fight ISIS has produced less than 10 fighters currently in the fight – most of the initial cadre were killed, captured or defected to Islamist groups in Syria. Millions of dollars were wasted in what can only be described as incompetent execution of a flawed plan.
While I want to focus on Syria in this article, I should mention that the situation in Iraq is not much better. The Iraqi Army, despite over a year of renewed American and European forces’ training efforts, is virtually useless. No matter the rhetoric emanating from the Iraqis in Baghdad, the U.S. Central Command in Tampa, or the political mouthpieces in Washington, the Iraqi military is incapable of mounting effective operations, even with the Iranian-trained and led Shi’a militias. I recall the claims last year that the Iraqi Army was about to mount a campaign to regain control of Mosul – they can’t even retake the city of al-Ramadi, a mere 65 miles west of Baghdad.
Then again, how would we know what is actually happening? No one trusts the statements from either the State or Defense departments. Why should they? As I wrote last month, “someone is cooking the intelligence to make it fit into the narrative dictated by the White House and the political leadership at the Pentagon.” (See the entire article, Is your government lying to you about the war against ISIS?
It has been an American policy objective that Syrian President Bashar al-Asad must either step down or be removed from power – that has been the policy since the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011. Yet, in 2012, when the secular rebel group known as the Free Syria Army (FSA) requested assistance from the United States and our European allies, we offered only token amounts of non-lethal aid. It was a combination of this short-sighted position in Syria and the premature withdrawal from Iraq in late 2011 that led to the genesis and rapid expansion of ISIS. By 2014, the situation was ripe for ISIS to move from Syria and seize control of Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city.
It was not until 2014 that the Obama Administration recognized the serious threat posed by the group now calling itself “The Islamic State” – deployment of U.S. military trainers to Iraq began, soon followed by commencement of airstrikes on ISIS targets in Iraq and Syria. In President Barack Obama’s own words: “Our objective is clear: We will degrade, and ultimately destroy, [ISIS] through a comprehensive and sustained counter-terrorism strategy.” Sounds good, but….
To say that the US-led coalition air campaign has been anemic would be kind. The overly restrictive rules of engagement (ROE) and the fear of causing any collateral damage has hamstrung what passes for the air operation. Sorties rates are dismally low, and pilots often return to base without employing any of their weapons, again citing the ROE and a convoluted target approval process that takes hours instead of seconds or minutes. For some insight into these self-imposed limitations, see my article from March of this year, Why is American airpower not stopping ISIS?.
Because of the lack of American political commitment to the air campaign against ISIS, the Islamist group has made significant gains in Syria, losing basically only one battle, that being for the Kurdish city of Kobani, which was saved only through an uncharacteristic display of American airpower. Combined with successful ground operations by several of the Syrian rebel groups, especially a coalition of Islamist groups, the Syrian army has been pushed out of much of the northern part of the country and has come under attack in the south and in the suburbs of Damascus.
The situation is beginning to look much like mid-2012 when the al-Asad regime appeared to be on the verge of defeat. It was only intervention then by the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Lebanese Hizballah that the Syrian military was able to regroup and stave off defeat.
Now that the al-Asad regime is again on the ropes, a new savior appears – none other than Russian President Vladimir Putin. Why the Russians? It was not our failure to effectively take on ISIS as Putin may want the world to believe, but the specter of the collapse of the Syrian regime that convinced him to take action. The fall of Bashar al-Asad may threaten what Putin believes is a vital Russian national interest – continued Russian access to the Middle East and the Mediterranean.
Since the mid-1970’s, the United States has effectively pushed the Russians out of the region – with the exception of Syria. The Russians have maintained a small presence at a joint Russian-Syrian naval facility in the port city of Tartus and for a time a presence at a desert air base in central Syria. When the decision was made to move combat aircraft to Syria, I expected the Russians to again use the air base at Tiyas. However, recent ISIS gains have put that area at risk.
In the last few weeks, dozens of Russian transport flights have landed at Humaymim air base, located just south of the port city of Latakia on Syria’s Mediterranean coast. This area is also the home of the ‘Alawis, the sect of which Bashar al-Asad is a member. For more on the Russians in Syria, see Russian intervention in Syria – what is the endgame?
As of today, there are over two squadrons of Russian Air Force fighter, fighter-bomber and attack aircraft at the air base, as well as helicopter gunships. An anonymous American official confirmed the presence of 12 Sukhoi SU-24 (NATO: FENCER) fighter-bombers and 12 Sukhoi SU-25 (NATO: FROGFOOT) attack aircraft – see image.
Here is a short but good quality video of a Russian Ilyushin IL-78 (NATO: MIDAS) aerial refueling aircraft with four SU-24 fighter-bombers deploying to Humaymim air base a few miles south of Latakia. For my readers who do not speak Arabic, the speaker in the video explains that these are Russian aircraft heading west over the north rural area of Homs governorate – that puts them on a course for the air base at Humaymim.
Now that the Russians have deployed a small, but fairly potent expeditionary force to Syria, one has to ask, what are President Putin’s intentions? Is he going to use his aircraft against ISIS in conjunction with the Syrian Air Force and the U.S.-led coalition? Is he also going to order his pilots to attack those rebel forces (some of which are supported by the United States) attempting to remove Bashar al-Asad from power? Or both? I believe he will publicly do the former and covertly do the latter.
Keeping Bashar in power meets Putin’s goal of assuring continued Russian access to the area, while degrading ISIS serves his interest in combating Islamist fighters, many of which have come to Syria from Russia, most notably from Chechnya. Killing them now in Syria is preferable to fighting them later in Russia.
How does the current situation affect American policy? Perhaps it is time to recognize the reality that removing Bashar al-Asad from power – a good idea in 2011, 2012 and 2013 when we could have and should have supported it – may not be feasible now. Too much has changed since that policy goal was articulated, but it has been the rise and expansion of ISIS that has emerged as the major threat to American interests – ISIS far eclipses the threat posed by the al-Asad regime. Syria might be considered a regional threat because of its close ties to Iran and Hizballah – Syria is the conduit for Iran to continue to fund, train and equip the Lebanese Shi’a militia – but ISIS is now a far greater threat to the United States.
There is a common enemy for all parties involved – it is a strange match up indeed. The United States, Europe (including Turkey), Syria, Iraq, Iran, the Gulf Arabs, the Kurds and Hizballah are all fighting ISIS in Syria and/or Iraq. Now we have the deployment of Russian combat forces into Syria. While the elimination of ISIS is a desirable outcome, the presence of so many different military forces operating high-performance aircraft armed with sophisticated weapons in close proximity to each other without close coordination creates the potential for unintended confrontation. Confrontations between jet fighter aircraft tend to be quick and lethal, over in seconds.
The informal coordination (or more correctly, notification) channels that now exist are inadequate. Of course, the Pentagon claims that we do not coordinate coalition air operations with the Syrian Air Force (and now the Russians). While technically true, we do coordinate with the Iraqi armed forces – is anyone naive enough to believe that the Iraqis are not communicating with the Syrians while taking on a common enemy? It would be irresponsible to send American pilots into Syrian skies without some notification to the Syrians to not interfere.
With the presence of Russian fighters, fighter bombers and attack aircraft in Syria ostensibly to fight ISIS, now might be the time for a more formal coordination/notification protocol. Since it is likely impossible politically to coordinate with the Syrian Air Force – they drop crude barrel bombs on their own civilian populations – we should establish a coordination mechanism with the Russian expeditionary force in Syria. The Russians can work with the Syrians. If it is not true coordination of air operations against ISIS, at least we should be able to deconflict the operations of the various parties. We do not need an armed confrontation between an American pilot and a Syrian or Russian pilot at 600 miles per hour 20,000 feet over northern Syria.
On the ground, we should also reassess how we are going to take on ISIS in Syria. Obviously, the 10 U.S.-trained rebels are not going to make a difference. Despite any assurances or deals we have made with the Turks in return for access to their air bases just north of Syria, we need to better support the Kurds, they are the only effective fighting force now engaging ISIS on the ground.
This is a ready-made solution requiring a bit of spine, something seemingly in short supply in Washington. Provide better weapons and materiel to the Kurds in Syria. With U.S.-led coalition and Russian airpower supporting the Kurds on the ground, this could take the fight to ISIS effectively.
Let’s destroy (not defeat, but utterly destroy) ISIS, then we can worry about the dictator in Damascus. Eliminate the threats one at a time – ISIS first, Bashar second. It has a chance to succeed, whereas our current policy is an abject failure.
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September 2nd, 2015
By Rick Francona.
Although I tend to limit my analysis and commentary to Middle East issues, my expertise in the region was gained from almost three decades of service as an intelligence officer – as both a clandestine case officer and a signals intelligence officer – with the Defense Intelligence Agency, Central Intelligence Agency and National Security Agency, agencies probably better known by just the initials DIA, CIA and NSA.
All three intelligence agencies deal with the highest levels of classified information in the United States government. The proper handling and safeguarding of that information is taken extremely seriously in the intelligence community. Serious breaches of the federal laws and departmental/agency regulations are usually career-ending events.
I will not address the politics of the email controversy surrounding former Secretary of State and presidential candidate Hillary Clinton. I will, however, address some facts about national security intelligence information and draw some conclusions about the presence of Top Secret/SCI information found in supposedly unclassified emails discovered on Mrs. Clinton’s unsecured private email server.
SCI refers to Sensitive Compartmented Information and involves special handling requirements because of the sensitivity of the sources and methods used to acquire and produce the intelligence information bearing the SCI markings.
You will also see references to SI (Special Intelligence – a specific reference to information derived from signals intelligence, the exclusive purview of NSA) and “codeword” information in the emails – these are references to SCI. SCI can be at the Secret or Top Secret level – it can also be further restricted to limited distribution lists in the cases of extremely sensitive sources.
For example, if NSA was able to obtain information on Russian nuclear weapons capabilities and the intentions of the Russian leadership based on breaking an encrypted Russian military communications system, it would be very closely held – only a small group of senior military officers and national security decisionmakers would see that information.
If the fact that NSA had successfully penetrated these communications were to come to the attention of the Russians – or their allies – our capability to access that information would dry up immediately. This is the level of damage inflicted by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden – it will take many years and billions of dollars to recover from his treachery.
Because intelligence information is sensitive, the laws and regulations that govern how it is produced, marked, handled, transmitted, stored and ultimately used are very specific and not open to interpretation. Intelligence material is classified at its inception, at the very first stage of the acquisition of the raw intelligence information, and remains classified throughout its entire existence until it is destroyed or an authorized official declassifies it. Declassification authority rests with the agency or department that originated the information and determined the initial classification.
It is that last part that seems to be lost on people at the State Department. Even retired Admiral John Kirby (a fine officer by all accounts) seems to misunderstand the rules. Granted, for almost all of his Navy career, the admiral was a public affairs specialist and not involved in either operations or intelligence, but any senior officer in the armed forces should be aware of the basic rules of handling classified information.
Admiral Kirby’s public pronouncements that Mrs. Clinton’s emails contained information that was not classified when it was sent, but was classified later, defy not only common sense but the rules and regulations of both the Defense Department and the State Department. The admiral and I have a cordial relationship, but his position on this is untenable and bordering on the ludicrous.
Of course, the media doesn’t quite get it either. I heard an anchor this morning describe the emails as “subsequently classified” – obviously she has accepted Admiral Kirby’s fiction. It is ridiculous – the information was always classified; it was classified by the originator. What she should have said was that the emails contained classified information that had been improperly handled.
I think we can all stipulate certain facts, despite the State Department’s claims to the contrary or their attempts to claim that information was not classified but now is (a virtual impossibility): it has been shown that Mrs. Clinton’s emails or email server contained information deemed by the intelligence community – the agencies that originated the information – to be Top Secret/SCI. That information was classified when it was collected, analyzed, collated and disseminated – thus it was classified when it reached her private unsecured server.
Top Secret/SCI information is, and has been, restricted to either Defense Department, State Department or CIA communications channels authorized to handle such information. The firewalls between the intelligence community and unclassified networks are managed by NSA to guarantee that no classified information is introduced into unclassified and unsecured communications systems – Mrs. Clinton’s private email server is a perfect example of a unsecured communications system. Having done this for a living, I can attest that it is virtually impossible to electronically move classified information to an unclassified network or server.
Yet classified information, including Top Secret/SCI information, was found in over 100 emails on Mrs. Clinton’s private unclassified unsecured system. The question that immediately comes to mind is how is that possible? All classified information is prominently marked – on the document overall and on each paragraph separately. Although the exact paragraph markings differ by department/agency, each and every paragraph bears the classification of that specific portion of the information. It is the basic classification marking in all classified documents.
It fast becomes evident that the information resident on Mrs. Clinton’s server and in some of her emails was transferred illegally and improperly from classified government servers across a firewall to that server. These are the emails that Mrs. Clinton initially claimed were unclassified, but has now altered that description to “not marked as classified.” She is splitting hairs here.
Someone on the Secretary’s staff – most of us believe it may have been either Huma Abidin or Jake Sullivan – took highly classified US intelligence information and wittingly ignored the classification markings and retyped or “cut and pasted” the intelligence information for relay to Secretary Clinton via the unsecured “clintonemail.com” server.
Technically, Mrs. Clinton can claim – disingenuously – that she received no information marked classified. The information was of course highly classified but improperly stripped of its classification markings – a felony. Either Mrs. Clinton knew about it, condoned it or chose not to report it, or she did not realize that sensitive intelligence information from DIA, CIA and NSA was classified. If the former is the case, she might be complicit; if the latter is the case, she might be incompetent. I doubt that she is incompetent.
The bottom line is that classified information was found on her unsecured server. It was never unclassified and later classified – it doesn’t work that way, regardless of how Mrs. Clinton or the State Department spokespersons try to spin it. Someone deliberately put sensitive national security information at risk for the sake of convenience. Everyone involved needs to be held accountable – perhaps the FBI will do just that.
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February 8th, 2015
By Rick Francona.
By now, virtually everyone with even a passing interest in the Middle East has at least heard of the brutal immolation of Royal Jordanian Air Force (RJAF) pilot 1st Lieutenant Mu’az al-Kasasbah at the hands of the self-described Islamic State (more commonly called the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, or ISIS). Al-Kasasbah’s F-16 fighter jet crashed in Syria on December 24, 2014 – there are indications that he was murdered as early as January 3 of this year.
News commentators, political pundits and military analysts (including me) have offered our thoughts on the murder – why did they do it, what did it accomplish, was it a smart propaganda tool for ISIS, will it increase ISIS recruitment, did it violate the tenets of Islam, etc.
Here are a few initial thoughts and conclusions.
Let’s address the gruesome murder of Lt al-Kasasbah. I watched the video (I believe it is part of my professional obligation) and cannot remember feeling this much revulsion at the death of another human, a fellow airman and officer – and I survived an improvised explosive device (IED) attack which resulted in a scene of sickening carnage.
By way of disclosure, I served as an adviser to the Jordan Armed Forces – my colleagues included several RJAF officers – I feel a sense of kinship with my Jordanian brothers in arms. I make a living analyzing events and either writing about them or talking about them on the air, but it is hard to find the words to describe the feelings this video generated.
The video – obviously almost professionally produced – placed Lt al-Kasasbah in scenes designed to replicate areas subjected to coalition airstrikes. In fact, the man who lit the accelerant which ignited the fire that killed the pilot was identified in the Arabic caption of the video as the leader of a unit who had been bombed by coalition aircraft.
The fact that ISIS chose to make this point is telling. There are many analysts in the media, academia and what I will call “militaria” (we retired officers who analyze wars and combat operations) have been critical of the U.S.-led air operation against ISIS which began in August 2014. Granted, it is hard to accurately assess the effects of the air campaign against ISIS, but overall the evaluation has not been favorable.
Based on U.S. Air Force standards, the campaign is, to be kind, anemic – the sortie counts are mere fractions of the amount we analysts believe is required to deal a decisive blow to ISIS. Although in Iraq the airstrikes may have blunted ISIS’s momentum as it advanced down the Tigris River valley towards Baghdad and stopped the group’s moves towards the Kurdish area, the terrorist organization still manages to hold territory and launch new attacks – the oil-rich city of Kirkuk is now in their sights.
That said, American and allied fighter and bomber aircraft have dealt a blow to ISIS. I would be remiss if I did not distinguish between coalition air operations over Iraq and those over Syria. While there are many nations who have committed aircraft to military operations over Iraq, very few have agreed to allow their pilots to operate over Syria.
Only the United States and a handful of Arab countries – Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar – agreed to attack targets in Syria. This arrangement may stem from the Iraqi government’s unwillingness to have aircraft of countries who are supporting the removal of the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Asad, a government supported by the Shi’a-dominated government of Iraqi Prime Minister Haydar al-‘Abadi, operate in its skies. When it comes to the United States, the Iraqis have no choice – they need American airpower.
After the capture of Lt al-Kasasbah, the Arab countries suspended operations, leaving only the United States to conduct airstrikes in Syria, including a large number of sorties aimed at stopping ISIS from overrunning the Syrian-Kurdish town of Kobani on the Turkish border. At least that part of the operation has met with some success – ISIS has been forced to withdraw after suffering heavy losses to American airpower.
One of the objections voiced by the Arab members of the coalition, particularly the United Arab Emirates (UAE), was the long distance of combat search and rescue (CSAR) forces from the target areas. Some analysts believe that had there been CSAR assets staged closer to Syria, there may have been a chance to rescue Lt al-Kasasbah. In reaction to this criticism, the U.S. has moved its CSAR forces into northern Iraq. At the same time, the UAE has deployed an F-16 squadron to a Jordanian air base to cut the flight time to targets in Syria from hours to minutes.
When I think about the brutal method used to murder Lt al-Kasasbah, I believe that ISIS is being battered by the coalition air campaign and is frustrated because there is very little they can do about it. Although it is hard to gauge the effectiveness of the air campaign, it seems to be hurting them.
Another factor of frustration is ISIS’s realization too late – almost certainly after they killed the pilot in early January – that they missed an opportunity of having an extremely valuable hostage in their custody. They grossly underestimated the power and influence of the al-Kasasbah family and tribe in Jordan, and the lengths to which the Jordanian monarchy was prepared to go to secure his release.
While I do not think ISIS cared in the least about convicted suicide bomber Sijadah al-Rishawi or al-Qa’idah in Iraq member Ziyad Karbuli, it clearly missed an opportunity to extract concessions from the Jordanian government, publicly embarrass King ‘Abdullah and drive a wedge between those in Jordan who did not believe ISIS posed a threat to the kingdom and those who supported the king’s affiliation with the coalition.
ISIS miscalculated the regional and international response to the brutal murder of Lt Mu’az al-Kasasbah. It appears that all ISIS has done is galvanized the Jordanian people to support their king in his stepped up participation in airstrikes against ISIS in Syria and brought at least one of the other Arab allies, the UAE, back into the fray.
ISIS has responded by burning alive at least three Iraqis in the western Iraqi governorate of al-Anbar. I think they may have miscalculated again. People who were undecided on how to deal with these brutal psychopaths are beginning to realize that there is only one way to deal with them – hunt them down and kill them.
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