UK’s exit strategy from ‘ever closer union’

Introduction

British Prime Minister David Cameron has promised to hold referendum before  the end of 2017,while renegating the terms of Britain’s EU membership.The critics of the Uk’s euroscecptic policies say that the British want to take advantage of the benefits of EU membership –in particular the large market–but to do so without having to relinquish any sovereignty or to allow other EU countries to benefit from Britain in the same way Britain benefits from them.

Background

The Treaty of Rome was the founding treaty of the European Economic Community (EEC), which later became the EU. Also known as the Treaty of the European Community (TEC), all the subsequent European treaties have built upon or amended the Treaty of Rome and its provisions still form the majority of EU treaty law. The treaty focused overwhelmingly on economic co-operation, but it also set out a wider political vision for ‘an ever closer union’ to ‘eliminate the barriers which divide Europe’.

The idea of a United States of Europe had been posed by Sir Winston Churchill in 1946 and was driven forward by Jean Monnet during the 1950s. However, the Treaty of Rome, which set up the intergovernmental Council of Ministers, stopped far short of creating Jean Monnet’s vision of a federal Europe.The proponents of the idea of ever closer union advocate that the the progress– regarding EU’s ‘economic and political communities– does lie in the very notion of ever closer union.

Britain joined the European Economic Community because joining the European project was perceived to be a way to stop its relative economic decline. In 1950, UK’s per capita GDP was almost a third larger than the EU6 average; in 1973, it was about 10% below; it has been comparatively stable ever since. On this basis, joining the EU worked – it helped to halt Britain’s relative economic decline vis-à-vis the EU6.

Euroscepticism: UK’s politics and policies

Euroscepticism is much more fluid and can move between sub-categories that include ‘Eurorejectionism’, ‘Europhobia’ and ‘Europragmatism’. Whereas some parties specialise in hard Euroscepticism, either as a single issue or as part of a wider nationalist or anti-capitalist response, sometimes choosing Euroscepticism as a means to differentiate themselves from the mainstream, elsewhere Euroscepticism is expressed through factions or currents in larger political parties that are pro-system.

As for Britain, a worrying influence is increasingly entering British political discourse: europhobia, the irrational hatred of the EU. This goes beyond mere scepticism, as sceptics typically require evidence to support any assertion, whereas so-called ‘eurosceptics’ appear to be in complete denial of facts about the EU and the benefits it brings us.

Growing europhobia has led to growing support for a referendum on Britain’s membership of the EU, as clearly demonstrated by the recent suggestion of a Conservative electoral pact with UK’s independent party (UKIP) on condition of holding a referendum. This is extremely worrying due to the potential damage that leaving the EU could cause Britain.

With the coming of 2014 and the expiration of work restrictions on Romanian and Bulgarian migrants, the U.K. has become even more vocal about its national sovereignty, with the Conservatives promising an ‘in-out’ referendum before 2017 if their party was to win the next general elections.

Roughly one-third of Conservative MPs favor an EU exit, and even Cameron sees this as a plausible scenario. The prime minister has announced that he will clarify his stance on Europe in a long-awaited address this month, but he provided a foretaste in a television interview on Sunday.

While it would not be ‘right for Britain’ to leave the EU entirely, the country is ‘perfectly entitled’ to ask for changes to this relationship, particularly in light of the fact that the EU is ”changing the nature of the organization to which we belong,” he said on the BBC’s “Andrew Marr Show.”

Cameron’s philosophy

In exchange for greater European integration, Cameron said that Britain should be allowed to take back some powers from the EU. Among his suggestions were a review of tighter EU immigration controls to limit the possibility for “people to come and live in Britain and claim benefits,” and getting rid of the EU’s Working Time Directive, which he said “should never have been introduced.”

Like many small right-wing parties in Europe,UKIP is a movement of radical opportunists who claim that they speak for a large proportion of white lower-middle-class voters.

They are fighting to ease the current ban on smoking in pubs and to stop the construction of wind turbines. It is a British version of the American Tea Party movement.

The long-awaited letter from David Cameron to president of the European Council Donald Tusk, detailing the areas in which the UK wants to secure a new settlement in its relationship with the EU, places considerable emphasis on the importance of respecting the differences ‘of its many member states’. It stresses that he wants the euro to succeed and will not stand in the way of the deeper integration that all sides agree are vital for its success.

UK and the ‘Eurozone’

Equally, the UK case for a new deal for those outside the Eurozone emphasises that changes must ‘respect the integrity of the single market, and the legitimate interests of non-euro members’. The rationale behind Cameron’s position is that some of the actions that the Eurozone might take to enhance the functioning of the euro could have an adverse effect on the single market.

The latter is about ensuring the free movement of goods, services, labour and capital. The UK concern is that actions to shore-up the ‘monetary’ in economic and monetary union (EMU) could lead to conflicts if they erect new barriers to these four freedoms. However, this analysis neglects the fact that the ‘economic’ in EMU is about much more than the single market.

David Cameron and the Conservative eurosceptics set great store by obtaining an declaration that the phrase in the preamble of the EU Treaties referring to an ‘ever closer union’ should not apply to Britain.

The full sub-clause in the preamble in the EU Treaty sets out in typical oratorical phrases typical of many international treaties what the ‘high contracting parties” – diplomatic terminology to describe the governments signing the Treaty – seek to achieve.

So in the last of these general ambition the signatories, including the United Kingdom, declare themselves: ”

There are 65 declarations and protocols appended to Treaties at the demand of member states seeking an opt-out or a non-applicability statement for minor parts of EU Treaties.  These reflect specific national political needs and the EU has always been flexible and sought to accommodate member states provided the overall obligations of the Treaty are not compromised.

It should not be impossible for EU lawyers to find words together with Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) experts that can be added to the next Treaty whenever that is negotiated. There are forthcoming Treaties on possible enlargement and a potentially a big one to put on a full Treaty basis some of the supervisory mechanisms that have been created in the Eurozone.

The opt out urge or the exit strategy

FOR months David Cameron has refused to set out exactly what he wants from his renegotiation with the European Union before his in/out referendum. That is because whatever he asks for will instantly be denounced as inadequate by the prime minister’s own eurosceptic backbenchers.

Yet at the European summit on October 15th-16th he was forced by irritated fellow leaders to promise to put his demands in writing early next month. And, as he repeated this week, high up his wishlist is a determination to exempt Britain from the treaty commitment to “ever closer union”.

The full formulation is an “ever closer union among the peoples of Europe”, a subtle but important addition. This phrase occurs in the preamble to the 1957 Treaty of Rome and in most later treaties. Yet until recently even eurosceptics did not object to what is merely an aspiration. Some other governments have expressed scepticism about the goal.

In 2013 the Dutch government declared that “the time of ‘ever closer union’ in every possible policy area is behind us”. And in June 2014 the European Council formally said that the concept embraced different paths of integration for different countries, “allowing those that want to deepen integration to move ahead, while respecting the wish of those who do not want to deepen any further.” So why is Mr Cameron using scarce negotiating capital to scrap the provision for Britain?

The short answer is that he needs a gesture to appease his Eurosceptics, who have not had a good week. On October 20th the Confederation of British Industry, the main business lobby, claimed that “the majority of British firms believe that the pros of EU membership outweigh the cons”. Philip Hammond, the foreign secretary, also called it “completely unrealistic” to seek an individual national veto.

The divided Europe on EU’s policies

What Europe has instead witnessed in recent years is the rebirth of the nation state in contrast to the years between the treaty of Rome and the Single European Act.

As for Britons, far from an ever-closer union, it may be argued that it would be more accurate to talk of ‘ever more nation-states’ as the chief product of the EU in recent times.

On foreign policy, there certainly is no ever-closer union. Europe is divided over whether or not to intervene in Syria and its member governments habitually take different positions on such key international questions as recognition of the Palestinian authority as a UN state. Europe’s military strength is diluted by remaining parcelled out between different armies with different defence procurement policies.

On energy policy, there is equally little sense of an ever-closer union – Germany opts out of nuclear, Poland sticks to brown coal, Britain keeps dashing for gas, and prices paid by industry vary widely.

Despite this, co-operation and the search for agreement on common policy is worthwhile and necessary. Political agreement, if not political union, is needed to transfer authority to the European Commission in areas like trade and competition – and financial supervision and control. Political union in the sense of supranational agreement to transfer sovereignty to the European Court of Justice in key areas has been a good thing from an economic point of view. The single market, although still not complete, is the product of ever-closer political union.

Conclusion

Unsurprisingly, in light of the ongoing Eurozone crisis, Britain’s relationship with Europe is again at the top of the foreign policy agenda. It is yet difficult to say that Cameron’s veto marks a turning point in the UK’s relationship with the rest of Europe – the implications will in any case rest on continuing efforts to resolve the crisis and the longer-term consequences of this for the EU itself. European Commissioner for Refugees Frans Timmermans, said,

“The concept of ever closer union allows for different paths of integration for different countries, allowing those that want to deepen integration to move ahead, while respecting the wish of those who do not want to deepen any further.”

The government’s current approach, the different context accepted, is certainly distinct from the bridging strategy of the Blair years. Cameron’s firm stance is underpinned by a belief that Europe should act ‘with the flexibility of a network, not the rigidity of a bloc’, while ‘valu[ing] national identity and see[ing] the diversity of Europe’s nations as [a] source of strength’. The protracted crisis has undoubtedly highlighted the disconnect between the concerns of European citizens, the efforts of governments to forge collective – and decisive – action, and the more immediate judgement of the financial markets.

If the referendum is to be won for the remain camp, the prime minister Cameron will have to win an argument about Britain’s long-term interests being best served by partnership with continental neighbours. Increasingly, his credibility in making that case depends on his ability to show not just British voters but other European leaders that he really means it.The British  eurosceptics now faces the challenge to accommodate or accept Cameron’s ideology of  ‘europragmatism’.

The ever closer union’s Europhiles seem justified in their belief that in terms of foreign policy, the British policies have been much gravitating towards its transatlantic pole than moving towards Brussels, thereby also distancing gradually from the core of the European projected and fostered doctrine of regional integration-cum-institutional approfondissement-the credo of EU’s transnationalist approach.

Seen factually,the UK’s seemingly exit strategy from the EU’s club may equally cast a ‘boomerang effect’ upon both Britain and the EU in that it will decline the European Union’s global clout while posing new challenges for the British citizenry to redefine or rebuild its political and regional identity beyond the EU’s defined personification.Therefore,both the sides,the Eurocrats in Brussels and the British political leadership must discover a workable modus operandi that may provide a balance between UK’s economic expediencies and the EU’s perceived political exigencies.