By Sam Mullins.
We are now all-too-familiar with the fact that residents and citizens of Western countries are becoming radicalised and actively participating in Islamist militant activities, including taking up arms with terrorist-insurgencies abroad in places such as Somalia, and plotting to attack civilian targets at home in the West. Yet despite the fact that ‘home-grown’ Islamist terrorism (HGIT) is no longer as shocking as it once was, it remains a topic of much debate that is still poorly understood. In order to clarify our understanding of this issue, the first step is to try and disentangle the various motivational factors involved. Here I will briefly examine nine factors of interest before proposing a composite model of motivation for Islamist terrorism in Western countries.
#1: Socioeconomic backgrounds
It is now widely acknowledged that Islamist terrorists do not conform to a single profile in terms of their background characteristics that might help differentiate them from the population at large, or which might be useful from an investigative point of view. The vast majority are young males, generally ranging from their late teens to their early thirties, but there is a great deal of diversity in socioeconomic standing, educational achievement, ethnicity and marital status. In short, people living in Western countries do not generally get involved in Islamist terrorism because they are impoverished, uneducated or incapable of finding a wife.
#2: Psychological abnormality
Likewise, the idea that terrorists must be suffering from some kind of mental disorder has been generally discredited. A very small minority of individuals involved in Islamist terrorism do suffer from a variety of psychological problems, but the vast majority appear to be psychologically ‘normal’.
#3: Individual adversity
Although not clearly disadvantaged on the whole, people who become involved in Islamist terrorism in Western countries quite often seem to suffer from social and/or spiritual alienation and find it difficult to ‘fit in’. A number of individuals have also experienced personal adversity such as loss of family members or difficulties with drugs. Experience of adversity (regardless of the precise nature) can create ‘cognitive openings’ which prime individuals to be more open to alternative worldviews and increase the chances that violent ideology might be accepted.
#4: Conditions in the West
Although not deprived in absolute terms, Muslim populations in the West (in particular in Europe) are often disadvantaged in comparison with the general population, as reflected, for example, in lower average earnings and higher rates of unemployment and imprisonment. The perception that counter-terrorism (CT) measures unfairly single out Muslim communities may also add to the sense of grievance. Such experiences of relative deprivation and discrimination may then conceivably result in frustration and aggression, which for some individuals find expression in acts of terrorism. However, this does not explain why certain individuals get involved in Islamist terrorism while others experiencing the same broad conditions do not (and it likewise fails to provide a comprehensive explanation for differential rates of Islamist terrorism between different countries).
#5: ‘Crises’ of identity
Closely related to issues of individual adversity and conditions in the West, it has been suggested that psychologically, Islamist terrorists may be experiencing a ‘crisis’ of identity. Such crises may arise from social alienation, tension between Muslim and Western identities, or a sense of marginalisation among converts to Islam who then pursue their new-found religion with a combination of excessive zeal and lack of knowledge. Issues of individual and collective identity indeed permeate almost every aspect of terrorism and by invoking these concepts we gain a more nuanced understanding of individual experiences. Yet the discussion so far has essentially revolved around the same factors- namely disillusionment and dissatisfaction with life in the West.
#6: Foreign policy
Western foreign policy has been the most consistently and explicitly voiced grievance of Islamist terrorists over time, in particular support for Israel and military interventions in Muslim countries. The invasion of Iraq is thought to have been especially significant for seemingly confirming perceptions that Islam is under attack by the West and fuelling recruitment to militancy. Whether it is direct Western involvement (e.g. Mali) or lack thereof (e.g. Syria) each new conflict involving Muslims is interpreted as further evidence of a grand Western conspiracy against Islam. Just as importantly, footage of Muslim women and children being raped and killed is utilised within visually and emotionally powerful recruitment videos which instil a sense of ‘moral shock’ and an altruistic desire to take up arms, or to inflict revenge.
#7: The influence of the Islamic world
Radicalization in the West is not solely an outcome of what Western nations do, and does not occur in a vacuum. Political machinations in the Islamic world facilitated the spread of Salafi Islam, which many Islamist terrorists claim to adhere to. They also directly contributed to the influx of veteran mujahideen to the West after the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan, further enabling militant networks to expand. In addition, diaspora populations pay close attention to developments in their countries of origin and Islamic governments have been instrumental in whipping up anti-Western sentiment in response to a range of incidents, from the Salman Rushdie affair to the publication of the Prophet Muhammad cartoons. In a practical sense, Western recruits also continue to seek out connections with Islamist terrorists in Asia, Africa and the Middle East in order to gain training and combat experience.
#8: The role of religion
Statistically, the number of people involved in Islamist terrorism in Western countries represents less than 1% of the Muslim population and most of these recruits have led secular lives up until the point of radicalization. It would thus be ill-informed to equate involvement in terrorism with Islam in general. Yet religious beliefs are clearly an important part of the Islamist terrorist identity and just because individual militants may be lacking in religious knowledge does not preclude the fact that they might still feel very strongly about the beliefs they hold. What is important then, is to understand the particular interpretation of Islam that terrorists adhere to, how it shapes their identity and behaviour, and how it appeals to new recruits.
#9: Social motives
Friends and family often act as important facilitators for initial radicalisation and recruitment to Islamist terrorism. The majority of research on the subject suggests that although leaders, ‘recruiters’ or ‘entrepreneurs’ sometimes play a central role, increasing radicalisation is often driven by small group dynamics. Gradual absorption of violent ideology is thus frequently driven by social interaction, and feelings of loyalty, friendship, belonging and excitement may be just as important as ideological beliefs.
Bringing it all together: A composite model of motivation
Taking into consideration the range of possible motives and the diversity of individuals involved, it seems likely that different people will exhibit different motivational patterns. However, by classifying the different motives we can gain an appreciation of how they combine to ultimately drive someone to commit acts of terrorism in the name of Islam. This furthermore enables us to identify necessary conditions for involvement in HGIT.
Pre-disposing risk: General
Factors such as varying life ‘crises’, disillusionment or dissatisfaction with life in the West and any pre-existing desire for adventure or violence all fall under the heading of general pre-disposing risk. They may increase susceptibility to the Islamist terrorist narrative but they are not by themselves determining factors and are very widely experienced without often leading to involvement in terrorism.
Pre-disposing risk: Specific
Specific pre-disposing risk factors are very similar to general factors, except that they involve a natural alignment with specific elements of Islamist ideology. Self-identification with Muslims around the world, anger at Western foreign policy and feelings of empathy and moral shock at the suffering of Muslims in conflict zones, although still widely experienced, thus represent more specific motivational risk factors.
Direct motivators: Process drivers and social goals
Direct motivators drive and sustain involvement in Islamist terrorist activity. Process drivers and social goals are non-ideological factors that do this. Among them are motives of belonging, acceptance and loyalty; group dynamics; the development of an identity as amujahid, or Islamic fighter; the desire to maintain a positive collective identity; and the desire to maintain the existence of one’s specific militant group, once established.
Direct motivators: Ideological goals
Finally, there are goals prescribed by jihadi ideology, which groups and individuals are actually trying to achieve to varying extents. These include to do God’s (perceived) will; to help other Muslims; to pursue revenge and violence against the perceived oppressors of Islam; to end Western interference in the Islamic world; and to establish ‘true’ Islamic states.
Necessary conditions
The above factors help us to appreciate individual susceptibility and reasons for continued involvement in Islamist terrorism in the West. They do not, however, tell us how people get involved in the first place. There may well be no sufficient conditions, but with very few exceptions the necessary conditions for involvement in Islamist terrorism are a combination of exposure to the ideology, social exposure to similar individuals and practical opportunity. A very small number of genuinely lone actor terrorists may get involved without even an online social component, but these cases are the exception to the rule.
Implications
The themes of identity that apparently lie at the core of involvement in Islamist terrorism suggest that for the purposes of theory-building, there may be potential in further utilising and combining Identity Theory and Social Identity Theory (SIT). These can help us tie together various elements such as identity crises, moral shocks, empathy and group dynamics to give a more coherent theory of involvement in terrorism. In particular, suicide terrorism likely involves what is referred to in SIT as depersonalisation, whereby a person’s individual identity is essentially relegated in favour of their collective identity to the point that they are willing to sacrifice their life for the ‘greater good’.
is certainly value in exploring such possibilities, including possible implications for CT, in further research. In a more practical sense, if we accept the argument here that experiences of dissatisfaction or adversity in the West are in fact pre-disposing risk factors, rather than direct motivators for involvement in HGIT, the implication is that efforts to improve the socioeconomic situation of Western Muslim populations are unlikely to be particularly effective for CT. This is because the relationship with individual involvement in terrorism is seemingly indirect.
On the other hand, although we might ideally remove direct motivators for terrorism by addressing political and religious grievances, such factors do not lend themselves to easy manipulation. The most effective means of reducing HGIT in the West will thus be to target the necessary conditions, which most directly drive individual recruitment and are potentially accessible for intervention- namely ideology, social exposure and opportunity.
This may include a variety of different approaches by both governmental and non-governmental agencies, but at the core these will involve a combination of efforts to counter terrorist ideology, identify and disrupt specific militant networks and measures to reduce practical opportunities. Space here does not permit further discussion of these issues; however it is hoped that this brief summary article has helped to clarify the motivational factors underpinning Islamist terrorist activity in Western countries, and that it serves to inspire further research and theoretical development.
