By Nickolaos Mavromates.
On June 7, 2015 during Turkey’s General election day AKP’s voting constituency saw a dive from 49 to 40.8 percent, giving it only 258 seats out of 550 seats at parliament. Leaving the party 18 seats short of forming a single-party government as it has done since 2002. However in spite of the electorate outcome and the immediate derailing of Erdoğan’s planned constitutional reforms to strengthen the role of the Turkish presidency due to HDP electoral success, the game for AKP’s control of Anatolia is far from over. More precisely the Kemalist leftist Republican People’s Party (CHP) did not see any increase in its support. It remained static at its 2011 election results (25%) while from the status quo parties, just the extreme right wing Nationalistic movement Party MHP increased its percentage from 13 percent to 16 percent. It acquired an extra 3 percent mainly from AKP’s conservative Islamic voting pool that became dissatisfied with AKP policies or by Erdoğan’s political behavior since the Presidential elections of 2014.
Only Turkey’s pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), saw a significance increase of its electorate percentage from 6 percent since the last elections, to almost 13 percent currently. Thus, obtaining a negotiation tool that could be used for its political purposes and Kurdish self governing aspirations especially now that no party has the necessary electorate majority to form a government. Few analysts have doubts of what is at stake for the future of this nations domestic and external polices vis-à-vis the Turkish people and the surrounding international environment.
This raised the question which Party from the Turkish opposition (CHP, MHP, HDP) will share power with Erdoğan’s AKP and what will be given in return for this act to take place. The alternative is having President Tayyip Erdoğan declaring new elections after 45 days due to lack of forming a minority government between the opposition and the AKP. This would prove to the masses of Anatolia that there is no alternative for political stability other than the rule of AKP as a single entity once more. A nightmare scenario for the opposition in Turkey, knowing in fact that this current political setting might bring after a brief break a triumphant AKP back to power.
Tayyip Erdoğan’s party might have had its wings clipped but its legacy left inside turkey is still alive. Despite Turkey’s lira downfall vis-à-vis the Euro and the dollar the overall economy is not so bad, compared with other neighboring countries in the region. After all Turkey is a member of the G20 major economies block which became possible mainly by the liberalization of the Turkish financial system and by the “Arab gulf Monarchies oriented Green Islamic funding. In return Turkey has promised to provide cooperation on matters of security and intelligence issues and above all a “Sunni sword protection” in times of need against any potential enemies of its Gulf donors, namely that of Iranian influence in the area. Turkey’s mutual defense military agreement with the Qatari government to station Turkish troops into that small Gulf Monarchy is a statement by itself of what might follow in the near future. Also notable is the rise of Turkish military presence as well in the Republic of Albania.
But above all, the Justice and Development Party has managed to increase Sunni religious conservatism and solidify it into the Turkish society inner psych. It legitimized the İmam Hatip Occulari,(Islamic High Schools) allowed women wearing head scarves into public places, forced CHP leadership to even accepting the value of these religious schools into the Turkish society, purged high echelon kemalist military officers that could cause issues to his agenda, and simultaneously pleased the military apparatus’ with huge indigenous defense procurement projects. It also placed the foundations for an autonomous defense production that has the potential also to elevate Turkey into the Nuclear weapons family of nations.
Last but not least he reintroduced the Ottoman Legacies of the Imperial past along with its religious connotations that are equally shared by the Nationalistic party of MHP, the religious Conservative Felicity Party and the Islamic Nationalistic Great Union Party alliance (Saadet Partisi and Büyük Birlik Partisi ) and also even by small segments of the CHP and HDP parties voting population. Pax Ottomanica is alive and present in the current political system. One has only to look at Hurriet, a secular news paper that similarly follows conservative newspapers on the Neo Ottoman cultural revolution on matters of Osmanli, (Ottoman) past endeavors.
This historical trend was totally unheard some years ago, since the Ottoman period was looked by the kemalist elite as demeaning and a backward example for the 20th century Republican Turkey to follow. Finally his Turkish Intel Spy Chief Dr. Hakan Fidan sat down to the negotiation table with PKK’s Kurdish separatist movement imprisoned leader Abdullah Öcalan and its political wing KCK (Kurdish Communities Union) in order to find a peaceful resolution to the Kurdish question, that seeks more cultural and political autonomy from Ankara’s grip. The PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) has been fighting an armed insurgency with the Turkish Armed forces that has taken the lives of more than 40.000 people and with the potential if it remains unchecked to cost even more in lives and possibly parts from the territorial integrity of Turkey.
However, despite, the above mentioned successes, Tayyip Erdoğan’s rise into the Turkish political pantheon did not last long enough to accomplish his final dream of strengthening the Turkish Presidency, allowing him to rule as the sole power inside Anatolia. The reasons of this failure are twofold. First his egoistic autocratic policies and polemic competitiveness versus certain former political allies namely that of former Turkish president, Abdullah Gül and that off Islamic religious preacher Fethullah Gülen. Policies that chipped away points from certain Islamic audiences which instead voted for the National Alliance (Millî İttifak) between Felicity Party and the great Union Party or MHP’s political platforms.
Secondly his failure to initially support the Kurdish enclave of Kobaniyê against ISIS forces. Kurdish Nationalism versus ISIS atrocities proved a strong paragon that was ignored by Erdoğan’s Geopolitical aims in the Levant concerning the support of Al Nusra and ISIS forces against Assad’s regime. At least 4 to 5 percent of Kurdish traditional AKP Kurdish voters switched allegiance to HDP allowing it to pass the ten percent threshold and enter as a single political entity into the Turkish parliament. A deadly political miscalculation on his behalf that cost him the majority rule in the Turkish Parliament.
Possible Coalitions
Returning to the original question of which political platform can hold a coalition government with AKP Party the best answer lies primary with MHP’s elite governing ambitions and its foreign policy similarities shared by AKP’s geopolitical agenda. Finally the other alternative lies with HDP’s self governing dreams and that of swallowing its political pride in order to acquire cultural autonomy inside Turkey. How far will HDP leader Demirtaş go to achieve a loose federal self-government inside Anatolia, but always under the banner of the Turkish flag despite his refusal to join or support an AKP minority government is another question.
As far as CHP goes, despite certain foreign policy overlapping concerning Greece, Cyprus, the Balkans, and Turkey’s Defense projects, there is a huge societal chasm that has its roots since Mustapha Kemal’s times. No to mention the Alevi Sunni dichotomy that perceives CHP as the Alevi’s main political platform of resistance against the total Sunnification of Anatolia. It is not a secret that Assad’s Baathist Alawite administration has been openly identified by the AKP and the conservative populace as having many commonalities with CHP’s party structure and its Alevi voters. On balance AKP is what CHP is not. Religious, conservative, anti-kemalist and above all an advent admirer of the Ottoman past.
Yet, in politics nothing is impossible but currently as the world turns, this probable coalition seems unfeasible to materialize unless Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu agrees to Erdoğan’s conditions about strengthening the role of the Turkish Presidency and AKP in return gives something of equal value to its kemalist political nemesis. After all, it maybe the Kurdish threat in Syria and in Turkey that might bond them together to face it. Off course for many Turkish politicians, businessman, intellectuals, journalists as Murat Yetkin claims a CHP and AKP minority coalition would have been the ideal one. One that could bring about a new constitution, including a reasonable solution to the Kurdish problem as they claim. However, they fail to answer how reasonable is a Kurdish resolution with CHP’s domestic agenda since CHP has equally historic nationalistic tendencies that also oppose a political solution to Turkey’s Kurdish issue, like MHP, despite its recent opening on the Kurdish question.
Also a possible MHP minority coalition, with HDP and CHP is out of the question as well. Devlet Bahçeli chairman of the MHP and his party are the biggest polemics of the latest AKP’s peace initiative with the Kurdish insurgence. Turkish nationalism versus Kurdish self government is a topic that MHP cannot budge on at all. MHP’s Chairman Bahçeli openly identifies the Kurdish peace initiative as Turkey’s dissolution talks. Thus sharing power within a HDP and CHP coalition will mean the end of MHP as we know it. Therefore MHP or HDP joining or supporting an AKP minority government are the only clearly feasible alternatives. Each party off course has its own reasons and the end justifies the means, but what the future will entail for them is another question that needs to be seen in the near future as well.
MHP’s Platform similarities with AKP’s overall political Schema’s
Regardless of what the future has in store for Erdoğan’s political career, nobody can deny that AKP has transformed Turkey religiously and more geopolitically assertive. Nationalism along with Islam has become more entrenched into Turkish society. Its ottoman glorious past has been revived into the new generations aspirations to see their nation leading once more in the Levant and in the eastern Mediterranean basin. In recent times Turkey has witnessed a Sunni cultural Blitzkrieg revival by the AKP that converted former Christian churches turned Museums into mosques again. Attempting to project the victory of the Ottomans versus the infidel Byzantine Greek legacy for a second time. The subliminal neo-Ottoman message here does not remain only in the Byzantine side but also to all potential enemies of the new rising Hegemonic Turkey.
For MHP, a Turkish Geopolitical ascend among the rest of the nations and transforming itself as a Middle Power is a vision that MHP likewise cherishes . In issues concerning Greece, Cyprus, the Turkish geopolitical infusion into the Balkan peninsula MHP rides along with Erdoğan’s strategic agenda. In addition MHP seems to concur with Ankara’s strategic dealings with Moscow, despite past and current historical enmities from the treatment of Turkish allies like the Crimean tartars or the Chechen cause. Both MHP and AKP know that acquiring nuclear, military and infrastructural technology, China and Russia is the way to go. According to Professor Ziya Öniş:“{T}urkey has recently moved towards the China-Russia axis.” Putting into action Lord Palmerstone quote that “there no friends in international relations but permanent interests that drive foreign policy relations.”
The current Russian isolation from the west due to the Ukrainian crisis has presented Ankara with a major opportunity not to be missed regarding the latter’s ambition of becoming a major energy global hub. Since the South Stream project was canceled by Putin during his visit to Turkey in December 2014 and instead a Turkish stream was proposed aiming to transfer Russian natural gas to Europe via Turkey in its place, Ankara looks to score high on energy routes diplomacy. Possible even persuading Iran and Azerbaijan to contribute with their gas resources in this major project.
Overall MHP foreign agenda does not differ from AKP’s. The only foreign scheme that MHP had an objection to, is with Erdoğan’s Syrian regime policy change due that he failed to foresee Bashar al-Assad’s survivability skills along with the dangers it might have on Kurdish nationalism in the neighborhood. If unchecked it might open Pandora’s Box on matters of Kurdish national determination and Turkish interests in the region. The recent gains of YPG (Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units) with the help of U.S.-led coalition airstrikes against ISIS jihadists concerning the capture of a strategic pass along with the town of Tal Abyad (Girê Spî in Kurdish) justified MHP’s Kurdish fears.
This not only eliminated an ISIS major hub for volunteers entering from Turkey into Syria and then to ISIS Syrian Capital Raqqah, but it also allowed for the unification of self declared Syrian Kurdish cantons of Cizîrê and Kobaniyê to get together. Also an YPG victory means automatic Kurdish control over 300 kilometers of the Syrian-Turkish border. It should be noted that Kurdish forces declared autonomy in the three cantons of, Efrînê, Cizîrê and Kobaniyê in Rojava Syrian Kurdistan after Assad’s’ government forces withdrew from the region during the start of the Syrian Civil War. Thus, opening the eventuality of uniting with Efrînê canton in the near future. More accurately if Syrian Kurdistan gets unified putting aside independence dreams there is always the suggestion of making a new pipeline from Northern Iraq into the Syrian Port of Lattakia under an agreement with Damascus in the near future.
It is not coincidence then that one of the three conditions of MHP’s to form a minority government with AKP is the termination of the settlement process, which the MHP maintains is a process that would lead to the disintegration of the country. Another MHP demand is that Erdoğan must remain independent as Turkey’s president and not get occupied, in the affairs of the government thus violating the constitution and lastly, those allegedly involved in corruption (graft case) are called to account to the Turkish Justice.
As far as the first condition it happens to be a little complicated given the fact that PM Davutoğlu has declared explicitly that the AK Party is determined to go ahead with the settlement process with the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) regardless what the outcome of coalition negotiations with opposition parties might be. However, both Parties can use the Kurdish process for the benefit of their own political interests. More precisely AKP in case of a coalition government with MHP can adhere to its Kurdish voters and the rest of the Turkish populace that supports it, but MHP is the main reason for postponing the Peace process. Similarly MHP can declare openly that recent Kurdish gains in Syria and stopping the Kurdish peace initiative is above all other previous MHP’s demands on AKP.
Therefore is not a surprise to anybody that MHP has already taken the initiative and advised the government to announce the formation of a security belt in the region in order to protect both its borders and the security of Turkmens in Syria. According to Bahçeli “{T}his so-called Kurdistan corridor between northern Iraq and the Mediterranean is a chemical bomb thrown at Turkey. This is a national issue and above parties,” he said. A goal that President Erdoğan is equally looking to achieve since the start of the Syrian Civil war despite continuous US objections on the matter.
Furthermore apart from the National Security reasons that prompt MHP to cooperate with AKP, Devlet Bahceli is also familiar with other two main causes that push the party apparatus on this direction. First according with the recent polls taken by IPSOS for CNN TÜRK after June elections suggest that the AKP would have seen a 4 percent increase if voters had known the election results beforehand.
While the MHP would have seen a 2 percent decrease, the CHP would had remained static and the HDP would have seen a 1 percent decrease. But also it indicated the possibility that some 22 percent of MHP voters would have voted for the AKP if they had known the success of HDP along with the inconclusive result ahead of time.Secondly like in any political party in the world, MHP followers, and the party’s provincial organizations know that the party has been absent from power for many years therefore this opportunity should not be missed. Given the fact that its electoral power is enough to keep AKP and MHP combined for a long time into influencing Turkish politics and geopolitical affairs in the region.
As Daily Sabah claims there are already reports that MHP and AKP have started dealing behind closed doors despite initial objections by Bahceli and his political cadres to cooperate with AKP. It is said that MHP wants nine ministries to be run by the party while AK Party heavily insists on holding the Justice and Interior Ministries in order to continue its fight against Gülen’s parallel structure into Turkey’s civil and government institutions. But what the past has taught Turkish political life is that MHP has been there for AKP when it was in dire need for political support .
The best example lies with the 2007 Presidential Abdullah Gül, candidacy and the massive popular secular outrage against it. Secular Turks objected to his candidacy on the fact that his wife wore a head scarf. An anathema from the Kemalist’s point of view especially for the Presidents posture in a secular Turkey and his image vis-à-vis the rest of the world. Here, MHP took a neutral stance on the matter and most importantly did not side with the kemalist organized mass demonstrations on this issue repeating the same policy once more during the 2013 Gezi Park demonstrations. Therefore, only time will tell if and when the Anatolian political bargaining will grant results concerning the possibilities of seeing a MHP and AKP coalition come into power. For sure the chemistry is there however it takes two to tango.
HDP’s possible motives for joining or supporting an AKP minority government.
For the first time in modern Anatolian History the Kurdish question has transformed itself into an elected political Party. One that broke the chains of a 10 percent threshold placed by the earlier shadowy periods of the Turkish deep state in action. A dark era of Turkish and Kurdish history that is connected with numerous acts of violence and mayhem that has the potential to repeat itself if Neo Ottoman aspirations and Turkish ultra nationalism prevail over Peace and common sense. More precisely during the late 80’s and 90’s a terror campaign had been waged between the PKK and the Turkish state but also between Kurds themselves. In the 1990’s a Kurdish Islamic terrorist organization named Hizbullah (not to be associated with one in Lebanon) was recruited by Turkey’s “deep state”, “{a}n allegedly antidemocratic group of senior spooks, military officers and members of the judiciary, to murder hundreds of PKK members and supporters.
A phenomenon that has the potential to recur itself this time between HDP and Hüda-Par (Free Cause Party), the legalized since 2012, Kurdish Islamic wing of Hizbullah. Hüda-Par uses Sunni Islamic traditions and religion as unified platform between Kurds and Turks in order to create an Islamic state under Sharia rule, while HDP adheres mainly to Kurdish Nationalism as means of self determination. For Hüda-Par priority has been to radiate itself as an Islamist party rather than a Kurdish party.
Burcu Ozcelik substantiates her claims by denoting that: “{I}ts program was published in Arabic and Turkish before Kurdish. When Huda-Par explicitly defends Kurdish rights, it does so within a wider discussion of Islamic social justice values”. Furthermore Hüda-Par has been accused of compliance with AKP aims since both parties are governed by a sense of commonality that draws upon a rhetoric of shared Islamic principles. What is more alarming is the murderous ferocity between HDP and Hüda-Par sympathizers that took place in October of 2014 during the Kobaniyê, crisis. Stemming from Hüda-Par indirect support of ISIS and Ankara’s idle reaction against the atrocities committed by the Jihadists in Western Syria versus HDP / YPG supporters in the area.
During the recent electoral run up there was a series of bombings on HDP political offices in Adana and Mersin days before the June 2015 elections and ended with the deadly explosion in Diyarbakir on June 5. The attack wounded more than 100 people and caused the life of four people. The attacks culminated with the recent assassination of Aytaç Baran a Hüda-Par leading member only to be followed with the reprisal assassination of three HDP affiliates the same night. Immediately HDP denied any connection with the killing of Baran with only Hüda-Par taking a negative approach on this matter by blaming PKK as the sole proprietor behind Baran’s death.
All these events could Open the Pandora box for possible similar intimidations that could easily culminate into disorder and anarchy in Turkey’s area of Kurdistan. Many political commentators claim that uncertainty and chaos in southeastern Turkey or even to the rest of Anatolia will benefit mainly the AKP’s performance if new elections are to be declared, due to the absence of forming a minority government. Thus Turkish nationalism and a forged sense of security that was prevalent prior the elections accompanied by AKP economic success in comparison with the kemalist past will in the short run benefit Erdoğan’s electoral goals. These political conditions are easily identified by the pious Muslim population of Anatolia that could easily retract votes from MHP and even nullify the (Millî İttifak) National Alliance’s recent 2% gain back into the fold. Now regardless of Selahattin Demirtaş statements made immediately after the June 7, 2015 elections that HDP will not cooperate with AKP in order to form a coalition government should not be taken at face value and the reasons are many.
For the first time HDP will have the ability to influence somehow the Turkish government but above all it could push Kurdish aspirations of political and cultural autonomy into becoming a reality. After all AKP is the only party that took the initiative to solve the Kurdish Question regardless of its true intentions on the matter. But HDP’s greatest victory is that it that managed to prove to the world and in Turkey that is here to stay in spite terrorist bombings to its offices, and Erdogan’s religious propaganda to persuade Kurdish pious muslin voters to vote for AKP. According to Erik Meyersson of the overall 13.1% HDP received, 4.2% came from former AKP voters(1.5 million conservative Kurds) and 1.9% from former CHP (leftist Alevi) voters. But what is more amazing is that about 2% of the votes for the HDP translating into 1.1 million people came from Turkish voters with no Kurdish connection to the HDP. It is no surprise to say then that seeing HDP and Turkish flags together in Kurdish rallies paid dividend to Demirtaş overall policy of portraying the Peoples’ Democratic Party HDP as not just a Kurdish party but a party for all citizens of Anatolia. After all HDP was mainly the first party to include other minorities in its ranks only to followed by CHP and AKP soon after.
Secondly an HDP into supporting an AKP government might see a small percentage of its people joining the Turkish government institutions thus acquiring a positive role into Turkeys political life and foreign image. It is not a secret that Abdullah Öcalan’s niece Dilek Öcalan, ran as an HDP candidate and won. Stipulating the matter that historical family names along with the political gains stemming from them are equally identified with the ongoing affairs that occur as well in Turkish main stream politics. Therefore legitimizing HDP to the Turkish society is paramount, given the fact that a small amount of about two percent other than Kurds voted also for HDP. In addition seeing an HDP giving support to AKP might not only bring economic prosperity to the area through restarting the Peace initiative but a but also manage to lower the ten percent threshold to be in parliament hence fortifying HDP presence in Turkish politics for the long run to come.
Thirdly, Abdullah Öcalan’s İmralı island incarceration might play a role of pushing HDP to cooperate with AKP. More precisely HDP as precondition for cooperation with AKP might push for the possible transfer to a house arrest of PKK’s leader, somewhere in Turkey rather seeing him dying in isolation. Of course things might get more complicated knowing that Ankara may additionally require the disarmament of the PKK. Something that is not easy to get accomplished at the moment since the leadership of PKK field structure under Mûrat Karayilan in Qandil mountains won’t agree so easily or because Öcalan may have lost influence over PKK.
Fourthly, there are exterior Kurdish powers that want to see HDP/PKK cooperating with Ankara. Having an HDP that acts independently and as the sole representative of Kurds inside and outside Turkey is an immediate threat to them. Northern Iraqi Kurdistan, the de facto ruler Mesûd Barzanî is not very happy with a powerful Kurdish movement inside Turkey and neighboring civil strife worn Syria that could potentially threaten his Kurdish state’s legitimacy in the region.
The recent skirmishes between KRG forces and PJAK (Free Life Party of Kurdistan) the Iranian Kurdish branch of PKK is a recent example of Kurdish dichotomy concerning the leadership struggle among rival Kurdish organizations for the minds and hearts of the Kurdish people in Turkey, Iran Iraq and Syria. PJAK openly accused KRG forces that are under the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) of Iraqi Kurdistan that cooperate with the Iranian military against them by betraying their camps inside and outside Iran. These examples of Kurdish civil strife are an important factor that Ankara is using successfully but also reasons that compel HDP to find a Modus Vivendi with AKP’s political agenda. Both sides have to give something.
Finally one of the most important factors that has not been fully been acknowledged by many security analysts is the perfect cooperation up to date between PKK historical leader Abdullah Öcalan and Turkey’s spy chief Dr. Hakan Fidan. Since the Oslo talks from 2009 Dr. Fidan has played an important role of somehow pacifying PKK’s military operational theater of operations in southeastern Turkey. Despite some small skirmishes between the PKK and the Turkish army, events point out that since 2013, when the temporary ceasefire proposed by Öcalan due to the initiation of finding permanent solution to the Kurdish question is holding. Pointing out the good chemistry and trust evolved between Dr.Hakan and Öcalan that might even lead to HDP’s eventual cooperation with AKP, thus re-energizing the peace process and winning greater constitutional rights for Kurds. After all Dr. Hakan Fidan and PKK leader share one common denominator that of both being from Kurdish origin.
In conclusion
The Padisha of Anatolia has lost a battle but not the war. He still has certain aces in his sleeves namely political uncertainty or instigated chaos, through ethnic tensions between Kurds and Turks. Both can bring havoc in Turkey or both can bring Erdoğan’s AKP Party into power once more. AKP party apparatus and government mechanisms are still active in Turkish security and intelligence structures, but most importantly there are connecting links between MHP’s nationalistic tendencies and CHP’s Kemalist’s elites on matters of Kurdish nationalism. Tendencies that can successfully be used by Erdoğan to fit his own aims. For certainty however the short and long run winner in these Turkish elections is the Kurdish populace. Their time has come to achieve their Kurdish dream of political and cultural autonomy.
As far as the Alevi’s demands for receiving religious equality by the Turkish State they haven’t been met yet. However, the major reason lies with CHP’s farsighted policies of the past when it failed miserably to satisfy their demands, when it was in its apogee of political power and no one could stop it. Risking the possibility to be absorbed by HDP if the latter remains a party for all Turks and not just a Kurdish platform. But what is more ironic is that the leader of CHP along with Turkeys intelligence MIT undersecretary chief Dr. Hakan Fidan also share a Kurdish linkage. A bond of culture that shows how a considerable amount of Kurdish populace has been absorbed into the Turkish society as well as working for the Turkish state.
Turkish Hero and politician Mustafa İsmet İnönü along with Islamic politician and President of the Republic Turgut Özal are the best examples of the past. Militarism, Ottoman historical bonds and Kemalism were the means of connecting for the first one with the Turkish Republic while Sunni Islam was the platform for the second one. Unfortunately, for the majority of the Kurds a forced Turkishness that prevailed after the establishment of the Republic, as an institutionalized policy was not easily accepted, leading to many uprisings and eventually to the creation of the PKK as means of acquiring their cultural autonomy. What the future holds for them is not known but for sure the Kurdish Jinni of independence that was strengthened after the collapse of Saddam Hussein Iraq and the current events in Syria is here to stay.
Finally, as far as what Tayyip Erdoğan’s currently has in mind there is a Turkish proverb that describes his mentality better than any political analyst in the world. Yenilen pehlivan gurese doymaz. A defeated wrestler always asks for second chance.
