Much is being commented in both print and electronic global media about Russia’s military action in Syria. The western skeptics intrinsically doubt Putin’s initiative with no fair intention of Moscow’s intervention in Syria. The critics of the action feel alarmed by Russia’s intervention since they possibly envisage the resurgence of a la bipolarity phenomenon or proxy wars ushered in an era of the Cold War period in the Middle east . They think that Russia may ploy with the Syrian problem or the Middle east crisis management, in order to gain its realist agenda.

As for Russia, the current aggressive notion in Syria, seems an exigent and justifiable measure in that it is based on terminating the IS and the Daesh networks. Because of the expanding waves of Islamic radicalism in the Middle east, Russians feel highly apprehensive.Amid these western negative propositions,there seems a new shift accompanied by the exigency in the international system, promising a ‘collective role’ against the rising challenge of global terrorism.Initially the Russian policy in Syria, seems a mixture of opposites, albeit subsequently it may pave the way for playing an instrumental role in combating the centrifugal forces in the region.

On 30 September 2015, Russian President Vladimir Putin requested permission from Federation Council, the upper house of the Russia parliament, to deploy the country’s military in Syria. On the same day, Federation Council approved the use of Russian military in Syria to fight terrorist groups, the Islamic State in particular. On 1 October, the Russian Defence Ministry stated it had deployed over 50 planes (including also Su-34) and helicopters to Syria: “The air group was deployed on very short notice. It was possible because we had most of the materiel and ammunition ready at our depot in Tartus. We only had to move our aircraft and deliver some extra equipment.”

Moscow’s  launched airstrikes against Syria’s rebels have already been called Russia’s boldest military intervention outside the former Soviet Union since Afghanistan in the 1980s. Like that decade-long entanglement, Russia’s entry into the Syrian conflict — in which as viewed by the western thinkers,  Putin appears to be taking aim at ISIL’s rival rebel factions more than ISIL itself, in order to bolster the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad — carries significant strategic risks. As Joshua Landis, a Syria expert at the University of Oklahoma, put it: ‘Russia has gotten itself into the tar pit.’

From Putin’s point of view, the greatest threat is the spread of Islamic radicalism on the southern borders of the Russian Federation. He’s fought two wars in Chechnya, and there’s a radical Islamist movement in Dagestan. He looks at Syria as a potential source of radicalism in his own country. Moscow claims that at least two thousand Russians of various ethnic groups have been recruited by the Islamic State to Iraq and Syria. They can pose an internal terrorist threat within the Russian Federation itself.

The Russians also have a strong interest in maintaining access to the naval facility in [the Syrian coastal city of] Tartus, [Russia’s] only warm-water port in the Mediterranean. It represents the perception of the Russian navy projecting power beyond the Russian Federation’s borders. A change of regime in Damascus could jeopardize Russia’s military and naval presence in Syria.

Early on the Obama administration stated that Assad has to go [because] he is part of the problem, [so he could] not be part of the solution. The administration pointed out that he fired on his own people. In the intervening years, [Assad] has used the air force for really destructive operations against the rebels in the opposition, as well as against a large part of the civilian population.

Putin has a very clear position on Assad and his regime. He thinks that anything to weaken the regime would open the door for ISIS and other radical groups to take over the country. The Russians want to build an anti-ISIS coalition and leave the Assad regime alone. They are seeking U.S. cooperation.

But there is a serious ambiguity in Russia’s tactics and policy. Russia joining an international anti-ISIS coalition is one thing, but if its military actions also target rebel groups, it will be seen primarily as bolstering the weakening Assad regime. This can lead to serious political and even military issues with the United States and the anti-ISIS coalition as a whole.

While geo-strategic factors have led Russian Syria policy, regional and domestic factors have also been a concern. Putin has risked the ire of Assad’s Gulf and Turkish enemies, with repeated UN vetoes in support of Syria and a constant supply of arms, even causing his ambassador to Qatar to be assaulted in Doha in 2012. Yet he has not been insensitive to regional concerns.

Vitaly Naumkin, director of the Institute of Oriental Studies at Moscow State University, notes how Israeli objections deterred Moscow from supplying Syria with S-300 missiles, while bridges have been rebuilt with the Gulf since the 2012 low. Indeed, as one British diplomat recently noted to me, Moscow has earned a grudging respect in the Gulf for consistency, contrasted with the perceived unreliability of the West.

Moreover, Russia has been careful to maintain its thriving trade with Turkey despite differences over Syria. For nearly four years, Russia’s Syria policy has not been too costly for Moscow. It has successfully prevented what it saw as Western-led regime change in Damascus, while weathering any damage to its regional reputation.

In 2015, a weaker economy and the domestic threat of IS may limit some of the tools available, but are unlikely to alter Moscow’s overall view and strategy in Syria. In that sense, the latest developments simply mean that Russia is finally joining the other states involved in the Syria crisis: pursuing a costly policy, yet still unwilling to compromise.

The question is whether a Russian operation against the Islamic State is a good thing or not. Could it be that Russia is doing the right thing, even if for the wrong reasons?

The initial reactions from Western and Middle Eastern representatives to possible Russian air strikes are all negative. The Saudi foreign minister has warned of an escalation. But for Saudis, any support for Assad, one of Iran’s closest allies, is a bad thing, no matter where it comes from.Russia-Turkey relations may get strained because of Turkish government grave reservations over its air space issue.At the same time , Russia’s ties with the GCC member states may also get estranged on its entry into Syria. But Egypt seems supporting the  cause of the Russian action in Syria.Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukr said, “Russia’s entrance, given its potential and capabilities, is something we see is going to have an effect on limiting terrorism in Syria and eradicating it.”

U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry has also cautioned against a Russian combat mission, fearing an escalation. But the American (and Western) position remains built around the demand that Assad must leave office. Only that this is not going to happen .Russia will not abandon its old ally, Syrian opposition forces are too weak to defeat him, and his voluntary departure from power is extremely unlikely.

In reality, therefore, the options in Syria are all bad. In cases like that, preventing the worst is better than hoping for the best. Perhaps the negative side effects of a Russian intervention in Syria—namely, the stabilization of Assad in power and the increased role of Russia in the region—are acceptable when assessed against the potential takeover of the country’s capital and other large swaths of territory by the Islamic State.Yes,the right thing Russia could be doing via this possibly a wrong intervention is to weaken and defeat the IS, Daesh and Al-Qaeda networks in the region.

Some American hawks think that with the launch of airstrikes in Syria, Russian President Vladimir Putin instigated a proxy war with the U.S., putting those nation’s powerful militaries in support of opposing sides of the multipolar conflict. And it’s a huge gamble for Moscow, experts say. “This is really quite difficult for them. It’s logistically complex. The Russians don’t have much in the way of long-range power projection capability,” said Mark Galeotti, a Russian security expert at New York University.

Thierry Meyssan,the French journalist in Syria reports the possible deployment of MiG-31s to Syria.  The problem with this is that the MiG-31 is a pure interceptor designed to protect a huge volume of Russian airspace from a US Air Force attack involving low flying cruise missiles and strategic bombers.

As a counter-insurgency weapon the MiG-31 is simply useless.  True, the six MiG-31s rumored to be sent to Syria would provide a formidable deterrent against any US, NATO, Turkish or Israeli aircraft entering the Syrian air space, but this is also why I would expect these countries to protest such a delivery with utmost outrage and determination rather than ‘more or less’ coordinate it or ‘remain silent’.  It would be much more logical to send SU-24s and SU-25s to Syria if the goal is to support Syrian army operations against Daesh.  But these rumors do not mention these aircraft.

Moscow’s military campaign in Syria is relying on supply lines that require air corridors through both Iranian and Iraqi air space. The only alternatives are ‘naval supply lines’ running from Crimea, requiring a passage of up to 10 days round-trip. How long that can be sustained is unclear.

That and other questions about Russian military capabilities and objectives are taking center stage as Putin shows a relentless willingness to use military force in a heavy-handed foreign policy aimed at restoring his nation’s stature as a world power. In that quest, he has raised the specter of ‘resurgent Russian military might’ — from Ukraine to the Baltics, from Syria to the broader Middle East. No, the primary foreign policy objection with Putin’s actions in Syria is about optics, because it makes Russia look ‘proactive’; and while the United States look ‘reactive’.

The optics on Syria look disastrous. But frustration at the status quo is not a good enough reason to pursue a riskier, more interventionist policy. There has to be persuasive evidence that this administration could successfully execute such a policy. And one can see zero evidence for that. If Russian military uses.

Nonetheless a neutral and reasonable mind finds no warranted western justification for brewing apprehension regarding Russia’s military action in Syria subject to the enlightenment of the fact: for decades, the Russians seem to have been pursuing a strategy of keeping enemies at a distance by using its openness to the oceans to project its naval(and latterly air and nuclear) power to the rim of every other continent, and to cultivate friendships and alliances with countries on the further side of America’s oceanic glacis. It reasonably appears that Putin would not attempt at expanding its war zone beyond Syria.

The problem about this western ‘skepticism and the feelings of  discomfiture’ regarding Russia’s Syrian role stems from the fact that the western thinkers view Russia’s Syrian action through the ‘Ukrainian picturesque’.

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said  that Russia was ready to coordinate its strikes against the Islamic State with the U.S.

US Defence Secretary Ash Carter also said that the U.S. would keep the door open for cooperation with Russia if Moscow chose to change course in Syria, and warned that if a policy change is not forthcoming that “this will have consequences for Russia itself, and I suspect in the coming days Russia will suffer casualties in Syria.”

In a briefing at NATO headquarters, the U.S. Ambassador to NATO Douglas Lute expressed concern that Russia’s role in the Syrian conflict might intensify — a claim that officials in Moscow have continuously downplayed.

Lute said that Russia had deployed its most advanced weapons platforms to the Syrian airbase in Latakia, a move the ambassador remarked was ‘quite impressive’ given the speed with which the force was deployed.

By all sane realistic calculations, Putin’s Syria policy seems a ‘multitasking display’ of Moscow’s initiative of driving peace via military muscling and diplomatic understanding with both Iran and Iraq in Syria, its demonstration of military might, its tactic to deepen Russian role in the future politics of the Middle east, and most significantly its quest for making new allies and its lasting desire of gaining a ‘global strategic clout’.

As one can be assured that Moscow seems determined to play an increasingly decisive role in the Middle East and Europe, to the detriment of the destabilizing politic and expansionist of the Zionist elites and their counterparts Atlanticists. The fate of Russia is well mapped out; as to that of Western Europe, if it appears closed, however, could well be opened in case of a major crisis on real political and societal upheaval.

Objectively seen, the ongoing Russian military action in Syria may cause a great damage to the IS and Daesh forces in the region, thereby providing a force of unity to the coalition forces against these terrorist organisations. Yet there is rich possibility that the negatively-propelled western criticism against the Russian initiative may politically Jeopardize the cause of Russian action in Syria.

The thinking in Brussels that Europe needs good relations with Russia seems highly pragmatic and realistic. This is the time of collective show of unity- semblance against Daesh and IS.

The  October 10th  terrorist attack– in Ankara, Turkey- causing many casualties –is highly indicative of the fact that the threat of terrorism has reached from Syria, Iraq to Turkey.Therefore, both the US and Nato must also morally support and think constructively about Russia’s Syrian action.

Obama’s policy of ‘strategic restraint’, regrading both the Syrian crisis and the Russian involvement into the Syrian affairs is rightly based on ‘healthy pragmatism’.

The Obama administration appears to have absorbed the lesson that the great powers that endure are those that learn to adapt. The administration at least speaks of rebalancing American power and purpose in the world through a range of efforts including: restoring U.S. economic health, political legitimacy and human capital; revitalizing America’s civilian power institutions, especially its diplomatic and development organs, to catalyze others into action; applying non-military means and whole-of-government approaches to end or prevent security threats and solve emerging global challenges; exercising strategic restraint to avoid getting stuck in unwinnable insurgencies and averting unnecessary and dangerous military competition; and building the capacity of partners so that they may better support local, regional, or global security and stability.

The Obama administration is moving forward on all these avenues, with diplomatic engagement becoming the centerpiece of its foreign policy approach . This is what the crux of the philosophy of ‘military restraint’ working behind Obama’s Syria Policy.

The Syrian crisis offers a crucial test for both the leaderships in Washington and Moscow to adopt such policies that may deescalate the tension.Defeating and failing the IS and the Daesh terrorists in the region, must be the unified objective of the US and Russia. As for the international community,nothing  may seem more significantly satisfactory than the seemingly ‘ Nato -Russia joint venture against ‘international terrorism’.

Put positively yet dismaying to the neoliberals’ thinking, with Russia’s entry into the Syrian stalemate, an opportunity arises creating a new ‘synthesis of collaboration’ that may involve replacing the new world order,an order based on the strategy of ‘global rapprochements and partnerships’ – characterizing a Moscow-Washington ‘resolve of reconstructing the international relations’.