By Syed Qamar Rizvi.
Russian President Vladimir Putin arrived in Istanbul on Monday, an official said, on his first trip to Turkey following a crisis sparked by the shooting down of a Russian war plane over Syria last November, Agence France-Presse reported. A Euromed and Nato member Turkey is trying to rebalancing its foreign policy pendulum towards both the West and the East. Yet, the most driving factors to influence the future relationship between Ankara and Moscow are: the US factor; the Syrian factor, the European factor, the Crimean factor; and the economic factor.
Putin and Erdogan demonstrated powerful personal chemistry in Istanbul, and both seemed at ease dismissing criticism from Western countries over human rights. In what appeared to be a careful piece of diplomatic choreography, during the energy summit Erdogan posed for photos flanked by Putin and another bogeyman of Washington’s, Venezuela President Nicolas Maduro.
Many good hopes in ejecting bilateralism notwithstanding, powerful and conflicting forces continue to influence Russian-Turkish relations, analysts caution. “It’s a misnomer to characterize this as a rapprochement,” said Sinan Ülgen, a visiting scholar at the Brussels-based think tank Carnegie Europe. Ulgen pointed out the differences over the Syrian civil war that culminated in the downing of the Russian bomber remain unaddressed.
In September, Erdogan rolled out the red carpet – although in Turkey, it is turquoise – for the Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Nayef bin Abdul Aziz, as Turkey continues to build ties with countries with goals contrary to Russia’s in Syria. The Saudi visit was the latest in intensifying diplomatic traffic between the countries. Ankara has again been calling for the immediate removal of Syrian President Bashar Al Assad, a demand that walks back a gesture to Moscow in which Ankara suggested the Syrian dictator could play a role in a transition of power.
The Putin-Erdogan summit at St. Petersburg on Aug. 9 marked the beginning of a new era in relations between Russia and Turkey. Murat Yetkin, editor-in-chief of Hurriyet Daily News, in an Aug. 9 article provided details of the “secret diplomacy” that eased Turkish-Russian tensions. According to Pekin, the Homeland Party believes it played a critical role in improving relations, but in the diplomatic corridors of Ankara, there are suggestions that the party is trying to make a name for itself through political maneuvering.
As Ankara’s relations with the United States soured over Turkey’s demand for the extradition of cleric Fethullah Gulen, Turkey was able to repair its relations with Russia thanks to quick, wise diplomatic initiatives. Just before his meeting with Putin, Erdogan told Tass, “The most important actor for bringing peace to Syria is Russia.” In late June, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan apologized to Moscow for the incident with the downed Russian plane that took place on Nov. 24, 2015 and triggered a seven-month-long crisis in bilateral relations.
The thaw in two states was orchestrated following the apology: Putin and Erdogan had their first telephone conversation since the November incident, the parties agreed to meet in person in the near future, andrestrictions on travel to Turkey for Russian tourists were lifted.
“In general, the situation should not have a negative effect on Russian-Turkish relations,”saidI lshat Sayetov, a Turkey expert and head of the Center for Contemporary Turkish Studies.
“The country is headed by a leader who has expressed a clear intention to restore relations. However, the overall instability in Turkey – terrorist attacks, semi-coups, polarization of society and so on – is, of course, not to the benefit of the two countries’ relations,” said Sayetov.
“The concentration of all power in the hands of the Turkish president increases the risk of ill-judged decisions, and the Russian authorities will be taking this into account,” he said.
And yet it goes without saying that the current mode is one of waiting to see if Ankara will soften its red line and adjust the priorities of its Syria policy. Beyond its geographic proximity to the peninsula in the Black Sea, Turkey also has deep historical ties to Crimea, once an Ottoman province, and strong interests there, especially with regards to the fate of Muslim Crimean Tatars, who make up an estimated 15 percent of the population.
Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu recently expressed his concern about how developments in Crimea might impact the Tatars and today his ministry issued a statement calling the upcoming referendum there on whether the region should become part of Russia as a “wrong” move. Meanwhile, Turkey and Russia will establish a joint investment fund with capital of $1 billion, Turkish Economy Minister Nihat Zeybekci was reported as saying by state-run Anadolu Agency.
Many experts are of the view that the normalization of relations with Russia will help Turkey to revive its tourism industry. As reported by Turkish newspaper Hürriyet Daily News, Turkey’s “long-suffering” tourism sector might soon “reap diplomatic fruits” of ongoing efforts to improve bilateral relations.
By all fair strategic calculations, the Turkish government has been making the case that it is best positioned, both geographically and politically, to find a solution to Europe’s energy problem — the continent depends largely on Russian natural-gas exports for energy, even as it is locked in a confrontation with the country over its role in the eastern Ukrainian war.
Turkey seems to have been gaining from this Western conundrum. It has been participating in pipeline projects that benefit both Russia and the West. The proposed pipeline represented the Turkish Stream was catapulted into its next planning stage whereby Ankara and Moscow agreed on the route for the 700-mile pipeline, which could begin delivering oil as early as December 2016. It is assumed that the pipeline will run from Russia through the Black Sea to the Greece-Turkey border. The U.S. and its European allies are seen attempting to dissuade Greece and Serbia from signing on to the project as transport countries because they are worrying it would give Russia even greater energy dominance in the region.
There is much likelihood that the growing chemistry of relationship between Ankara and Moscow would bring about the impact on the ongoing currents-cross currents not only in the Middle eastern politics but also towards Ankara’s relations with Europe and America.
