India is targeting Pakistan’s civilian population along the Working Boundary and the Line of Control.New Delhi’s hostile posture towards Islamabad is much reflective of its policy of offensive  ‘arreire pensee’.In the given atmosphere of hostility,mistrust and belligerence between the two nuclear South Asian states,an alarming and scowling situation for regional peace and security,the purpose of this article is to examine the role played by the dynamics of geopolitics,strategic stability-instability between two countries vis-a-vis the concept of the collective conflict management that the two states, India and Pakistan can positively adopt to mend their fences.

“If the enemy ever resorts to any misadventure, regardless of its size and scale, it will have to pay an unbearable cost,” Gen Raheel,the Pak army chief said while addressing a special ceremony to celebrate the 50th Defence of Pakistan Day at GHQ in Rawalpindi on Sunday.

The Pak army chief said Kashmir was an unfinished agenda of Partition and that peace in the region hinges on the resolution of the Kashmir dispute.

“Without resolving Kashmir issue according to aspirations of Kashmiris, peace in region is not possible,” he said.

In the post Cold War era, new geopolitical dynamics have been reshaping and re-emerging  in the South Asian region.Despite the fact that the security doctrines– led by the burning quest for armament– orchestrated by the establishments in both India and Pakistan– do have an inevitable role in defining the concept of the strategic stability-instability,the Indian government’s inability to foster a meaningful comprehensive negotiation policy regarding the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan,has developed the impression to both the government and the people of Kashmir, that India has had no serious intent of resolving the festering Kashmir issue.

Ideologically, the hawkish Indian mind set advocates the Utopian thesis: Pakistan cannot win a war against it, Pakistan cannot compare its internal political instability with India’s political stability, Pakistan cannot hope to compete economically with India what is a booming economy well on its way to becoming a global economic power, and Pakistan certainly cannot compare the conservativeness of its society to the open pluralism of India.This euphorically adopted Indian notion is the root cause of growing skepticism and misuderstanding between the two governments.

Pakistan’s governments both past and present,have been under acute pressure because of the ongoing war against terrorism waged inside Pakistan.Instead of sharing this grave challenge,the Indian side has been exploiting the situation to the best of their vested generally ‘negative interests’.

The  war against terrorism–Pakistan has been fighting in Fata,north-south Waziristan—is not an easy task yet.Pakistan military forces under the gallant command of Gen Raheel,  are exercising their best ‘professional endowments and strategies’ to win that war- a fact that is admitted globally. Afghanistan has a government and it has fragile institutions. It is dependent on external financial and economic support. It has the Taliban networks who have been engineering the terrorist operations inside both Pakistan and Afghanistan.

So, yes,both Kashmir and Afghanistan ‘truly matter ’ as for the regional stability is concerned.  So does a stable sovereign Pakistan. South Asians know these realities and it is in their interest to work together to confront the regional challenges . Pakistan has also learnt through hard experience that allies can sometimes be ‘hidden enemies’ and that is why Pakistan’s focusing  on ‘governance and internal stability’ and it is now orchestrating all its institutions to achieve these goals.

In Balochistan,the present civil and military governments are trying to counterpoise the insurgency move and better results are being cultivated and seen.The illiteracy and poverty-stricken Balochistan province is getting much attention under the auspices of General Raheel. The Aggrieved Baloch are now ready to talk with the federal government by restoring their prompt faith in the ‘federation of Pakistan’.

The image of India in the region, has been largely tarnished because of its border disputes with its neighbours.  The Indian involved designs in supporting the non-state actors via proxy trajectories in both Afghanistan and Baluchistan are now no hidden facts. The Indian design to create a mess in Sindh via its Raw’s network is a well-known gambit that India has had been playing against Pakistan. Pakistan claims it has strong evidence that India has been using Afghanistan as a ‘strategic backyard’ to encircle Pakistan from both its eastern and western borders and to use Afghanistan as a hub aimed to destabilize Pakistan by fueling the role of non-state actors in Baluchistan and to destabilize its tribal areas.  Further more,China-US-Pakistan are duly engaged in propelling the ‘AfPak peace process’ via systematic negotiations with  the Afghan Taliban.

India has no real say in the search for an Afghan settlement; it has been reduced to a marginal player in Central Asia; and the China-Pakistan relationship is assuming global significance. India is and has been trying to reinvent ‘new corridors’ of partnership with the Gulf states,thereby also trying to improve its ties with Iran and Saudi Arabia.

And yet Pakistan and India have always been dependent on bigger powers as far as their security and survival are concerned. The Indian solicitation for the US’s mediation in the Kargil crisis between India and Pakistan,  is no more  a shrouded mystery.The third world countries seek survival and are constantly in competition. Therefore, internal and external factors both act as ‘catalysts’ in influencing the behaviour and decisions of these states.

At the systematic level, Pakistan and India have faced conflict of interests at the geo-strategic(geo-economic) and geo-political levels. Whether it was the conflict of disputed territories between the two or of being a part of different alliances, these two countries have always found themselves to be on the opposite sides. Pakistan and India have historically suffered from a ‘security dilemma’ regarding each other’s ‘military strength’. That can be related to the alliance-formation of these states in time of need due to their dependence on developed countries. For example, Pakistan allied with the U.S. during and after the Cold War; while India, despite declaring itself as part of the Non-Aligned Movement, was being assisted by the former Soviet Union, especially in the military sector.But presently these dynamics have been and are being changed.

Domestic politics have deeply impacted relations between the two countries. Domestically, the ultra-right and the hard-line factions in both countries have maintained a constant pressure on the governments of both sides and on occasion have forced the countries to behave or adopt a certain policy which the governments in ordinary circumstances might not have taken. This appeasement to the right wing has been witnessed numerous times and has more times than not resulted in stagnation of the peace and dialogue process. In recent times, the 2002-2003 stand-off between Pakistan and India and the Mumbai attacks of 2008 bear witness to this  fact.And unfortunately, the most most driving threat posed to ‘secularism’ comes under the Modi’s government, where its future is waning day by day.

On the regional level, the relations between Pakistan and India directly have an impact on ‘regional security and stability’; this relationship is considered to be one of the most important ones in the world. The world views the relationship between the two countries of a highly volatile nature, mainly because of the traumatic ideological and political history shared by the two. This shared history between Pakistan and India comes with a baggage. The legacy of ‘unjust partition’ resulted in territorial disputes and constant state of insecurity and tension on borders. The conflicts between the two countries have weighed down on the future of the two countries.

Both states’ inability to solve these conflicts has raised much concern, not only within these two countries but in the world as well. One of the most important points of concern between the two countries is Kashmir. Kashmir has been and still is a constant source of tension and a potential recipe of disaster between the two countries. That is why many have termed it as a ‘nuclear flashpoint’; just waiting to go off.

Robert Kaplan in his article ‘Rearranging the Sub-continent’ (published in Forbes on Dec 24,2014), rightly argues:”In fact in the case of India and Pakistan the partition remains incomplete because India refuses to resolve Kashmir and other border issues so the only change possible is a completion of the process of partition in the interest of regional harmony and peace”.

As for Kashmir, India seeks to engage Pakistan to legitimize the territorial status quo by finding some means to ‘formalize the LOC’ as the ‘legal international border’. Thus for India, the status quo is a basis for a solution to the ongoing dispute over the disposition of Kashmir.  Whereas Pakistan seeks to engage India to find some means of altering, in various ways, the status quo and publicly rejects the possibility of transforming the LOC into the international border as a viable means of dispute resolution. For Pakistan the status quo is the problem, not the solution to the problem.

These diametrically ‘opposed objectives’ are typically reflected in the ways in which both states engage each other. For example, Pakistan historically has sought to place the Kashmir issue at the top of the bilateral agenda.

For India, the Simla agreement supplanted the UN resolutions as a point of ‘reference’ for the resolution of Kashmir. For Pakistan, however, the Simla agreement became just ‘another means’ of resolving the Kashmir dispute, it did not replace the UN resolutions.

Durable peace in Afghanistan can never be achieved without a resolution to the Kashmir dispute. World powers and the United Nations will have to seek an amicable solution to the Kashmir conflict through legal and moral mechanisms instead of political rhetoric and commercial interests. Several solutions to the problems facing Afghanistan pass through the valleys of Kashmir where the Indian armed forces indulge in serious human rights violations.

The international community can continue to encourage and facilitate an uninterrupted peace dialogue between India and Pakistan. India has always been scornful of foreign mediation between them and prefers bilateral engagement, where it can bring its greater weight to bear. This continues despite the fact that the US involvement during the Kargil crisis went entirely in India’s favour.

Since the genesis of the two countries, there has been a huge third party interference. At times, this interference was for the sake of maintaining peace and stability in the region, while at the others it was not. Whereas some of the observers in both countries have referred to this third party interference as meddling, while others see it as a way of moving the dialogue process forward.

These international actors like the United States have time and again helped propel the dialogue process forward and repeatedly urged the two countries to reach a point of detente in their relations. It should be noted that over the last decade or so, this third party interference seems to have been decreased considerably. Much of it has to do with the two countries’ resolve to solve the underlying disputes and also because of the changing geo-strategic conditions of not only the region but the world at large.

While changing dynamics in India and U.S. partnership regarding strategic balancing after civil nuclear deal (in 2008), Pakistan and China both have also strengthened their 60-years old strategic relationship. As a result, the strategic quadrangle – the U.S.-India-China-Pakistan is getting eminent as a new dynamic of the South Asian balance-of-power politics-also endorsed by the growing nexus or’ trilateralism’ between China, Pakistan and Russia.

The Russia-Pakistan-China ‘triumvirate’ is a seemingly reality and has a far greater convergence of security objectives in Asia than a similar Russia-China-India grouping (also subsumed within BRICS). The ongoing work on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor(CPEC),paves the way  towards the goal of forming a new ‘geo-strategic tapestry’in the region where ‘geoeconomics’ gets a lead over geopolitics. While in its attempt to counterbalance this strategy, India is trying to get its ‘strategic access’  to Iran’s Chabahar port.

Moreover, it should be noted that India has always considered itself to be the ‘sole regional power’  of South Asia, whereas Pakistan has always refused to accept India’s hegemony.

The defiance of Pakistan and its refusal to yield to India’s hegemony in the region and its demand to be treated on the same level globally has never been accepted by the Indian establishment and policy-makers. Hence, that has led to ‘regional destabilisation and tensions’.

These tensions not only put a stop to the on-going peace process between the two countries but also held off any advances that might have accrued if the talks had continued. It would not be wrong to assume, perhaps, that the reason that Pakistan and India have not been able to achieve a breakthrough on a single core issue has been because of the internal domestic pressures.

‘Ideological polarization’ can be considered as one of the factors which have impacted, rather severely, relations of the two countries by giving a negation to the realization of the fact that Pakistan and India are neighbouring countries whose future– is ‘entwined and dependent’ upon each other– but unfortunately seems ‘locked in animosities’.

As for the core doctrine of ‘strategic stability’, the ongoing military developments in India, that include the introduction of ‘ABM(Anti Ballistic Missile) systems’ in the region and developing a second strike capability in the form of submarine launched ballistic missiles, could once again lead to ‘deterrence instability’. The ABM system in the South Asian regional environment does not offer protection from the incoming missiles due to short ‘flight trajectories’. Instead, this could possibly lead to ‘false sense of security’ by the possessor thus providing incentive to launch pre-emptive or disarming strikes.

Notwithstanding the lesser value of ABM systems, the introduction of this capability would add compulsion on Pakistan to take possible remedial measures to re-restore ‘strategic stability’ in the region. One such option could be to simply increase the number of its ‘delivery systems’ rendering ABM systems ineffective. Likewise, India‟s acquisition of submarine launched ballistic missile capability could also adversely affect the strategic stability in the region. While in the long run, Pakistan may have to develop its own version of submarine capability to restore strategic stability, however, in the short term it could consider increasing the ranges of its missile systems that could offer greater reach within India, while offering more options for ‘dispersion and concealment’ against possible disarming strikes by India.

Unlike the emerging global trends, ‘nuclear deterrence’ continues to remain relevant and active in South Asia due to the existence of long outstanding disputes that had been a source of several wars and military crises between the two South Asian nuclear neighbours. Introduction of nuclear weapons may have brought stability to the region by preventing an ‘all out war’, but at the same time, it could be a source of instability at the lower end of the conflict, that may have led India to contemplate new war fighting doctrines such as the ‘Cold Start and Proactive Operations’.

In response, Pakistan has developed conventional and nuclear responses to deter all forms of aggression; however, if new technologies like the ABM systems and submarine launched ballistic missiles are introduced into the region, it would further destabilize the region as ‘stability-instability’ paradox could turn into ‘instability-instability’paradox, i.e. instability at full spectrum of the ‘conflict’.

Pakistan’s strategic weaponry is believed to be deployed in de-mated condition routinely in peacetime. Whether that posture will apply to the newer tactical systems is unclear. Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine, unlike India’s, is centered fundamentally on first use, and it is oriented primarily towards defeating India’s conventional superiority in the event of conflict. Although Pakistan’s nuclear forces are intended, strictly speaking, for deterrence and not war fighting, Islamabad’s emerging tactical capabilities could inadvertently push Pakistan towards the latter. if India decides to retaliate against Pakistan through the large scale use of military force for punitive purposes.

Any significant employment of Indian military force obviously carries the risk of a Pakistani nuclear response, which is why Indian leaders have shied away from exercising major conventional war options that require especially the large scale use of land forces. Should India contemplate major military operations, however, it is likely that the United States would intervene, but mainly through energetic diplomacy as it did in 2001-02 and again in 2008.

Pakistan recently test-fired a surface-to-surface ballistic missile, Shaheen III– capable of carrying a nuclear warhead, the missile is estimated to have a maximum range of 2750 km. It is believed that Shaheen III is a major step towards strengthening Pakistan’s deterrence capability” vis-à-vis India.

In the India-Pakistan strategic context a ‘balance of terror’ through ‘Mutual Assured Destruction’ (MAD) came into operation. This transformation in effect negated the advantage of conventional weapons numerical superiority acquired by India over Pakistan. Consequently, an effective and credible situation of nuclear deterrence was established. The implication of this reality was that resort to war or use of force no longer remained an option for either side.

Yet the fact of the matter is that in case of ‘advertently/inadvertently waged- nuclear war’ between the two sides, the application of the doctrine of mutually assured destruction (MAD)seems irrefutable.The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Stimson Center currently reported that Pakistan, out of its fear of India, was far outpacing its rival neighbour in the development of ‘nuclear warheads’ and may be building 20 nuclear warheads annually.And in this scenario, it is reasonably assumed that within the next 10-15 years, Pakistan may become the ‘third largest nuclear state’ ,after USA and Russia.

Apparently, Modi’s establishment boasts the ‘aggressive posture’ towards Pakistan and seeking a strategic space to start a limited war with Pakistan, yet realistically, Indian military capacity to conduct a major attack against Pakistan is debatable.

Any raid by Indian forces inside Pakistan would risk a nuclear war in South Asia as Pakistan nuclear policies are crafted exclusively to ‘counter any aggression’ from one neighboring state, unlike India who has to balance its conventional and nuclear capabilities for two nuclear neighbors. Over the past, in the aftermath of the Mumbai Attack, India’s inclination to launch a quick strike against Pakistan was called off viewing the “poor state of armory, both ammunition and artillery”.

Yet again in 2012, the Indian Army Chief painted a ‘grim and indeed alarming’ picture of their operational capabilities in his letter to PM. The critical shortfall in ammunition reserves repetitively revealed in 2014 that India does not have enough ammunition to launch a full-blown war for even 20 days. Lately, the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) of India reported that country continues to face the severe ammunition shortage which is adversely impacting the operational readiness.

In the wake of all these realities, India’s belligerent statements serve more the purpose of verbal strokes than a ‘valid schema’. The stern response by Pakistani establishment to each statement substantiates the lack or true Indian conventional and nuclear threats to deter Pakistan. Nonetheless, by avoiding such futile confrontational statements in the future, India should recognize the danger of nuclear ‘escalation in a limited conflict between the two nuclear armed states, which will take the lives of  millions and millions people and make the South Asian land ‘barren’ for years to come.

In the present state of deadlock between India and Pakistan, the imperative of engagement–  that the two governments apparently seem to avoid yet intrinsically seem to register–involves the real test of Narendra Modi’s ‘statesmanship’ or a test of Indian premier’s ‘savoir faire’, how to break the ice and take the initiative of applying the notion of ‘collective conflict management'(a post Cold War period-based  peace concept, objectively practiced in international relations) via a sustainable ‘South Asian conflict resolution’ by engaging Pakistan on all bilateral issues, most significantly including Kashmir.As Indian Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj put it during her recent press conference: “In diplomacy, there’s never a full stop, only commas or semi-colons.”