By George Washington University. 
Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahedeen, meaning “Mujahedeen Youth Movement” in Arabic, is an alQa’ida affiliated terrorist organization that seeks to establish an Islamist state in Somalia. In its short history, al-Shabaab has evolved from a small militia group to a formidable insurgent force that once controlled significant amounts of territory. Extending beyond Somalia, al-Shabaab has pursued a global jihadist agenda by launching terrorist a Tacks in countries such as Uganda and Kenya, and soliciting support from the Somali diaspora and external extremist groups.
Following the 2006-09 Ethiopian invasion of Somalia, al-Shabaab rose to national prominence as a symbol of resistance against Ethiopian ‘occupiers.’ Filling the void in the wake of Ethiopia’s withdrawal and the collapse of the Islamic Courts
Union, the group rapidly expanded becoming Somalia’s dominant governing enty. By August 2010, al-Shabaab controlled the majority of south and central Somalia, and launched its first international a Tack targeting Uganda’s capital Kampala with multiple suicide bombings.However, by late 2011, al-Shabaab’s fortunes had turned. A three pronged offensive led by government allied African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM), Kenyan, and Ethiopian forces, combined with a famine in south and central Somalia, forced al-Shabaab to withdraw from Mogadishu and reassess its strategy.
Over the next year, internal divisions, a loss of public support, and continued offensives by government-allied forces throughout the country significantly weakened the group. Although al-Shabaab remains a major threat to security in Somalia, today, the group’s resources, territory, and influence have diminished significantly.
Origins
While al-Shabaab emerged as an organization in 2006, the group’s roots extend back to the 1980s and the nascent stages of the militant political Islamic movement in Somalia. In particular, the militant group al-Ihad al-Islam (AIAI) provided a platform for the growth of religious extremism and the training of future al-Shabaab leaders in Somalia.
By 2005, al-Shabaab had emerged as a loose organization of militia leaders running the military wing of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), a conglomeration of religious courts competing for control of south and central Somalia. As of 2006, the UIC had rapidly become the dominant political body in south and central Somalia, taking full control of Mogadishu.
Facilitated in part by financial backing from Persian Gulf and Somali businessmen, The UIC’s increasing strength along with the inclusion of extremist elements, was deemed a threat to Ethiopia and the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia, based in of Nairobi.8 In late 2006, with international support, Ethiopia invaded Somalia and ousted the UIC.
The collapse of the UIC led to the emergence of several groups engaged in a bloody insurgency against Ethiopian forces. Nonetheless, al-Shabaab dominated the struggle, and by the :me Ethiopia withdrew in January 2009, the group had evolved to become Somalia’s most effective fighting force.
2009 – A Poli>cal Vacuum in Somalia Several independent factors helped facilitate al-Shabaab’s ascendency in Somalia, the most prevalent of which is the failure of various political ideologies and governments to establish lasting law and order. Aper Siad Barre’s military dictatorship fell in 1991, Somalia lapsed into nearly two decades of clan affiliated warlordism and the absence of central government rule.10 During this period, 14 internationally backed efforts, such as the 2000-04 Transitional National Government (TNG), tried and failed to rehabilitate the country – earning it the reputation of the world’s worst failed state.
Following years of fighting, a new order began to emerge in Somalia around 2000.12 Influenced by political Islam and proselytizing Wahhabi Islamists from the Gulf, religion took on an increasing role in Somali society. Islamic charities and leaders rose to prominence helping facilitate an environment for the increased acceptance of Islamist organizations.
Al-Shabaab’s Relationship with Clans
Clans remain at the heart of Somali society and identity, and understanding clan politics is key to understanding local dynamics and the failures of central governance. Since its inception, al-Shabaab has been critical of clannism, attempting to present itself as above clan politics. During its rise to prominence, al-Shabaab espoused a narrative of “Somali Nationalism” to unify Somalis under al-Shabaab and mitigate clan conflict.
Nonetheless, al-Shabaab has engaged in clan-based military and economic alliances throughout south and central Somalia at times. In many instances, al-Shabaab intervened in conflicts between clans or backed minority clans against rival dominant clans. Additionally, many top al-Shabaab leaders are also prominent clan figures and al-Shabaab has drawn support from these connections to strengthen the organizations position in Somalia.
(Senior al-Shabaab commander Muktar Robow from the Rahanweyn clan is one such example). Conversely, clan rivalries have also caused turbulence within al-Shabaab. For example, during the 2011 famine that ravaged south and central Somalia, some analysts felt al-Shabaab’s blocking of relief agencies caused conflict amongst its leadership, as the clan members of certain leaders, such as Muktar Robow, suffered immensely, while those of other leaders, such as Amir Ahmed Godane’s Isaaq clan did not experience the same fate.
Governance Structures
In 2010, al-Shabaab controlled the majority of south and central Somalia, establishing centralized governance structures and instating a chain of command that controlled thousands of fighters and managed territory from the national to the local level. At the national level, al-Shabaab is led by Amir Abdi Ahmed Godane (Abu Zubeyr), who heads the main Shura council – a committee of key al-Shabaab leaders that ranges from eight to roughly forty members.18 Under the Shura council are a series of national ministries or “Maktabatu,” which are responsible for the group’s national military, media, financial, and religious/legal operations.
This administrative structure is replicated at the regional level, where al-Shabaab divides into regional governing bodies or “Wilaadaya.” In 2010, the size and strength of these regional administrations varied significantly, with the largest footprint in major urban centers such as Baidoa and Kismayo. Today, al-Shabaab largely retains a similar operating structure, but has been forced to adjust to territorial losses.
Al-Shabaab Messaging
While not monolithic in its ideology or goals, al-Shabaab employs several key narratives to present itself as the true and righteous power in Somalia and a unify of Muslims around the world. Al-Shabaab’s messaging strategy has also proven to be dynamic and innovative, marked by the group’s early embrace of social media and communication in multiple languages in an aTempt to a Tract wider support from the global Somali diaspora.
At its core, al-Shabaab subscribes to an extremely conservative religious ideology, Salafi-Jihadism, which runs counter to Sufism, a mystical form of Islam that has been practiced in Somalia since the 15th century. While Sufism is embraced by many different elements of Somali society, it is considered heretical by al-Shabaab.23 Portraying itself in a global battle against non-Muslims, al-Shabaab calls for the reunification of the Ummah (global Muslim community) under the Caliphate, a global Islamic state.
In 2009, al-Shabaab leader Ahmed Abdi Godane stated, “We will fight and the wars will not end until Islamic sharia is implemented in all continents in the world.” At the national level, al-Shabaab utilizes religious and nationalist sentiments to depict itself as defenders of Islam and Somalia in the face of invading forces.
Tapping into the wave of nationalism spurred by the 2006 Ethiopian invasion, al-Shabaab expanded its ranks from hundreds to thousands, and pushed for the establishment of an Islamic Emirate of Somalia. The organization initially generated considerable local and international support with this narrative, as many Somalis living in diaspora countries returned to Somalia to fight alongside al-Shabaab against the Ethiopians or provided financial support to the group.
In the United States, several individuals have either provided financial support for al-Shabaab or left to fight alongside the group in Somalia.29 Since 2007, more than twenty young men have left Minnesota – the home of the largest Somali Diaspora community in America – to fight with al-Shabaab.
External Linkages
Al-Shabaab maintains a formal affilia:on with al-Qa’ida. Nonetheless, al-Shabaab’s ini:al appeals for a merger went unheeded by al-Qa’ida’s leader Osama Bin Laden, who believed a public alliance would bring undue pressure on Somalia. However, following the death of Bin Laden, al-Qa’ida’s new leader Sheikh Ayman al-Zawahiri and al-Shabaab Amir Godane released a video announcing the formal merger of the two groups in February 2012. While the alliance remains in place, al-Shabaab did not adopt the al-Qa’ida name and the relationship has created significant internal rumblings amongst al-Shabaab’s leadership.
In April 2012, senior al-Shabaab commander Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys publicly challenged the authority of al-Shabaab and al-Qa’ida, declaring that jihad can be waged in many different ways and by many different groups. Aweys elaborated, “We are in al-Shabaab but its operation is very wrong, we should correct it . . . al Shabaab [sic] and al Qaeda [sic] do not represent the Muslim world, they are only part of it.”
Al-Shabaab has also worked closely with the Yemen-based al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). AlShabaab leaders have collaborated with AQAP and the group has open acted as a conduit to al-Qa’ida for al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab members have received training in Yemen and brokered weapons transfers. In 2012, two weapons shipments reportedly sent by AQAP intended for al-Shabaab were captured off Somalia’s northern coast.
In addition to working with al-Qa’ida and its affiliates, al-Shabaab has demonstrated its ambitions by expanding a presence throughout the Horn of Africa. Al-Shabaab affiliated extremist groups have sprouted up throughout East Africa; namely the Kenyan Muslim Youth Group (MYC) in Kenya and Ansar Muslim Youth Center (AMYC) in Tanzania. Moreover, upper Kenyan forces invaded Somalia in October 2011, al-Shabaab launched an aggressive campaign targeting security forces and civilians in Kenya.38
Al-Shabaab: Strategy and Tactics
Following the collapse of the UIC and departure of Ethiopian forces in 2009, al-Shabaab initially launched a guerilla warfare campaign designed to overthrow the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and establish an Islamic state in Somalia. Through local alliances and the use of tactics such as armed ambushes and suicide bombings, al-Shabaab captured large amounts of territory in south and central Somalia.
By August 2010, al-Shabaab had gained significant strength and shipped its strategy to employ conventional military assaults and direct engagements with TFG and AMISOM forces. This was particularly true in Mogadishu, where al-Shabaab launched a military offensive during the month of Ramadan [August 2010] that divided the city in half. However, the Ramadan offensive failed to wrest control of the city from the government, and al-Shabaab’s fortunes came down. Facing mounting pressure from AMISOM and TFG forces in Mogadishu, al-Shabaab conducted a “strategic withdrawal” from the Somali capital in August 2011.
Following its departure from Mogadishu, alShabaab faced even greater challenges as Kenya began an incursion into southern Somalia, while anti-al-Shabaab militias, such as Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama (ASWJ), and Ethiopian forces pushed southeast from the Ethiopian border. To address these challenges, alShabaab withdrew from most major cities in Somalia. Some members fled to safe havens like the Galgala Mountains in the semi-autonomous region of Puntland, and possibly other countries such as Yemen.
In south and central Somalia, al-Shabaab shifted its strategy back to a campaign based on guerilla warfare tactics.44 On all fronts, including Mogadishu, al-Shabaab increasingly employed irregular attacks ambushing military convoys, assassinating government and military officials, and conducting bombings with IEDs, grenades, and landmines.
Despite the shift back to guerilla warfare, al-Shabaab has not been able to stop the advance of allied forces. On 29 September 2012, Kenyan forces took Kismayo, al-Shabaab’s home base from which it generated significant amounts of revenue through the taxation of local economic activities. In response to the loss, al-Shabaab more than doubled its rate of attacks over the next three months launching over twenty per month against pro-government targets. While alShabaab has not sustained this intensity in 2013, likely due to its continued loss of financial resources and public support, it nonetheless retains the ability to inflict significant violence.
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