Introduction

The Russian president Putin has currently hinted that Moscow can not rule out its role in Central Asia, particularly in Afghanistan . As outlined in Russia’s NSS, Moscow regards the Collective Security Treaty Organization as a key instrument to counter regional challenges as well as political and military threats. Some in the West believe that Moscow is deliberately stirring up regional fears with regard to ISIS, a trend that has continued.  Moscow aims at revitalizing the scope of Collective Security Treaty Organisation.

The role of geopolitics 

Russia has signaled its willingness to boost its involvement in Afghan security in a power play that could help President Vladimir Putin burnish perceptions of Moscow’s global significance while dealing a fresh blow to Western influence.

There’s a peculiar belief currently coursing through intellectual circles in Moscow. Combining the bubbling traits of nativism and fear of Islamic terrorism, and playing squarely into the hands of those seeking to amp up the region’s security structures, certain circles have begun pumping up the terror and tenor of the threat posed by the Islamic State.

Putin described the situation in Afghanistan as “genuinely close to critical” in an address to fellow Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) leaders at a summit in Kazakhstan on October 16. The Russian president warned of “terrorists of different stripes…gaining more influence and not hiding their plans for further expansion” and urged neighbors to “be ready to react in concert.”

The CSTO summit ends just as the 70th United Nations General Assembly kicks off in New York, and provided the CSTO members a chance to discuss their collective agenda for the general debate at the end of the month. TASS, according to Asia-Plus, reported that the CSTO members plan to make several joint statements on “space weapons and countering international terrorism.”

Russia is guided by the logic that a strengthening of the terrorist underground in Afghanistan poses new security risks in Central Asia, which the Kremlin is anxious to avoid. In this regard, Moscow and Beijing could potentially sponsor the fight against IS inside Afghanistan, even if it means involving the Taliban. In May, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Russian-led military bloc, put its forces on display along the Afghan-Tajik border.

In drills involving 2,500 troops, 500 of which were Russian, the operation simulated an armed incursion of 700 Taliban fighters entering allied territory. Following the exercise, CSTO chief Nikolai Bordyuzha reiterated the bloc’s readiness to push back any force coming from the southern frontier. The move is seen as reinforcing Moscow’s role as the main guarantor of the fragile region’s security once U.S. troops depart Afghanistan.

The Islamic State provides “an additional lever of pressure to convince regional governments to join Russia-led multilateral organizations and ensure that the region stays solidly within Russia’s sphere of influence,” said Noah Tucker, editor of the Central Asia blog.

The CSTO’s organisational structure

The Collective Security Treaty Organization is a regional mutual defense alliance that consists of seven member states: Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Originally formed in 1992 under the auspices of the Commonwealth of Independent States and the Collective Security Treaty (CST), the purpose of the CSTO is to promote peace, strengthen international and regional security and stability, and ensure the collective defense of the independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of the member states. Led by the Russian Federation, the CSTO has a Collective Security Council, a Council of Defense Ministers, a Council of Foreign Ministers, a Secretariat, and a small rapid deployment force consisting of 4,000 troops.

Since its inception, alliance building within the CSTO has progressed at a glacial rate often running into road blocks as a result of diverging national interests among member states. Following the 11 September 2001 attacks and the subsequent introduction of U.S. forces into Afghanistan and Central Asia, Russian-led efforts to revitalize the security alliance have gained momentum with many Central Asian nations questioning U.S. long-term intentions in the region.

The 2003 Iraq War served as another catalyst for change when CSTO Secretary General Nikolayevich Bordyuzha stated “…the Iraqi developments…had forced many political leaders [in Eurasia], whether they liked it or not, to ponder over the security of their states.”2 Perhaps one of the most pivotal events to solidify Russia’s resolve to transform CSTO into a strong military alliance was the 2008 Georgian War. From Russia’s perspective, continued U.S. military and political support for Georgia likely played a critical role in Tbilisi’s decision to conduct military operations in the restive provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

When taken in concert with Georgia’s longstanding desire to become a NATO member, Kremlin leaders have given renewed priority to establish a legitimate defensive alliance to deal with a wide array of security challenges along the country’s vast periphery. While none of the Collective Security Treaty Organization’s forces are permanently deployed, each member nation has designated specific units within their militaries to stand on call for deployments. CSTO forces are largely stationed in Central Asian bases but answerable to a Moscow-based command structure.

The members — Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan — do not contribute equal numbers of troops.

The command structure

While the alliance has never deployed units, under Article 4 of the CSTO charter they would conceivably see action if one of the group’s members was attacked by a foreign military — much like NATO’s famous Article 5.

There are two key combat forces organized by the CSTO: the Central Asian Regional Collective Rapid Deployment Force (KSBR- TSAR) and the Collective Fast Deployment Force (KSOR).

Central Asia Regional Collective Rapid Deployment Force

The KSBR- TSAR force was established in 2001 by agreement of the presidents of Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The force has about 5,000 troops on permanent combat readiness, supported by 300 tanks and armored vehicles, with close air support provided by 10 Su-25 fighter jets and 13 Mi-8MTV-1 helicopters. According to Moscow Defense Brief, a magazine published by the Center for the Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, a private Moscow-based think tank, the Central Asia force is an equivalent of NATO’s Response Force and can be deployed in under five days.

The KSBR TsAR holds a comprehensive joint-exercise annually and is comprised of:

  • Russia: Three motor rifle battalions based at the 201st Military Base in Tajikistan, Russia’s biggest foreign military deployment; and an air group based at the 999th Air Base in Kant, Kyrgyzstan.
  • Kazakhstan: Two airborne assault battalions.
  • Kyrgyzstan: Two alpine rifle battalions.
  • Tajikistan: One motorized rifle battalion and two airborne assault battalions.

The NATO Response Force (NRF), in comparison, has 25,000 troops on six-of Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The force has about 5,000 troops on permanent combat readiness, supported by 300 tanks and armored vehicles, with close air support provided by 10 Su-25 fighter jets and 13 Mi-8MTV-1 helicopters. According to Moscow Defense Brief, a magazine published by the Center for the Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, a private Moscow-based think tank, the Central Asia force is an equivalent of NATO’s Response Force and can be deployed in under five days.

The KSBR TsAR holds a comprehensive joint-exercise annually and is comprised of:

  • Russia: Three motor rifle battalions based at the 201st Military Base in Tajikistan, Russia’s biggest foreign military deployment; and an air group based at the 999th Air Base in Kant, Kyrgyzstan.
  • Kazakhstan: Two airborne assault battalions.
  • Kyrgyzstan: Two alpine rifle battalions.
  • Tajikistan: One motorized rifle battalion and two airborne assault battalions.

The NATO Response Force (NRF), in comparison, has 25,000 troops on six-month dedicated NATO deployments.

CSTO forces, meanwhile, maintain a constant state of battle-readiness within their national militaries so that they can be tapped for CSTO action at any time. But they are not permanently stationed under CSTO duty.

Collective Fast Deployment Force

CSTO’s more powerful force is the newer interregional Collective Fast Deployment Force (KSOR), created in 2009.

The KSOR’s strength is about 20,000 troops. Of these, 17,000 are permanently stationed combat-ready troops, and 3,000 are special operations troops supplied by the security services of CSTO member states, according to Moscow Defense Brief.

The KSOR goes on exercises at least once a year, and holds two special exercises every two or three years, focusing on special forces and counter-narcotics operations.

There are three smaller forces operating under the CSTO as well. Two of them are essentially bilateral defense arrangements of Russia-Belarus and Russia-Armenia, rather than forces united under a central command, and the third is a peacekeeping force of a few thousand drawn from national security services — police forces, rather than professional soldiers.

CSTO and Central Asia

The establishment of a CSTO RRF and a larger Central Asian military grouping support Russia’s goal to create such a force. According to the former Russian president Dmitry Medvedev , “as far as fighting potential is concerned, it [the CSTO RRF] needs the same sort of training as the troops of the North Atlantic Alliance,”12 reinforcing the belief that Russia intends to recreate an alliance similar to the former Warsaw Pact to counterbalance NATO and Western influence in the region.

Second, the Kremlin is concerned over growing instability resulting from the activities of Islamic extremists in Afghanistan and Pakistan, which threatens to spread to Russia and other Central Asian states. Since 2006 the overall security situation in Afghanistan has significantly deteriorated following the reconstitution and reorganization of the Taliban, Al Qaida, and other extremist groups operating throughout the country. Although the United States and NATO’s International Security Assistance Force have stepped-up efforts to quell the violence, Russian security officials likely view the short-term security outlook in Afghanistan as bleak since militant groups and criminal elements continue to escalate their attacks against Afghan civilians and coalition forces.

Equally troubling to Russian leaders is the unstable security situation in the terrain of Afghanistan- Pakistan closely affiliated with borders, CSTO members are becoming increasingly concerned that Islamic militants fleeing from northwest Pakistan will relocate to safe zones inside Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Russia.

Of the three Central Asian states that share borders with Afghanistan, only Tajikistan is a member of the CSTO. Uzbekistan withdrew from the group in 2012. Russia maintains three military installations in Tajikistan — near Kulob, Qurghonteppa, and Dushanbe — all part of the 201st Motor Rifle Division.

The leader of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev, for example, has been in effective control of politics in that country since he was Prime Minister of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic back in the mid-1980s, and many of the leaders of the other nations in the region can similarly trace their political careers back to the days of the Soviet Union. At the same time, though, several of these nations have charted off on their own in recent years, especially in response to the war on terror.

For several years, for example, the United States leased at least one airbase in Uzbekistan that had been used for missions in support of the war in Afghanistan and there have been rumors that other Central Asian nations were used for CIA operations in connection with the War on terror. For the most part, though, with obvious exceptions such as the situation in Georgia and the conflicts involving Chechnya and Nagorno-Karabach, these nations have either stayed within the Russian sphere of influence.

Given the extent to which ISIS has expanded from Iraq and Syria and into Libya, Yemen, and, according to some reports, Afghanistan, the possibility of ISIS causing problems in Central Asia or even Russia itself is arguably a very real one. The fact that Putin is using that possibility to consolidate his power is perhaps just inevitable. It is worth noting that China has taken a keen interest in the Afghan settlement, sending signals to official Kabul that only peace in the country can stimulate Chinese financing of various energy and infrastructure projects.   Given this, it’s not entirely surprising that Moscow would be using an opportunity like the rise of ISIS to strengthen its influence over the area.

Russia and its Central Asian allies hold a domino theory regarding Afghanistan: they fear that if it fails—which they expect—then the Islamic State, the Taliban or homegrown terrorists could take the opportunity to launch an insurrection northward into Central Asia. Recent bloody violence in Tajikistan, in September 2015, which involved a shootout with government security forces and armed men linked to a jilted former deputy defense minister with purported ties to Islamist forces (see EDM, September 23), has only reanimated the fears that were openly voiced earlier.

Both Vladimir Putin and Kazakhstani President Nursultan Nazarbayev publicly expressed concerns about Tajikistan’s stability at the recent summit of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), in Astana, on October 17. Putin also warned that the situation in Central Asia had become critical and that terrorists were seeking to break through to the region. In response, ostensibly within the framework of the CIS, Russia has launched a new military agreement with Central Asian states until 2020, and called again for coordinated action against terrorism while depicting the US strategy in Afghanistan as a failure (Kremlin.ru, October 17).

The Afghanistan factor: US versus Russia

It is important to emphasize that these Russian and Central Asian anxieties about potential threats from Afghanistan and the likelihood of allied failure are long standing and precede the fighting at Kunduz. In other words they are not merely tactical expressions of the current anti-American mood of the Kremlin. In September, i.e. before the seizure of Kunduz but after the violence in Tajikistan, Putin warned that the situation in Afghanistan was deteriorating. He not only called for an international coalition there—as he has in his diplomacy regarding Syria—but also for stepped-up activity by the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).

The Woodrow Wilson International Center’s Kugelman says that while Washington may not like that its geostrategic rival is taking on a bigger role in Afghanistan, their interests are largely convergent there and a larger Russian involvement might prove helpful for Washington. “The uncomfortable truth is that Moscow and Washington share very similar interests in Afghanistan,” Kugelman says. “They both want more stability, they both support a peace process with the Taliban, and they both seek a credible and effective Afghan government. Moscow can end up helping Washington out in Afghanistan in a big way, even if indirectly.”

In response to the Russian strategy of penetrating its influence in Central Asia, US Secretary of State John Kerry, on a swing through the Central Asian states, is seeking to boost trade and security ties with countries at risk of falling further under the sway of the Kremlin.