US-Pakistan Relations after the Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan: The Bush and Clinton Years

By John Gennace.

 

Background and Introduction

The U.S.-Pakistan relationship has been characterized by many ups and downs since the 1950s; with neither side proving capable of distinguishing itself in developing a stable, long-term relationship.[i] In what is arguably the high-water mark of the often frustrating bilateral relationship, after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, Pakistan was once again considered a frontline state against Soviet expansionism. An offer to Pakistan of $400 million in economic and security aid by the Carter Administration in early 1980 was turned down by President Zia-ul Haq as “peanuts.” In September 1981, however, the Reagan Administration, negotiated a $3.2 billion, 5-year economic and military aid package with Pakistan. Congress facilitated the renewal of aid in December by amending the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA),[ii] giving President Reagan authority to waive Section 669 for six years in the case of Pakistan, on grounds of national interest. Pakistan, therefore, became a conduit for arms supplies to the Afghan resistance, as well as a haven for three million Afghan refugees.[iii]

Notwithstanding the renewal of U.S. aid and close security ties, many Members of Congress were apprehensive about Pakistan’s nuclear program, based partially on evidence of U.S. export control violations that indicated the Pakistanis were working to acquire a nuclear weapons capability. In 1985, the Pressler amendment was added to the FAA, requiring the President to certify to Congress that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear explosive device during the fiscal year for which aid is to be provided.[iv] The Pressler amendment was a compromise between Members of Congress who wanted aid to Pakistan frozen because of evidence that it was pressing on to develop its nuclear program and those who preferred continued support for Pakistan’s role in opposing the Soviet occupation of neighboring Afghanistan. Ultimately a $4 billion, six-year assistance package for Pakistan was authorized in 1986.[v]

The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, beginning in May 1988, however, marked the beginning of a profound shift in U.S. policy toward Pakistan that would severely strain the bilateral relationship. It is this period in U.S.-Pakistan relations – the immediate aftermath of the Cold War and through the decade of the 1990s – which this paper will examine. Specifically, it will broadly analyze the roles and focus on the key decisions of the White House, Department of State and Congress in shaping U.S. relations with Pakistan, along with Pakistan’s reactions to certain key U.S. policy decisions.

The Bush Years: 1989-1993

With the Soviet exit from Afghanistan came increasing U.S. scrutiny over Pakistan’s nuclear program. Even before he assumed the presidency, then president-elect George H.W. Bush had put the Pakistanis on notice that they stood on the edge of sanctions in a letter that followed President Reagan’s final certification under the Pressler amendment.[vi] Indeed, the Bush administration and State Department conveyed to Pakistan on several occasions the legal bind that Pressler would put them in if the president were unable to certify that Pakistan was not in possession of a nuclear device.

During an early 1989 visit to the United States by Pakistan’s chief of army staff, Gen. Mirza Aslam Beg, he met with Bush’s national security advisor, Brent Scowcroft, warning Beg, who shared responsibility for Pakistan’s nuclear program with then-President Ghulam Ishaq Khan: “You have to realize that the administration’s hands are tied on the nuclear issue. President Bush [will] certify as long as he [can] under the Pressler amendment, but he [will] not lie. Pakistan [stands] very close to the line.”[vii] Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto assured Bush that Pakistan understood U.S. concerns when he reviewed the nuclear issue directly with her when they met in February 1989 while in Tokyo.[viii]

It seems rather clear that Bush was signaling to Bhutto that he desired to continue the close security relationship with Pakistan, but doing so would hinge entirely on suspension of the nuclear program. Simultaneously, the Bush administration was saying in no uncertain terms that with the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the imminent end of the Cold War, that the U.S. would be changing its policy on the nuclear issue.[ix] In other words, absent the Soviet threat, the rationale for not imposing sanctions on Pakistan would be far less compelling and pressure from nonproliferation advocates in Congress would intensify.[x] U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan, Robert Oakley, was more forceful, however, when he warned Islamabad, “If you take any action on the nuclear program and you go past the line … [Bush] will blow the whistle and invoke Pressler.”[xi]

Despite Pakistan’s assurances that it had not developed a nuclear weapons capability, the U.S.-Pakistan relationship would take a profound turn for the worse in May 1990. In what is described as “an exercise in preventive diplomacy,” President Bush dispatched deputy national security advisor, Robert Gates to South Asia not only to meet with Pakistani and Indian leaders to try to deescalate tensions over Kashmir, but also to deliver what was essentially an ultimatum to Pakistan regarding its nuclear program.[xii] By the time of Gates’ trip to South Asia, U.S. intelligence had determined that Pakistan had been machining uranium metal into bomb cores – the final step toward obtaining a working nuclear weapon.[xiii] Despite Pakistan’s vehement denials that it had not crossed the nuclear threshold, as far as the U.S. was concerned, there was no doubt that it had. Ambassador Oakley made clear to Bhutto that Pakistan was “committing suicide” as far as its relationship with the U.S. was concerned if it did not agree to roll back its nuclear program.[xiv] According to Oakley, “[Pakistan] kept hoping that it wasn’t going to happen … They were in a state of denial. So I kept putting it in front of them and nothing ever happened.”[xv] When he returned to Islamabad in September 1990 he delivered a letter from President Bush to the Pakistani’s informing them he could not issue the necessary certification to Congress as required by Pressler. Consequently, the following month, $564 million in military and economic aid was frozen.

Among the most serious consequences of the sanctions on Pakistan was the United States’ refusal to deliver seventy-one F-16 fighter aircraft ordered in 1989. An attempt was made to secure a deal with another country in order to reimburse Pakistan the $658 million it had paid for twenty-eight of the aircraft, but proved unsuccessful. Extremely upset by the U.S. refusal to deliver its planes and the non-refund of its money, the Pakistani government purportedly considered taking the U.S. to court over the issue.[xvi] It would take eight-years and a second Clinton administration before the United States allowed Pakistan to recover its financial losses ($324.6 million) in the deal from the Judgment Fund of the U.S. Treasury – a fund used to settle legal disputes that involve the U.S. government – as well as provide Pakistan with $140 million in goods, including agricultural commodities.[xvii]

According to Brent Scowcroft, President Bush was “genuinely sad” about having to take the action that he did, but he felt he had no choice.[xviii] The administration did, however, make efforts to delay implementation of the sanctions in order to give Pakistan some time to deal with the nuclear issue. When the State Department presented the idea of delaying sanctions to Congressional leaders – Democrat and Republican – the response was negative. Republican Senator William Cohen proclaimed, “If we lower our [nuclear] standards again, who is going to take the standard seriously?”[xix]

Any hopes for Pakistan to avoid the punishing U.S. sanctions evaporated when its foreign minister, Yaqub Kahn, traveled to Washington in October 1990 to meet with Secretary of State, James Baker. Yaqub proposed freezing the nuclear program if the U.S. would agree to lifting the sanctions. Baker refused. According to Baker, in order for the president to issue the necessary certification under Pressler, the Pakistanis would have to melt-down their bomb cores and “roll back its capability to the other side of the line.”[xx] Therefore, unless Pakistan agreed to U.S. demands, Baker would not recommend certification. When Yaqub told Baker that a rollback was not possible, any chance for reconciling the matter was lost. According to Yaqub, Baker was “cold and lacking in sympathy for his country.”[xxi] After a decade of intensive U.S.-Pakistan cooperation, The United States had decided, in effect, to file for divorce.[xxii]

Despite years of American warnings that sanctions could become a reality, Pakistanis reacted with intense shock and anger. In years past the U.S. had always managed to avoid making good on its threats of sanctions, so on the one hand it was reasonable for Pakistan to assume that this time would be no different. Indeed, the Reagan and Carter administrations had managed to avoid sanctions when they needed Pakistan to counter the Soviets in Afghanistan, couldn’t the same be expected from Bush? From the perspective of U.S. officials such as Scowcroft, Oakley and Gates, however, no one in Islamabad should have been at all surprised. Pakistan’s president, prime minister and army chief had all been explicitly warned and Washington was simply making good on the threats it had been issuing for years.[xxiii]

Nevertheless, the Pakistanis were enraged over Pressler particularly because it targeted Pakistan, while its nemesis, India, had detonated a nuclear device in 1974 without suffering similar consequences. For Pakistan, the Pressler ordeal is regarded as America’s ultimate abandonment – “With the Afghan War over, the United States no longer need[s] Pakistan. You Americans have discarded us like a piece of used Kleenex.”[xxiv] Without a doubt, the Pressler episode caused severe damage to what was a close security relationship that had flourished during the 1980s and set the tone for the complex and strained U.S.-Pakistan relationship of the 1990s.

America’s shifting geopolitical priorities in the immediate wake of the Cold-War not only altered U.S. policy on Pakistan’s nuclear program. By early 1990 the U.S. was becoming increasingly concerned over Pakistan’s ongoing support for the Kashmiri insurgency. While meeting with Pakistani Ambassador Abida Hussein in Washington, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Arnold Kanter warned that if Pakistan continued its covert assistance for the Kashmiri insurgency, it ran the risk of being declared a country officially supporting terrorism. Kanter cautioned, “If you get hit with this on top of Pressler, that will end the U.S.-Pakistan relationship.”[xxv]

The terrorism problem stood at the top of Nicholas Platt’s agenda, along with the nuclear problem by late 1991. Platt, who replaced Robert Oakley as U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan recalls, “I raised the issue at every level from the prime minister on down.”[xxvi] Although Pakistan’s initial response was that it was merely offering political and moral support for the Kashmiri insurgency, they later conceded that the ISI had been providing more substantial assistance, but claimed that this had been halted.[xxvii] Pakistan’s foreign office and the ISI disagreed over the appropriate response to pressure from the United States. The foreign office was concerned over the fallout of ignoring U.S. warnings, while the ISI favored continuing to support the Kashmiri insurgency and was not convinced that the U.S. would actually make good on its warning to designate Pakistan a state sponsor of terrorism. Ultimately, Prime Minister Sharif agreed with the foreign office and reigned in the ISI enough to avoid being lumped together with “rogue states” such as North Korea, Libya and Iran.[xxviii]

By the end of the Bush Administration in 1993 the U.S.-Pakistan relationship had been effectively derailed. Absent the Soviet threat and its withdrawal from Afghanistan, U.S. and Pakistani interests began to diverge in ways that were especially damaging to the bilateral relationship. For the U.S., Pakistan had not only become strategically irrelevant, but had become a nuclear pariah, too, and a source of regional instability by its support for the Kashmiri insurgency, which landed it on the U.S. terrorism “watch list.” For Pakistan, the punishment of the Pressler sanctions and the seemingly abrupt shift in U.S. policy was viewed as proof that America was fickle, unreliable, and not a true friend to Pakistan.[xxix]

The Clinton Years: 1993-2001

Although it is outside the scope of this brief paper to thoroughly analyze every key aspect of the U.S.-Pakistan relations during the Clinton era, it will attempt to briefly examine the ones that arguably had the greatest impact (for better or worse) on the bilateral relationship.

Despite the damaged U.S.-Pakistan relationship and the ongoing nuclear problem inherited by President Bill Clinton in 1993, his administration and other elements of the U.S. government sought to engage Pakistan, rather than isolate it.[xxx] One of the strongest proponents of improved U.S.-Pakistani relations was Assistant Secretary of State, Robin Raphel. Raphel was appointed by President Clinton to work in the new Bureau of South Asian Affairs and had remained convinced that Pakistan was a potentially useful friend for the U.S. and a force for moderation in the Islamic world.[xxxi] On her first official visit to South Asia in the fall 1993, she told journalists that the U.S. had never accepted the accession of Kashmir to India, which pleased Islamabad, while drawing the ire of the Indian press.

U.S. Secretary of Defense, William Perry also shared Raphel’s desire for improved relations with Pakistan. The U.S. military was not happy with the deterioration in relations with Pakistan and was seeking ways to restore the relationship. The Pentagon, like Raphel, considered Pakistan a longtime ally, a potentially helpful partner in western Asia and the Middle East, and an important source of forces for expanding UN peacekeeping missions. The Pakistani army had sent six thousand troops to Somalia and three thousand took part in the peacekeeping mission in Bosnia[xxxii] – both contributions being extremely important to the post-conflict stabilization efforts there. When Perry traveled to Islamabad in January 1995, he was the first U.S. official in many years to recommend any steps towards reestablishing security ties. Although the secretary was skeptical that the Congress would lift the sanctions, Perry told the media, “I intend to press on, to make the most I can of the security relations between the United States and Pakistan … I want to try to make things better.”[xxxiii]

Raphel secured another ally in Republican Senator Hank Brown, after he become chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s South Asia subcommittee. Brown told Dennis Kux in an interview that although he supported good U.S.-India relations, while on a Congressional trip to South Asia, he became convinced that the draconian sanctions on Pakistan were harmful to U.S. interests.[xxxiv] While Brown initially proposed easing sanctions by lifting the ban on economic assistance and releasing all military equipment frozen in the United States, including the F-16s, he dropped the aircraft after realizing that including them would torpedo his effort to ease sanctions.[xxxv]

In what became known as the Brown amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act, the Senator was essentially advocating for a one-time waiver of the Pressler sanctions. Although Brown’s amendment preserved the restriction on U.S. government arms assistance and transfers, it allowed for renewed economic aid, loan guarantees by the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, and Export-Import Bank lending. It also authorized Pakistan to take ownership of the military equipment frozen in the United States, with the exception of the F-16s, and allowed the resumption of training of Pakistan’s military personnel.[xxxvi] Despite its passage in September 1995, Brown faced stiff opposition not only in the U.S. Congress, but from the Indian-American community who argued that the amendment would upset the balance of power in South Asia. In fact, the arms transfer would have little impact on the strategic balance between India and Pakistan. Although the amendment could not undo Pressler’s ban on U.S. military aid and arms transfers, from Pakistan’s perspective, however, it demonstrated that the Clinton administration agreed with the intrinsic unfairness of the Pressler amendment and it had tried to lessen its impact. Robin Raphel in essence shared Pakistani sentiment before a Senate hearing: “The key impact of sanctions relief is not military or financial. The effect would be primarily in the political realm, creating a sense of faith restored and an unfairness rectified with a country and a people who have been loyal friends of the United States over the decades.”[xxxvii]

U.S. President Bill Clinton’s reelection in November 1996 brought with it a new foreign policy team that moved South Asia higher on its agenda. Newly appointed Secretary of State, Madeline Albright, brought with her former ambassador to India, Thomas Pickering to serve as undersecretary for political affairs and Robin Raphel’s replacement, Karl Inderfurth, as assistant secretary for South Asia. Pickering shared their vision this way: “We want to show that we don’t consider South Asia the backside of the diplomatic globe.”[xxxviii] Notwithstanding U.S. goals to reinvigorate its efforts in the region, the U.S.-Pakistan relationship would be profoundly frustrated by a number of issues that would unfold during Clinton’s second presidential term.

Unbeknownst to the United States, by spring 1998 India had decided to move ahead with a series of nuclear tests and was completely surprised when the latter detonated five nuclear devices on May 11, 1998. The tests came at a time when nuclear nonproliferation had made steady progress as a number of former Soviet states and other potential nuclear countries had signed-on to the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), along with broad international support of the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). A “deeply disturbed” President Clinton was quick to impose a series of wide-ranging sanctions that were mandated under the 1994 nonproliferation act.[xxxix] India’s tests left Pakistan in a precarious situation. Then-Prime Minister Sharif came under enormous pressure from the U.S. to not respond in-kind, while domestic pressure in Pakistan was relentless in demanding that Pakistan match India’s tests. Clinton dispatched Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbot to Islamabad in an effort to persuade Pakistan to show restraint. Talbot was authorized to reopen discussions on the F-16s and the resumption of military and economic aid, and argued that Pakistan would garner international moral support by not conducting its own nuclear tests and, thus would further isolate India. Besides, Talbot argued, a test was unnecessary because it was widely presumed that Pakistan already had a nuclear capability. To stress Talbot’s appeals, Clinton spoke with Sharif on four occasions by telephone in hopes of persuading him.

For Sharif, however, he was in the unenviable position of having only two choices – both of them bad. If he gave the green light to test, the economic price for Pakistan would be high. The country was already reeling from previous sanctions and its economy would unlikely be capable of withstanding more. Also, Pakistan would arguably forfeit the opportunity for better relations with the U.S. – something it had been working toward since the imposition of the Pressler sanctions eight years prior. Even so, Pakistan had legitimate reason to be skeptical of the U.S. Officials in Pakistan had little faith in Clinton’s words and were doubtful that Congress would agree to removing sanctions and approve a substantial economic and conventional arms assistance package.[xl] However, if Sharif did concede he would pay an enormous political price at home. Opposing political parties as well as his own were vehement in their demands for Pakistan to match India. Sharif was reportedly told by the editor of the widely read and influential Urdu daily Nawai-i-Waqt, “There is going to be an explosion soon. It will either be a Pakistani nuclear test or your being blown out of office!”[xli] Unable to secure a security guarantee from President Clinton vis-à-vis India, Sharif authorized Pakistan to proceed with the tests and on May 28, 1998, it detonated five nuclear devices and a sixth three days later.

President Clinton’s disappointment in Sharif’s decision was evident when he commented, “By failing to exercise restraint in responding to the Indian test, Pakistan lost a truly priceless opportunity to strengthen its own security, to improve its political standing in the world.”[xlii] Simultaneously, the White House made clear that the president was angrier at India. “Prime Minister Sharif was honest and straightforward in the description of the decision he was wrestling with … and India manifestly was not.”[xliii]

Although the Clinton administration was forced to sanction Pakistan as it had India, it worked to lessen their impact. To be sure, the sanctions were also potentially harmful to U.S. commercial interests and stood to be particularly damaging to agricultural interests who needed a customer for 350,000 tons of wheat. Therefore, in July 1999, only two months after the nuclear tests, both houses of Congress voted to exempt agricultural credits from the sanctions. [xliv] Additionally, there were well-placed fears that the sanctions might ruin Pakistan’s economy. Pakistan had a foreign debt of $30 billion and foreign exchange reserves of only $600 million at the time of its nuclear tests. Consequently it would be unable to make upcoming debt payments unless it received help from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) – a move supported by the U.S. State Department.[xlv] The deal that was ultimately agreed to by the IMF and Pakistan, however, was largely meant to keep the country from financial collapse, rather than a complete rescue package for its suffering economy.

It was during President Clinton’s second term in August 1998 that the threats emerging from Afghanistan were becoming evident. U.S. intelligence concluded that the terrorist attacks carried out earlier that month on U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, killing more than two-hundred, were planned and financed by Osama bin Laden who was then living in Afghanistan under Taliban protection.[xlvi] By this time ISI’s support for the Taliban (something it continued to deny) had become a significant source of tension with the U.S. Even before the embassy attacks the Taliban was being universally condemned, especially in the United States, for its poor treatment of women, acceptance of the illicit drug trade and their willingness to provide safe haven for Islamic extremists and terrorists.[xlvii] A few weeks after the embassy bombings The U.S. launched a retaliatory cruise missile attack on bin Laden’s training camps in Afghanistan. Although the U.S. chose not to inform Pakistan of the strikes in advance, Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Joseph Ralston, was in Islamabad at the time and was able to inform Pakistani General Karamat that the missiles were American, not Indian, and Afghanistan was the intended target.[xlviii]

Notwithstanding Gen. Ralston’s assurances, Pakistanis were not pleased with what they viewed as an infringement on their sovereignty. The U.S. was now eager to apprehend bin Laden and urged the Pakistanis to pressure the Taliban to hand him over. Pakistan was not optimistic that it would be successful citing fiercely held Afghan customs regarding hospitality that would render its efforts to get bin Laden futile. Sharif was again faced with a difficult dilemma. If he sided with the U.S. and took action to apprehend bin Laden, he would likely pay a huge price at home and infuriated the Taliban, while having little assurance that helping the U.S. would do much for Pakistan. Indeed, Sharif’s dilemma and reluctance to do more was indicative of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship – a lack of mutual trust resulting in missed opportunities for both. Tragically, the missed opportunity to cooperate on bin Laden would have terrible consequences only a few years later with the terror attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001.

The twenty-first century did not begin on a positive note in South Asia. In January 2000 relations between Pakistan and India were abysmal and many held valid concerns over renewed conflict between the two nuclear states. Therefore, in an effort to ease tensions in the region, President Clinton announced in late January that he would move ahead with this twice-postponed trip to South Asia in March.[xlix] From the outset there were serious security concerns over the state of anti-American sentiment in Pakistan and hence the safety of Clinton while visiting there. While certainly valid, these overriding concerns would ultimately limit the president’s Pakistan visit to a mere five hours – a stark contrast to the celebrated five days he would spend in India beforehand.

Clinton delivered a soaring speech received by Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee this way, “Mr. President, your visit marks the beginning of a new voyage in the new century by two countries which have all the potential to become natural allies.”[l]  Afterwards Clinton traveled throughout the country attending receptions with cheering Indians and Rajasthani villagers showered a smiling Clinton with a blizzard of rose petals.[li]

This was not the case in Pakistan. Because of fears of a terror attack on the first presidential visit in more than thirty-years, Clinton arrived in Pakistan in an unmarked Gulfstream jet that followed a decoy of the president’s Air Force One. In closed door meetings with President Musharraf, Clinton warned him that he must deal with the terrorism problem in Pakistan and to reconsider his country’s nuclear posture. Clinton spoke of the dire threat posed by the Taliban in Afghanistan and shared his hope that Pakistan should return to civilian rule quickly.[lii] Afterwards Clinton addressed Pakistan in a live, uncensored broadcast cautioning of the “danger that Pakistan may grow even more isolated, draining even more resources away from the needs of the people, moving even closer to a conflict no one can win.”[liii] Skipping the standard photo session with Musharaff, Clinton hurried off to make the fifteen mile drive from Islamabad back to the Rawalpindi airport along a cleared, heavily guarded highway.[liv] Clinton’s brief stop in Pakistan only served to reinforce Pakistan’s long held narrative of abandonment and betrayal by the United States. Although pleased that the president had not skipped Pakistan altogether, most were understandably hurt that Clinton had only given Pakistan five hours while spending five days with rival, India.

Conclusion

When examining the U.S.-Pakistan relationship of the 1990s there should be little doubt that the implementation of the Pressler sanctions had by far the greatest impact on bilateral relations. Indeed, it set the tone for virtually all U.S.-Pakistani interactions and policy decisions that would follow. While Pressler sought to address a very real concern in nuclear proliferation, it did so at the expense of a critically important and mutually beneficial U.S.-Pakistan relationship. Although U.S. geopolitical interests were shifting in the aftermath of the Cold-War, by virtue of Pakistan’s strategic location, deep fears of its nuclear rival in India and its longtime support for U.S. interests in South Asia, the U.S. and, the Congress, in particular, should have given these issues far greater consideration before moving forward with Pressler.

While the Bush and Clinton administrations had generally good intentions towards Pakistan, the Pressler sanctions very often constrained and undermined White House and State Department policies that could have facilitated better relations and policy outcomes. Furthermore, it is reasonable to say that President Clinton’s South Asia trip contributed greatly to undoing much of the engagement efforts carried out during his two terms in office and to reinforcing Pakistan’s feelings of abandonment and insolation. To be sure, a more equitable agenda could have gone a long way toward better U.S.-Pakistani relations to say nothing of better Pakistan-India relations. Sadly, President Clinton left office leaving a legacy of missed opportunities in the U.S.-Pakistan relationship.

[i] April 7, 2016 interview with Karl Inderfurth.

[ii] Section 620E of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 governs aid to Pakistan. Section 669 banned U.S. economic, and military assistance, and export credits to countries that deliver or receive, acquire or transfer nuclear enrichment technology. Barbara Leitch LePoer. March 2001. Pakistan-U.S. Relations. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service.

[iii]Barbara Leitch LePoer. March 2001. Pakistan-U.S. Relations. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service.

[iv] Barbara Leitch LePoer. March 2001. Pakistan-U.S. Relations. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service.

[v] Barbara Leitch LePoer. March 2001. Pakistan-U.S. Relations. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service.

[vi] Dennis Kux. 2001. The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press (299).

[vii] Dennis Kux. 2001. The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press (299).

[viii] Dennis Kux. 2001. The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press (300).

[ix] Dennis Kux. 2001. The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press (300).

[x] Dennis Kux. 2001. The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press (300).

[xi] Dennis Kux. 2001. The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press (300).

[xii] Dennis Kux. 2001. The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press (306, 307).

[xiii] Dennis Kux. 2001. The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press (306, 307).

[xiv] Dennis Kux. 2001. The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press (307).

[xv] Dennis Kux. 2001. The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press (307).

[xvi] Barbara Leitch LePoer. March 2001. Pakistan-U.S. Relations. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service.

[xvii] Barbara Leitch LePoer. March 2001. Pakistan-U.S. Relations. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service and Daniel Markey. 2013. No Exit from Pakistan: America’s Tortured Relationship with Islamabad. New York: Cambridge University Press (91).

[xviii] Dennis Kux. 2001. The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press (308).

[xix] Dennis Kux. 2001. The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press (309).

[xx] Dennis Kux. 2001. The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press (309).

[xxi] Dennis Kux. 2001. The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press (310).

[xxii] Steve Coll. 2004. Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001. New York: The Penguin Press (220).

[xxiii] Daniel Markey. 2013. No Exit from Pakistan: America’s Tortured Relationship with Islamabad. New York: Cambridge University Press (91).

[xxiv] Dennis Kux. 2001. The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press (310) and Daniel Markey. 2013. No Exit from Pakistan: America’s Tortured Relationship with Islamabad. New York: Cambridge University Press (91).

[xxv] Dennis Kux. 2001. The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press (316).

[xxvi] Dennis Kux. 2001. The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press (316).

[xxvii]Dennis Kux. 2001. The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press (316).

[xxviii] Dennis Kux. 2001. The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press (316).

[xxix] Dennis Kux. 2001. The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press (320).

[xxx] April 7, 2016 interview with Karl Inderfurth.

[xxxi] Interview with Robin Raphel, April 26, 2016 and Dennis Kux. 2001. The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press (328).

[xxxii] Dennis Kux. 2001. The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press (328).

[xxxiii] Dennis Kux. 2001. The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press (328).

[xxxiv] Dennis Kux. 2001. The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press (329).

[xxxv] Dennis Kux. 2001. The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press (329).

[xxxvi] Dennis Kux. 2001. The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press (330).

[xxxvii] Dennis Kux. 2001. The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press (331).

[xxxviii] Dennis Kux. 2001. The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press (340).

[xxxix] Dennis Kux. 2001. The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press (344).

[xl] Dennis Kux. 2001. The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press (344).

[xli] Dennis Kux. 2001. The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press (346).

[xlii] Dennis Kux. 2001. The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press (346).

[xliii] Dennis Kux. 2001. The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press (346).

[xliv] Dennis Kux. 2001. The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press (347).

[xlv] April 7, 2016 interview with Karl Inderfurth.

[xlvi] Dennis Kux. 2001. The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press (348).

[xlvii] Dennis Kux. 2001. The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press (348).

[xlviii] Dennis Kux. 2001. The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press (349).

[xlix] Dennis Kux. 2001. The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press (355, 356).

[l] Daniel Markey. 2013. No Exit from Pakistan: America’s Tortured Relationship with Islamabad. New York: Cambridge University Press (179).

[li] Daniel Markey. 2013. No Exit from Pakistan: America’s Tortured Relationship with Islamabad. New York: Cambridge University Press (179).

[lii] Daniel Markey. 2013. No Exit from Pakistan: America’s Tortured Relationship with Islamabad. New York: Cambridge University Press (179).

[liii] Daniel Markey. 2013. No Exit from Pakistan: America’s Tortured Relationship with Islamabad. New York: Cambridge University Press (179, 180).

[liv] Daniel Markey. 2013. No Exit from Pakistan: America’s Tortured Relationship with Islamabad. New York: Cambridge University Press (180).

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