By Insight Crime.
1. Executive Summary.
Once again the possibility of ending nearly 50 years of civil conflict is being dangled before Colombia. While the vast majority of the Colombian public want to see peace, for themselves and especially for their children, the enemies of the peace negotiations appear to be strong, and the risks inherent in the peace process are high.
As soon as he took office in August 2010, President Juan Manuel Santos began to explore the possibility of peace talks with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). In August 2012, he announced to the nation that exploratory dialogues had been taking place with rebel representatives in Cuba.
Formal negotiations began in October 2012, in the Norwegian capital of Oslo. These talks are continuing, once again in Havana, Cuba. According to the two negotiating teams, progress is being made. President Santos has staked most, if not all, of his political capital on these negotiations.
This political capital is being eroded as the civil conflict continues apace, while opponents of the process, including former President Alvaro Uribe, miss no opportunity to undermine the peace process. Public support is already beginning to wane. The talks face herculean hurdles, as almost five decades of civil conflict have entrenched positions, polarised society and left countless victims. Even if negotiators reach an agreement, there is a very real risk that elements of the FARC will refuse to turn themselves in, or simply criminalise and keep millions of dollars, which currently fund the revolutionary struggle, for themselves. Indeed, some form of criminalisation of rebel elements is inevitable.
The FARC fund their fight through a variety of criminal activities. Unlike the Central American revolutionary struggles of the 1980s and 1990s, the FARC never received significant support from Cuba or the Soviet Union. The FARC have always been self-financing, and have turned themselves into perhaps the richest insurgent movement in the world.
They have been accused of being one of the planet’s most powerful drug trafficking organisations, but this tells only part of the story.Income from coca base, cocaine, heroin and marijuana certainly provide the rebels with a large percentage of their income.
Since abandoning kidnapping for ransom (one of the government preconditions for sitting down to peace talks), the FARC have increased their extortion demands across the country and diversified their fundraising to include gold mining. There are no reliable figures on the FARC’s annual income. However, maintaining around 8,000 armed rural fighters and an estimated 30,000 militiamen could cost up to $200 million a year.
FARC earnings are believed to exceed that, although it is unlikely that all of this money ends up in the movement’s coffers. In their fundraising, the only thing that differentiates the FARC from organised crime is ideology, and the fact that profits are, for the most part, used for the rebel cause.However, it is not the money alone that may prompt elements of the rebel army to criminalise or refuse to hand in their weapons. FARC guerrillas have status in their predominantly rural communities.
While many have little to no formal education, they are respected and even revered. The idea of becoming subsistence farmers, or security guards in a city they do not know, will hold little appeal. The fighters who control the units on the ground, where the coca is grown and the gold is illegally mined, are not the political operators who could have prominent roles in a post conflict situation. Some are barely literate and have never been to a city, but command forces, and earn huge sums of money.
With the dismantling of the Medellín, Cali and Norte del Valle Cartels, and the demobilisation of the paramilitary United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia (AUC), the FARC are the most powerful illegal army still standing. Should the rebels, or even elements of the group, decide to go into business for themselves, they could quickly become the most powerful criminal syndicate in Colombia.This paper will explore three scenarios for the potential fragmentation of the FARC and the possible criminalisation of elements of the organisation.
1. The first possible fragmentation scenario is during negotiations, if elements within the
FARC decide either that their interests are not being represented at peace talks or that the
leadership is “selling out the organisation”. There is precedent for this, with a faction of the
Popular Liberation Army (Ejército Popular de Liberación– EPL) refusing to join negotiations
that ended with the demobilisation of that group in 1991.
2. The second scenario is once a peace agreement is negotiated, and could occur if certain
rebel elements believe that the agreement is unsatisfactory, that it does not justify the
sacrifice of those who have died in the revolutionary fight, or that continuing the armed
struggle is preferable. There is a risk of this if the interests of particular units or leaders do
not get addressed during talks.
3. The last scenario is once an agreement is signed, and after demobilisation of the rebel army
occurs, in which elements of the FARC criminalise, returning to the same illegal activities as
before, but now keeping the money for themselves. The example of the AUC post-2006
provides a solid precedent for this, with numerous cases of former paramilitaries, and even
entire units, moving back into organized crime, particularly drug trafficking.
During previous peace negotiations, there was never a significant concern of FARC fragmentation. What has changed and why are the conditions different in 2013? Part of the answer to this lies in the fact that the conditions are now more favourable for peace than they were in the past. In 1999, when the last round of peace talks were launched, the FARC were atthe zenith of their power.
They had inflicted a series of defeats on the Colombian military and were circling the principal cities of Bogotá, Medellín and Cali. They had moved from a traditional guerrilla war to a war of movement and, in accordance with the 1982 FARC strategic plan, they were planning to move to a war of positions, which would divide the country in two along the line of the Eastern Cordillera (Andes mountain range) and threaten Bogotá. The FARC were negotiating from a position of strength and believed that taking power by force of arms was a real possibility. They never really negotiated in earnest.
Today it is the government that has the upper hand. Indeed, it could safely be argued that the FARC have been strategically defeated by the US-backed security forces. Certainly their stated aim of overthrowing the government and imposing a socialist regime is now nothing but a pipe dream.
Some analysts have insisted the rebels are now in terminal decline. Regardless of the varying interpretations of the FARC’s current position, the rebel group has just a small percentage of the territorial influence or military capacity that it boasted in 1999. President Juan Manuel Santos is negotiating from a position of strength, and even as talks progress, the military continues its campaign to consolidate territory around the country and take down guerrilla commanders.However, it is precisely the decimation of the FARC’s leadership, particularly its more ideologically committed and politically active leaders, that has increased the risk of fragmentation and criminalisation of elements of the rebel army.
Added to this is a weakening of the command structure and the breakdown of units, often into groups of less than six fighters, which inevitably has an effect on discipline. Finally, there is the existence of agreements, and perhaps even alliances, between the FARC and the new generation drug trafficking groups that emerged after the demobilisation of the AUC, known by the government as “BACRIM” (from the Spanish “bandas criminales” – criminal groups).
Since the breakdown of last peace talks and the end of the safe haven in 2002, the FARC have not been able to maintain centralised training camps and new recruits have not undergone the same military training or political education as their predecessors. High levels of desertion have shown the ideological weakness of many FARC members. All of this means that the government is presently dealing with a very different FARC to that of 1999, and even more so compared to the organisation that engaged in earlier negotiations in the 1980s and early 1990s.
There are several factors that might lead FARC units to break away or criminalise, and these will be explored in the paper:
Lack of contact with the Secretariat or even bloc commanders
Close relationship with the BACRIM or other criminal groups
Presence of coca, marijuana or poppy crops in area of operation
Involvement in drug exportation
Location along the borders and/or near potential embarkation points for drug shipments
Presence of illegal gold mining in area of operation
Lack of political instruction or ideology within unit
Lack of representation of interests by negotiators
Poor leadership, discipline and training
There is a significant risk of elements of the FARC breaking away or criminalising. The government must be aware of this during peace negotiations, once any agreement has been signed and, even more so, should the rebel army demobilise. This risk must be analysed, steps taken to prevent the break-up of the rebels, and measures enacted to ensure any fragmentation or criminalisation does not destroy the chances of ending the nearly five decade civil conflict.
Scenarios of Possible FARC Fragmentation or Criminalisation Three possible scenarios for the fragmentation and/or criminalisation of the FARC are studied in this paper. The first could occur during peace talks, the second once an agreement is reached, and the last once the group has demobilised and elements of the rebels stay in, or return to, the field, continuing with the same illicit activities in which the FARC currently engage.
There are those who argue that the FARC are already divided, and that elements have already criminalised. Military intelligence believes that of the 67-odd fronts of the rebel movement, only 15 still strictly follow the orders of the Secretariat.1 There may be some truth in this, although it does not mean that the other fronts have broken away from the FARC, but rather that their contact with the Secretariat is sporadic.
There are certainly many remote fronts that have not seen a member of the Secretariat for over a decade. Command and control has been greatly weakened since the end of the safe haven in February 2002 and the launching of the government’s Democratic Security Policy.
The guerrillas have broken down into small units known as Tactical Combat Units (Unidades Tácticas de Combate), sometimes with as few as four fighters in each. Even in a conventional army, maintaining discipline with such small and disperse units, and such a decentralised command, would be a challenge. The inability of the FARC to concentrate in any one place for even a small period of time for fear of aerial bombardment has affected all aspects of command and control.
The rebels were unable to physically gather together for their Ninth Conference in 2006, and it apparently had to be carried out virtually, using emails.2 These conferences are extremely important events for the FARC, as they are when appointments to the Central General Staff are made and replacement figures for the Secretariat designated. It is during these meetings that FARC doctrine and strategy are set out.
Levels of desertion also reveal a rebel army in crisis. The worst year for the FARC, in every sense, was 2008. During that year almost 3,500 guerrillas deserted, taking with them a treasure trove of intelligence on the organisation for the intelligence services to pick through. Since 2008, desertion levels have fallen significantly, with around 1,000 cases reported in 2012.
One of the ways the FARC have reduced the number of desertions is to pay more attention to their recruitment, falling back on their traditional areas of influence, and recruiting people from communities, or families, with close guerrilla ties
The two-month unilateral ceasefire declared by the FARC from November 2012 to January 2013 suggests that there is still discipline, along with basic command and control of the fighters. Even the harshest critics of the ceasefire cannot deny that hostile actions by the FARC fell by more than 80 percent over the two months.
The ceasefire showed that none of the seven FARC blocs or fighting divisions were openly opposed to talks and, with a few exceptions, the ceasefire was respected across the country. The department with the most violations of the ceasefire was Cauca (at least 11 major violations). This should come as no surprise. Cauca has seen the highest level of conflict over the last year, with the powerful 6th Front and the Jacobo Arenas Mobile Column carrying out sustained operations to counter the increasing deployment of Colombian security forces.
Most of the “violations,” then, could be seen as defensive actions by the FARC, who were reacting to army operations. Indeed, the 6th Front released a communiqué stating that they were respecting the ceasefire, but that the army had launched “a massive military operation” against them.
Perhaps the most worrying violations took place in Antioquia, home to the Northwestern Bloc, or Iván Ríos Bloc, where five major violations were registered during the ceasefire. Here, just two days into the truce, the 36th Front blew up two electricity pylons in a direct violation of the ceasefire, which pledged to halt attacks on infrastructure. The 36th Front later issued communiqué admitting responsibility for the attack, but claiming that the ceasefire order had not reached the unit which carried out the action.5 Either the 36th Front was sending a message to the FARC high command (see the section “Case Study: Iván Ríos Bloc” for more details on this), or communication between FARC units in the region is extremely poor.
The possibility that they had not received the order seems unlikely, as the ceasefire had been announced well before it was put into effect.A second violation by the same bloc occurred in December 2012, when elements of the 34th Front attacked the municipal police station in Murindó, Antioquia. Some reports received by In Sight Crime suggest that the attack was a distraction intended to allow a drug shipment to move through Chocó.
Whatever the motivation, it was a direct and unprovoked violation of the ceasefire.While there are varying tendencies and philosophies within the FARC, the command structure, organisation and unified leadership of the movement has been one of its greatest strengths, and has allowed it to survive 49 years with no major divisions.
At the heart of the FARC are two structures. The Central General Staff (Estado Mayor Central), which has around 30 members, and the seven-man ruling body, the Secretariat. Even in the darkest days of the FARC, in 2008, when the movement’s founder, commander-in-chief and Secretariat member, Pedro Antonio Marín, alias “Manuel Marulanda”, died and two other Secretariat members were killed (Luis Edgar Devia Silva, alias “Raúl Reyes” and José Juvenal Velandia, alias “Iván Ríos”), there was no interruption in the leadership or operations of the FARC. The fallen Secretariat members were quickly replaced.
Not only are there clearly defined command positions at every level, with detailed responsibilities; there are also designated replacements. It is this structure that has maintained discipline within the rebel army and prevented any notable fragmentation.
To continue reading this great report please go to http://www.insightcrime.org/specials/farc_peace_crime.pdf
