Muslims in Thailand

By Chryssoula Katsikoudis.

Thailand’s deep south has had centuries of old tradition in conflict with the government based in Bangkok. While democracy expanded throughout Thailand in the 1980’s and 1990’s, Muslims essentially began to play a key role in the local and national administrations. Many political analysts consider this as a successful example of Muslims integrating as a minority. The majority of ethnic Malay Muslims in Thailand live in Thailand’s “deep south,” in the tri-province area of Narathiwat, Patani, and Yala. They are not only divided from the Thais by religion, but also by cultural differences, and mostly share a common language with their neighbors in Malaysia.^[1] As a minority in Thailand, which consist of ninety percent Buddhist, the “deep south” has been exposed to violence and radical Islamism claiming lives of more than 2000 people since 2004 in the southern provinces of Patani.^[2] What lies behind this violence in southern Thailand? Furthermore, what does the violence have to do with Islam in particular? These questions will be answered in the following essay analyzing the origins of the Patani insurgency by looking closely at political, religious, and economic factors. While assessing these factors, this essay will conclude with why the south has become a failed community as a result of political insurgency, religious intolerance, and economic inequality.

Religious Conflict

Islam in Thailand has been considered as an “imported religion” and described as “foreign to the country.” The notion of “Thai” varies since the Mons, the Laos, the Khmers, and the Chinese have been part of that melting pot. However, this recent developed ideology, to be identified as Thai is to profess “Theravada Buddhism.” Religion, arguably, plays a big role in ethnic identity for the people of Thailand. The Muslim minority is neither “homogeneous in origins” nor in daily religious life.^[3] What are some of the problems this heterogeneous minority is facing, ultimately a fractional cause of the escalating violence in the “deep south?” During the 1980‘s and 1990‘s there was a strong Islamic resurgence in Thailand. It was not only a political factor, but had strong interest in the ritual demands of their faith and religious way of life.^[4] The resurgence brought Islamic ideas, and also institutions, such as schools and universities. The way Islam was viewed became a challenge for the authority, as the Thai government tried to impose the Thai language in secular schools.^[5] The 2000 census showed the number of Muslims at 4.6 percent of the total population. In the southern provinces of Thailand, the Malay Muslim population exceeds to 70 percent out of the entire population. Three quarters of Muslims live in souther Thailand, with a distinction of different regions where Muslims are the majority from the rest of the population. For example, in the the provinces – Patani, Narathiwat, Satun, and Songkha, right at the border of Malaysia – 75-85 percent are Muslims.^[6] However, there is a slight different between the rural and the urban areas in those provinces. Most of the towns are strictly Buddhist, with Sino-Thai speaking people. Those living further in the country side, in provinces such as Trang and Phangnga, only 35-50 percent are Muslim.^[7] According to statistics, there are approximately 6 million Muslims living in the Southern part of Thailand.^[8]

Since the 1970’s, there was a significant Muslim migration from the Middle East into Bangkok, which became to be knows as the “mini-Beirut of the East.”^[9] Some analyst would agree that Muslims have been “successfully integrated into Buddhist-dominated society,”^[10] however, Islam is making itself less and less obvious it can “indicate a society in crisis where appearance counts for as much as, if not more than, sincerity and deeply felt religious beliefs.” This could be a sign of “fundamentalist interpretation” of the religion itself.^[11] Certain sociological trends in Thailand, such as family and other characteristics among Muslims, do not co-exist with those of Buddhist religious beliefs. For example, in countries, such as Thailand, where people enjoy all varieties of food, Muslims might be hesitant to certain restaurant where they have to consider their “dietary restrictions.”^[12] These clashes between two societies, perhaps equally united, can also turn into clashes between two different cultural beliefs.

As previously discussed, the Thai population is homogenous when it comes to religion, ethnicity, and language. Most are ethnic Thai speaking some form of Thai language. In the province of Satun, everyone speaks Thai. In Songkhla, there is a widespread use of Thai with a strong regional accent. The rural inhabitants of Songkhla speak Yawi, which is a Malay dialect universally spoken in the provinces of Patani, Yala, and Narathiwat. Yawi speakers are Sunni adherents, and the dialect itself uses written characteristics in Arabic, which derives from Arabic  but has fewer letters.^[13] However, if a person from Songkhla, speaking Thai, would visit the rural area of the town, he or she would not understand those speaking Yawi;^[14] therefore, there is a linguistic segregation in addition to the religious one.

The rapid growth of Industrialization and changes in production and consumption results in reach for new desires in modernity. This change affects not only the Thais, but also the Muslim population. Among those minorities who are mostly “disoriented” is the youth. By imposing stricter Islamic rules will most likely “provoke dramatic self destruction.” Education in Thailand’s southern Muslim population has been another political issue stressed by elected or non elected leaders, who strive for a vital importance of improving the educational system. Islam as a belief, requires education to be a top criteria, and the desire to obtain more knowledge is embedded in Muslim society.^[15] The competition between Buddhist Thailand and the religious values of Muslim makes Islam “not only compatible with “modernity,” but can “place individuals in a position to take on a rapidly changing society.”^[16] This could result in an societal clash between the Muslims and the dominated ideology of Buddhism.

Most would argue that Thailand’s southern violence has deep roots in political, and religious factors. Until the end of the nineteenth century, the northern part of present Thailand was divided between two principalities of Chiangmai and Nan.^[17] In the eighteenth century, these two principalities were vassals of Siam, with the majority of the population practicing Theravada Buddhism^[18] which William C. Dodd called the “Yuan cult.”^[19] The language of Buddhism was used as not only a spiritual, but a symbolic strain, often exercised as a resistance to royal power.^[20] Theravada Buddhism, also called the “way of the elder”, differs from other forms of Buddhism following “monastic practices” by monks. Their duty is to make sure the teachings of the Buddha (thamma) are preserved by strictly following the “monastic code” (winaya).^[21] While Buddhism is a religion and a philosophy evoking traditions and beliefs, Islam, as a monotheistic religion, is based on the scriptures of the Qur’an containing the word of God (Allah), brought forward by Mohammed, who is considered by Muslims the last prophet of God.

The spread of Islam in Thailand have deep roots, since the formation of the Kingdom of Siam, in agriculture, to the trading periods on sea and land, and mainly immigration. Like most of the Kingdoms of East Asia, Siam was built on the cultivation of rice. ^[22] Theravada Buddhism was part of the agricultural world, whereas Islam was already introverted into the Malay peninsula when Siam extended its Kingdom. Analysts say, Islam was conceived in the desert and spread mainly through trading.^[23] Until the fourteenth century, trade routes between Europe and China were passing through the north – also called the “silk road” – or to the south – the “sea route” – with ports alongside the Straits of Malacca. As trading was exposed through land and see between different rival towns or principalities, so did the spread of religion, and ultimately Islam.

The most common religions spread throughout these “allies” and their clients were Hinduism, Buddhism, Taoism, and Confucianism – a basic common principle in Chinese traditions and beliefs.^[24] Islam was brought over by Indians and Malays, who have recently converted. In the Malay peninsula, the Malays believed that that Islam brought order; in 1450, Islam became the state religion in Malacca, following Patani in 1457.^[25]

In the thirteenth century, Islam and Buddhism clashed with each other when Persia and Asia Minor got a small taste of Buddhism.^[26] Buddhism has always been a more “varied community” and ethnically diverse, whereas Islam has attracted the Western world, remaining mostly an “ethnically based tradition.”^[27]

As discussed earlier, in the four southern provinces of Thailand the majority of the people, who practiced Islam, spoke with a Malay dialect. Since the 1930s, the government has tried to impose the Thai language and clothing, and to close down all community schools teaching Islam.^[28] This followed by the resistance of religious leaders, who demanded a petition for a “federal structure that would allow them to preserve the area’s distinctive culture within Thailand.”^[29] When the “nationality law” was amended in the 1950s – which stated that “anyone born within the borders qualified for Thai nationality”^[30]– it became problematic for the Malay Muslims living in the provinces of the far south. They southern Malay community refused to assimilate in the demanded language or religious practices by the government. Due to the lack of commitment by the Thai government, as a result the communities of the deep south created their own “pondok” schools, sending the young people off to South Asia or the Middle East for further education.^[31]

Although there was an obvious distancing of religion from political affairs, Buddhism itself has maintained its role in political culture. With evident roots in cultural, social, and symbolic factors in the political arena^[32][33], Buddhism had little involvement in political reforms.^[34] Rather, it has had a cultural influence on political reforms, making Buddhism and politics in Thailand a melting pot.^[35] Some of the official recognized Buddhist institutions have been kept to assist in positions regarding politics. This is because since the earlier history of Thailand, monarchs and elected government officials have been using the “culturally centered” Buddhist institutions for political advantage.^[36]

Political Conflict

The image of Muslims in Thailand are associated with the ethnic and cultural minority living in the deep south provinces on the border with Malaysia. The three provinces that have Malay speaking majorities were for centuries part of the Kingdom of Patani.^[37] In the twentieth century, Thailand began competing with British over Malaysia. In 1909, there were negotiations between the British and the Siamese which resulted in the separation of the Malay-speaking population in Thailand from the Malay cultural activities.^[38] This followed by the Thai government promoting assimilation.

The conflict in southern Thailand, mainly in the Patani region, has escalated since the formation of nation states in South-East Asia in the nineteenth century onwards, following withe the inequalities in education, and religious tolerance. Patani has been the victim of southern violence from political to social factors, which led to resistance by the minority and the rise of separatist thinking.^[39]

After the Anglo-Siamese treaty in 1909 – which touched issues on Thai Malays Islamic faith, language, and cultural identity – the nationalistic revolution of 1932 caused an upheaval amongst the Muslim population, when the government tried to integrate the Thai Malays by teaching them the Thai national anthem, history, and language. This all changed when Pibul Songkhram came to power in 1938, whose policy contained to assimilate the Thai Malays by force resulting in a great resistance in the South.^[40] Pibul discriminated strongly against the Malay culture and language, which ultimately lead to a Malay separatist movement in southern Thailand.^[41] His regime fell in 1944, but despite his assimilation policies, the Thai Malays were able to keep their separate identity. However, after Pibul’s return in 1948 through a coup, he ordered the arrest of Thai Malayan leader, Haji Sulong, and approximately two thousand Thai Muslims fled south of Malaya.^[42] In 1957, Pibul was overthrown by a coup d’etat, however, his regime left a legacy of conflict in the South.^[43]

In 1963, the military regime of Thanom Kittikachorn came to power, and problems in the south accumulated. The rise of Malay separatism in southern Thailand began to reach concern among the Thanom administration. From the other developed party’s, such as the Malayan People’s Liberation Army (MPLA), Thanom feared an alliance between the MPLA and the Malay Muslim separatists.^[44] That is why the government started to take further measures in approving the economic development for the Muslims in the South.^[45] For example, Mobile Development Units were sent to less-developed Muslim communities in the South; as well as the drainage and water supplies were improved. Even Thai Buddhist officials were to learn Malay and respect the Islamic culture.^[46] For a while, it seemed as Thanom’s policies were working well, however, it was a short lived idea.

In 1975, eleven people were killed and forty-four wounded when a bomb exploded at a Muslim demonstration in Patani. Responsible for these attacks were a group who called themselves “Path of God.” Two years later, in 1977, another bomb exploded in the near presence of the royals while on their visit in the Yala province – holding accountable Malay separatists.^[47] These are just some examples to show that the violence in southern Thailand, mainly in the Patani region, has been since day one an escalating political phenomena, due to the lack of religious tolerance and other social, and economic factors. Summing together politics in Thailand before the 1980’s, the fighting was most climaxing when radical separatists were waging “guerrilla war” against the Thai government.^[48]

Politics in southern Thailand from the 1980s an onward, have been characterized by regular attacks in the south, with Malay Muslims seeking for political privileges and development funds, mostly in education; in addition religious tolerance.

Patani was not always center of violence in southern Thailand, but also a center for diversity and cultural riches. Buddhist and Muslim cultures have been strengthened through trade and borrowings.^[49] With both religions interacting and two different cultures emerging, the Malay Muslims in the southern provinces of Thailand were proud of their identity as Malays, Muslims, and part of the people of Patani. They considered it as an ancient Kingdom, and the center for Islamic cultures and education.^[50] However, since the 1980s, Thailand’s deep south went through a wider range of power struggles affecting the Thai government. What does the violence have to do with Islam, is ultimately the question this essay is proposing, trying to find a solution by analyzing some of the factors so far discussed in this essay.

Even though the southern provinces of Thailand is predominantly Muslim, it is hard to convince that Thailand’s southern violence is linked to “Wahhabism” or Salafist teaching with a fundamentalist resistance to secular modernity.^[51] In fact, Islam in the southern provinces remain Malay; Salafism has only been a recent development in Thailand. Historically, Islam in the deep south has been clashing with traditional values of Islamic education by the privatization of “pondok” schools.^[52] Demanding religious tolerance and further development in education for Malay Muslims, the question of who is representing the interests of Malay Muslims has remained a crucial problem in the political system of southern Thailand.

Since the 1980s , there was no smooth transition to democracy. With military coups taking place in 1991 and 2006, many of those elected politicians were characterized as corrupt by military officials. However, promising the demands of Malay Muslims in the south, elected politicians started to become popular with voters.^[53] By 2001, Thaksin Shinawatra’s dominant political party brought up a renewed violence challenged by Thaksin himself.

The rise of Thaksin Shinawatra

During 2004 and 2005, over a thousand people were killed due to the political violence in  the southern provinces of Thailand. By 1997, Thailand was facing an economic crisis and had a new constitution. This opened the door to Thaksin Shinawatra’s rise to power.^[54] Thaksin Shinawatra lead the recently formed Thai Rak Thai (TRT) Party, defeating the democrats in the general elections in January 2001. He mainly addressed national problems such as stabilizing health care, which largely attracted rural voters. His goal was to “dismantle network monarchy” and to focus more on the political economy through businesses.^[55] He was also the first Prime Minister to challenge the royals and to maintain leadership over Thailand. ^[56]

His first term as Prime Minister, he shifted his approach to the southern problem. Strategically, he sent his own people to report on the issues in the southern region, get rid of previous representatives in the south, and put in new, and loyal officials of his.^[57] However, despite all his efforts, he was merely interested in the South, because he felt as if he did not have fill control of the are yet. He was more focused in challenging General Prem Tinsulanonda’s authority and policies previously imbedded to the cause of the southern border provinces.^[58] Prem was very familiarized with the south and the border provinces. He was a southerner himself, and understood the mindset of the Democratic Party.^[59] He also had the support by the local government officials who were very loyal to the Democratic Party.^[60] In comparison to Thaksin, Prem aimed for a dominant role of the military, as well as for the palace, including loyal bureaucrats to the Democratic Party.^[61] Thaksin challenged all that, and assigned Major General Songkitti Chakkabhatra, who, although has never served in the South before, was appointed deputy commander of the Fourth Army in 2001. Studying the southern situation for months, he reported back to Theksin arguing that there was “no real insurgency in the South” and that Thaksin should “normalize the security situation.”^[62]

Since the 2001 elections, Thaksin’s “Thai Love Thai” or TRT Party received a victorious number of voters hoping for the something better. However, instead, Thaksin put an aggressive start into Thai Politics. The demands of the Thai Muslims were not met as they have hoped for, rather the violence in the southern provinces continued to escalade, and turning into a crisis.

 

Crisis after Crisis

In 2004, Thailand’s deep south was overtaken by daily assassinations on soldiers, religious leaders, and civilians reaching a high level of insurgency that Thailand has not seen for over thirty years.^[63] Evidently, Malay Muslims are mainly exposed to this conflict because there is no religious tolerance, and equal representation by the state. Furthermore, Islam has become a “threat” to the Buddhist country. It is looked upon as a religion that centers itself on Muslim unrest which has been escalating since World War II.^[64] The incidents in 2004, were clearly a clash between the Thai government and Muslim militants^[65], making it the most brutal political violence in Thai history.

On April 28, 2004, the Krue Se Mosque in Patani was occupied by religious militants after assaulting military forces. Krue Se Mosque has been a symbol to the Malay Muslims for the resistance of Thai domination. Following the devastating incident in Patani, 108 militants were killed, with another 85 civilian deaths in Narathiwat on October 25, 2004.^[66] These separatist movements have been a part of the Malay speaking provinces since the 1950s. The opposition by the Malay Muslim community has been a result of “forcible assimilation efforts” by the government to suppress Islam as a culture, and the Malay language in Islamic schools.^[67]

 

Economic Failure

However, it is not only religion as a factor that accumulates to the growing conflict in the souther Thailand, but also social and economic injustice. Continuing government oppression adds to the growth of Islamic extremism which some say has “less to do with theology and a lot to do with the failure of the domestic political economies.”^[68]

Developments in the economy have been progressively made since the financial crisis of the 1990s.^[69] The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has increased from 2.1% in 2001 to 6.7% in 2003, when the GDP in the 1990s was 8%-10%. Foreign debt declined from $67.5 billion in 2001 to $51.7 billion in 2003. In 2004, the Free Trade Agreement with China gave Thailand a boost on its economy with a trade surplus of $81 million in the agricultural products.^[70] It looked as if Thailand’s economy was on the right track, how come this does not apply to the Malay Muslim population in the South? It could be argued that the constant instability in the southern provinces result in a decline of foreign investments and tourism, which is largely a big contributor to any country benefiting from it.

The financial crisis of 1997 has been characterized as a result of political corruption due to political reforms enacted by the government with devastating consequences on Thai economy.^[71] When the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) occurred, it was evident to many political analysts that, not only the political reforms, but also the economic crisis ultimately caused the 2006 coup d’etat.^[72] The AFC not only created big business who survived the crisis, but Thaksin’s government turned into an authoritarian regime, oppressing political authority, resulting in the escalation of separatists insurgency in the Malay Muslim majority of Thailand’s southern provinces.^[73] It caused political and social upheaval reaching a point where the opposition finally overthrew the regime.

When Thailand became a constitutional monarchy in 1932, it started falling deeper and deeper into the pit of corruption. Generals turning into Prime Ministers, the military gave the country an open invitation to run the country. It was until ex-commander in chief of the army, General Prem Tinsulanonda, that corruption was kept under control.^[74] Prem also made sure that the military had a limited role in running the country, in comparison to the pre-1973 military regimes. Thaksin on the other hand, used his financial abilities to built an administration with leading business men to run the cabinet.^[75] He took advantage of the newly formed Constitution on 1997, to himself concentrating power as an executive.^[76]

Since the 1997 financial crisis, business men thought it would be wrong to leave the country in the hands of politicians. There was a sudden shift from political reforms to economic recovery. Thaksin therefore argues that only successful business men could lead the country back on its economic feet. By promising “easier credit for business liquidity and investment,” Thaksin’s Thai Rak Thai Party quickly won the elections in 2001.^[77] He promised economic recovery with the middle class somewhat gaining out of his promises. The government promoted the sale of desktops and laptops as well as raising the salaries for civil servants.^[78]

However, Thaksin’s authoritarian style of ruling not only set the pretext for a political crisis, but also 2004 marked the year of the decline of his administration. The decline of his administration was a result of the separatist insurgency among the Malay Muslims in the south, which not only escalated the political crisis, but ultimately resulted in an economic upheaval. Oil prices started to go up, and the Avian Flu threatened the economical growth prospects of Thailand.^[79]

Thailand’s idea of the future was dramatically changed since the AFC in 1997. The 1990s double digit growth created problems with wages being raised, and there was a lack of education and the supply of technology based industries.^[80]  As an after shock to the economic crisis, southern Thailand has been a victim of political and economical neglect; the lack of representation has been a tremendous burden for the Malay Muslim majority in the south – exceeding in violence. Furthermore, since the economic crisis, Muslims of Malay race immigrating from Malaysia, were less welcomed into Thailand.^[81]

The Failed South

To conclude this essay, after analyzing the political, economic, and religious factors that have roots in the escalating violence in southern Thailand, since the emergence of Islam in Thailand, the Muslim minority has been a caged community trying to set itself free. Muslims in Thailand are a religious minority, and with Buddhism being the dominant religious group in Thailand, is it no surprise that there have been demands of an independent Islamic State.^[82] However, the Patani Muslims in Thailand have failed so far to create an independent Islamic State. External courses of conflict have been influential with the arrival of Arabs and Europeans entering the different regions of the area.^[83] With the government taking measures to forcibly attempts to integrate Patani Muslims into Thai society and culture has set the resentment of the Muslim community to the edge. As previously discussed in this essay, when the government introduced secular education and the Thai language in pondok, and traditional schools, the Malay Muslim community’s leader Haji Sulong demanded that, “Islamic law to be recognized and enforced in a separate Muslim court.”^[84]

After the second World War, Muslims in Thailand hoped to gain an “autonomous status” and “complete independence.”^[85] However, after the arrest of Haji Sulong in the late 1940s, the Dusun Nyiur incident – a violent clash between Thai police and Patani Muslims^[86] – political conflict continued to escalate well into the 1950’s. As mentioned earlier, economic failure in the South was another act of neglect for Malay Muslims in the Patani province. After the price of rubber fell in the 1960s, the Patani economy started to decline rapidly. Malay Muslims believed that the regions rubber resources was “siphoned off” by Buddhists.^[87] Meanwhile, the government did try to enact an economic program where the construction of roads, schools, universities, and hospitals were to start in the region. However, even though it was considered as a positive act by Muslims, the separatists still believe it was a trick by the Thai government to abuse Patani culture, economy, and society.^[88] In 1997, during the economic crisis, a new form of organization was created – the Council of the Muslim People of Patani (MPRMP), who pressured the Thai government to come to terms with Patani Muslims.^[89]

The main reason of the failure in Thailand’s deep south is predominantly that the Muslim minority has been deprived of political, economical, and social equality. In Patani, the Thai government is not so much interested in religious conversion, but political domination.^[90] Although the government has made efforts to gain Patani’s political loyalty, there is still up to this day a lack of representation resulting in a continuous denial of participation. Patani’s Malay Muslims have not been given the chance to become politically active in the circle of the the political elite.^[91] Furthermore, the separatist movements in the Patani region are mostly results of historical, political, and social factors. Malay Muslims were also keen, for decades, to maintain their religious identity which has been severely affected by the Thai government depriving them equality, and representation.^[92] It is fair to say, that separatist movements do create a bond of religious, and cultural unity amongst a community, however, it can only be successful if it is supported by external forces, such as political organizations.^[93]

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