By the International Crisis Group.
Since Bosco Ntaganda’s mutiny in April 2012 and the subsequent creation of the 23 March rebel movement (M23), violence has returned to the Kivus. However today’s crisis bears the same hallmarks as yesterday’s, a consequence of the failure to implement the 2008 framework for resolution of the conflict.
Rather than effectively implementing the 23 March 2009 peace agreement signed by the government and the CNDP (National Council for the Defence of the People), the Congolese authorities have instead only feigned the integration of the CNDP into political institutions, and likewise the group appears to have only pretended to integrate into the Congolese army. Furthermore in the absence of the agreed army reform, military pressure on armed groups had only a temporary effect and, moreover, post-conflict reconstruction has not been accompanied by essential governance reforms and political dialogue.
To move away from crisis management and truly resolve this two-decade-old conflict, donors should put pressure on both Kigali and Kinshasa. The M23 is behaving in a similar fashion to previous rebel movements by creating its own administration and its own financing system in parts of North Kivu. Meanwhile, Mai-Mai groups are expanding in rural areas where they commit atrocities that exacerbate inter-ethnic tensions.
In July this year, in accordance with the peace and security architecture, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) organised a regional dialogue to avoid conflict between Rwanda and the DRC. Unfortunately, the outcome of this was an unrealistic and ineffective solution: the deployment of a 4,000-strong neutral force at the border between Rwanda and the DRC.
If international donors and African mediators persist in managing the crisis rather than solving it, it will be impossible to avoid such repetitive cycles of rebellions in the Kivus and the risk of large-scale violence will remain. Instead, to finally resolve this conflict, it is essential that Rwanda ends its involvement in Congolese affairs and that the reconstruction plan and the political agreements signed in the Kivus are properly implemented.
For these things to happen Western donors should maintain aid suspension against Rwanda until the release of the next report of the UN group of experts, in addition to issuing a clear warning to the Congolese authorities that they will not provide funding for stabilisation and institutional support until the government improves political dialogue and governance in both the administration and in the army in the east, as recommended by Crisis Group on several previous occasions.
In the short term, this crisis can be dealt with through the following initiatives:
the negotiation and monitoring of a ceasefire between the Congolese authorities and the M23 by the UN;
the reactivation of an effective and permanent joint verification mechanism for the DRC and Rwandan border, as envisaged by the ICGLR, which should be provided with the necessary technical and human resources;
the addition of the individuals and entities that supported the M23 and other armed groups to the UN sanctions list and the consideration of an embargo on weapons sales to Rwanda;
the joint evaluation of the 23 March 2009 agreement in the framework of the international follow-up committee it established and this assessment should be the basis for resumption of dialogue between the government and the CNDP;
the launch of local peace initiatives in Walikale, Masisi, Shabunda and Kalehe areas where ethnic tension is high by MONUSCO and the government;
the arrest and handover of Bosco Ntaganda to the International Criminal Court (ICC); and
the launch of an investigation by the ICC into the actions of M23 and new armed groups, and the request by the ICC that MONUSCO transfer to it its files concerning M23 leaders.
After analysing the failure of the stabilisation of the Kivus in the report Congo: No Stability in Kivu Despite a Rapprochement with Rwanda, this new Crisis Group briefing explains the surge of violence and underlines that the Kivus do not need a new strategic approach; rather, the peace agreements and stabilisation plans should no longer remain empty promises. To achieve this, coordinated and unequivocal pressure is required from the donors that help fund the Rwandan and Congolese regimes.
II. THE STABILISATION PLAN FOR THE KIVUS: A DEAD END
In 2008, the crisis in Goma, when the CNDP almost took over North Kivu’s capital, was resolved by the replacement of its leader and the signing of a peace agreement between the government and the CNDP on 23 March 2009. Secret negotiations between Kinshasa and Kigali and more or less discreet mediation initiatives conducted by some members of the international community created a framework for resolving conflict, as described in a previous Crisis Group report.
That framework had three components: the political and military integration of Congolese armed groups in the Kivus; military action against militias, notably the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR); a reconstruction and stabilisation strategy to restore state authority and provide services to the communities living in zones previously controlled by militias.
This plan seemed relevant in 2008. However, four years later, with the emergence of a new rebellion that still threatens Goma and the recapturing of territory by some armed groups, it now seems to have reached a dead end.
A. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 23MARCH AGREEMENT:LITTLE MORE THAN A CHARADE
As with previous Congolese armed movements, the government’s solution to the challenge posed by the CNDP in 2009 was political and military integration. On 23 March 2009, in an agreement facilitated by Olusegun Obasanjo and Benjamin Mkapa, the CNDP and the Congolese government agreed on arrangements for the CNDP’s integration into the institutions in exchange for an end to the rebellion.This agreement was based on the integration of CNDP soldiers into the DRC’s armed forces (FARDC) and conversion of the CNDP into a political party authorised to participate in the country’s political life.
It also provided for the release of political prisoners, amnesty, reconciliation, care for the war-wounded, widows and orphans, etc. The agreement was a strange mixture of clear commitments and promises to consider the CNDP’s concerns.
As indicated in 2010, its implementation proved to be “a fool’s game”. The Congolese authorities pretended to integrate the CNDP into the political system, while the latter pretended to be integrated into the FARDC.
Political, administrative and military integration According to the M23, the main reason for their mutiny is the government’s non-compliance with the 23 March agreement. In fact, the two years following the signing of the agreement showed that the government and the CNDP have both tried to use it to their advantage and both have acted in bad faith.
Political and administrative integration: Kinshasa retains control Although the CNDP was granted the status of political party, as stipulated by the agreement, political integration has remained at provincial level. The Congolese government has taken only two steps to promote political integration: it appointed François Ruchogoza as provincial minister of justice, human rights and community rehabilitation on 22 December 2009 and co-opted the traditional leaders nominated by the CNDP into the provincial assembly.
Despite two ministerial reshuffles since March 2009 and formal support for Joseph Kabila’s political platform, the CNDP never entered the national government. The movement’s secretary general described this as a “deliberate violation of the peace agreement”.10 In addition, the 2011 legislative elections that were to seal the CNDP’s entry into the national assembly were annulled in Masisi territory, which is considered to be its stronghold.
Resolution of the problem posed by the CNDP’s parallel administration in Rutshuru, Masisi and Nyiragango territories was to take place through the integration of CNDP administrative personnel into the state administration in exchange for the government’s reinstatement “of territory administrators and assistant territory administrators”.
Other staff were to remain in place “until further notice”.12 However, the CNDP waited until the appointment of five territory administrators from its ranks on 14 June 2010 before it officially ended its parallel administration.13 Moreover, although an amnesty law was quickly voted, no steps were taken to implement reconciliation measures.
Military integration: the CNDP retains control Although the 23 March agreement included only one condition for the integration of CNDP combatants into the army and police (ie, formal recognition of ranks), integra-tion proved to be extremely difficult and came up against three issues: recognition of rank, allocation of posts and location of deployment.
The process of integrating CNDP troops began promptly but immediately ran into issues caused by a lack of transparency regarding the number of CNDP combatants. In 2008, the CNDP said it had 5,276 soldiers; in January 2009, during negotiations with the government, it claimed 11,080.17 During the census conducted in 2008, 2010 and 2011, the European Union (EU) Advisory and Assistance Mission for Army Reform in the DRC (EUSEC) identified 8,000 men as CNDP combatants.
Meanwhile, Kinshasa was in no hurry to recognise the ranks of CNDP soldiers. On 10 December 2010, CNDP officers refused to wear their new uniforms because their ranks had not yet been formally recognised.19 The recognition of CNDP and PARECO ranks finally happened on 31 December 2010 through a presidential decree.
CNDP combatants who integrated into the army were also concerned about where they would be deployed. Following Joseph Kabila’s announcement on 10 September 2010 of the redeployment of FARDC battalions from the Kivus to other provinces, former CNDP officers publicly refused on 23 September to be deployed outside the Kivus21 on the grounds that they were engaged in the Amani Leo operation.
Military officers based in the Kivus who are not from the CNDP also refuse to be deployed outside their province of origin. Another source of tension was the allocation of officer posts.
In August 2011, FARDC members who were not former members of armed groups expressed their discontent about the priority granted to Rwandophones for command posts.
In September 2011, they published a memorandum against Tutsi and Hutu domination of FARDC high-level posts in South and North Kivu24 and on 12 September 2011, threatened to mutiny. Bosco Ntaganda took advantage of his appointment as commander of the Amani Leo operation to place men loyal to him in officer posts and extend his influence from Fizi, in the south of South Kivu, to Beni in the north of North Kivu.
The extent of this gave the appearance that it was the CNDP that had absorbed the Congolese army and not the other way round. There was also friction between officers and a dual chain of command in North Kivu – Bosco Ntaganda on the one hand, and the general commanding this military region, Vainqueur Mayala, on the other.
Aware of this role reversal, the chief of staff tried to break the CNDP chain of command within the army by reorganising the armed forces into regiments in the Kivus. However, this “regimentation” failed to end the military influence of Bosco Ntaganda, who ordered ex-CNDP soldiers to refuse biometric registration, which would allow identification of ex-CNDP soldiers and non-integrated CNDP recruits.
As integration was not accompanied by profound reform of the Congolese armed forces, the CNDP managed to maintain control over much of the military apparatus in the Kivus, which continued to generate strong resentment among the rank and file.
2. Return of the refugees: Total impasse on a major issue
The 23 March agreement put an emphasis on the refugees and displaced populations. It provided for mechanisms “to encourage and facilitate” their return and for “quick implementation”. Local conflicts were to be managed by “Permanent Local Arbitration Committees (CLPCs)” and…
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