By Simone Pasquazzi.
The Afghan puzzle: Does the solution stand in a political agreement with the Taliban
Introduction.
On Monday 7 October 2013 (the 12th anniversary of the Afganistan war), six months before he steps down from office and one year before NATO conclude its operations, Afghan outgoing president Amid Karzai gave an interview to BBC criticizing the Western military operations’ outcome in his country. “I am not happy to say that there is partial security. That’s not what we are seeking. What we wanted was absolute security and a clear-cut war against terrorism,” he said. Karzai told that the international troops were not able to really secure Afghan villages and flush out Taliban bases in Pakistan. He addedd that during military operations Western forces often caused civilian casualties. Finally, and more importantly, he figured a scenario seeing Taliban groups given roles within government in the near future, at least in case some of their leaders do previously give formal assurance to democratically run in the next Afghan elections (provincial and presidential scheduled for 2014, parliamentary for 2015). Mr. Karzai sustained that a possible Taliban participation into government would not undermine “democratic progress” or Afghan women’s condition. The president concluded by afferming his priority for his remaining weeks in office will be to forge a peace agreement with the Taliban.
International reactions to Karzai’s declarations did not focus much on the evaluation of NATO’s performance. After all, the political and military troubles faced by the Atlantic Alliance in the “management” of the Afghan situation are well known, as well as the difficult relations between Karzai and the US (which believes, in part correctly, he was not a completely reliable and effective partner during his two mandates as Afghan president).
Most of international reactions to Karzai’s declarations did concentrate on the most important political passage of his speech, that is the one about a possible Taliban role in the Afghan government. A number of human rights activists and Western diplomats have voiced fears that the Taliban would roll back gains reached by the country in terms of democracy and individual freedoms. Many in the US and Europe think in fact a Taliban presence in the Afghan government will produce anti-democratic and anti-liberal effects, making difficult (if not impossible) both a pacific dialogue between the different institutional and social actors of the country and young girls and women studying and getting higher education and better job opportunities. After all, the Taliban regime (1996-2001) not only hosted al-Qaeda’s members and bases, but did also instaurate a religious leaded autocracy which strongly discriminated women (among other things by limiting their access to education and forcing them to wear burqas at all times).
In any case, it seems now almost sure the Western combat role will cease by the end of 2014 “no matter what”, as President Barack Obama said over the last weeks (even if the US is trying to reach an agreement with Karzai on a residual Nato force for training and support in counter-terrorism). The Afghan war has been for Washington a real quagmire. The US military and diplomatic actions have been very often frustrated by Karzai’s defiances, an extremely difficult domestic scenario and a complex regional environment (in which also Pakistan, Russia, China and Central Asian Republics try to play a role). Moreover, at least 2,146 U.S. military have been killed in the conlict, which has cost U.S. taxpayers between $4 and $6 trillion by some estimates. As the war enters its thirteenth year, and as its outcome is quite different from how originally expected, the US administration strongly wants to end the dispute (which in military terms would probably continue to be stalemated even with an injection of additional troops).
The reasons for an agreement with the Taliban
After twelve years of war, the Taliban have been politically and militarily weakened, but not defeated; they still keep some influence in the country, especially among certain tribal groups in the South and the East. That is why “an agreement with the enemy” can be an (undesirable but rational) option. As early as 2011 Hillary Clinton suggested for a peace process to work, Taliban leaders, if renouncing violence, should have been considered as legitimate diplomatic counteparts. US officials in the last months have often publicly sustained the Afghan conflict won’t be won on the battlefield, which is why Washington did recently support the opening of official contacts and diplomatic negotiations with Taliban leaders (both in Qatar, where an office of the Taliban was established last June, and Afghanistan). European governments too have been part in this diplomatic process, since the talks with the Taliban were partly brokered by Pakistan and Qatar after months of diplomatic spadework also involving Germany, Norway and the UK.
Inasmuch as a complete social and military defeat of the Taliban still seems impossible, a political settlement would constitute a legitimate attempt at ending the conflict and preparing the country to survive without a significant international presence on its territory. In other words, when war fails, politics can be the continuation of war by other means, even with the most radical of the enemies.
Can an agreement with the Taliban effectively work and help stabilize the country?
We now know political agreements and compromises with “radical” opposition forces sometimes can not only contribute to defuse intra-state military disputes, but also bring those forces to partially mitigate their political and ideological positions. Perhaps this has not been exactly the case with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, but the gain of government responsibilities had such an effect, at least partially, on Hamas in Palestine and Hezbollah in Lebanon. “Political legitimization” of those groups did not have harsh negative impacts, either at the domestic or the international level. Taliban’s radicalism can be stronger and it is all but beyond question the Students of the Islamic Knowledge Movement will accept the logic of compromise. In any case a political bargaining with them might decrease their ideological and political unity, bringing more moderate Taliban leaders to prefer dialogue to violence back of conditional power-sharing offers (this could at least decrease the number of insurgents the Afghan security forces will have to fight in the near future).
Politically speaking, an agreement between the Afghan government and the Taliban surely represents a riskful option, but it might work if based on a mixture of conceding power to Taliban areas while ensuring that Taliban governors respect and implement the central government policies. Some of the issues Taliban leaders are more interested in are related to the autonomy of provinces. They share that concern with other Afghan groups, as many of them are very critical over the centralized asset of power that is imprinting the political system of the country. In this sense several of the Taliban demands do fit in with the requests that seem important for other Afghans. So theoretically there could be some space for the parties to find an agreement.
Once a political agreement is reached, then a constitutional settlement is needed. The latter could be much more difficult to get. The constitutional debate involves thorny issues to agree on such as human rights, women’s rights and the rights of minorities. In the past the Taliban have very often said they dislike the Afghan current constitution and they want a “totally Islamic law” (that is to say a socio-legal system based on a very rigid interpretation of Sharia). However, in the last two years several Taliban leaders seemed to gradually make less radical their positions. A significant part of their jihadi rhetoric has been replaced by more nationalist speeches. It seemed they wanted to convince Afghan people and foreign powers they are good Afghans and patriots, and their struggle is a patriotic fight against foreign occupation, not a war on Afghan people. In addition, according to some recent articles and reports, in the last couple of years the Taliban allowed education at a high level even for girls in some areas under their control in the East and the South. The Taliban also told they are breaking their links to Al-Qaeda, and they will not be training foreign Sunni-jihadists or attack Shia Muslims as in the 90’s. Finally, they said they are trying to establish better relations with the religious minorities of the country and all the non-Pashtun groups.
It is difficult to believe in a real moderate evolution by the Taliban. Besides, it is possible a part of them will refuse the logic of political bargaining and will not depose their arms. That said, Taliban leaders do not have many alternatives. They themselves probably know if they continue fighting after the US and the other Western powers leave, then there will be a high risk of a without-end civil war. This time the central government, the Northern Alliance, the Afghan army, the warlords in the North and the non-Pashtun groups would all want to play a role. Each of these groups seems stronger now than in the 90’s, and the majority of Afghan people does not want a radical islamization of the country.
External actors
Facing the perspective of a peace-agrrement and a Taliban participation in the government, regional powers such as Pakistan, Russia and China will try to increase their influence on the country, even though history clearly suggests no foreign power will be able to really impact on Afghan affairs.
In the last months the Taliban sent several messages they want to avoid tensions with all the states of Asia, and especially with its near neighbors. They declared India is not an enemy, which in a certain sense does not like to Pakistan, but surely is what the Indians like to hear. In any case, it is likely that in the near future Pakistan will try to favor a possible peace agreement between the Taliban and Kabul. Since Nawaz Sharif took office as Prime Minister in Islamabad he saw huge problems, such as economic crisis, electricity shortage and terrorist attacks. If Sharif wants to help the economy and political stability of his country, he has to tempestively and unambiguosly deal with the issue of terrorism, at home (where Pakistani Taliban very recently asked for negotiations) as well as for Afghanistan.
Moscow probably welcomes a peace dialogue between Taliban leaders and Karzai, at least in case the first do give clear evidence of severing ties with Muslim terrorism – a problem still affecting Russia. The same can be said about China, which is not only concerned about its own Islamic insurgents/Uighur separatists spilling across the China-Afghanistan border, but also strongly interested in controlling Central Asia natural resources and limiting the trafficking of narcotics through the region. ‛Political reconciliation’ in Afganistan is one of the cardinal point of Bejing’s policy towards ‘Greater Central Asia’. So it is very probable Bejing will try to take advantage from any possible space for compromise between Karzai and the Taliban for increasing its (economic and political) role in Central Asia. This may not sound particularly good for Western powers, but whether NATO after 2014 will keep a residual force in the country this will help not only security and counter-terrorism, but also the US and Europe to not lose too much (and too fast) in comparison to their competitors.
Conclusion
In conclusion, after 12 years of war, no real alternative seems to exist for Afghanistan to Karzai’s quest to integrate the Taliban into the government. In the short run a Taliban participation in the government might not increase Afghanistan’s chances to evolve into a society in which people will dramatically better their living condition and share some form of effecive (liberal)democracy, but it might contribute to a gradual process of peace and a relatively stable and secure state. This result would not be modest for Afghanistan, while the benefits to the US and other Western states would be relevant if the country is no more used as a base for actions against them. If this is the case, despite the Western geostrategic influence in Afghanistan and the whole region will soon lessen, the last ten years of war, with their huge human and financial costs on the US and its allies, will not have been totally unuseful. In other words, the Afghan conflict very hardly can be considered “victorious”, but perhaps it helped making the Taliban a less radical political force and Afghanistan a less troubled country. That said, if the more moderate Taliban prove to be wolves in sheeps’ clothing, there will be little to do about it.
