By International Security Observer.
Risk is the defining feature of modern society. Citizens today are risk averse and the desire to ‘manage’ risk has become the lingua franca of business, politics, economics and public policy. It has also become the language of security strategy and war. Put succinctly ‘Risk and uncertainty are the hallmark of world politics at the dawn of the twenty-first century’[i]. But why is this? And what does it mean for international security?
At the end of the Cold War there was a transition in security strategy from the monolithic, state-centric viewpoint of a world conveniently split between two (Cold) warring ideological viewpoints to a world of unbounded known and unknown risks, able to spread easily from one part of the world to another, irrespective of state boundaries. From a western security standpoint the end of the Cold War, instead of making states feel more secure, had the paradoxical effect of making states feel more uncertain and at risk than before. The beast had been slain but now the security landscape resembled a jungle full of snakes.
Recognising this, NATO in the nineties changed its modus operandi to one of managing security risks openly acknowledging that the threats its members were up against were not static nation states but elusive and flexible non-state actors able to capitalise on the revolution in information technology and the shrinking of time and space brought about by globalisation. Its 1991 New Strategic Concept acknowledged that ‘In contrast with the predominant threat of the past, the risks to Allied security that remain are multi-faceted in nature and multi-directional, which makes them hard to predict and assess. NATO must be capable of responding to such risks if stability in Europe and the security of Alliance members are to be preserved’[ii]. Likewise the UK 1998 Strategic Review acknowledged that ‘stability based on the active management of risks’ was the challenge at hand[iii].
This shift stems from a wider sociological change to a risk society in which the ideas of controllability, certainty and security have collapsed[iv]. The result is state’s scrambling to re-take control of the uncertain future; to manage the risks. Whilst the future cannot totally be colonized, a policy of security risk management, allows states to ‘minimize or reduce factors which lead to risk occurring’[v]. French philosopher Michael Foucault referring to risk once stated the suitable metaphor for government was a ship: in our risk adverse society government attempts to manage risk can be seen as an attempt to steer society toward the safe harbour avoiding risks along the way. If a few targeted killings and pre-emptive strikes mean safe passage, so be it.
Risk in security policy is proving itself to be primarily an energizing principle. Politicians and security decision makers become increasingly reflexive as they endeavour to avert future risks through anticipatory measures. A critical feature of this security “Zeitgeist” is that knowledge and lack of knowledge become equally constitutive[vi] resulting in policy responses that treat them both on the same risk level. Whilst we know what some of the risks are, we also know that there are risks we don’t yet know about which need to be protected against as well. In trying to imagine what these risks are strategists undertake a process of premeditation; imagine the worst futures and then attempt to harness and“commodify” the risks and uncertainty through pre-emptive risk management policies. [vii]
When 9/11 demonstrated the notion of geographical space as a protective barrier was tragically false security, US security planners in response proposed ‘routinizing the exercise of imagination, thus turning a scenario into constructive action’[viii]. Take the publicly presented speculative justification for war in Iraq and Afghanistan where nightmare scenarios of despot leaders colluding with terrorist organisations like Al-Qaeda were “sold” as facts. Former British Prime Minister Tony Blair, referring to Afghanistan, stated that ‘whilst there are risks of action, we know the risks of inaction are much greater’ a rationale mirrored by former U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney regarding Iraq: ‘the risks of inaction are far greater than those of action’[ix]. Similarly the policy of drone strikes and targeted killings are a reflection of a security policy of pre-emption rather than reaction. Targeted killings are a form of ‘uncertainty absorption’ literally aimed at the elimination of threats before they can demonstrate their full potential. Individuals who may not have been responsible for a criminal act on foreign soil and might not even present an imminent threat are targeted owing to their status as a potential risk. A report by the Council of Foreign Relations on drones states that ‘the vast majority of those targeted via drones were neither al-Qaeda nor Taliban leaders rather most were low-level, anonymous suspected militants who were predominately engaged in insurgent or terrorists operations against their governments, rather than in active international terrorist plots’[x][xi]. The logic of objectification and imagining futures inherent in security risk management magnifies the non-innocence of low level insurgents to those of top leaders. As former President George W. Bush once said ‘If we wait for threats to fully materialize, we have waited too long’[xii].
The largest problem with making risk the heuristic device through which security policy is determined is that unlike risk management in business and economics, security risk is not objective and quantitatively rational. Risks are socially constructed phenomena meaning they can be whatever the decision makers of the day want them to be. This has real life and death consequences for when one selects a strategy of making presumed (lack of) knowledge the foundation of actions against risks the flood-gates of fear are opened and everything becomes threatening and everyone a potential risk[xiii]. The effect of this modus operandi within international security is that whilst simultaneously making citizens more secure by eliminating risks before they become active threats capable of destruction, the culture of risk-management perpetuates itself as, without a concrete enemy, new risks always have to be established and managed in order for societies to convince themselves they are secure.
http://securityobserver.org/the-rise-of-risk-in-international-security-policy/
