A series of arrests this year in India has highlighted how India has been unable to escape its overtures as Islamic State (IS) continues its attempts to expand its geographical and online reach beyond Iraq and Syria.
While IS propaganda has so far struck a chord with only a small number of India’s Muslims, reports have emerged that the group’s jihadist ideals spread via web forums and social media have inspired many individuals formerly affiliated with indigenous militant formations such as the Indian Mujahideen and the Student Islamic Movement of India.
Following sporadic incidents over the last couple of years—such as the appearance of IS graffiti and the group’s black flag in Kashmir and Tamil Nadu, and even reports of masked men dressed in fatigues bearing IS insignia—India seems to be waking up to the reality that IS has made both a real and virtual footprint in the country (Daily Excelsior, June 18, 2015; The Hindu, August 7, 2014).
Radicalization
The call of IS has not only resonated with South Asia’s myriad militant groups, but has also reached new individuals, galvanizing support and fomenting radicalization through effective use of social media such as Twitter and Facebook. The oft repeated exhortations of IS are based on the supposition that all “true Muslims” should be part of its brand of jihad and serve the Caliphate. This has resonated relatively well across South Asia, including India with its 170 million-strong Muslim population.
IS began its efforts to infiltrate India with the aim of acquiring resources and manpower. Several Muslim youths from India have reportedly traveled to fight under the IS banner in Iraq and Syria since June 2014. The official “guestimate” suggests that so far, over 25 young people of Indian origin have joined and fought alongside IS forces in Syria. Of those, seven fighters have been killed and a number of others have returned home and undergone rehabilitation (The Hindu, December 27, 2015). Overall, the statistics suggest a relatively poor performance by IS in India, but the interdiction of many young IS aspirants at the exit points of the country and the unearthing of the IS-inspired extremist network the Junud-ul-Khalifa-e-Hind (JKH, or Soldiers of the Caliph in India) in late January 2016 demand serious attention (DNA India, January 27).
India’s National Investigating Agency (NIA) and Maharashtra State police, along with other domestic intelligence agencies, made a total of 14 arrests of JKH members in the final week of January 2016 (Asian Age, January 24). Among those arrested were Muddabir Mushtaq Sheikh (alias Abu Musab), the apparent leader of IS in India. He was apprehended in Thane in Maharashtra, while four followers were apprehended from Uttar Pradesh’s Haridwar locality. The rest were apprehended from different parts of the country as a result of a nationwide search and sweep operation covering at least five states: Karnataka, Telangana, Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, and Uttar Pradesh. Muddabir’s arrest brought IS and its systematic online recruitment drive in India into the limelight. As a result, it emerged that JKH was planning to carry out terror strikes at installations in major cities across India as part of an IS network, although the alleged plot appears to have only been in its early stages.
Army of the Caliph
The remnants of the indigenous Indian Mujahideen, which is now in disarray, have developed linkages with the IS leadership in Syria and Iraq. This can be seen in the establishment of Ansar-ut Tawhid fi Bilad al-Hind (AuT), an India-centric militant group based on the Afghanistan and Pakistan borders. Shafi Armar, a former Indian Mujahideen militant and one of the founders of AuT, along with his elder brother, Sultan Armar, were the first to pledge support to IS. By joining with IS and pledging bayat to its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, they hoped to unite IM and sympathizers of the Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI). The Armar brothers fled to Pakistan to set up AuT in the wake of the countrywide crackdown on the IM network in 2008. Via its media arm called al-Isabah Media, AuT has focused on recruiting Indian-origin fugitives in Pakistan to participate in fighting in both Syria and Afghanistan.
Sultan Armar died in March 2015 on the Syrian battlefields fighting alongside IS forces Indian Express, March 20, 2015). When his elder brother was killed in Kobani, Syria, Shafi Armar took the reins of the AuT and al-Isabah Media, with the intention of expanding the group’s network inside India. He pumped money and online resources into recruiting operatives to form JKH, using internet chartrooms and messaging applications such as Trillian and Facebook to recruit mostly former IM cadres and members of SIMI. Before forming JKH, Safi Armar had attempted to raise another IS-linked unit. Known as the “Ratlam Module,” it was led by an individual named Imran Khan Muhammad Sharif and four others in Madhya Pradesh, but all of its members were arrested in April 2015 (The Pioneer, May 7, 2015).
Shafi Armar is believed to have died in a U.S.-led drone strike against IS forces in Syria in late April 2016 (The Hindu,April 25).
Use of Online Resources
JKH’s use of the internet was significant. Following the NIA-led raids in January, the intelligence agency confirmed that those arrested were connected online, and that their online involvement had led subsequently to physical meetings at different locations in Hyderabad, Bangalore, Tumkur, Saharanpur, Lucknow, and Pune. Nafees Khan of Hyderabad and Rizwan of Uttar Pradesh were recruited via Facebook and accessed bomb-making knowhow from publishing platforms like “justpaste.it” (The Quint, January 29). From the social media accounts of Obeidullah Khan of Hyderabad, investigating agencies found IS videos and images that were frequently shared by him with his followers. It is also clear the group’s members used the internet to connect with Shafi Armar who was based in Syria at the time.
The last secret meeting of JKH, according to the NIA investigation, was held sometime in the first week of January. The arrested men were instructed not only to plan terror attacks in India, but also to recruit and strengthen the group’s cadre base. Under the guidance of Shafi Armar in Syria and Mudabbir in India, JKH’s objectives were to carry out attacks with the intention of establishing the rule of sharia in India and encouraging submission to the Islamic Caliphate. In addition, JKH has been working to spread IS propaganda and recruit young Indians to travel to Iraq and Syria (Indian Express, February 8; Economic Times, February 9).
While Mudabbir served as the chief of the JKH in India, he identified Rizwan Ahmed Ali (Khalid) of Uttar Pradesh as the group’s deputy chief. Meanwhile, Najmal Huda, originally of Uttar Pradesh and later resettling in Karnataka (Mangalore), was identified as the military commander of the JKH. He acted as a recruiter for aspirant youths, communicating to them the activities and ideology of the IS. The Hyderabad-based Nafees Khan (also known as Abu Zarrar), originally from Mumbai, has been identified as JKH’s logistics and finance chief (Economic Times, February 10).
Mudabbir and his lieutenants had amassed nearly INR 10 lakhs (approximately $15,000) in different banks. He received nearly INR 6.50 lakh ($9,000) through the hawala informal banking channels from Shafi Armar or Yousuf Al Hindi. Substantial amounts of those sums were distributed among the members of the group for planning and logistics purposes (Economic Times, February 9). Another concerning development was that the JKH leadership was planning to set up a central media wing with subsidiary units in almost all of India’s major cities, including the capital of New Delhi and the financial capital of Mumbai.
JKH also made use of the teaching and sermons of senior Islamic scholars like Mufti Abdus Sami Qasmi, a resident of Delhi and an alumnus of the infamous Darul Uloom Deoband Islamic institution in Uattar Pradesh. As a preacher of the IS ideals, Qasmi often gave incendiary, anti-India sermons and lectures on Islamic affairs at madrasas across India (Indian Express, February 7). In addition, the group also engaged Mohammed Abdul Ahad (also known as Bada Ameer), a U.S.-educated computer professional who was deported from Turkey, along with his family; Turkish officials arrested them as they attempted to travel to Syria in January 2015. Ahad reportedly helped the group by sharing his knowledge of Syrian terrain and IS ideology (The Hindu, January 25).
The discovery of JKH and the arrests of its members in January have brought to light the threat of IS-inspired extremism in India. While the bulk of the Indian Muslim population has rejected the group’s ideals, a small number of extremists were able to organize themselves to a worrying degree simply by using the internet and social media to tap into existing indigenous militant networks. Despite cracking down successfully on the Indian Mujahideen in 2008, the Indian authorities cannot afford to be complacent.
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The Maldives, the Muslim-majority archipelago country in the Indian Ocean, is going through a tumultuous time, facing increasing Islamist activities at home, an exodus of radicalized youth to join the jihad in Syria and a growing domestic clamor for the implementation of Shari’a law. This has been accompanied by the targeted abduction and intimidation of local Maldivians who hold progressive ideals and secular values. Although the country is better known as a romantic honeymoon destination, these developments – which include the establishment of the “Islamic State of the Maldives” (ISM) group – have exposed the deep extremist undercurrents in Maldivian society and are increasingly drawing the attention of local and international security forces.
Syrian Connections
In October 2013, some of the first cases of radicalized Maldivian youths attempting to travel to Syria were reported when two youths were detained at the Ibrahim Nasir International Airport (INIA) in the capital Malé (Haveeru Online, June 1). Since then, about 100 Maldivians are believed to have joined the Syrian conflict and most of these are said to have joined up with al-Qaeda’s official affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra (or al-Nusra Front/the Support Front). Several recent incidents shed further light on the ongoing jihadist exodus. In October, Sri Lankan security officials detained three Maldivians, including an 18-year-old woman, who were suspected of planning to travel to Syria through Turkey. Separately, another Maldivian family – comprising a 23-year-old radicalized man, his mother and his 10-year-old sister – was reported to have travelled to Islamic State-held territory in Syria or Iraq, from where they sent a message home stating that the Maldives is a “land of sin” and an “apostate nation.” These statements were perhaps an early indication that jihadists might someday regard the Maldives itself as a legitimate target (Minivan News, October 30). Meanwhile in November, it was reported that at least six more people from the Fuvahmulah and Meedhoo areas of the Maldives had travelled to Syria to join the Islamic State organization, illustrating that the flow of jihadist recruits to the Middle East continues (Minivan News, October 30; November 6).
As of November 8, at least five Maldivians have reportedly died in Iraq and Syria fighting alongside Jabhat al-Nusra. The dead have been identified, under their assumed jihadist aliases, as Abu Turab, Abu Nuh, Abu Dujanah, Abu Ibrahim and Abu Fulan. Of these, Abu Turab and Abu Nuh were reportedly killed in late May; both died in Syria fighting alongside Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic Front’s (IF) Suqur al-Sham brigade (Minivan News, May 27). Prior to his death, Abu Turab sent a message via YouTube that he was joining the jihad to establish an Islamic State and to implement “Allah’s Shari’a.” Urging all Muslims to join the struggle, he said, in his native Divehi language, that “Enemies of Allah are spreading democracy all over the world, as fast as they can. So in return for every person they lead astray, I want to – even if by myself – kill as many enemies of Allah as I can.” [1] Some of these militants appear to have also made an impression on other foreign fighters; an Australian jihadist with Jabhat al-Nusra has feted Maldivian fighters as “courageous and well-mannered mujahideen.” [2]
As with other foreign jihadists in Syria, social media is vital for relaying their message to audiences back home. A key social media tool used by Maldivian jihadists is their online media forum, Bilad al-Sham Media (BASM), is run by a group of Maldivians in Syria to publicize the activities of Maldivian jihadists and their perceived heroics on the battlefield. According to information circulated in the BASM-run blog, the group currently fighting in Syria are mostly young university students of Maldivian origin who have travelled to Syria through a third country with the aim of “liberating” the Islamic world and establishing the global Islamic caliphate. The managers of BASM appear to be closely involved in fighting units; the latest slain Maldivian fighter killed in early November was Abu Fulan, who was a disciple of another slain Maldivian identified as Abu Dujanah. Dujanah was BASM’s founding editor. According to reports, Abu Dujanah was killed in September this year and since then BASM has been run by another group of Maldivian mujahideen. [3] Abu Dujanah was later identified as Yameen Naeem, from the Maafannu area in Malé; he had decided to travel to Syria while studying in Egypt (Haveeru Online, November 8; Minivan News, September 2).
Amid these fast unfolding developments, the establishment of the so-called “Islamic State of Maldives” (ISM) group, which claims to be a local organization affiliated with the Islamic State organization, emerged in the last week of July. This coincided with the Maldives’ Independence Day celebrations and an Islamic State flag was hoisted for the first time in Malé’s Raalhugandu area in the same month. Islamic State flags were also seen during an early August protest march against the Israeli attacks on Gaza City. On September 5, hundreds of pro-Islamist protesters, including veiled women and children, marched in the streets of Malé holding Islamic State flags and banners, calling for the implementation of Shari’a law in the country. Some of the banners read: “We want the laws of the Quran,” “Islam will eradicate secularism” and “Shari’a will dominate the world” (Minivan News, September 6).
Domestic Radicalism
The flow of recruits to Syria has been accompanied by radical elements in the Maldives becoming more assertive and violent. Most notably, this has involved taking liberal and progressive individuals hostage or threatening them with serious consequences if they speak out against radical Islamism. The latest victims of such Islamist vigilantes are the journalist Ahmed Rilwan, who has been missing since early August, and a web administrator of the Ranreendhoo Maldives pro-opposition Facebook page (Minivan News, November 13). In addition, Islamist-linked criminal gang members (e.g. from the Bosnia, Kuda Henveiru, Dot and Buru gangs) have participated in attacks on scholars, journalists and free speech activists for their allegedly “anti-Islamic” activities (Minivan News, September 22). The gangs have also issued threats through text messages on mobile phones, threatening to violently attack anyone they regard as “laa dheenee” (non-religious) (International Federation of Journalists, August 8). Physical attacks on such dissenters are also common, and there are also reports of Islamist vigilantes abducting and interrogating young men in order to force them to identify online activists advocating secularism or professing atheism through social media sites (Minivan News, June 9).
Although politicians in the Maldives have engaged in a public blame game over the visibly deteriorating situation, there is little doubt that the root cause of the rise in visible Islamist radicalism is the growing popularity of Salafist ideologies among some sections of the population, notably the younger generation. In particular, years of grooming by visiting clerics and radical preachers have played a key role in fermenting radicalism and anti-Western sentiment in the archipelago. Known radical English-language preachers with substantial online presences such as Bilal Phillips, Zakir Naik and Anjem Choudary have also notably played a key role in popularizing radical Islam in Maldives, a trend which is now merging into rising support for transnational jihadism. [4] At present, however, the government seems oblivious to the serious long term implications of this grassroots Islamist surge and it is likely to continue to attempt to sweep such issues under the carpet, even as evidence grows that the Islamic State organization’s brand of Islam has now reached its shores.
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A seemingly organized sectarian violence against Pakistan’s beleaguered minority Shi’a community has plumbed new depths in recent months with a series of bombings of Shi’a worshipping places and targeted killings that have left over 170 people dead so far in 2015. Previously the anti-Shi’a armed campaign was spearheaded by banned Sunni militant groups like Sipah-e-Sahaba, Lashkar-e Jhangvi (LeJ) and Jundallah, which all are closely affiliated with Taliban conglomerate the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP–the Pakistani Taliban). However, with the arrival of Islamic State in Pakistan’s jihadist landscape, there has been a spike in the volume of anti-Shi’a violence, partly as a result of tafkiri jihadi groups like LeJ or Jundallah entering into alliance with the strongly anti-Shi’a Islamic State.
The scale of anti-Shi’a attacks in recent years can be judged from a study by the Islamabad-based Jinnah Institute, which found that a total of 1,905 people from the country’s Shi’a community, including from the Hazara and Ismaili subsects, died either in bomb blasts or targeted gun attacks from 2012 up until May 2015 (Press TV, June 6). [1] At least three incidents of 2015 prove this disturbing trend. On January 30, a suicide bombing struck the Shi’a Karbala-e-Maula mosque (a.k.a. Karbala Imambargah—a Shi’a prayer hall) situated in the Shikarpur district of Sindh, killing more than 60 people (Express Tribune, January 30). Two weeks later, on February 13, another anti-Shi’a attack involving gunmen and suicide bombers took place in Hayatabad in Peshawar, killing 21 Shi’a while they were offering Friday prayers (Dawn [Karachi], February 14). Exactly three months later, over 40 Ismaili Shi’as were killed when armed militants opened fire on a bus on May 13 in Gulshan-e-Iqbal in Karachi (Dawn [Karachi], May 14).
Most of these anti-Shi’a attacks were claimed by Jundallah, a splinter group of TTP thatis now aligned with Islamic State. After the Sindh attack, its spokesperson Ahmed (Fahad) Marwat said: “Our target was the Shi’a community mosque… they are our enemies” (Reuters, January 30). The group also claimed responsibilities for the May 13 bus attacks, although an English pamphlet was found at the crime scene; it was titled “Advent of the Islamic State,” and contained messages such as “O soldier of rawafidh [rejectionist, meaning Shi’a] and taaghut [oppressors]! We swear that we will continue to make you and your family shed tears of blood and will not rest until we rid this land of your filthy existence and implement the Shari’a on it” (The Nation, May 14). A statement purportedly by the Islamic State’s Pakistan chapter (Wilayat Khurasan) was also published on Twitter, claiming responsibility for the Safora Bus attack, stating: “Thanks to God, 43 apostates were killed, and close to 30 others were wounded in an attack by the soldiers of Islamic State on a bus carrying people of the Shi’a Ismaili sect in Karachi” (Reuters, May 13). In addition, Jundallah spokesperson Marwat said in a media statement that “these people were Ismaili, and we consider them kafir [infidels]. We had four attackers. In the coming days, we will attack Ismailis, Shi’ites and Christians.” Marwat had previously said that the Islamic State is like a brother to Jundallah and that “whatever plan they [the Islamic State] have, we will support them” (Express Tribune, November 18, 2014).
Jundallah’s support for the Islamic State, and particularly for its anti-Shi’a ideals, underline that Pakistan is a conducive environment for such ideologies, given decades of sectarian tensions in the country and the fact that anti-Shi’a invectives enjoy substantial patronage from mainstream religious organizations and political parties, even though Shi’as remain influential in many areas of Pakistani politics and society. Indeed, it is largely due to this sectarian environment that the Islamic State’s ideals, and especially their contention that Shi’as are not Muslims, has found more traction in Pakistan than anywhere in the Indian subcontinent.
The attacks also underline the growing influence of the Islamic State on Jundallah, which pledged support to the Islamic State in November 2014 following a reported meeting in Saudi Arabia with an Islamic State delegation led by Zubair al-Kuwaiti (Express Tribune, November 18, 2014). This high profile delegation also included Islamic State members Fahim Ansari and Shaykh Yusuf, from Uzbekistan and Saudi Arabia respectively. Jundallah is likely to be partly comprised of cadres from banned sectarian Deobandi tafkiri groups like LeJ or Ahle-Sunnat-Wal-Jamat (ASWJ), which consider Shi’a Muslims to be kafirs, underlining that the group already had strong sectarian leanings even before the advent of the Islamic State. Indeed, in the past, ASWJ, which is a front group of the banned Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), openly declared war against Shi’as and Sunni Barelvis (Sufis), both of whom it has regularly described as being non-Muslim, as well as also targeting other “non-Islamic” entities such as the Pakistani Army, media outlets and the country’s Christian community. [2] Like ASWJ, the TTP has also previously declared war against Shi’as. As a result of these factors, it was natural that the Islamic State’s campaign against Shi’as would easily find sympathizers or supporters among groups such as Jundallah and the TPP.
One striking aspect of these group’s targeting of Pakistani Shi’as is that militants often target Shi’a worshipping places (Imambargah) during prayers in order to maximize fatalities and to emphasize the religious dimensions of their attack. For instance, so far this year, at least five Imambargahs have been targeted, including Aun o Muhammad Rizvi in Rawalpindi on January 9, Karbala-e-Maula Imambargah in Shikarpur on January 30, Imamia Masjid in Peshawar on February 13 and the Qasr-e-Sakina Imambargah in Rawalpindi on February 18. The geographic location of these attacks is also significant, showing that anti-Shi’a attacks in Pakistan have spread in recent months beyond traditional sectarian flashpoint locations in Karachi (Sindh) and Quetta (Balochistan) to a range of areas such as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (e.g., Peshawar, Hangu), Punjab (e.g., Islamabad and Rawalpindi) and FATA (e.g., Kurram Agency) where sectarian violence was previously less common.
The increase in anti-Shi’a violence in Pakistan also has broader security implications as it signals the Islamic State’s growing influence over like-minded militant groups, even as the Pakistani government has continued to deny the presence of the Islamic State in the country. Moreover, even though LeJ or Jundallah militants are carrying out attacks for the Islamic State as local collaborators, both for domestic clout and to remain relevant in the fast-changing global jihadist landscape, rather than as official subsidiaries of the group, these developments nonetheless show that the Islamic State brand has arrived in Pakistan, reinvigorating jihadist groups and stoking increased sectarian violence.
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Mohamed Muhsin Sharfaz Nilam was the first known Sri Lankan member of the Islamic State to be killed in Syria (Source: Dabiq).
In recent months, there has been growing evidence of actual and attempted outreach by the Islamic State into Sri Lanka, presently struggling to recover from a three-decade long conflict between its Sinhalese and Tamil ethnic groups. One of the most significant developments was the news of two Sri Lankan nationals fighting with the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq. One such report, in July 2015, indicated that a Sri Lankan national in his mid-30s, identified as Mohamed Muhsin Sharfaz Nilam (a.k.a. “Abu Shurayh al-Silani”), was killed while fighting in Raqqa, Syria, during a U.S.-led coalition airstrike. Sri Lanka’s prime minister subsequently ordered investigations into possible Islamic State influence in the country to fathom the levels of radicalization among its minority Muslim populace.
The news of Nilam’s death was released by another Sri Lankan, Thauqeer Ahmed Thajudeen (a.k.a. “Abu Dhujaana Silani”), who is believed to be still fighting with the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (LankaNewsPaper.com, July 26). Six months after Nilam’s death, the November 2015 issue of the Islamic State’s online magazine Dabiq paid tribute to its slain Sri Lankan fighter:
May Allah accept Abu Shurayh and have mercy on him and all those who gave their life, wealth and time for the cause of Allah… whose actions continue to inspire and awaken this Ummah. [1]
A cursory look at Nilam’s life gives us some clues on his Islamic education background and possible radical orientations. A resident of Warallagama of Kandy district, Mohamed Muhsin Nilam received an education in Shari’a law at Pakistan’s International Islamic University before returning to Sri Lanka. He afterwards became a visiting Urdu teacher in the capital’s Colombo University before 2012, and later became principal of a school in Galewala, Kandy (Sunday Times [Colombo], July 26).
Besides Urdu and Islamic law, Nilam was known locally as a martial arts trainer as he gave karate lessons at various schools as an instructor in Maharagama, Kotahena and Kandy. However, he left the Galewala school in 2014, reportedly informing the school administration that he would travel to Mecca with his family for pilgrimage in January 2015 (Sunday Times [Colombo], July 26). Per available reports, Nilam and his entire family of six children, then pregnant wife and his parents obtained tourist visas in December 2014 to visit Turkey. Information given in Dabiq about Nilam claimed that he was in fact leading a party of 16 Sri Lankan nationals, including his family members, to perform hijrah (migration) not to Mecca but to the Islamic State’s so-called caliphate in Iraq and Syria. [2]
Insights into some of Nilam’s motivations are given by his posts on Facebook. For instance, in one post, dated July 3, 2015, he wrote: “America, Iran, Bashar [al-Assad, president of Syria], Arab Countries, 70 other countries are fighting [the Islamic State]. The only country who doesn’t fight is Sri Lanka. So logically [the Islamic State] is a product of Sri Lanka” (Facebook, July 3). On the same day he posted an image of the Islamic State’s leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, with text that said “We will kill every man, woman, child, Shi’a, Sunni, Zoroastrians, Kurds, Christians” (Facebook, July 3).
In another of his many Facebook postings, Nilam went on to justify al-Baghdadi’s position as the caliph and attempted to validate the legitimacy of the Islamic State’s caliphate. He seemed to be prepared for any eventuality in his life with the jihadist organization. For instance, he wrote a prayer that: “May Allah guide us all, make us steadfast in the truth until death, make our life and death pleased to Him, and grant us death of a Shahid [martyr]” (Facebook, June 28). His more recent Facebook posts prior to his death dealt with discussions of the caliphate, Shari’a and eulogizing the Islamic State’s martyrs. According to Dabiq, Nilam was engaged in “dawah” (recruitment) activities, as well as taking part in battles for the T3 gas fields and Jazal, located in “Wilayat Homs” in Syria. [3]
Nilam and Thajudeen’s cases have spurred debate in Sri Lanka about the possible inroads of the Islamic State into the country and whether its local supporters are now actively scouting potential foot soldiers. The security establishment is at present apprehensive about two things: the existence of Islamic State-linked jihadist networks in the country and that several other Sri Lankan nationals may also be fighting for the jihadist group in Iraq and Syria. For instance, like Nilam and Thajudeen, another Lankan national from Colombo who has pledged allegiance to the Islamic State and is very active on Facebook is Abu Abdulla Silani, who has mentioned in his online profile that he, too, is a solider of the Islamic State and lives in the group’s self-declared capital, Raqqa, in Syria, according to his now-deleted Facebook page.
Moreover social networking sites have many Sri Lankan nationals and groups who claim to be affiliated with jihadist groups in Syria and Iraq, and are mostly linked with the Islamic State. For instance, a Facebook group named “Seylan Muslims in Shaam” (Sri Lankan Muslims in the Levant) urged Sri Lankan people, irrespective of Tamils or native Singhalese, to join the Jihad bandwagon. For instance, in a message posted on August 16, the group said:
O people of Sri Lanka, we the Muslims of Shaam with origins from Sailaan (Sri Lanka) send you this message as a wakeup call with sincere intentions, keeping Allah (SWT) as our witness. We invite you to leave all corrupt systems, which subjugate mankind to seek the freedom and justice of Islam. So that you will be successful in this world and hereafter. Remember that we will reach you even if it takes another generation and we will fight the corrupt leadership that prevents you from seeking the truth and establish Islam in Sailaan. [4]
The message even urged the Muslims of Sri Lanka:
[W]ake up from your slumber and see how humiliated you have become, not a single leader to lift a finger, when your mosques are destroyed or being bullied by extremists. You are being fooled by sellouts of our community, who work for American, Israeli, Iranian and Indian intelligence, who only care about themselves and their families. Soon you will see their real faces by the will of Allah. [5]
It exhorted further: “O Muslims of Sailaan, after 90 years your Khilafah (caliphate) is back, and despite 70 nations pouncing on it, the Khilafah is remaining and expanding.” [6]
While the government of Sri Lanka investigates the growing stature of the Islamic State, several Muslim clerics’ organizations, like All Ceylon Jamiyyathul Ulama (ACJU), have issued a joint statement denouncing the jihadists’ violent agenda and naming it as a deviant organization. The statement also condemned all or any Lankan individuals associated with the the Islamic State. The ACJU also urged the Colombo administration to take action against any individual involved in any form of extremism (Colombo Telegraph, July 25).
The government’s and ACJU’s stands against the Islamic State’s outreach activities notwithstanding, grassroots radicalization of some Muslim youths in Sri Lanka is potentially directly connected with many violent skirmishes between Sri Lankan Muslims and vigilante groups associated with the majority Buddhist population in recent years.
Not only are anti-Buddhist sentiments high among a section of Muslim populations in Sri Lanka, but alarmingly, the minority population is more vulnerable to increasing attempts by Salafist sectarian groups, such as Sri Lanka Thawheed Jamaat (SLTJ), which not only promotes sectarian discord within Islam, but also attempts to preach a rabid strain of Islam that largely despises the practices and existence of other Islamic sects like Shi’as and Ahmadiyas (New Indian Express, November 8). [7]
These many fast shifting situations in Sri Lanka would possibly provide an opportunity for transnational jihadist groups like the Islamic State, which has been attempting to spread its influence beyond its base in Iraq and Syria. And most certainly, the group’s propaganda machinery would attempt now to portray native fighters like Nilam in an Islamic and heroic light to create an atmosphere of sympathy and support for the caliphate within the Sri Lanka’s Muslim minority population.
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It is increasingly evident that each time the relations between India and Pakistan improve, India-focused jihadist groups from across the Pakistani border attempt to disrupt it with attacks in the Indian states of Kashmir, Punjab, and elsewhere. The inevitable aim of these is to upset the possibility of amicable dialogue between these two populous and nuclear-armed nations.
The latest example of this occurred in January when the high-profile Pathankot Air base in the Indian state of Punjab was attacked by militants. The United Jihad council (UJC, also known as Muttahida Jihad Council), based in Muzaffarabad in Pakistan-administered Kashmir (PAK), claimed responsibility for the incident. The attacks and ensuing gun battle at the strategically crucial Indian airbase went on for three days and killed 13 people, including seven Indian security personnel and six militants. UJC Spokesperson Syed Sadaqat Hussain has since threatened similar attacks elsewhere in the country while chiding the Indian establishment for its alleged Pakistan-phobia (Dawn [Karachi], January 4). Days later, the chief of UJC, Syed Salahuddin, also supreme leader of Hizbul Mujahideen, criticized the Pakistani government in a similar vein for its alleged stand in support of India, saying that “Pakistan is not just an advocate, but also a party to the longstanding Kashmir conflict” and that it “should play the role of a patron [to groups like UJC] rather than of an adversary” (Express Tribune, January 20). Salahudin’s comments were issued alongside the Pakistani government’s crackdown on the leaders and infrastructures of another constituent of UJC, Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM), as the group’s militants were suspected of being involved in the Pathankot attack.
Rejecting the claim by the UJC as a ploy to divert attention and to confuse their investigation, Indian security agencies investigating the attack have tracked at least four Pakistan-based militant operatives as the prime architects of January’s Patahnkot attack. All are affiliated with Pakistan-based Jaish-e Muhammed, including its chief, Maulana Masood Azhar, his brother Abdul Rauf Asghar, as well as Ashfaq Ahmed, Haji Abdul Shaqur, and Kashim Jaan. While Azhar allegedly oversaw the operations, his brother Asghar and two others were in touch with the militants once they made their way inside the airbase. India shared with Pakistan, the telephone numbers and the identity of the suspected Jaish handlers, among other evidence. Initially, the Pakistani government was said to have acted on information provided by Indian agencies by detaining at least 12 JeM operatives for their alleged involvement in the Pathankot terror attack and sealing branch offices of the JeM located in Bahwalnagar, Bahawalpur, Multan, and Muzafargarh (Daily Pakistan, January 13). It also claimed to have taken Masood Azhar into protective custody (Dawn, January 15). On the ground, however, JeM leadership denied any such detentions or arrests. Moreover, over a month after the incident, Pakistan’s Special Investigation Team (SIT) concluded that there was no substantive evidence to suggest that Masood Azhar or JeM were responsible for the deadly assault (Express Tribune, February 8). In order to secure the safe release of JeM’s supreme leader Masood Azhar from an Indian prison, his fellow militants had previously orchestrated the hijacking of Indian Airlines flight IC 814 in late December 1999, the December 2001 Indian parliament attacks, and a number of coordinated attacks in Jammu, Kashmir, and elsewhere in India.
Most UJC militants, who are either camouflaged under new group names or operating under newly-floated hybrid strike units (e.g. as Al-Shuhada Brigade, Shaheed Afzal Guru Squad and Highway Squad), are largely part of the exiting jihadist groups such as Hizbul Mujahideen (HM), Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM). These groups often operate collectively. This tactics help anti-India agencies in Pakistan to keep the vexed Kashmir conflict live and relevant, drawing international attention to the contested nature of the territory, and towards the so-called popular insurgency, while also maintaining a level of deniability.
The Pathankot events were not isolated developments as far as Pakistan-based militants are concerned, but were rather a part of a well-orchestrated militant surge. For instance, one report by the Indian Intelligence Bureau (IB) in April of 2015 warned that six Pakistan based militant groups, including HM, LeT, and JeM, were preparing to launch attacks on security installations in India (India Today, April 1, 2015).
These militant groups have both collectively and independently been attempting to reinvigorate terror infrastructures in Kashmir and beyond, apparently with the patronage of Pakistan’s political, military, and intelligence agencies. There have been many instances of similar violent and well-coordinated strikes in Kashmir and Punjab in the last few years, all emanating from Pakistani soil. Almost after a decade of relative calm in the region, the December 5, 2014 serial attacks in Kashmir and Srinagar killed 21 people, including 11 security personnel and two civilians, in three separate incidents. The fatalities also included eight Pakistani militants who carried out multiple strikes, including an attack at the Indian Army’s 31 Field Regiment Ordinance Camp at Mohra, Baramulla district (Reuters, December 2014).
The latest Pathankot events are reminiscent of July 2015’s Dinanagar (Punjab) attacks where Pakistani militants launched multiple assaults, including an attack on a police station that killed at least seven, including a senior police official. The militants were equipped with sophisticated arms and ammunitions, including a U.S. Night Vision Device (NVD) and Global Positioning Systems (GPS). The U.S. has confirmed that the NVD used in the attack was in use in Afghanistan in 2010 and was lost during battle (IBN Live, September 16, 2015). Exactly how it reached the militants who were slain in Gurudaspur remains a mystery.
The involvement of Pakistan Army’s Border Action Team (BAT) and heavily armed militants in attacks in India has been confirmed on many occasions in the past as a part of a persistent and deliberate attempt by sections of Pakistan’s army, intelligence agencies, and alleged non-state actors sponsored by the state to underline the peaceful atmosphere in neighboring Indian states (The Economic Times, January 20, 2015; First Post, August 18, 2013; DNA India, May 19, 2014). Context for the latest increase in attacks is these groups’ desire to revive anti-India militancy in the India’s Kashmir region, which has seen a decline in pro-separate militancy in the past few years.
The Pathankot attacks and the resulting clamor in India for immediate action against the perpetrators has brought about a significant development. In Pakistan, for the first time, the National Assembly Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs issued a four-page policy paper on Kashmir, suggesting that “Pakistan should not encourage calls for active support to armed, banned, militant groups in Kashmir” (The Express Tribune, February 1). At the same time, however, it should be noted that in recent decades, Pakistan’s Kashmir policy has consistently adhered to few time-tested methods, such as pressing for diplomatic dialogue with India while consistently backing India-focused jihadists in the aim of creating the impression of a broad-based and popular insurgency in Kashmir.
The Pathankot attacks occurred just one week after the December 25, 2015 surprise meeting between Indian and Pakistani prime ministers in Lahore. The attacks led to the cancellation of scheduled follow-up talks between respective foreign secretaries and cooled the warming diplomatic relations between the two countries (The Hindu, January 15). The events therefore illustrate both patronage of militant groups by elements of the Pakistani security establishment opposed to improved relations with India, and also underline the resulting resilience of Pakistan’s Kashmir-centric jihadi infrastructure, which continues to pose a threat to Indian national security.
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Islamic State has found some success in recruiting youths from India (source: Indian Express)
A series of arrests this year in India has highlighted how India has been unable to escape its overtures as Islamic State (IS) continues its attempts to expand its geographical and online reach beyond Iraq and Syria.
While IS propaganda has so far struck a chord with only a small number of India’s Muslims, reports have emerged that the group’s jihadist ideals spread via web forums and social media have inspired many individuals formerly affiliated with indigenous militant formations such as the Indian Mujahideen and the Student Islamic Movement of India.
Following sporadic incidents over the last couple of years—such as the appearance of IS graffiti and the group’s black flag in Kashmir and Tamil Nadu, and even reports of masked men dressed in fatigues bearing IS insignia—India seems to be waking up to the reality that IS has made both a real and virtual footprint in the country (Daily Excelsior, June 18, 2015; The Hindu, August 7, 2014).
Radicalization
The call of IS has not only resonated with South Asia’s myriad militant groups, but has also reached new individuals, galvanizing support and fomenting radicalization through effective use of social media such as Twitter and Facebook. The oft repeated exhortations of IS are based on the supposition that all “true Muslims” should be part of its brand of jihad and serve the Caliphate. This has resonated relatively well across South Asia, including India with its 170 million-strong Muslim population.
IS began its efforts to infiltrate India with the aim of acquiring resources and manpower. Several Muslim youths from India have reportedly traveled to fight under the IS banner in Iraq and Syria since June 2014. The official “guestimate” suggests that so far, over 25 young people of Indian origin have joined and fought alongside IS forces in Syria. Of those, seven fighters have been killed and a number of others have returned home and undergone rehabilitation (The Hindu, December 27, 2015). Overall, the statistics suggest a relatively poor performance by IS in India, but the interdiction of many young IS aspirants at the exit points of the country and the unearthing of the IS-inspired extremist network the Junud-ul-Khalifa-e-Hind (JKH, or Soldiers of the Caliph in India) in late January 2016 demand serious attention (DNA India, January 27).
India’s National Investigating Agency (NIA) and Maharashtra State police, along with other domestic intelligence agencies, made a total of 14 arrests of JKH members in the final week of January 2016 (Asian Age, January 24). Among those arrested were Muddabir Mushtaq Sheikh (alias Abu Musab), the apparent leader of IS in India. He was apprehended in Thane in Maharashtra, while four followers were apprehended from Uttar Pradesh’s Haridwar locality. The rest were apprehended from different parts of the country as a result of a nationwide search and sweep operation covering at least five states: Karnataka, Telangana, Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, and Uttar Pradesh. Muddabir’s arrest brought IS and its systematic online recruitment drive in India into the limelight. As a result, it emerged that JKH was planning to carry out terror strikes at installations in major cities across India as part of an IS network, although the alleged plot appears to have only been in its early stages.
Army of the Caliph
The remnants of the indigenous Indian Mujahideen, which is now in disarray, have developed linkages with the IS leadership in Syria and Iraq. This can be seen in the establishment of Ansar-ut Tawhid fi Bilad al-Hind (AuT), an India-centric militant group based on the Afghanistan and Pakistan borders. Shafi Armar, a former Indian Mujahideen militant and one of the founders of AuT, along with his elder brother, Sultan Armar, were the first to pledge support to IS. By joining with IS and pledging bayat to its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, they hoped to unite IM and sympathizers of the Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI). The Armar brothers fled to Pakistan to set up AuT in the wake of the countrywide crackdown on the IM network in 2008. Via its media arm called al-Isabah Media, AuT has focused on recruiting Indian-origin fugitives in Pakistan to participate in fighting in both Syria and Afghanistan.
Sultan Armar died in March 2015 on the Syrian battlefields fighting alongside IS forces Indian Express, March 20, 2015). When his elder brother was killed in Kobani, Syria, Shafi Armar took the reins of the AuT and al-Isabah Media, with the intention of expanding the group’s network inside India. He pumped money and online resources into recruiting operatives to form JKH, using internet chartrooms and messaging applications such as Trillian and Facebook to recruit mostly former IM cadres and members of SIMI. Before forming JKH, Safi Armar had attempted to raise another IS-linked unit. Known as the “Ratlam Module,” it was led by an individual named Imran Khan Muhammad Sharif and four others in Madhya Pradesh, but all of its members were arrested in April 2015 (The Pioneer, May 7, 2015).
Shafi Armar is believed to have died in a U.S.-led drone strike against IS forces in Syria in late April 2016 (The Hindu, April 25).
Use of Online Resources
JKH’s use of the internet was significant. Following the NIA-led raids in January, the intelligence agency confirmed that those arrested were connected online, and that their online involvement had led subsequently to physical meetings at different locations in Hyderabad, Bangalore, Tumkur, Saharanpur, Lucknow, and Pune. Nafees Khan of Hyderabad and Rizwan of Uttar Pradesh were recruited via Facebook and accessed bomb-making knowhow from publishing platforms like “justpaste.it” (The Quint, January 29). From the social media accounts of Obeidullah Khan of Hyderabad, investigating agencies found IS videos and images that were frequently shared by him with his followers. It is also clear the group’s members used the internet to connect with Shafi Armar who was based in Syria at the time.
The last secret meeting of JKH, according to the NIA investigation, was held sometime in the first week of January. The arrested men were instructed not only to plan terror attacks in India, but also to recruit and strengthen the group’s cadre base. Under the guidance of Shafi Armar in Syria and Mudabbir in India, JKH’s objectives were to carry out attacks with the intention of establishing the rule of sharia in India and encouraging submission to the Islamic Caliphate. In addition, JKH has been working to spread IS propaganda and recruit young Indians to travel to Iraq and Syria (Indian Express, February 8; Economic Times, February 9).
While Mudabbir served as the chief of the JKH in India, he identified Rizwan Ahmed Ali (Khalid) of Uttar Pradesh as the group’s deputy chief. Meanwhile, Najmal Huda, originally of Uttar Pradesh and later resettling in Karnataka (Mangalore), was identified as the military commander of the JKH. He acted as a recruiter for aspirant youths, communicating to them the activities and ideology of the IS. The Hyderabad-based Nafees Khan (also known as Abu Zarrar), originally from Mumbai, has been identified as JKH’s logistics and finance chief (Economic Times, February 10).
Mudabbir and his lieutenants had amassed nearly INR 10 lakhs (approximately $15,000) in different banks. He received nearly INR 6.50 lakh ($9,000) through the hawala informal banking channels from Shafi Armar or Yousuf Al Hindi. Substantial amounts of those sums were distributed among the members of the group for planning and logistics purposes (Economic Times, February 9). Another concerning development was that the JKH leadership was planning to set up a central media wing with subsidiary units in almost all of India’s major cities, including the capital of New Delhi and the financial capital of Mumbai.
JKH also made use of the teaching and sermons of senior Islamic scholars like Mufti Abdus Sami Qasmi, a resident of Delhi and an alumnus of the infamous Darul Uloom Deoband Islamic institution in Uattar Pradesh. As a preacher of the IS ideals, Qasmi often gave incendiary, anti-India sermons and lectures on Islamic affairs at madrasas across India (Indian Express, February 7). In addition, the group also engaged Mohammed Abdul Ahad (also known as Bada Ameer), a U.S.-educated computer professional who was deported from Turkey, along with his family; Turkish officials arrested them as they attempted to travel to Syria in January 2015. Ahad reportedly helped the group by sharing his knowledge of Syrian terrain and IS ideology (The Hindu, January 25).
The discovery of JKH and the arrests of its members in January have brought to light the threat of IS-inspired extremism in India. While the bulk of the Indian Muslim population has rejected the group’s ideals, a small number of extremists were able to organize themselves to a worrying degree simply by using the internet and social media to tap into existing indigenous militant networks. Despite cracking down successfully on the Indian Mujahideen in 2008, the Indian authorities cannot afford to be complacent.
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After months denying the existence of transnational jihadist groups on its soil in the face of a violent campaign against secular and progressive forces, Bangladeshi authorities appear to have woken up to the reality of extremist militancy.
Following a series of knife and machete attacks, shootouts, and sectarian assaults usually directed against those criticizing Islamists prejudices and religious fanaticism, the Bangladeshi government initiated a countrywide crackdown on Islamist extremists on June 10. The search and sweep operations covered most of the hotspots of Islamic militancy, including the capital Dhaka, Chittagong, Bogra, Khulna, Dinajpur, Rangpur, Kushtia, Gaibandha, and Rajshahi. An unprecedented number of suspects engaged in criminal activities in the country were apprehended during the weeklong operation.
Among those arrested were at least 194 militants linked to outlawed local Islamist networks such as Harkat-ul-Jihad-al Islami Bangladesh (HuJI-B), Jamaatul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), Hizb ut-Tahrir, and Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT). The police also seized large amounts of firearms, explosives, machetes, motorbikes, and jihadi literature during the raids (BD News24.com, June 19).
Bangladesh’s Internal Affairs Minister Asaduzzaman Khan Kamal underscored that to contain the violent attacks on secular individuals, free thinkers, and the country’s minorities (generally speaking, a reference to Hindus, Christians and Buddhists) there may be another round of crackdowns soon.
Attacks on Liberals and Minorities
This massive pan-Bangladesh operation was in fact triggered by events that occurred in the preceding week. Suspected militants in Chittagong city attacked and killed Mahmuda Khanam Mitu, the wife of acclaimed local counter-terrorism official Babul Akhter (Dhaka Tribune, June 6). Suspicion fell on the al-Qaeda linked Ansar al Islam, the Bangladesh chapter of al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), and its strike unit ABT. Perhaps sensing the coming retributions and societal backlash, however, Ansar al-Islam branded the killing “impermissible under Islam” and distanced itself from Aktar’s murder (SITE Intelligence, June 10; BD News24.com, June 11).
On the same day, June 5, Islamic militants also killed Sunil Gomez, a Christian grocery shop owner, in Baraigram, Natore district. Within the next few days, militants killed a Hindu priest named Ananta Gopal Ganguly in Naldanga area in Jhenaidah district. Islamic State (IS) subsequently claimed responsibility for the deaths of Gomez and Ganguly through its Amaq News agency, a pro-IS media outlet that emerged in 2014 in the midst of the crisis in Syria (Dhaka Tribune, June 07).
Over the past three years, the Islamist terrorists, who openly claim affiliations with IS and AQIS, have killed or injured more than 50 people in Bangladesh. Often they attack in broad day light with machetes or crude homemade firearms. The attacks have targeted freethinkers, secular writers, liberal intellectuals, and religious minorities, all with relative impunity facilitated by divisions within Bangladesh’s own political establishment.
Government in Denial
In the face of these attacks, the Bangladeshi government denied the presence of IS or AQIS in the country, putting the blame instead on the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), the country’s main opposition party, and the banned religious organization Jamaat-e-Islami.
For its part, the BNP continues to insist blame should fall on the ruling Awami League for misgovernance and “the absence of democracy.” It has reiterated many times that the activities of extremist militant groups have grown as the government has resorted to “the course of violence in governing the country” (New Age Bangladesh, May 22). The BNP has also claimed the recent raids were designed to stifle political dissent and to detain its leaders and activists.
Amid the country’s long-standing political and religious divide, Islamic militants of varied hues are finding opportunities to reinvent themselves with the blessing of IS or AQIS, which are attempting to establish and expand their presence in the country.
The deteriorating law and order situation in Bangladesh has proved to be a fertile ground for the militants, providing space for these two groups to develop their operations. Al-Qaeda, which has a history engagement with Bangladesh dating back to the 1990s, found new avenues of support in early 2013 during the Shahbagh movement and the calls for Bangladeshi Islamist leader Abdul Quader Molla to face the death penalty. The turmoil engendered by those protests, which saw violent confrontations between secular and Islamist forces, presented an opportunity for the group to re-establish its influence. It was during this time that Ansar Islam and ABT emerged, acting in line with al-Qaeda’s regional jihadist agenda.
Evidently, the political and religious situation also offered an opportunity for the then Syria-based IS to create pockets of influence in Bangladesh through existing militant networks – especially by using the subdued JMB, newly formed hybrid groups like Islamic State of Bangladesh (ISB), or Jund al-Tawheed wal Khilafah (JTK) – to reinvigorate and consolidate militant movements.
Outside Influence on Domestic Actors
IS propaganda magazine Dabiq – in issues 12 (November 2015) and 14 (April 2016) – broadly revealed the extremist group’s shadowy presence in Bangladesh when it published a eulogy to a slain Bangladeshi IS fighter named Abu Jundal Al Bengali (a.k.a Ashequr Rahman) and an interview with the leader of IS Bangladesh chapter, Sheikh Abu Ibrahim al-Hanif.
Rahman, who was killed in Syria, had been a student at Dhaka’s Military Institute of Science and Technology (MIST). He joined IS having left Dhaka on February 21, 2015 to attend a conference in Turkey. Al-Hanif, meanwhile, described in his interview how efforts to recruit “soldiers of the Khilafah” in Bangladesh had gained “great momentum,” with many Muslims joining its ranks. Al-Hanif – identified as Tamim Chowdhury, a Canadian resident of Bangladeshi origin – also hinted that cadres of Jamaat-e-Islami were joining the Khilafah’s soldiers in Bengal.
Previous IS media releases have also referred to the support of JMB remnants, describing them as the real defenders of Islam in Bangladesh. [1] Separately, a number of IS publications have eulogized JMB and its slain leaders for attempting “to awaken the Muslim masses of Bengal to the importance of ruling by shariah and the fundamentals of Al-wala wa-l-bara [loyalty and disavowal].”
Besides these, IS media units make great efforts to exhort the people of Bangladesh through literature and social media to join its fold.
Similarly, AQIS has repeatedly urged Bangladeshi Muslims to “confront the crusader onslaught against Islam” through its As-Sahab media unit. It also regularly exhorts its followers in Bangladesh to stand up against secularist fervor and confront alleged “atrocities” carried out by the security forces against pro-Islamic elements of the populace.
Mufti Abdullah Ashraf, the supposed Ansar al-Islam spokesperson, and the group’s suspected leader Syed M Zia-ul-Haq have both called for a Sharia-based caliphate in Bangladesh and condone the killings of secular bloggers and intellectuals. Reports suggest that there are around 200 active members of Ansar Al Islam and ABT in the country (Daily Star, June 07).
The group also claimed the killings of two LGBT rights activists, Xulhaz Mannan and Samir Mahboob Tonoy, in April this year [2]
Continued Attacks
Even though Bangladesh’s counter-terror apparatus has now swung into action, it is clear that the recent massive sweep operation has not deterred militants from staging random attacks. During the operations, fresh attacks took place in Madaripur. Machete-wielding militants attacked Ripon Chakraborty, a Hindu mathematics teacher in the government-run Nazimuddin College; on June 10, Nityaranjan Pandey, an elderly volunteer at a Hindu ashram in Pabna district, was hacked to death. IS claimed responsibility for Pandey’s killing (Daily Star, June 11).
Meanwhile, an eleven-member panel of leading Islamic clerics issued a fatwa (a religious diktat) against terrorism. The panel, led by Farid Uddin Masoud, the chairman of the Bangladesh Jamiyatul Ulama (BJU), condemned the activities of the militants in Bangladesh. A total of 101,524 Islamic clerics signed the fatwa against militancy and violent extremism (Daily Star, June 18; Dhaka Tribune, June 06).
The Bangladeshi government has struggled to explain the rise in violence while simultaneously denying the presence or influence of transnational jihadi groups in the country. It is time that the Awami League-led government recognized that remnants of previously subdued militant groups have found moral and ideological support through the rise of AQIS and IS in the region.
The far-reaching shadow of al-Qaeda or IS on Bangladesh’s local militant networks has been constantly overlooked and ignored. The government crackdown suggests the authorities have, belatedly, resolved to tackle the situation, but more will need to be done to halt the attacks that threaten the country’s secular fabric.
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Two pro-democracy bloggers were killed by Islamist activists in Bangladesh in little over one month.
The killings highlighted the growing prominence of Islamist vigilantism in the country and its growing threat.
The attacks occurred during a period of ongoing serious political and societal tension and perhaps also reflect increasing religious intolerance in the country.
The killing of two bloggers in separate incidents in the Bangladeshi capital Dhaka in late February and March has drawn international attention to a renewed spate of Islamist vigilantism in the country, which since early 2013 has increasingly manifested itself in attacks against pro-democracy activists who express critical views of fundamentalist Islam via social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter.
The murders occurred amid the ongoing political turmoil that has gripped Bangladesh since January, when the opposition Bangladeshi Nationalist Party (BNP) and its allies – including the influential Islamist party Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI) – called for countrywide strikes and protest rallies against the Bangladesh Awami League government. The protests were called to mark the first anniversary of the controversial election in January 2014, which the Awami League won after a boycott by the BNP and other opposition parties, and the murder of the two bloggers risks further exacerbating the unrest.
Police examine the site of the attack on Bangladeshi-American blogger Avijit Roy in Bangladesh’s capital Dhaka on 26 February. (PA)
Critical thinkers
In the first of the two recent incidents, Bangladeshi-American blogger Avijit Roy was killed and his wife Rafida was seriously wounded when assailants attacked the pair with a meat cleaver as they returned from a book fair at Dhaka university campus on 26 February. One month later, on 30 March, Oyasiqur Rahman Babu, who was also active on social media and ran a blog promoting free speech, was killed by three assailants in a similar attack.
In both cases, the initial inquiry indicated that the men were targeted because of their promotion of free speech on social media platforms such as Twitter and Facebook, where they wrote on atheism, religious prejudices, and human rights. Roy in particular was regarded as one of the pioneers of the Bangladeshi blogging scene, and had promoted other Bengali bloggers through the Mukto-mona (Free Mind) web portal, which is now offline. In 2014, he published a book entitled The Virus of Faith , and in a posthumously published paper of the same name he had argued that “religious extremism is a contagious virus” that is afflicting the entire human race, citing as evidence the January 2015 attack on the Charlie Hebdo magazine in Paris, France; the December 2014 Peshawar school attack in Pakistan; and the December 1992 demolition of the Babri Masjid in India by a right-wing Hindu mob. The paper also detailed how, as a result of Roy’s campaigning against religious extremism, he had received repeated threats from Islamist extremists.
Meanwhile, Babu’s web postings had been similarly critical of the role of Islamist parties in Bangladesh, and he was a member of prominent bloggers’ group the Logical Forum, which is critical of all religions, including Islam. Notably, in the weeks before his death, Babu had published a number of tributes to Roy following the latter’s murder, posting messages such as “I am Avijit” and “Words cannot be killed” on his Facebook page.
Arrests
Police investigating Roy’s murder arrested Farabi Shafiur Rahman in connection with the killing on 2 March. Rahman was a former student at Chittagong University, and prior to Roy’s murder had regularly denounced him in social media postings, with one post in January stating, “It’s a holy duty of Bengalee Muslims to kill Avijit [Roy].” However, although admitting issuing such threats, Rahman has denied responsibility for Roy’s killing, and he had not been charged with the murder at the time of writing, being held instead under the Information and Communication Technology Act.
Meanwhile, two suspects in the Babu killing were apprehended at the scene by passers-by, while a third escaped. Following an interrogation of the two captured suspects, police reported that the men were members of the Hathazari Madrassa (Islamic school) in Chittagong and the Darul Uloom Madrassa of Mirpur in Dhaka, both of which are run by the radical Islamist organisation Hefazat-e-Islam (HeI). Although HeI itself is not directly implicated in the killings, the group is known for its hostile stance towards proponents of secular ideas, having called in its March 2013 manifesto for the introduction of a blasphemy law – carrying the death penalty – intended to target secular scholars and atheist bloggers.
Police deputy commissioner of Tejgaon zone Biplab Kumar Sarker subsequently told reporters on 31 March that the men had confessed to killing Babu because of his writings. However, the commissioner revealed that the men were not actually familiar with Babu’s work themselves, and did not appear to know what blogging actually was.
ABT involvement?
Police are also investigating the possible involvement of the Bangladeshi Islamist extremist group Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT), which rose to prominence after it was implicated in a previous spate of violence directed at secular Bangladeshis in early 2013, during the so-called Shahbagh protests.
The Shahbagh protests – named after the area of Dhaka where they took place – had been triggered by the handing of a life sentence to senior JeI leader Abdul Quader Mollah following his conviction for war crimes committed during the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War. Many had expected the death penalty for the Islamist leader, and Mollah’s life sentence was seen by pro-democracy groups as evidence of undue Islamist influence in national politics. Thousands of pro-democracy activists took to the streets of Dhaka to protest at the sentence, and to call for JeI to be banned from politics, sparking days of fighting between rival Islamist activists from HeI and the JeI’s student wing, Islami Chhatra Shibir (ICS).
The clashes culminated with the murder of prominent pro-democracy blogger and activist Ahmed Rajib Haider, who was hacked to death by a machete-wielding group outside his home in the Mirpur area of the city on 13 February 2013. The attack came one month after another award-winning blogger-activist, Asif Mohiuddin, was severely wounded in a similar attack on 14 January. Both Rajib and Asif had been activists with Ganajagaran Mancha, a secular social movement that demanded maximum penalties for convicted war criminals from the 1971 war.
On 2 March 2013, police arrested five suspected militants from the ABT, which they described as a newly-formed offshoot of the ICS. The men, all students at North South University, a private college in Dhaka, claimed in their confessions that they had acted at the behest of the ABT’s alleged spiritual leader, Jasim Uddin Rahmani. Rahmani was subsequently arrested in August that year, and was charged with Haider’s murder along with seven other alleged ABT members, all of whom are currently awaiting trial. On 18 March 2015, Rahmani denied the charges against him.
Before his arrest, Rahmani had established a reputation as a radical preacher known for denouncing pro-democracy activists and other “atheists” in his sermons. His books, such as Unmukto Torobari (Open Sword) and Islam-O-Attoghati Musulman (Islam and Suicidal Muslims), also encouraged the targeting of atheists. An eloquent speaker in Arabic and Bengali, Rahmani disseminated his sermons online via YouTube, while his followers published online propaganda in Arabic, Bengali, and Urdu.
Attesting to Rahmani’s influence at the time of his arrest in August 2013, the deputy commissioner of Bangladesh’s Detective Branch, Moshiur Rahman, claimed Rahmani had at least 3,000 followers in madrassas and universities across Bangladesh.
Moreover, the ABT’s online presence on the Al-Qaeda-affiliated Ansar al-Mujahideen English language forum and other similar websites – where the group has expressed support for the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, and acknowledged now deceased Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) ideologue Anwar Al-Awlaki as an inspiration – provides further indications of the group’s seeming affiliation with the transnational jihadist movement beyond Bangladesh.
Notably, Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri issued a statement in January 2014 entitled Bangladesh: Massacre Behind a Wall of Silence, in which he urged Bangladeshis to rally around “the true scholars of Islam” for a “massive public uprising in defence of Islam”, and specifically cited the killing of Haider the year before. Similarly, the most recent issue of the Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) publication Resurgence , published in late 2014, called for further attacks in Bangladesh on atheist, free-speech bloggers such as Haider, whom AQIS claimed had “insulted” Islam.
Outlook
As in 2013, it is notable that the recent attacks targeting Bangladeshi pro-democracy bloggers occurred against a backdrop of heightened and ongoing political tension, and it appears that hardline Islamist elements are seeking to take advantage of the fragile political situation in the country, orchestrating violent attacks on pro-democracy or anti-Islamic elements in a bid to further polarise Bangladesh along religious lines.
Meanwhile, although the murder of the bloggers was widely condemned, many in Bangladesh are sympathetic to the Islamists’ claims that such bloggers are defaming Islam, the state religion. Consequently, the Awami League government appears reluctant to play into the hands of the rival BNP by cracking down on the Islamists and appearing to align itself with what is perceived to be an anti-Islamic movement. Even some pro-democracy groups, wary of the democracy movement becoming associated with anti-Islamic atheists, have joined HeI and other Islamist groups in calling for tighter restrictions on posting comments online that hurt religious sentiment by criticising Islam.
Bangladesh does not have a blasphemy law like Pakistan. However, the country has provisions under Section 205 of the Penal Code that allow for the imprisonment of those found guilty of deliberately or maliciously hurting religious sentiments. Similarly, the 2006 Information and Communication Technology Act bans the publication of online material that can hurt religious sentiments or beliefs. Moreover, the government has previously shown its willingness to use these laws to curtail the activities of secular pro-democracy activists.
Following the Shahbagh protests, at least four secular bloggers, including Mohiuddin, were imprisoned in early April 2013 for their blog posts on Islam and the Prophet Muhammad. The arrests were intended to appease the pro-Islamic activists and to restore law and order in general, but generated severe international and domestic criticism. Mohiuddin was subsequently released in August that year due to health concerns, while the others were granted conditional release in May 2013, shortly after their initial detention.
Consequently, although the recent attacks on bloggers promoting secular values are in part a product of growing grassroots Islamist activism, they also reflect a wider and related trend towards religious intolerance that has increased discernibly in Bangladesh in the past two-to-three years. As such, the attacks – and the clashes between Islamists and secular activists more generally – risk not just fuelling political instability in the near term, but also a steady chilling of freedom of speech and religious debate that has longer-term implications for the country.
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Transnational Islamist terrorist groups have recently made sporadic attempts to lure India’s Muslim population towards global jihad, frequently urging them to fight the democratically elected secular government. India-specific incitements have issued from al-Qaeda chief Ayman al Zawahiri and al-Qaeda ideologue Maulana Asim Umar through audio-visual messages that directly target Indian Muslims. A similar anti-India campaign was unleashed by a hitherto unknown group calling itself Ansar-ut Tawhid fi Bilad al-Hind (AuT – Supporters of Monotheism in the Land of India) through its media arm, al-Isabah Media. Its messages highlight the issue of government atrocities against Muslims in India and encourage Indian Muslims to join the ongoing Afghan or Syrian jihads and to carry out attacks inside India.
The AuT has issued at least four videotapes since October 2013, the most recent of them surfaced on May 17, when the group called for attacks against Indian targets worldwide. The ten-minute video featuring AuT leader Maulana Abdur Rahman al-Hindi urges other prominent jihadi leaders such as the Taliban’s Mullah Omar, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, Nasir Abd al-Wuhayshi of al-Qaeda in Arabian Peninsula, al-Shabaab’s Abdi Godane and Abd al-Malik Droukdel of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb to come forward to attack Indian Government interests and its economic centers in India and elsewhere as a means of “protecting the Muslims of India.” [1]
The AuT’s call appeared to resonate immediately when suspected Taliban militants attacked the Indian consulate in Afghanistan’s Herat Province on May 23, with the aim of embarrassing the newly-elected Indian Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government of Narendra Modi, who is prominently attacked in the AuT’s propaganda materials (AP, May 23). Islamists have long blamed the BJP and its leadership for demolishing Ayodhya’s 16th century Babri Mosque in December 1992, an act that fanned countrywide communal tensions that left 2,000 dead and fuelled an enduring schism between India’s Hindu and Muslim communities. Numerous episodes of sectarian violence, including the Gujarat riots of 2002, have a direct connection to the mosque’s demolition. The AuT’s May 17 message attempted to exploit the socio-religious divide prevalent in India.
Through its media arm, AuT released its first ever propaganda message in October 2013. Entitled “In the Land of Hind: Usood al-Hind (Lions of India),” the video called for the participation of Indian Muslims in the global jihad. [2] A subsequent video entitled “From Kandahar to Delhi” attempted to incite Indian Muslims to take revenge for the anti-Muslim disturbances in Gujarat, Assam, Hyderabad and, most recently, in the Uttar Pradesh city of Muzaffarnagar. [3] The video portrayed AuT chief Maulana Abdul Rahman al-Hindi flanked by seven gunmen together with still footage of past communal clashes and terrorist attacks, including the Babri Mosque demolition, the Mumbai serial blasts and the Gujarat riots. These events found a place in AuT’s subsequent propaganda videos. One such message entitled, “Oh Indian Muslims, if you can’t understand, you will perish!” was issued by al-Isabah Media in late March. [4] This 18-minute video declared that, since independence from British yoke in 1947, “Indian Muslims are living in fear and dread under the Hindus… who worship cows.”
Most of the AuT’s Arabic and Urdu messages demand the overthrow of Hindu supremacy in India and the establishment of an Islamic caliphate. AuT videos eulogize those who have perpetrated the numerous terrorist revenge attacks inside India following the Babri Mosque demolition. Proudly terming all the slain Muslim terrorists as martyrs, the videos are dedicated to all Indian-origin mujahideen who are fighting on jihadist battlefields in different parts of the world.
AuT messages commonly include verses from the Quran and Islamic hadith-s (deeds and sayings of the Prophet Muhammad).The visuals depict the jihadist “Black Flag of Khorasan” (a medieval Islamic empire consisting of most of modern Afghanistan and parts of Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan), piercing a map of India or hoisted atop the Red Fort of Delhi, indicating that this new anti-Indian jihad originates from Afghanistan.
Media reports indicate that a breakaway faction of the Indian Mujahedeen (IM) formed the AuT with the help of the Pakistan and Afghan Taliban (Mail Today [Delhi], May 23). If Intelligence sources are to be believed, around six IM militants have joined the AuT and are undergoing training in Pakistan’s North Waziristan province (The Hindu [Chennai], May 22). Most of these IM operatives are from the movement’s Azamgarh (Uttar Pradesh) and Bhatkal (Karnataka) wings that fled to Pakistan following the countrywide crackdown on IM’s infrastructures in 2008-2009.
On May 30, Indian investigative agencies believed they had found the missing link between IM and the AuT when Haider Ali, a suspected IM terrorist under detention, provided details regarding the joint training of IM and AuT operatives at Pakistani Taliban training centers (Times of India, May 30). Ali is believed to have been involved in multiple bombings at the October 26, 2013 BJP rally at Patna (Bihar) and to have had ties with the proscribed Student Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) led by Islamist Safdar Nagori.
Even if information about AuT’s actual strength and leadership remains sketchy, the emergence of this organization indicates that India has become a prime target for transnational terrorist groups. With its large Muslim population (the second largest in the world, after Indonesia), India presents a massive source of manpower for Islamist groups like al-Qaeda or the AuT that are ready to work closely with homegrown terrorist groups such as IM or SIMI. The myriad threats from domestic terrorist groups in India have now spread well beyond the usual Kashmir-centric groups fighting for the “liberation” of that region.
Animesh Roul is the Executiv
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