Posts by ZambelisChris:
Nuclear Agreement Overshadows Arab Unrest in Iranian Khuzestan
August 23rd, 2015
By Chris Zambelis.
Arab Struggle Movement for the Liberation of Ahwaz
The accord recently struck between Iran and the five permanent UN Security Council members plus Germany (P5+1) represents a watershed in Middle East diplomacy. The culmination of almost two years of negotiations, the deal outlines a plan to lift most international economic sanctions on Iran in exchange for its agreement to forego any pursuit of nuclear weapons and to accept other limits on its nuclear program. The implications of Iran’s return to the international fold for geopolitics, Iran’s overall strategic posture and domestic political situation and global energy markets have been extensively analyzed and debated. Also important, however, is the agreement’s potential impact on Iran’s precarious ethnic and sectarian minority dynamics.
Given the opposition to the nuclear agreement from many Arab Persian Gulf states, the current position of Iran’s ethnic Arab minority population in the country’s southwestern province of Khuzestan merits consideration. This was underlined by a series of attacks in recent months against Iranian security forces and other targets in Khuzestan claimed by ethnic Arab militants affiliated with the Harakat al-Nazal al-Arabi li-Tahrir al-Ahwaz (Arab Struggle Movement for the Liberation of Ahwaz—ASMLA) (YouTube, May 17; al-Arabiya, April 2; Press TV, April 2; Ahwazna.net, April 1). The Arabs of Khuzestan are known as the Ahvazi (Ahwazi in Arabic) and have endured various forms of abuse and repression by the state on account of their ethnic and cultural identity. Significantly, the vast majority of Iran’s proven oil reserves—between 80 and 90 percent—are located in Khuzestan. Consequently, any volatility in Khuzestan will become increasingly relevant as foreign oil firms contemplate their much-anticipated return to Iran’s energy sector (Financial Times, July 16).
In April, the ASMLA announced what it called an “unprecedented escalation” in its armed campaign against Iranian security forces, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Basij paramilitary units and other targets that represent the state, on its network of official websites and social media platforms (Ahwazna.net, April 1; Twitter, April 1). On April 2, the ASMLA’s armed wing, the Mohieddin al-Nasser Martyr Brigades, attacked a police checkpoint in Hamidiyeh, approximately 16 miles west of the provincial capital Ahvaz, killing three police officers and wounding two others (al-Arabiya, April 2; Press TV, April 2). Iranian authorities later announced that they had detained the perpetrators of the April attack (Press TV, April 22). The ASMLA also claimed responsibility for a May 16 attack against the governor’s office in Susangerd, located about 40 miles northwest of Ahvaz. The attackers used homemade explosives and small-arms fire. Video footage of the operation was shared by the ASMLA online (YouTube, May 17; al-Arabiya, May 17). The number of casualties resulting from the May attack is uncertain. These attacks fit the pattern of previous operations executed by the ASMLA and other Ahwaz militant currents in Khuzestan (See: Terrorism Monitor, January 23, 2014).
The attacks occurred amid a backdrop of heightened tensions in Khuzestan in recent months. The March 14 self-immolation of an Ahwazi street vendor, Younes al-Asakirah, in Khorramshahr to protest against what he saw as the unlawful confiscation of his wares by the authorities sparked a wave of protests across Khuzestan. Ahwazis who attended al-Asakirah’s funeral used the occasion to direct their ire against the government. The ensuing crackdown by the security forces resulted in scores of arrests and the imposition of other repressive measures (Middle East Eye, March 26). In another incident, at a May 17 soccer match between the local Foolad Khuzestan team and the visiting al-Hilal team from Saudi Arabia, some Ahwazi fans reportedly chanted anti-government slogans couched in Arab nationalist rhetoric, while other fans showed their support for the visiting al-Hilal squad on account of its Arab origin (al-Arabiya, May 18).
Between two and four million Ahwazis reside in Khuzestan; estimates of the Ahwazi population can be smaller or larger depending on the political persuasion of the source. Despite residing amid tremendous oil wealth, Ahwazis suffer from severe poverty, underdevelopment and environmental degradation, as well as social, political and cultural subjugation due to their Arab identity (Human Rights Watch, April 29). Many Ahwazis believe that their predicament is the product of a calculated effort to emphasize the Islamic Republic’s Persian character at their expense, even though the majority of Ahwazis are Shi’a Muslims. These circumstances have provided a fertile ground for the spread of secessionist and nationalist impulses among many Ahwazis over the years.
Central to the Ahwazi national cause is a discourse of historical grievance and sacrifice, and the ASMLAdraws from a long tradition of Ahwazi separatist activism. For example, its armed wing, the Mohieddin al-Nasser Martyr Brigades, draws its namesake from Mohieddin Shaykh Nasser al-Kaabi Humaidan, one of the founding leaders of the Arabistan Liberation Front (ALF). Founded in 1958, the ALF sought the establishment of an independent “Arabistan”—Ahwazis and pan-Arab nationalists often refer to Khuzestan as Arabistan, the largely Arab territory that enjoyed a period of limited self-rule during different eras of history—and hoped for its eventual unification with other Arab lands. The ALF was steeped in the pan-Arab nationalist ideology advocated by Egyptian President Gamal Abd al-Nasser. However, Mohieddin al-Nasser was arrested in 1963 for his involvement in irredentist and separatist politics, and was executed in 1964 along with other leading ALF figures (National Liberation Movement of Ahwaz, August 3, 2001). The Ahwaz nationalist movement also leverages a sophisticated political activist network, and the Ahwazi diaspora and sympathetic activist organizations in Europe and beyond regularly advocate on behalf of the Ahwazi cause. In July, for example, protesters gathered at the London headquarters of Iran’s National Oil Company to draw attention to the plight of the Ahwazis (YouTube, July 3).
Iran has accused the ASMLA and other ethnic Ahwazi activist and militant organizations as serving as proxies for enemies of the Islamic Republic. In particular, the historical links between Ahwazi militants and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq continues to shape Iranian perceptions of its Arab population. The rhetoric and actions of Ahwazi militants are likely to feed Iran’s suspicions. The ASMLA has embraced similarly motivated activist movements that purport to act on behalf of Iran’s ethnic Kurdish, ethnic Baloch and other minority communities, including violent insurgent groups. For instance, a statement issued by the ASMLA in May threatened that its future military operations will be coordinated with ethnic Baloch and ethnic Kurdish insurgents (al-Sharq [Dammam], May 15). The claimed establishment of a virtual “joint media center” between Ahwazi and Baloch national causes in Iran also raises another set of questions about the level of coordination—real or otherwise—between violent opposition movements operating in Iran (Twitter, July 5).
The ASMLA has also praised Saudi Arabia and other Arab nations for devoting more attention to the Ahwazi cause. The ASMLA has also declared solidarity on behalf of Ahwazis with Saudi Arabia and other countries involved in Operation Decisive Storm to repel the advances of Zaydi Shi’a Ansar Allah (Supporters of God, a.k.a. the Houthis) in Yemen and what it describes as Iran’s “destructive interference” in Arab affairs (Ahwazna.net, April 1). For Iran, an opinion column penned in March by prominent Emirati businessman Khalaf Ahmed al-Habtoor vindicates its worries about the intentions of its Arab rivals regarding Khuzestan. Titled “Arab Ahwaz Must be Liberated from Iran,” al-Habtoor echoes the claims of injustice made by Ahwazis and calls on Arab countries—and especially the Gulf Cooperation Council—to support the Ahwazis’ demands for independence by, among other things, providing billions of dollars of direct aid. He also suggests that the return of an independent “Arabistan” would sever Iran’s access to oil revenue (al-Arabiya, March 29). A series of meetings between Ahwazi activists and U.S. officials, disclosed by Wikileaks, is also likely to have raised alarm bells in Tehran over the extent of foreign influence in Khuzestan (Wikileaks, January 14, 2007; Wikileaks, December 6, 2006; Wikileaks, June 13, 2006; Wikileaks, May 8, 2006; Wikileaks, April 4, 2006).
The strategic repercussions of any further rebellion and upheaval in Khuzestan carry far-reaching implications for Iran, regional stability and global energy markets. The ASMLA has previously targeted energy infrastructure, and any future foreign investment in Khuzestan’s energy sector would likely represent a high-value target for Ahwazi militants. Meanwhile, Iran’s traditional rivals in the Middle East are also likely to continue to view the Ahwazi cause as a lever in which to check or otherwise threaten Iran, even as the shifting global diplomatic climate becomes more favorable to the Islamic Republic.
Comments Off on Nuclear Agreement Overshadows Arab Unrest in Iranian Khuzestan
To Topple the Throne: Islamic State Sets Its Sights on Saudi Arabia
March 26th, 2015
By Chris Zambelis.
King Salman and Saudi Arabia have moved up on the Islamic State’s list of targets (Source: DoD Flickr).
The meteoric rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, which has since styled itself the Islamic State in an affirmation of its broader aspirations of dominion over a self-declared caliphate beyond the territories where it exercises control, has aggravated the Middle East’s already treacherous geopolitical landscape. Having emerged out of conflict and instability in Iraq and Syria, the Islamic State has arguably matched or otherwise exceeded the capabilities of fellow extremist groups such as al-Qaeda, its regional affiliates and other violent Islamist organizations. Despite its recent setbacks—notably in Syria’s Kurdish-majority town of Kobane (a.k.a. Ayn al-Arab), located in the northern Aleppo province—the Islamic State has demonstrated an impressive ability to capture, control and consolidate its hold on territory and sustain its insurgent and support cadres.
It also operates a sophisticated information and propaganda wing that exploits social media as a force multiplier alongside its scorched earth campaign. It has also drawn support from independent sympathizers and ideological allies throughout the broader Middle East and around globe—including among locally focused extremist factions in Afghanistan, Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Pakistan and Yemen. These attributes are reminiscent of al-Qaeda’s at the pinnacle of its influence. However, they also reflect the simmering competition between the Islamic State and its al-Qaeda precursor as well as the latter’s regional affiliates such as Jabhat al-Nusra (Terrorism Monitor, February 20). The Islamic State’s increasingly strident discourse and threats also illustrate its rising ambitions; in addition to confronting the incumbent regimes in Iraq and Syria and rival militants and insurgents, the Islamic State has an ambitious set of goals that include challenging Saudi Arabia.
The Islamic State today represents the latest and potentially most complex set of challenges to Saudi Arabia, which had previously drawn the ire of al-Qaeda and its regional affiliate al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Due to the recent death of King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz al-Saud and the succession of King Salman bin Abdulaziz al-Saud, the Islamic State’s rise also comes amid a period of heightened domestic and regional uncertainty. This article will examine the Islamic State’s escalating threats toward Saudi Arabia, which suggest, alongside other recent trends, that the Islamic State is employing a steadily more aggressive threat posture toward Saudi Arabia that is likely to foreshadow future attacks and intensifying pressures.
Mapping the Threat
The Islamic State’s leader (and self-styled caliph) Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi singled out Saudi Arabia in an audio statement titled “Even if the Disbelievers Despise Such,” released by the group’s al-Furqan Media Foundation on November 13, 2014. In his statement, al-Baghdadi extolled what he describes as the purported expansion of the Islamic State to the “lands of al-Haramein” (two holy places) in addition to Yemen, Egypt, Libya and Algeria, through its acceptance of oaths of allegiance sworn by local militants to the self-styled caliphate. Al-Baghdadi’s mention of al-Haramein is notable in that it reflects the radical Islamist proclivity for avoiding any reference to Saudi Arabia by name and, by implication, any indirect recognition of the legitimacy of the Saudi royal family, instead highlighting Islam’s two holiest sites at Mecca and Medina. Al-Baghdadi also proclaimed the appointment of regional governors to represent the Islamic State and called on followers in Saudi Arabia and beyond to recognize and follow their leadership. Al-Baghdadi issued a categorical call to arms: He referred to the Saudi royal family as “the serpent’s head” and the “stronghold of the disease,” and implored his Saudi subjects to attack the “al-Saloul” and “their soldiers.” The reference to al-Saloul represents a derogatory distortion of the al-Saud family name; in Islamic tradition, the al-Saloul family guarded the then-pagan holy site of the Kaaba at Mecca during the pre-Islamic period. He also implored his followers to attack polytheists and rafidah (rejectionists), an inflammatory label often assigned to Shi’a Muslims by extreme Salafists and other hardline Sunni Islamists, in an apparent reference to the Kingdom’s substantial Shi’a minority population. Al-Baghdadi then issued an appeal for “patience” and reassured his followers in the Kingdom that the “vanguards of the Islamic State are on their way” (al-Furqan Media Foundation, November 13, 2014).
The subsequent release of the fifth edition of Dabiq, the Islamic State’s official magazine, in November 2014 by its affiliated al-Hayat Media Center, followed up al-Baghdadi’s earlier de facto declaration of war against the House of Saud. The cover of the magazine is emblazoned with a photograph of the Kaaba at Mecca, while the foreword proclaims that the Islamic State’s flag will “fly over Mecca and Medina.” It is also emphasized that Saudi militants should take up arms at home and avoid traveling to battlefields abroad. A section devoted to Saudi Arabia exalts the efforts of earlier generations of militants who resisted and attacked the monarchy, including al-Qaeda and its regional affiliate AQAP, while at the same time lamenting their failure to achieve their objectives. Equally important, the Islamic State declares its opposition to Saudi’s fellow Persian Gulf monarchies in an apparent declaration of war against Saudi Arabia’s allies in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). A section of the magazine dedicated to the group’s activities in Yemen emphasizes the proximity between Saudi- and Yemen-based Islamic State loyalists and their potential to cooperate in launching attacks in the Arabian Peninsula (Dabiq, November 2014).
An incursion by militants who had infiltrated Saudi Arabia’s northeastern town of Arar, located in the Northern Borders province that sits adjacent to Iraq’s southern border, on January 5 underlines the potential threat the Islamic State poses to the Kingdom (al-Jazeera, January 5). While details surrounding the incident remain murky, a band of Iraq-based insurgents reportedly associated with the Islamic State is said to have penetrated Saudi territory and engaged a Saudi border police post. The attackers are reported to have employed small unit ambush tactics and a suicide bomber, who detonated his explosives-laden vest while offering to surrender to a senior Saudi security officer, killing himself and the officer. The ensuing incident left three border officers and four militants dead (Saudi Press Agency, January 5). The Northern Borders province is located alongside Iraq’s Anbar province, a key locus of support for the Islamic State that is hotly contested between the Islamic State and Iraqi security forces (Reuters, February 12). The Saudi authorities have also linked the November 2014 murder of a Danish national in the capital Riyadh following the release of a video purportedly recorded by the perpetrators who claimed responsibility for the attack (The National [Abu Dhabi], December 2, 2014). An attack that targeted Shi’a worshippers, who had gathered to commemorate Ashura, in al-Hasa in the Kingdom’s Eastern province has also been attributed to the Islamic State (al-Jazeera, November 25, 2014). Saudi authorities are also reported to have disrupted numerous militant cells linked to the Islamic State (al-Arabiya [Dubai], August 28, 2014).
Geopolitics of the Palace
A consideration of Saudi Arabia’s geopolitical significance is critical to appreciate the nature of the threats the Islamic State poses to the Kingdom. In many respects, the factors that have compelled the Islamic State to confront Saudi Arabia echo those that had originally induced al-Qaeda to take on the monarchy. Much like other entrenched authoritarian regimes in the Middle East that have drawn al-Qaeda’s fury over the years, Saudi Arabia is despised by the Islamic State for what it sees as its pervasive corruption, strategic relationship with the United States and illegitimate position as the custodian of Mecca and Medina. In this regard, the Islamic State, much like al-Qaeda, views the Saudi royal family as an agent of U.S. imperialism that is bent on the domination and subjugation of the Arab and Islamic world. Its status as the world’s largest exporter of oil, and second-largest oil producer, adds another layer of complexity that is surely not lost on the Islamic State. In this regard, al-Qaeda’s earlier targeting of strategic energy infrastructure, including its February 2006 operation against the Abqaiq oil refinery—one of the world’s largest—may provide valuable insights into the Islamic State’s tactical calculus with respect to prospective targets inside the Kingdom (al-Jazeera, February 27, 2006). The circumstances surrounding the 1979 seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca by militants, led by Juhayman al-Otaibi, who were violently opposed to the Saudi monarchy, may also offer a glimpse into the Islamic State’s plans for the Kingdom (al-Majalla [London], November 2009).
For al-Qaeda, the prospect of toppling or otherwise destabilizing the throne represented the apex of achievement in its broader struggle. The often-overlooked fact that a number of al-Qaeda notables, including its late founder and leader Osama bin Laden, arose out of the domestic political opposition in Saudi Arabia, serves as a testament to the hatred the Saudi royal family has incurred within extreme Islamist circles. It is reasonable to assume that Saudi Arabia also figures prominently in the Islamic State’s vision for the wider region even as it is preoccupied with its multiple front insurgent campaign in Iraq and Syria. The Islamic State’s ongoing rivalry with al-Qaeda and its regional affiliates has also likely elevated the Kingdom’s importance as the Islamic State may sense an opportunity to succeed where its al-Qaeda predecessor previously failed. Saudi Arabia’s declared opposition to the Islamic State, its support for rival Syrian insurgent factions such as the Islamic Front and others and its participation in the U.S.-led coalition against the Islamic State have likewise elevated its stature as a target (al-Akhbar [Beirut], February 4, 2014; al-Safir [Beirut], January 7, 2014; AP, February 18).
Countermeasures
Saudi Arabia has taken numerous steps to mitigate the threat posed by the Islamic State. In the realm of ideas, it has attempted to rein in members of its religious establishment, including over the solicitation of funds for aid and relief in Syria and prohibiting outright any attempts by Saudis to join the conflict in Syria or engage in other un-sanctioned activities abroad (al-Akhbar, June 7, 2012). In doing so, the Kingdom leveraged the Council of Senior Scholars, the country’s highest religious body. While these efforts predate the rise of the Islamic State, they demonstrate mounting concerns in the palace over events in Syria and their impact on the Saudi population.
These efforts have yielded mixed results, as some prominent clergy have deviated from the official line on how to approach the situation in Syria. More importantly, Saudi volunteers also continue to stream into Syria and other battlefields in large numbers to take up arms alongside various insurgent factions (al-Safir, December 8, 2013; al-Safir, January 20, 2012). There is a great deal of sympathy among Saudis for the plight of Syrians and a deep antipathy toward a secular Baathist regime that is viewed by many as heretical and apostate. An additional challenge is that the ultraconservative forms of Wahhabist and Salafist ideologies propagated by Saudi Arabia’s religious establishment— in many respects, Saudi Arabia is the wellspring of these ideas—are hard to distinguish from the worldviews being espoused by the Islamic State. The Islamic State’s dramatic expansion has nevertheless provoked the Kingdom to engage with its population in the ideological arena. Most recently, Saudi Arabia’s Grand Mufti, Shaykh Abd al-Aziz al-Ashaykh, has spearheaded a campaign that aims to enlist media and educational institutions in combating the Islamic State’s appeal (Arab News, February 22).
Meanwhile, in the realm of physical security, the Kingdom has embarked on an ambitious project to construct an approximately 600-mile-long security wall on sections of its northern border with Iraq. The wall is designed to prevent militants from infiltrating Saudi territory (al-Jazeera, September 6, 2014). The Kingdom has resorted to a similar strategy in an attempt to insulate itself from the expanding violence and instability that has overtaken its southern neighbor Yemen, building an approximately 1,000-mile-long wall along its border with Yemen (Reuters, January 22; al-Arabiya, April 10, 2013). Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia’s security forces have also continued to make mass arrests of suspected militants in an apparent effort to disrupt suspected domestic extremist activities associated with the Islamic State and potentially other violent Islamist organizations (The National, December 7, 2014).
Conclusion
In contrast to the chaos of Iraq and Syria and other conflict-ridden zones in the broader Middle East where the Islamic State has gained a foothold, Saudi Arabia, upon first glance, represents an impermissible environment for staging and launching militant activities. The Islamic State’s particular brand of brutality has also galvanized opposition to its expansion and influence, including among rival militants wary of its tactics and other actions in Iraq, Syria and elsewhere. This is best illustrated by the losses it has incurred in recent months and the growing divide between its community of supporters and those of rival organizations (Daily Star [Beirut], March 3; al-Safir, March 31, 2014). At the same time, there are no indications to suggest that these setbacks will impact its ambitions to follow in the footsteps of its al-Qaeda precursor and lead a campaign to topple the Saudi monarchy.
Comments Off on To Topple the Throne: Islamic State Sets Its Sights on Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia and Qatar: Royal Rivalry in the Levant (Part 2/2)
October 15th, 2013By Chris Zambelis.
The roots of the Saudi-Qatari rivalry run deep. In spite of their vast size discrepancy, Saudi Arabia and Qatar share many attributes. Both countries are parties to entrenched and multifaceted strategic relationships with the United States. Each also boasts tremendous energy wealth – Saudi Arabia is the world’s largest exporter of crude oil, while Qatar is the world’s top exporter of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG). Saudi Arabia and Qatar have also amassed huge reserves of international currency. Both operate monarchical systems of governance marked by varying degrees of authoritarianism, and promulgate a common ideology derived from ultraconservative Wahhabist and Salafist philosophies.
Yet, the sum of these commonalities conceals a multitude of divergences on questions related to foreign policy. The disparate reactions by Saudi Arabia and Qatar to the wave of popular revolutionary upheaval that gripped the Arab world in late 2010, are exemplary cases in point. Fearing the potential of a grassroots revolt by its own people, Saudi Arabia viewed the calls for freedom, justice and democracy by Arab and Muslim publics with great trepidation. Saudi Arabia’s fears about the changing geopolitical landscape in the Middle East were compounded when the United States appeared to assent to the fall of Tunisian President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. In contrast, Qatar viewed the wave of uprisings as a chance to enhance its regional posture, and expand its influence globally.
Despite its diminutive stature, Qatar has employed an ambitious and aggressive foreign policy, that has allowed it to wield tremendous regional and international influence that far transcends its tiny geography and population. Qatar has effectively leveraged its wealth through institutions such as its network of Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs). It has also relied on instruments of soft power, including the Al-Jazeera satellite television network, which is owned and operated by the Qatari royal family, to throw its weight behind the political opposition movements that have upended the status quo. Despite Qatar’s stance on the crisis in Syria today, it was not too long ago that Doha enjoyed a relatively amicable relationship with Syria, Iran, and Hezbollah while serving as a mediator between regional and international rivals. Qatar, in essence, has excelled at engaging numerous and contradictory actors, including the United States; Qatar serves as host to a forward headquarters of the US Central Command (CENTCOM).
Qatar also has a history of challenging Saudi Arabia. At one time, Al-Jazeera provided members of the Saudi political opposition operating in exile with a forum to address Arab audiences. Qatar has also sought to circumvent Saudi Arabia’s preeminent position in the energy sector, by proposing the development of a network of natural gas pipelines that would transport Qatari natural gas to Turkey and Europe. Many of the most economically feasible proposals involving pipelines originating from Qatar, would involve traversing Saudi territory. This gives Saudi Arabia tremendous leverage over Qatar. The fact that Qatar shares the South Pars natural gas field – the world’s largest – with Iran is another point of concern for Saudi Arabia.
Qatar’s interest in enhancing its ability to expand its natural gas footprint, is often mentioned as a motivating factor in its strategy toward Syria. However, it was Qatar’s support for the numerous Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated associations and political parties in countries such as Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and eventually Syria, that drew the ire of Saudi Arabia. Qatar’s strategy also coincided with Turkey’s approach to the region. The electoral victory of now-ousted Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi’s Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), helped midwife what came to be viewed as an axis between Qatar, Turkey, and Egypt.
Saudi Fear of the Muslim Brotherhood
Saudi Arabia’s fears of the Muslim Brotherhood are manifold. At one point, Saudi Arabia provided refuge for persecuted members of the Muslim Brotherhood, who were targeted by the likes of Gamal Abd al-Nasser in Egypt and Hafez al-Assad in Syria. Saudi Arabia also enabled exiled members of the Muslim Brotherhood to organize opposition activities designed to undermine the secular, socialist, and pan-Arab nationalist ideals promulgated by republican Arab governments. However, as the self-proclaimed “Custodian of the Two Holy Sites of Mecca and Medina,” Saudi Arabia began to grow wary as the Muslim Brotherhood cadres active in the kingdom began to make inroads among Saudis. The Wahhabist and Salafist principles that serve as the foundation of Saudi Arabia’s legitimacy, especially as they relate to the unquestioned loyalty demanded by its rulers, was inherently threatened by the activist-oriented approach to politics advocated by the Muslim Brotherhood. Saudi animosity toward the Muslim Brotherhood also stems from the latter’s support for Saddam Hussein following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait.
Saudi Arabia has a deeply authoritarian regime that is witnessing growing displays of resentment and anger by disaffected members of its own population. This includes a sizeable segment of its youthful, politically aware, and social media savvy population that is calling for greater freedom and reform, along with a sizeable Shi’a minority that faces severe discrimination by a political and religious establishment that views them as heretics and apostates. Consequently, Saudi Arabia fears the precedent of a democratic, modern, and Islamist-oriented movement that can organize political action. It should come as no surprise that Saudi Arabia, along with the UAE and Kuwait, has welcomed Morsi’s fall in Egypt. Democracy, by definition, severely threatens the viability of the royal family as the dominant political and economic entity.
Saudi Arabia also harbors concerns over the potential return of Egypt as a major geopolitical player in the Middle East. Egypt’s limited rapprochement with Iran and Hezbollah under the FJP is a case in point. In the long run, Egypt may reemerge to challenge Saudi Arabia and rekindle their natural rivalry. Qatar, on the other hand, due its tiny population – almost 80% of Qatar’s population of 2.5 million is made up of foreign nationals – is relatively insulated from the kind of domestic opposition that threatens its neighbors. On account of its small size, it is also agile enough to recalibrate its foreign policy to benefit from what are often conflicting and contradictory regional interests.
Conclusion
Foreign actors will continue to be instrumental in the course of events in Syria. Despite Saudi Arabia’s apparent efforts to rein in segments of the insurgency deemed to be threatening to the wider region, the Syrian insurgency is operating through its own inertia. The reconstitution of al-Qaeda-affiliated elements in Iraq that are making forays into Syria raises another set of important challenges. It is also unlikely that the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Qatar will cease to be a factor affecting events in Syria. Meanwhile, the Ba’athist regime, emboldened by a series of major military gains over the last few months, is likely to prefer having to deal with an opposition operating under Saudi rather than Qatari auspices. Among other things, Syria may be calculating that Saudi Arabia’s growing anxiety over the course of the insurgency and its impact on regional stability, may provide a window of opportunity for some sort of agreement to end the crisis.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
Image: Copyright © Shutterstock. All Rights Reserved.
http://www.fairobserver.com/article/saudi-arabia-qatar-royal-rivalry-levant-part-2