Posts by Samiaerrazzouki:
Out with the Old and In with the Old: Morocco’s New Cabinet
December 30th, 2013By Samia Errazzouki.
![[Image of Morocco's newly appointed government. Image from Lakome.]](http://www.jadaliyya.com/content_images/3/ScreenShot2013-10-15at5.57.06PM.png "[Image of Morocco's newly appointed government. Image from Lakome.]")
These past few months have been a particularly turbulent period for Morocco’s Party of Justice and Development-led coalition government. While King Mohammed VI was on an extended vacation in France during May and June 2013, the conservative nationalist Istiqlal Party announced it was withdrawing from the coalition. Hamid Chabat, Istiqlal’s recently elected leader, cited the “slow pace” of reforms as a point that drove him and his party to decide on the departure from the ruling coalition to the parliamentary opposition. The decision necessitated Mohammed VI’s intervention and resulted in a dragged out political spectacle surrounding the question of whether the Party of Justice and Development (PJD) would be able to strike an alliance with another party to fill the void Istiqlal left or call for early elections. To no one’s surprise, the space was filled with the National Rally of Independents (RNI)—a party known for its close ties to the palace and whose members staunchly jeered the PJD-led government from the opposing side of parliament only months ago. The integration of the RNI in the coalition saw the reappointment of various officials who were voted out of their posts during the November 2011 elections. It also pushed the PJD out of several key ministries and left it outnumbered by its coalition partners.
Since its departure from the coalition, the Istiqlal Party has adopted a seemingly critical tone against the PJD and its allies. More recently, on the weekend of 21 September 2013, the Istiqlal Party and the UGTM trade union, which is a union associated with the party, organized a “protest” in Rabat denouncing the rising costs of living. The footage and images from the “protest” were reproduced on international media and wronglycharacterized under the same light as the February 20 Movement protests, which initially sprung out as a reaction to the uprisings in the region. Such mischaracterization of the Istiqlal’s “dissent” paints an incomplete picture of the party’s own aspirations. More importantly, it uncritically adopts the party’s narrative as being an “ally” of the people, when in fact, as a member of the ruling coalition, they were involved with the very budgetary negotiations that resulted in the rising cost of living. Ironically, Nizar Baraka, a member of the Istiqlal Party, was the minister of finance and economy under Prime Minister Benkirane’s cabinet, and was compelled to resign from his ministerial post only as a result of Istiqlal’s withdrawal from the coalition this past summer. It was under his stint as minister of finance and economy that negotiations for the 6.2 billion dollar loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) were finalized. This indicates that the Istiqlal Party was well aware of the energy and food price hikes that were scheduled to take place as soon as Ramadan ended (Istiqlal announced its withdrawal from the coalition just weeks before Ramadan began).
With its experiences as the oldest party that is still functioning, the implications are that the Istiqlal Party is familiar with the maneuvers that yield political gains within the Moroccan political system. Such views are widely held among Moroccans who have been critical of the regime’s response to demands for reform. It was under Istiqlal’s leadership as coalition leader that the February 20 Movement began protesting early 2011 in reaction to the uprisings in the region. While the movement tended to avoid targeting the monarchical institution, the Istiqlali-led government was fair game for the movement and the king responded by announcing that early elections would take place the same year protests began.
There were also indications that the Istiqlal Party was taking the criticism directed toward it and attempting to reform the party’s structure from within. In a break from its past leadership, which has generally tended to come from the Fassi family, Fes mayor Hamid Chabat was elected as the party’s leader. Chabat’s election to the leadership of the Istiqlal Party came only months before his expressed intention to withdraw from the ruling coalition. Ironically, among the reasons cited for Istiqlal’s decision, Chabat cited the PJD’s slow pace of applying reforms. The press release that announced the party’s decision employed shifty rhetoric, claiming its decision was rooted in wanting to “avoid being complicit in the scheme against the Moroccan people.” The language assumes that the party itself has been removed from this alleged “scheme.” If precedence holds any significance, not only has the Istiqlal Party existed and functioned within the power dynamics of the Moroccan regime for nearly seventy years, but up until Chabat’s election as party leader, the party was an active player and member of the current ruling coalition, holding several key ministerial portfolios.
Istiqlal’s evasion of complicity in this “scheme” presumes a degree of insulting naiveté on the part of the Moroccan people. It is then a twisted turn of events when the Istiqlal Party organized and led protests in Rabat railing against the PJD-led coalition, when just months before, its members stood on the same side of the aisle as their current opponents. It is even more ironic that the party that replaced Istiqlal’s position in the coalition, the Salehddine Mezouar-led National Rally of Independents (RNI) was one of the most outspoken critics of the PJD. For months, Mezouar slammed Benkirane and his party on national and international media networks, while attempting to display a “concern” over the lack of reforms. Like the Istiqlal Party, the RNI also held a position in the ruling coalition in the previous government before the November 2011 elections and during the beginning of the February 20 Movement protests. Several of its party members, including Yassir Zenagui, who was minister of tourism in the previous government, saw his position royally upgraded to adviser to the king. Another former RNI member, Aziz Akhennouch, resigned from his party during the change in government so he could maintain his ministerial portfolio at the ministry of agriculture and fisheries as a technocrat—making him the only minister to maintain his position through the November 2011 elections.
The fluidity through which parties float from the coalition to the opposition and from the opposition to the coalition reveals more than just the pursuit of political interests (i.e., Istiqlal wanting to disassociate itself from the price hikes on food and fuel). This fluid movement practically renders the parliamentary election process in Morocco futile. Even if the parliamentary elections were intended to feed a narrative of a liberalizing political system, the shifting movements of political parties reverses any changes brought about by an electoral process. Moreover, the inability of parties to tow a consistent political line places more reliance on the monarchy as an institution, especially when it constantly intervenes in inter-party disputes at the expense of policy-making. The palace (the king and his shadow cabinet) is increasingly viewed as a stable mediating actor, rather than its true nature as an institution that operates with unchecked powers and impunity. It is through this strategy of capitalizing from the partisan squabbles among political parties that the monarchy has anchored itself in Morocco’s political landscape as a “uniting” and seemingly “necessary” actor.
The monarchy’s position as a “mediator” among political parties has gained greater traction this past week following the king’s new cabinet appointments. Mohammed VI reshuffled the cabinet as a step in the process of transitioning RNI into the coalition. Various rumors that preceded the final cabinet list were confirmed, such as Mezouar’s newfound position as the foreign minister, which pushed the PJD out of a strategic ministry. (Lakome also aptly points out that the PJD is now a minority in its own government). While under PJD-member Saad Eddine El Othmani’s leadership, the tension between the palace and the PJD over foreign policy became increasingly scrutinized. For example, the palace and the foreign ministry reactions toward the June 30 protests in Egypt that led to Mohammed Morsi’s ouster were starkly different in tone, though ultimately, the palace wields power over the ministry. A foreign ministry held by Mezouar, who was formerly minister of finance under the previous government and minister of industry and commerce before that as well, will reveal less tension in terms of Morocco’s foreign policy. It is also important not to discount Taib Fassi-Fihri’s ongoing influence and involvement in foreign policy, despite the fact that he formally left the ministry in 2011 for a position as one of the king’s royal advisers.
The new cabinet, which was announced 10 October 2013, also drew discussion over its inclusion of more technocrats with close ties to the palace and former ministers who served as far back as under the reign of the late Hassan II. The inclusion of such figures bolsters claims that Morocco’s alleged “path toward reforming,” which some argue has never taken off in the first place, is quite visibly a regressive path. It is becoming more and more evident that the Moroccan regime has slipped comfortably into a deeply authoritarian nature and continues to tirelessly silence critiques. A recent example is the case of Ali Anouzla, a Moroccan journalist and editor of the Arabic version of independent online media publication, Lakome. Anouzla was arrested on 17 September 2013 under the pretext of “inciting terrorism” after he published an article that directed readers to a link displaying an Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) video. He remainsimprisoned under the 2003 “anti-terrorism” law on orders from the General Crown Prosecutor of Rabat. Ali Anouzla’s arrest fits into a wider context, where the Moroccan regime has continuously gone after critical journalists and activists, even despite the 2011 constitution, which allegedly includes articles “protecting” the freedom of expression. Anouzla has repeatedly been critical of the regime, the monarchy, and its policies. (See Ali Anouzla’s critique of the regime’s Western Sahara policy on Jadaliyya).
Between food and fuel price hikes, the contradictory shifting alliances of political parties, and the ongoing detainment of critical voices, the status quo has grounded itself within the political fabric of the Moroccan regime. It is becoming increasingly difficult for even the regime to adhere to its “liberalizing” and “reforming” narrative it put forth when protests began in February 2011. And as these authoritarian policies and practices gain greater traction, Benkirane and the PJD have displayed a level of passivity that conflict with their claims and views when they were campaigning for the November 2011 elections. Essentially, the palace has strengthened itself at the expense of other government institutions, which could have had the potential to emerge as sources of power independent of the monarchy, such as the parliament and the judiciary. The palace has embedded itself as a parasitic institution that only strengthens actors and groups in favor of its hegemony, while co-opting and marginalizing critical actors and groups that attempt to work within the existing paradigm. In this sense, the palace has demonstrated that the greatest obstacle in the pursuit of this “path” toward a more “democratic Morocco” is itself.
This publication could use some Journalism101: Response to Washington Post oped
September 23rd, 2012By Samia Errazzouki.
If Washington Post, its editors or Mr. Rosenbaum need a translation of this sign, I’d be more than happy to provide one. Please contact me privately.
The scarcity of mainstream media coverage on events and issues in Morocco has obviously set the bar super low. I’m increasingly perplexed by the fact that prominent publications would continue to compromise their credibility by posting pieces that offer nothing more than the desire to bash one’s head into a wall. I’d like to direct your attention to a recent oped posted on the Washington Post, with a title that should set an alarm: “This place could use a Wal-Mart.” The author’s basic argument is that life is so rough in the town of Ifrane, that the solution to make his temporary stay there more comfortable (and even going so far as to suggest that his definition of comfort is shared by the locals) is to set up a Wal-Mart. Yes, a Wal-Mart. Oh holy gods of neoliberalism and white privilege!
The author, Marcus D. Rosenbaum, begins by painting Ifrane as a town “full of quaint local shops offering a wide variety of interesting goods and fresh produce — especially since Ifrane is a small resort town high in the Atlas Mountains, sporting a small university, a fancy hotel, a royal palace and lots of vacation homes.” Mr. Rosenbaum, right there, in the end of your second paragraph, you provided the exact reasons why SETTING UP A WAL-MART IN IFRANE MAKES ABSOLUTELY NO FUCKING SENSE–not for Wal-Mart and not for locals. Ifrane is exactly what he describes it. A small town that mostly centers around one of Morocco’s prominent universities. The rest is mostly tourism-based.
What’s even more amusing is that toward the end, there is a note that says the author, Mr. Rosenbaum, lives in Northwest Washington. It’s amusing because it was only last month that Wal-Mart finally announced it would start building a location in DC, after loud opposition from members of the DC community. But, of course, because Mr. Rosenbaum so desperately needs the luxury of finding the “right light bulb,” as he explains, he’ll need to put the entire local economy and everything connected to it (crime rates, inequalities, poverty, etc) through the devastation of building a Wal-Mart. Not to mention that setting up a Wal-Mart in a relatively quiet Moroccan city sounds like a Tom Friedman wet-dream.
All jokes aside, there is something extremely frightening about this sort of discussion that is given the megaphone of mainstream media. Mr. Rosenbaum’s argument illustrates these materialistic neoliberal desires, the disconnection they facilitate, the impact they have, and how insignificant the realities of the Moroccan people, more specifically, the people of Ifrane, are painted. In Mr. Rosenbaum’s narrative of life in Ifrane, it’s not him that must adapt to his surroundings as a visitor, but that the surroundings must adapt to him, even if it comes at a high cost for those who permanently live in the area. Oh wow, this sounds an awful lot like colonialism!
After I finished reading it, I was hoping my frustration wasn’t unique. And sure enough, the only 3 comments on the article as of 6:21 PM, share similar sentiments. Some excerpts of the comments:
I can’t tell if this is supposed to be poorly written satire or just poorly written pointless stupidity.
If Mr. Rosenbaum is so lost without his American conveniences, he should have stayed in the United States; I’m sure his host country would have appreciated his absence as well. And, since he is there for the moment (for a blessedly short stay), I suggest he avail himself of internet shopping. He might even order those light bulbs.
Dissent in Morocco: Not All for One
August 4th, 2012By Samia Errazzouki.
When Tunisia and Libya began exhibiting what appeared to be the early stages of a popular uprising, some analysts and commentators turned to Morocco, the only remaining kingdom in North Africa, and tried to make sense of what Morocco is (or is not) experiencing:
“Morocco is a regional model.”
“Morocco is not like [insert your choice of country].”
“This King is not like his father.”
“Moroccans are not ready for democracy.”
“Morocco is the most democratic country in the region.”
“The monarchy is needed to preserve national unity.”
Contradictions and inconsistencies set up the predictable arguments of those who tout Moroccan exceptionalism. The logic of the “Moroccan exception” theory treats Morocco as so unique that standard methodological tools used to analyze the rest of the region are mostly dismissed. The “beloved” neotraditionalist monarchy, which rules unchecked despite the existence of a constitution and parliament, presents itself as an easy defense of Moroccan exceptionalism. Political and economic factors, and the entrenched authoritarian regime driven by decades of post-colonial policies, are replaced with a vague and inconsistent reference to Morocco’s situation in relative terms—sometimes drawing comparisons with either its recent history or the conditions of its regional neighbors. The diverse ethnic makeup of Moroccan society is seen as an obstacle to democracy and a threat to national unity, rather than a vehicle for pluralism. Eventually, the rhetoric of Moroccan exceptionalism slips into apologetic support of absolutism.
The theory’s supporters (or whoever is doing the counting) measure popular dissent, or the lack thereof, through the number of bodies present at a certain protest, the types of slogans chanted, and the diversity of the participation cited as an example of the protesters’ incoherent and obscure goals. Based on these measures, the “fall and rise” of the February 20th Movement, as Ahmed Benchemsi puts it, conforms to the perception of Morocco’s ongoing political experience as argued by defenders of Moroccan exceptionalism. While the February 20th Movement is a major component of opposition in Morocco, describing dissent as a matter limited to just the February 20th Movement not only serves those who cite “Moroccan exceptionalism,” but also belittles the presence of dissent in other spheres of Moroccan society. Like popular dissent elsewhere, the Moroccan brand has political, economic, and social roots, is present in both rural and urban areas, and has diverse followers. Dissent in Morocco cannot be captured by simply confining it under a nominal and monolithic umbrella. Doing so limits this otherwise diverse and colorful discourse to the rules of the status quo framed by the regime.
Article 7′s “democratic principles” and the National Rally of Independents (RNI)
July 7th, 2012By Samia Errazzouki.
To begin analyzing the state of a specific political party in Morocco, one should begin by considering the role of political parties vis-a-vis the monarchy. How significant is the role of a political party in a country where a hereditary monarchy rules unchecked, where the king sits as the supreme religious authority in addition to being the country’s senior business partner in the private sector, along with full control of the military? Not very significant. However, Morocco’s Western allies like to point to institutions like the constitution and parliament as indicators of the elusive “Moroccan Exception,” which is often cited as an explanation as to why Morocco didn’t experience the wave of popular uprisings on the scale that its neighbors have.
If we refer to the 2011 Constitution, article 7 begins to outline the role of political parties. The following is an excerpt. Note that this is not a legal translation, but my own from the French version:
Political parties express the will of voters and exercise their power on the basis of pluralism and alternation by democratic means through the framework of constitutional institutions. They can not be created with the goal to undermine the religion of Islam, the monarchy, constitutional principles, democratic foundations, national unity, or the territorial integrity of the Kingdom. The organization and functions of political parties must conform to democratic principles.
Lalla Nezha and Ahmed Osman attending the anniversary of the Royal Armed Forces in Washington DC. A very cheerful Abdeslam Bouziane as well. 14 May 1968. Image from Colonel Bouziane.
All that needs to be known about “democratic principles” in this context is that they are defined by a very undemocratic institution: the monarchy. Let’s consider the “democratic principles” of the National Rally of Independents. It was founded by then prime minister, Ahmed Osman, in 1978, and he was its leader until 2007. Osman is also married to King Mohammad VI’s aunt, Lalla Nezha. So, basically, someone who married into the royal family creates a political party while he’s prime minister and leads it for 29 years.
Fastforward a few years after 2007 and some of the most notorious figures in Moroccan politics have called the RNI their party:
Moncef Belkhayat – Former minister of youth and sports. He was also the center of the A8gate scandal last year. Before he was appointed minister, however, he was quick to jump ship from his former party, Istiqlal. As far as I know, he’s still a member of RNI. Not sure what his exact role is besides being the most active RNI-member on Twitter.
Aziz Akhennouch – Current minister of agriculture and fisheries. Akhennouch is the only minister in the current cabinet who kept his position through the new government after parliamentary elections in November. Literally, the day before the cabinet announcements were made public, Akhennouch announced that he has resigned from the RNI, making him the only minister with no official ties to a political party.
Yassir Zenagui – Former minister of tourism and current royal adviser. Zenagui was quickly upgraded to a position with no legal limits with less than 3 years of ministerial experience. Apparently, when he was appointed minister, he had not officially joined any political party, so the RNI it was! Proved to be a good decision for him.
Saleheddine Mezouar – Former minister of finance and current president of the RNI. He managed to pocket several tens of thousands of dirhams a month in bonuses during his stint as minister. Today, he mostly wanders from network to network decrying the PJD and attempting to be the face of the opposition.
The role of the RNI in the opposition is minimal at best. They mostly stand in the shadows of the self-proclaimed “leftist” Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP), which has done far more to rally constituents and supporters (they recently held a rally in Casablanca on 27 May 2012, which they claim saw numbers reaching 50,000). The number of RNI votes has slowly declined over the years and its most prominent members continue to dwindle, or find themselves engulfed in political scandals. The fact that the RNI hasn’t dissolved as a party and have its remaining members join the Party of Authenticity and Modernity (PAM), a party established by royal insider and current royal adviser, Fouad Ali El Himma, is a bit of a surprise. I’m sure they’d have a great time bashing Benkirane and his bearded supporters, as they sip some gin and talk about how “modern” and “Western” they are.
Oh no, but wait, that would mean that their involvement in politics has a strategic purpose aside from sheer opportunism and using their position to advance their personal business ventures. Oops, forgot about that one.
Meanwhile, check out this gem of a video with all 4 of the figures I mentioned above acting like a bunch of frat bros after a football match.