By Syed Qamar Rizvi.
It goes without saying that from the very day Narendra Modi took charge as India’s new Prime Minister, it has been an idee fixe of Modi’s government to demonstrate a military misadventure against Pakistan without realising the harrowing consequence of such aggressive offensive.
Since the September 18 attack on an Indian army base in Uri, India’s war hysteria has increased exponentially. Heuristically, Indian media, politicians and analysts didn’t even waste a single minute and as soon as the story of the attack broke the attack was blamed on Pakistan. The circumstances and the Indian story of how the attack unfolded are sketchy at best.
The fact of the matter is that in some circles in India it is reported that that it was a false flag operation as the ‘alleged’ evidence provided by the Indian forces through which they are trying to link the attack to Pakistan is nothing but Indian tomfoolery– of concocting the story against Pakistan—vindicated by the fact that some in India are of the opinion that there was never any attack and it was merely an accidental explosion in some oil storage tanks. The relentless war mongering and propaganda against Pakistan by Indian media has well exposed Modi’s government’s policy evolving the negative Indian mentality and their love for violence and war-an RSS policy objective. And yet many Indian analysts took to Twitter to spew venom against Pakistan. Some were seen making polls whether a nuclear attack should be launched against Pakistan or not.
By all fair calculations and deliberations, the Indian war hysteria is not only unfortunate but highly irresponsible reflected by the fact that some Indian anchors vocally demanded their Prime Minister to launch a military attack on Pakistan. The above mentioned reflections are suffice to expose India’s real face to the world community. Au contraire, the response from Pakistan’s government has been much responsible. The Pak Army Chief Gen Raheel and the Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif made it clear that any Indian misadventure will be dealt with full force and India will have to pay for its miscalculation about Pakistan yet at the same time it has been made clear to the world community that as a peaceful country Pakistan wants to resolve all issue on the dialogue table.
Politically too, in today’s surcharged atmosphere, it is improbable that any opposition party will want to support Modi’s leap of faith toward Pakistan. They will only see Modi as grandstanding in the run-up to the elections coming up in Bihar — and later in West Bengal and UP — or as attempting to distract attention from the ongoing Kashmir stalemate. It also looks that Modi would know he is trying to cut the Gordian knot, but then, what is the alternative? India is getting isolated in its own region as a result of the deadlock in the relations with Pakistan entailed by India’s unwarranted, unjustified and intransigent Kashmir policy. India has no locus standi regarding its Kashmir occupation; it has been reduced to a marginal player in Central Asia; and the China-Pakistan relationship is assuming global significance. India is walking back to the pavilion run out in the great game.
Similarly, the resistance from within the establishment is going to be fierce. Strong vested interests exist within the Indian establishment. Besides, it won’t be surprising if sections within the ruling elite who militate (for their own reasons) against what Modi is attempting may quietly connive with the disgruntled elements within the establishment. Meanwhile, Modi’s own agenda of regional cooperation in South Asia is unable to take off because of India-Pakistan tensions. Most important, India lacks any leverage to influence Pakistani policies. The containment strategy pursued by India toward Pakistan seems doomed to fail. Obviously, the international community regards Pakistan to be a key regional power. Taken at face value, there appears to be some validity to this line of thinking. Indian defense spending has doubled in real terms since 1997, growing at an average of 6.3 percent per year. The Modi announced a further 11 percent hike, raising the 2015–2016 military budget to $39.8 billion. Moreover, India is presently the world’s largest buyer of conventional weapons, with upwards of $100 billion expected to be spent on modernizing its defense forces over the next decade.
Modi faces a policy dilemma. It is true that he leads the BJP, which is not overly friendly toward Pakistan. But as the old saying goes, war stifles reform. If India gets distracted by war, it will stifle his program of forcing through tough economic reforms. That program means far more to him and his party’s future than posturing with Pakistan. Launching strikes inside Pakistan or initiating a military excursion using army, navy and air force should not be a problem for the world’s third largest military.
Such an action may also cause a sharp spike in public approval of Modi government’s decision. But the major issue will be the outcome of crossing the Line of Control, or even violating the sovereign airspace which rests on India’s objective behind the move. Is it only to punish the alleged non-state perpetrators of the Uri attack or penalise Pakistan itself? The other fundamental question remains India’s capacity to zero in the target precisely and eliminate them in the shortest possible timeframe and with the least cost.
Each country has a good military reason not to fight. The Indian military weaponry is, frankly, backward. India has been on a shopping spree of foreign arms purchases. But it still has a long way to escape its situation after the Mumbai terror attack by terrorists from Pakistani-supported groups, when India’s land forces were simply not in shape to strike back.
Despite the fact that Pakistan has an internal war against militants, especially the Pakistan Taliban, the war is long past the point of full hostilities, And the Indian policy thinkers that it is perhaps an expedient time to intervene into Pakistan since by doing that Pakistan’s armed forces would face a two-front war if they took on India. Yet, this line of Indian thinking seems unfit since it must be admitted that it is never far from the minds of the Pakistani military that they might fight with India because of its negatively projected or adopted policy of military brinkmanship in Kashmir and clandestinely engaging its espionage to destablize Pakistan, and so they are probably ready to cope with India.
There is little clarity as to how both the countries will be adhered to a limited war scenario. Will Pakistan deal with an Indian intrusion in Azad Kashmir as a limited conflict or a full-scale war? The most probable answer from the Pakistani point of view may be that they are not planning a war offensive against New Delhi .But If war is imposed on them (Pakistanis) they are ready enough to response to it in any manner that may suit to Pakistan’s military and defensive expediencies. Strategists in India have not been certain about the prospects of a limited war with Pakistan for years. Given the grandiloquence of Modi’s promise, the chances for a Kargil-like incursion are negligible. Pakistan’s response so far has been very explicit and prompt. The arm-laden fighter jets takeoffs and landings from motorways, mobilisation of other vital military resources and launch of a diplomatic offensive on the sidelines of UN General Assembly and elsewhere have exposed Indian plans regarding the Cold Start.
Apparently New Delhi may be relieved by having a Rafale deal with France since the Indian air force must have had its anxiety about Pak air superiority over India. Evidently, there are no options available with Delhi bordering on good to appease the RSS cheerleader. The sabre-rattling may not satisfy Modi’s electoral, but fruitless if not humiliating incursion will cost him more dearly in every sense of the word. And yet the chances of a nuclear strikes between the two states cannot be overlooked keeping in view the uncertain psychological dynamics of war. The military strategists in India are well cognizant of nuclear capabilities of Pakistan.
Though, it looks that India will much likely to depend on funding its proxies in Pakistan and to intensify its diplomatic assault on Pakistan than to really engage in a military offensive against Pakistan, but an unfair and devious India’s policy of sponsoring proxies in Pakistan will be opening more windows to promote hostility and polarisation in both government and people of Pakistan against India. In the present state of deadlock between India and Pakistan, the imperative to be engaged diplomatically is seen not only in India’s interest but broadly envisaging in the interest of 1.45 billion people of the South Asian region.
