Posts by ShanthieD:
Regional power play in Afghanistan and India’s policy options
June 14th, 2017By Shanthie Mariet D’Souza.
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Abstract
A regional power realignment is taking place in Afghanistan. As countries jockey for influence in shaping the end-game in Afghanistan, India seems to be a lone bystander being sidelined even by its traditional allies- Russia and Iran. A new great power rivalry between the U.S. and Russia is evident not just in Syria and other places, but also in Afghanistan. As there are attempts at regional block formation, should India join these blocks or should it maintain its independent policy? Can an India-U.S. alliance help stabilise Afghanistan or lead to further intensification of regional power competition? The rapidly changing geopolitical realities and increased spectre of violence is something that New Delhi cannot ignore.
(Site of the 31 May 2017 explosion in Kabul, Photo courtesy: Washington Post)
On 31 May, a truck bomb exploded in central Kabul killing nearly 100 people and injuring hundreds others. The continuing ghastly violence serves as a reminder of the difficulties the country has encountered in its search for a semblance of peace and stability. It is convenient to blame the Afghan security forces for their supposed inability to put to halt to such attacks. The larger issues, however, are the increased regional power competition and the international community’s ad hoc strategies with regard to the end state in Afghanistan.
Renewed Global Rivalry and Regional reconfiguration
The Trump administration mulls over an appropriate Afghan strategy. For the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, Gen. John Nicholson, the war with the Taliban is a stalemate. He has said several thousand more troops are needed to turn the tide of Afghan war. Even after the May 2017 Brussels summit, President Trump as well as the NATO countries are undecided on the requests for more troops. Meanwhile, Russia, a mute spectator in the 16 years of the U.S.-led war on terror in Afghanistan, is filling in the vacuum. This includes engaging the Taliban and leading a new diplomatic effort to shape Afghanistan’s future. Much of this coincides with the Kremlin’s attempt to wield greater international influence at the U.S.’ expense elsewhere, including intervening in the war in Syria and attempting to broker new Israeli-Palestinian negotiations.The renewed Russian interest in Afghanistan is perceived as a function of “American retrenchment’. The perception has intensified as President Trump since taking office has rarely mentioned Afghanistan.
Amidst such Russian maneuveres, the U.S. military targeted an Islamic State (IS) cave complex in eastern Afghanistan’s Nangarhar province with the 22,000-pound “mother of all bombs” (MOAB), the largest non-nuclear weapon ever used in combat on 14 April, 2017. It came a day before Russia was to host multi-nation talks on prospects for Afghan security and national reconciliation, the third such initiative since the December 2016 trilateral talks involving Russia, China, and Pakistan. Eleven countries – including Afghanistan, China, Iran, Pakistan, India, and former Soviet Central Asian states—met in Moscow. The U.S. skipped the talks, terming them a “unilateral Russian attempt to assert influence in the region.”
China, on the other hand, while assisting the Afghan government through security cooperation, has maintained links with the Taliban. It recently conducted joint law enforcement operations with the Afghan forces to fight terrorism. Beijing has also played host to the Taliban who visited China days after a trilateral meeting of senior diplomats from China, Pakistan and Russia in Moscow that supported lifting of international sanctions on the Taliban leaders. Reports from the field indicate that the Taliban in return has granted China the green light to restart a US$3 billion mining project in MesAyanak which has been mired in controversies since 2008. Iran too has maintained contacts with Taliban and at the same time supported to the Afghan government.
Non-state actors and ‘hedging strategy’
The advent of the Islamic State (IS-Khorasan or IS-K) in Afghanistan, with its local battles against Taliban for territorial domination has further complicated the security situation since 2014. Compared to the U.S. estimate of minimal IS strength (1,000 combatants), the Russian estimate is 3,500. Amidst reports of infighting having fractured the Taliban and weakened its leadership, efforts to undermine the IS-K has emboldened it and strengthened its negotiating potential. This has led to regional countries reaching out to the Taliban in order to establish /maintain linkages with a more ‘nationalistic’ Taliban that can be contained within the borders of Afghanistan and act as an effective counter to the transnational IS. Interestingly, efforts at decimating the IS-K are directed at making the Taliban more acceptable for peace negotiations. Russia has also promoted easing global sanctions on Taliban leaders who prove cooperative. The IS threat, thus, is part of a larger ‘hedging strategy’ on Afghanistandriving renewed Russian, Chinese and Iranian interest in the region. The emergence of Russia- China- Pakistan alliance has dramatically changed the equations on the ground for India.
India’s interests and policy options
India hence finds itself in a queer position. Being the largest regional donor with pledges more than US $ 2 billion in various infrastructure and capacity building programs, India’s development assistance has accrued tremendous good will among the Afghans. During my visits to provinces in Afghanistan (Kandahar, Nangarhar, Badkshan, Bamyan, Balkh, Herat since 2007), Afghans have expressed gratitude and desire for more of India’s assistance. However, New Delhi has not capitalised this good will into tangible outcomes. Neither has New Delhi increased the scale of its assistance in such areas as governance and institution building to prevent the back sliding of the Afghan state apparatus. In discussions with Foreign Service officials in New Delhi, it is evident that Afghanistan is seen as a distant, volatile theatre that is of ‘secondary interest’ and are wary of an ‘over-stretch’.
In the security sector, New Delhi’s minimalistic approach has not helped strengthen the Afghan security forces to face the onslaught of the insurgency. This is viewed by the military elite in Afghanistan as reneging on the commitments made by India in the Strategic Partnership Agreement of October 2014, the first agreement signed by India in the neighbourhood.
As there is a scramble among major countries to embrace the Taliban, New Delhi exercise caution in participating in externally mediated peace processes. A number of pro-talks advocates and international commentators are not averse to granting concessions like ceding territory with an asymmetric federalism arrangement to the Taliban, such propositions are acceptable neither to the Afghans nor the Taliban. While some Indian commentators have joined the chorus of talking the Taliban, any such attempt violates India’s core objective of building a strong and stable Afghanistan that acts as a bulwark against the return of extremist forces. Beyond elite buy-in, New Delhi will have to work towards mobilizing the grass root participation in the state building process to preserve the fragile gains of the last decade.
Time, however, is in short supply in Afghanistan. In the regional reconfiguration of powers, New Delhi will have to signal its intent to be a reliable friend and important power in the region. During mydiscussions with senior government officials in Kabul it is evident that they expect that India plays a role commensurate with major power status in the region. The present reticence has sent mixed signals. In April 2017, I spoke with Dr. Shaida Mohammad Abdali, Afghanistan’s ambassador to India in New Delhi. Ambassador Abdali expressed his desire to see India playing an important role in bringing peace and stability in the country. Neither can India be a lone bystander, nor can it fritter away the goodwill gained among the Afghan people by not taking a more proactive policy, Abdali said.
Being sidelined from its traditional alliance, New Delhi has the option of either joining the U.S. or maintain its independent position. President Trump’s senior military and foreign policy advisers have recently proposed a major shift in strategy in Afghanistan The new plan, which still needs the approval of the president, calls for expanding the U.S. military footprint (surge) as part of a broader effort to push an increasingly confident and resurgent Taliban back to the negotiating table. However, mere addition of troop numbers without a fundamental change in strategy will not help achieve such objectives nor stabilise Afghanistan. New Delhi needs to take a clear position in partnering with the US or any other regional power/block in addressing the causes of instability in Afghanistan, particularly when Afghans look up to India to play that leadership role.
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With major powers cosying up to the Taliban, should India shed its antipathy for the Taliban?
May 11th, 2017
By Shanthie D’Souza.
In the rapidly changing quicksand of Afghanistan, New Delhi faces some stark choices. As many countries reach out to the Taliban, should it jump in and start exploring options for engagement? Or should it wait for the proposed peace processes to take their own course and deal with the situation as it evolves? Will the ‘wait and watch‘ policy be strategically suicidal? Or is it the best course as Afghanistan traverses a difficult process of transition (inteqal)?
The new great game and proxy war
Arrival of the Islamic State (IS-Khorasan or IS-K) in Afghanistan, with its local battles against Taliban for area domination, would be complication enough for the security situation. Added to this, though, is an intensification of competition for influence between regional countries, each operating through proxies in order to maintain position. Ironically, some of the attempts to neutralise the IS-K have now been directed at making the Taliban more amenable for negotiations, a throwback to the time of ‘good boys versus the bad boys’ distinction. Infighting may have weakened the Taliban leadership, but efforts to undermine the IS-K has emboldened it and strengthened its negotiating potential.
A theatre for renewed US-Russia rivalry
Simultaneously, Afghanistan is re-emerging as a theater of rivalry between the United States (U.S.) and Russia. On 14 April, the U.S. military targeted an IS cave complex in eastern Afghanistan’s Nangarhar province with the 22,000-pound “mother of all bombs” (MOAB), the largest non-nuclear weapon ever used in combat. Conflicting reports of the impact of the measure notwithstanding, timing of the move was crucial.
It came a day before Russia was to host multi-nation talks on prospects for Afghan security and national reconciliation, the third such initiative since the December 2016 trilateral talks involving Russia, China, and Pakistan. Eleven countries – including Afghanistan, China, Iran, Pakistan, India, and former Soviet Central Asian states—met in Moscow. The U.S. skipped the talks, terming them a “unilateral Russian attempt to assert influence in the region.” Moscow in response said that it “could not comprehend” the U.S. action. A new chill in the bilateral relations of the Cold War rivals has set in. American military officials suspect Russia’s Afghan peace diplomacy is aimed at “undermining NATO efforts.”
Contending Perceptions
The Russians and the Chinese cite the rise of the IS as a greater threat and are more amenable to talks with the ‘nationalistic’ Taliban as an effective counter. Reports from the field indicate that even Iran is not averse to engaging the Taliban and has established multiple contacts. Compared to the U.S. estimate of minimal IS strength (perhaps 1,000 combatants), the Russian estimate is 3,500.
Beyond the perceived IS threat, though, a ‘hedging strategy’ on Afghanistan appears to be the key reason for the renewed Russian and Chinese interest in the region. Should the insurgency succeed, either through military or political means, both countries desire to have in place the required links.
There are, however, real limits on Russia’s outreach and influence. Among the Afghans, the 1979-89 interlude has not been entirely forgotten. It is doubtful that Russia will be able to get the Taliban talking and, more importantly, get Pakistan to acquiesce. In this the U.S. itself failed to achieve, despite its enormous clout, in the 2016 Quadrilateral Coordination Group’s (QCG) process.
Afghan perspective
The Afghan perspective, however, is starkly different. Senior Afghan government officials were skeptical of Taliban’s presence in Moscow as they see it is as conveying legitimacy without demanding anything in return, particularly a reduction in fighting. To the Afghans in the security sector, the use of MOAB is not a solution for the long term. They contend that with better training, weapons and force modernisation, they can deal with the IS threat as well as address the larger threat of an emboldened Taliban .
Despite the moderate success of the Afghan National Army (ANA) in gaining some ground vis-a-vis the extremists, the force lacks appropriate training, equipment, air power support, assistance in strategic planning, risk assessment, engineering to help improve their capabilities. A proposed increase in the number of U.S. forces to train and assist will by itself not dramatically change the conditions on the ground, unless there is a change in the rules of engagement. The number of enduring structural flaws and gaps in the Afghan security forces could continue to hamper their battlefield effectiveness.
Peace talks and Options for India
India hence finds itself in a challenging position. There has never been clarity in the desired ‘end-state’ that would result from a peace deal, even as a large number of international commentators and analysts continue to seek talks with the Taliban that include granting concessions like ceding territory with an asymmetric federalism arrangement. Interestingly, such propositions are acceptable neither to the Afghans nor the Taliban. To their mind, they provide no end-state superior to the ongoing ‘war’.
In particular, the Afghans are not willing to buy into the desperate desires of the U.S. Neither are they open to Moscow’s peace efforts, which they justifiably interpret as yet another attempt to impose a solution on them. Hence a dose of caution is in order while dealing with the murky waters of externally initiated peace processes. The fundamental question is why and with whom New Delhi should talk to within the Taliban.
Any unilateral attempt at ‘talking’ violates India’s core objective of building a strong and stable Afghanistan that acts as a bulwark against the return of extremist forces. Even though there are dangers of being left out in the cold as other major powers are establishing Taliban contacts, a senior Indian diplomat has noted, “Even if we did nothing, Taliban when it mainstreams, will become friends of India and its hatred for Pakistan will come to the fore.”
Though there seems more than a tad wishful thinking in such assessment, were such a scenario to unfold, the central concern would be whether a mainstreamed Taliban could bring peace to Afghanistan. There remains concern that Pakistan would move forcefully to deal with a turncoat Taliban. A rebranded Taliban rump, would buy a few more years to fuel the conflict in Afghanistan.
A New Delhi rush to embrace the Taliban thus needs to be resisted. Instead, India should support the Afghan reintegration and reconciliation process and help build a transparent and inclusive process. Indigenous peacebuilding efforts, such as the High Peace Council, are the right place for India to support and strengthen Afghan efforts. In partnering with the U.S. under the new Trump administration, New Delhi will have to lay out the conditions for its cooperation, especially since there remains no clarity on the ‘end-state’ in Afghanistan.
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