Reading a column by David E Sanger in yesterday’s New York Times, one gets a confirmed idea that the US administration is exploring deal to limit Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent capabilities by curbing the production of fissile material.In response to such a measure, Pakistan may be offered a civil nuclear energy deal, that of a quasi India’s type. The veritable point here, is to understand that given its warranted security concerns regarding scowling threats from India,  neither Pakistan’s civilian leadership nor its military establishment can ever accept a nuclear quid pro quo as proposed by the US officials simply because accepting such a deal, will mean to compromise on Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence — the end-all and be -all of its security doctrine against foreign aggression– and a bedrock of its national policy and ideology.Thinking of a deal,is not a viable alternative.Pakistan holds prompt justification or reasoning to turn down such American proposal on the grounds that Pakistan can not afford to revise its policy of a full spectrum-nuclear deterrence vis-a-vis India.

Earlier,in an opinion piece published by The Washington Post, US journalist David Ignatius claimed that Washington is exploring possible new limits and controls on Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and delivery systems. Such an accord, he wrote, may eventually open a path toward a Pakistani version of the civil nuclear deal that was launched with India in 2015.

“If Pakistan would take the actions requested by the United States, it would essentially amount to recognition of rehabilitation and would essentially amount to parole,” said George Perkovich, vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, who has maintained contacts with the Pakistani nuclear establishment.“I think it’s worth a try,” Mr. Perkovich said. “But I have my doubts that the Pakistanis are capable of doing this.”

The discussions are being led by Peter R. Lavoy, a longtime intelligence expert on the Pakistani program who is now on the staff of the National Security Council. White House officials declined to comment on the talks ahead of Mr. Sharif’s visit.

But the central element of the proposal, according to other officials and outside experts, would be a relaxation of the strict controls imposed on Pakistan by the Nuclear Suppliers Group, a loose affiliation of nations that try to control the proliferation of weapons.

Pakistan Foreign Office spokesperson said Pakistan’s nuclear policy was shaped by evolving security dynamics of South Asia, growing conventional asymmetry, provocative doctrines and aggressive posturing by India.

This situation, the spokesperson said, obliges Pakistan to take all necessary measures to maintain a full spectrum deterrence capability in order to safeguard our national security, maintain strategic stability and deter any kind of aggression from India. “Pakistan seeks peace and strategic stability in South Asia as a cornerstone of its policy and considers conflict resolution as a means to achieve this end. This policy has been reiterated by Pakistan’s highest decision-making body, the National Command Authority (NCA), chaired by the Prime Minister , in its meeting on September 9, 2015,” he said.

From the very start of the Indian indoctrination of the Cold Start, Pakistan took the doctrine seriously, because it had a direct bearing on our security, as well as to prevent destabilization in an environment of ‘conventional asymmetry’. We were the affect party. The doctrine was meant to be unleashed against Pakistan. Pakistan could not ignore the effects being generated by the ‘offensive doctrine’. Therefore in order to deter the unfolding of operations under the doctrine Pakistan opted to develop a variety of short range, low yield nuclear weapons, also dubbed tactical nuclear weapons. This was a ‘Pakistani defensive’, deterrence response to an offensive doctrine.

But, in an attempt to do one better on the escalatory run, some people responded via massive retaliation bluster, without thinking through the consequences in a nuclear parity situation. Pakistan thinks it’s time to get real. Even-handed and non-discriminatory approach to South Asia alone will contribute towards peace and stability. ‘Discriminatory approach’ on issues like NSG (nuclear supplier group) ‘exemption, and NSG membership’ is already proving to be ‘counterproductive’. It will never be acceptable to Pakistan. And will, in no way, contribute towards peace and stability. Therefore it is a must to desist from taking shortsighted measures today that will be regretted later.

Given operationalization, Pakistan’s nuclear capability in a manner that it today possesses a variety of nuclear weapons, in different categories. At the strategic level, at the operational level, and the tactical level. And the total comprehensiveness of the program is the effects that it is generating of deterrence, and keeping war away.Factually, the development of the entire capability has ensured peace in South Asia.

The analysis of the command and control, custodial and export control systems shows that it is, indeed, second to none in the world. It is also not fully appreciated that unlike some of the other nuclear states, apart from technical controls and safeguards, despite being a developing country and perhaps for that reason, Pakistan can and does afford maximizing specialized personnel and troops dedicated for safeguarding its assets against internal and external threats.

Therefore, the threat of any terrorist attack on nuclear facilities to try to seize any of the assets or fissile material, in reality, does not exist. Multiple physical and personnel reliability systems, as well as inventory controls and checks, rule out any insider-outsider threats.

Pakistan has also interacted with other countries, including Japan, UK, US and the EU. While it is true that Pakistan does not need a security clearance from any quarter, it is prudent to meet international concerns, and this is the policy of every nuclear state. It is for this reason that when ‘media hype’ was at its high water mark, those foreign officials and academics who were best informed, including for that matter the official spokesman of the U.S government, expressed full confidence on the ‘safety and security’ of Pakistan’s nuclear assets.

Those quarters which raise concern about Pakistan in the nuclear field, do not make comparisons with the security of nuclear weapons, fissile material and ‘nuclear facilities in other nuclear weapons states’, including Russia and India, while incidents have also taken place in the United States of America.

In Russia, the threat has been much greater. It necessitated the American, Nunn-Lugar legislation for assistance for safeguarding Russian facilities and fissile material after the breakup of the Soviet Union. Russian nuclear and other WMD production facilities deteriorated and some Russian scientists went abroad. There has been some leakage of fissile material. One of Russia’s leading military commanders stated that some of Russia’s suitcase nuclear bombs, designed for their Special Forces operations, had gone missing. While this was refuted by the Russian government, there are causes of concern across the spectrum. However, international attention is muted on it.

In the context of India, fissile material and nuclear weapons are arguably in greater danger. Unlike as in Pakistan, many Indian facilities are under the supervision of civilian security. There are seventeen ongoing insurgencies, which are potential terrorist threats. India has also displayed an unwillingness to engage with other countries on ‘security practices’.

Furthermore, most of the Indian power reactors were  ‘outside IAEA safeguards’. Even after the US-India nuclear deal, eight of the existing reactors remain outside safeguards, with India having the discretion of placing future reactors within or without IAEA safeguards. Since the majority of the Indian reactors have been outside safeguards, it is difficult for the international community to assess the status of past and present safety of the spent fuel generated by these reactors. India’s ambitious ‘thirteen breeder reactors’ program also remains outside safeguards.

DG of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Yukiya Amano and Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary met on the sidelines of the 70th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, discussed matters related to mutual cooperation between Pakistan and the UN nuclear watchdog in the peaceful application of nuclear technologies. Yukiya Amano praised Pakistan’s impressive nuclear security record spanning over four decades of nuclear power plant operation and expressed satisfaction at the implementation of ‘IAEA safeguards measures’ by Pakistan.

In the United States, 63,000 tons of nuclear waste, the sum total of all the waste generated by decades of nuclear power, sits right where it was created,  at the power plants themselves.

Often, these power plants are very close to major population centers — Washington, Boston, New York City, Philadelphia and Chicago havereactors within the 50-mile fallout zoneIf the waste catches fire, a situation Japanese officials are racing to prevent at Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi plant, critics say it could effectively render an area the size of half of New Jersey permanently uninhabitable. “It’s probably the single greatest security vulnerability in the United States,” said Kevin Kamps, radioactive waste specialist at Beyond Nuclear, a watchdog group.

India produces plutonium for weapons at two military production reactors and is estimated to have about 700 kilograms of separated plutonium, which is enough for about 140 bombs. It produces new plutonium at a rate of about 30 kilograms per year.

Pakistan has about 2 metric tons of HEU for its nuclear weapons and about 100 kilograms of weapons plutonium, which is enough for about 100 bombs. Pakistan has one plutonium-production reactor,  and is increasing its reliance on plutonium weapons. The reactor can produce about 10 kilograms of plutonium per year.

Although Pakistan and its nuclear-armed rival India each have more than enough nuclear firepower to deter a nuclear attack by the other, Pakistani leaders consider the proposed FMCT a ‘clear and present’ danger because it would prevent Pakistan from matching India’s fissile stockpile and production potential. Pakistan insists that other nations agree to discuss limits on existing fissile material stocks before talks can begin.

However, India has entered into ‘no legal bindings’ regarding its nuclear activities and has not even signed the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT), and is ‘free to expand and trade’ its nuclear programme. The option– to begin open-ended talks involving only Pakistan with facilities capable of producing fissile material for weapons—seems highly unjustifiable and partial.

None of these options is easy or simple. States that are truly serious about reducing the nuclear threat now must provide the leadership needed to build a more effective fissile material control system. Though in a post ‘South Asian conflict resolution’ phase, Pakistan may possibly agree on a proposal of envisaging a bilateral India- Pakistan initial focus to increase transparency and confidence regarding fissile production and fissile stocks and begin technical work via IAEA.

From the above discussion, it would be fair to conclude that either the global concerns are due to unrealistic fears of what can happen in Pakistan, or due to a deliberate campaign. Whatever the rationale, these concerns have generated suspicion that such a campaign is part of a plan to try to destabilize Pakistan and to try to neutralize Pakistan’s strategic assets and nuclear ‘deterrent capability’. While the notion of South Asian strategic stability is organically related to Pakistan full-spectrum nuclear deterrence,  the US administration’s attempt to curb Pakistan nuclear capability is tantamount to unjustly dealing with Pakistan. The US’s proposal of ‘nuclear civil deal’ must be positively entailed by considering Pakistan’s ‘security imperatives and its ideological expediencies’ .