Gary Grappo, Author at Think Research Expose

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Globalization: Made in the USA

August 30th, 2016

By Gary Grappo.

Globalization has become bad word of late.

It has been the punch line for the “Leave” supporters of Brexit, a campaign platform—if indeed he has such a thing—for US presidential candidate Donald Trump, a Bernie Sanders throw line to stir followers, a rallying cry for anti-free traders, a justification for those opposing “American hegemony” and the scapegoat for just about anyone who wants to “take back” their country, sovereignty, way of life, values or jobs.

The anti-globalization mood is ascendant in the United States where its supporters assert the phenomenon has robbed Americans of their jobs and livelihoods, opened their borders to too many immigrants—a curious claim in a country made up almost entirely of immigrants and their descendants—and diluted America’s culture and values.

However, America may have lost sight of the many benefits that have accrued to the country and the whole world as a result of globalization. What may also surprise them is that the version of globalization seen today in America and around the world was made in the good, ole USA.

That’s right. The globalization we see spreading about the world in all its forms—trade, investment, technology diffusion, the diversity stemming from the mixing of previously isolated people and cultures, the arts and sciences, international cooperation in climate change, counterterrorism, arms control and human rights—was designed and made in America. So, why are Americans turning against their own creation?

Human Interaction

It may be true that few opponents of globalization could define what it really is and what it has come to mean for the world. Definitions do vary, but most come down to theincreasing interaction, interdependence and integration of people, societies, governments, businesses and institutions around the world. While typically seen for its commercial and trade benefits, which are formidable, it has also facilitated technology exchange, the movement of people and capital, economic development—especially in less developed countries—and cultural awareness and understanding.

Globalization’s detractors cite the downside of globalization. These typically refer to the loss of manufacturing jobs in more developed nations to lesser developed ones, largely due to lower labor rates or taxes in the latter. But others have also claimed that globalization—which can also encompass greater immigration, multiculturalism and tolerance of non-traditional lifestyles—has diluted, or even polluted, the traditional cultures of a nation or society.

But globalization is not a new phenomenon. In fact, it has been around as long as mankind. Primitive tribes, often even rivals, were known to have traded for centuries, sometimes across great distances. Kingdoms and states were often founded on the basis of trade and increased interaction, from the Babylonians, Nabateans, Romans,Abbasids of Baghdad and Venetians, to the 18th– and 19th-century British Empire and post-World War II America. All incorporated globalization—more formally in its commercial guise—into its governing philosophies and structures. Often, technology and even religious concepts were adopted by one group from an unrelated group or tribe, e.g., the Romans and the Greeks.

Such interaction brought with it greater communication and new ways to live, prosper and grow. It also sometimes led to war. But it never stopped. Humanity has always understood that human interaction, especially across tribal, religious, ethnic, cultural and national boundaries, was a net positive for human survival and prosperity. Had it been otherwise, it would have ceased long ago.

Modern Globalization Gets Going

It wasn’t until the end of the Second World War, however, that nations decided that they would formally adopt globalization in its now almost infinite varieties into their strategies for security and prosperity. It would become the blueprint for the world’s modus vivendi. Leading that effort was the United States, the only large, major country to exit that war with its economic structures and society intact and relatively unharmed.

An enlightened and progressive leadership of Harry Truman, George Marshall and Dwight Eisenhower was joined by an extraordinary group of experts and advisers—Dean Acheson, Charles Bohlen, George Kennan, John McCloy, Robert Lovett, Dean Rusk—aka “The Wise Men” in Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas’ seminal work of the period. These men wanted to craft what would become not only America’s strategy in the postwar period but a global strategy that has endured to the present day. It should be noted that such terms as “enlightened and progressive” and “experts and advisors” have also come under much criticism and disparagement, today, from the anti-globalization gang.

These men and their many allies throughout the West and the world purposely set out to create an interdependent network of institutions, alliances, agreements and relationships to prevent not just America but the entire world from experiencing the catastrophes that had twice rained mayhem upon humanity in the first half of the 20th century.

They wisely reasoned that the best way to avoid such conflicts, especially in an era of nuclear weapons, would be to create this global structure that would preserve stability, ensure security and advance prosperity and human dignity.

Whether they could actually see 70 years into the future is unknown. But the fruits of their wisdom and genius are undeniable today. Organizations such as the United Nations (UN), the Bretton Woods System (the World Bank and International Monetary Fund), International Court of Justice (ICJ), World Trade Organization (WTO), Food and Agricultural Organization, World Health Organization (WHO), International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and so many others were created in the post-World War II years to ensure security, facilitate commerce, promote economic growth and improve human health and well-being.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) helped to unify the formerly warring nations in Europe in the continent’s defense and proved indispensable in ending the Cold War and the Balkan conflict peacefully.

UN resolutions and international treaties addressing global challenges—in such diverse areas as human rights, the rights and health of women and children, non-proliferation, counterterrorism, chemical and biological weapons, drug enforcement, space and sea exploration, climate change and environmental protection, to name only a few—all came about in the postwar period as a result of the creation of international institutions. And most often they came on the initiative of or with strong backing from the United States.

Nor should we forget the many regional institutions that grew out of the postwar globalization effort. The European Union (EU), Organization of the American States (OAS), Association of South East Asia Nations (ASEAN), the African Union (AU), the Arab League and the Asian, Latin American and African development banks and numerous others all complimented the efforts of their international counterparts to address specific challenges of peace and prosperity in their respective regions.

The Mechanism for Global Transformation

The achievements of globalization are undeniable. In every field of endeavor, humanity is better off today than at any other time in human history.

The world still has experienced far too many conflicts since the end of the last world war. However, major powers, most especially those armed with nuclear weapons, have steered clear of face-to-face confrontation. Undeniably, the Cold War was responsible for its share of fatalities in Latin America, Africa and Asia—mostly in the form of civil wars in which the opposing sides were often backed by the superpowers.

But shockingly, the end of one superpower—the Soviet Union in 1991—came without the loss of a single Russian or American soldier. The structures put in place after the Second World War that allowed for effective communication and interaction between the two enemies, such as the UN, Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe, arms treaties and a process of formal talks at senior levels between the two powers—also allowed the two governments’ leaders to talk and thereby diminish the potential for conflict. The fact that one superpower could have been transformed in such a manner without a shot being fired may be the greatest tribute to the postwar globalization structure.

War deaths in absolute numbers and in per 100,000 have declined steadily since 1945. The worst year, 1950, which coincided with the deadliest year of the Korean War, saw over a half a million deaths. The second worst, 1970, the height of the Vietnam War, saw over 350,000. Fatality rates in subsequent wars in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq never approached such levels. Moreover, the deadliness of wars—battle deaths per conflict averaged over each decade—declined from the post-World War II period high of about 100,000 to fewer than 5,000 by the end of the first decade of the 2000s.

Deaths for the two world wars of the 20th century total between 78 million and 90 million. Civil wars in Russia (1918-1922) and Spain (1936-1939) and the Mexican Revolution (1901-1916) account for another 14-plus million. That averages an astonishing 2-2.3 million wars death every year in the first 45 years of the 20th century. By the end of the next 65 years (1945-2010), the yearly average had declined by nearly 75%, still a tragic toll but far removed from what can be described as the deadliest 45 years in human history.

Clearly, these declines may also be attributed to better and more sophisticated weapons, improved tactics that reduced civilian casualties and improved battlefield injury treatment. But we cannot dismiss the globalization strategies that brought peacemaking and conflict reduction and conflict-ending measures to bear on conflicts to end them or lessen their losses.

The great human catastrophes of the early 20th century—the Holocaust and the Armenian genocide—which were responsible for the deaths of no fewer than 6 million Jews and nearly 1 million Armenians, respectively, saw their latter 20th century equivalents in Cambodia, the Balkans and Rwanda. Globalization may not be the remedy for all of humanity’s depravities. But it has within it the outlines for preventive measures and solutions.

Richer, Better, Healthier

The benefits of globalization are not measured by grim death figures alone. Economic conditions have improved dramatically since the end of World War II, per World Bank statistics. The number of extremely poor people—those earning less than $1 or $1.25 a day—rose consistently until the middle of the 20th century, then roughly stabilized for a few decades.

Since then, however, it has fallen, dropping more slowly through the 1980s but then precipitously since the 1990s, from nearly 2 billion in 1981 to under 900 million people in 2012. According to the World Bank data, that’s from 44.3% of world population to less than 13%. It wasprojected to fall to below 10% by the end of 2015—a startling achievement. Compare it with where the world stood at the end of 1945 when over half the world’s estimated 2.4 billion people lived in poverty.

Life expectancy has made similar gains. According to the WHO, life expectancy worldwide at birth in 2015 was 71.4 years (73.8 years for females and 69.1 years for males), ranging from 60.0 years in the WHO African region to 76.8 years in the WHO European region. That’s up from a global average for both genders of 48 years in 1945.

Global trade today has dramatically improved since the protectionist pre- and postwar eras. This came about as a result of an attitudinal change about trade and commerce and the vital roles they play in both national economies and international security. Countries that trade and do business with one another are less inclined to go to war with one another.

The movement to break down trade barriers was spearheaded in the post-World War II period by the United States, first with the creation of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) and then with creation of organizations like the WTO and World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), to the many free-trade agreements it has signed with neighbors nearby as well as allies and friends around the world. Other nations wisely followed suit.

Led largely by then superpower Great Britain, worldwide trade in the 19th century and until 1913 grew by more than 3% annually. It was spurred by technological advances, especially in communication and transportation, as well as by political and economic liberalization. It was the world’s first exposure to globalization and its opportunities.

But in the lead-up to the First World War, the bane of globalization—nationalism—crept into national political and economic policies, which in turn led to protectionism. War—or wars, to be correct—not surprisingly followed. From 1925 to 1945, total trade as a percentage of GDP in Europe fell from 40 percentage to just over 15. The lack of global economic leadership and cooperation were perhaps the biggest obstacles to interwar years’ recovery. America’s Great Depression likely prevented it from stepping in to replace Britain. Nationalism—and the protectionism it spawned—sadly ruled the day.

The lesson was not lost on the post-World War II leaders in America and elsewhere. The structures and agreements that followed produced the greatest economic expansion ever witnessed in human history. And trade was pivotal to that prosperity.

In 1913, the year preceding the First World War, world exports comprised 7.9% of global GDP, according to a WTO world trade report. By 1950, five years after the end of World War II, it had fallen to just 5.5%. By 1998, it had risen to 22.8% and reached almost 30% by 2014.

Predictably, world GDP growth paralleled the growth in trade,according to World Bank data, from a post-World War II high of 6.4% in 1964 to a low of -2.1% in 2009. (In the period from 1960 to 2014, GDP growth was negative only twice, in 2008 and 2009, the “Great Recession.”) In general, global economic growth throughout this 65-year period largely kept within a band of 2% to 5%.

The data cited above all attest to the benefits of globalization. In fact, it would be hard to identify any element of life on a national or individual level that has not improved since World War II as result of some aspect of globalization.

Globalization Challenged

So why America’s—and perhaps Britain’s as well—apparent turn toward nationalism, nativism and even isolationism? How could the nation most responsible for leading this great and grand strategy to move mankind out of insularity to such unprecedented prosperity now wish to effectively take a wrecking ball to the whole lot?

Former US Treasury Secretary,Hank Paulson, attributes it to America’s Republican Party’s endorsement of Donald Trump, who campaigns on “a brand of populism rooted in ignorance, prejudice, fear and isolationism.” That may explain in large measure the motivation of many of those attacking globalization.

One of the principal architects of this extraordinary post-World War II effort to bring the world closer together to ensure stability, Harry Truman, once confidently asserted: “No nation on this globe should be more internationally minded than America because it was built by all nations.” Truman uttered those words when faced with similar challenges posed by the isolationists of his period.

The wisdom of Truman, a great student of history, might also apply when he remarked that “The only thing new in the world is the history you don’t know.” Do Americans today understand what the world had gone through in the first half of the last century? More importantly, do they understand the extraordinary impact their nation and its farsighted leadership have had on the world and the potential for even greater progress?

Globalization has brought all markets, both America’s and other countries’, practically to the front door of everyone. Internet commerce—something else introduced to the world by the US—has opened new frontiers to innovators, of which America has a great many, who create business, wealth and prosperity. It has also exposed the world to much greater understanding as humans anywhere can now communicate with nearly anyone anywhere at any time.

Globalization’s detractors make some relevant arguments that governments and societies need to address. The first of these is the growing income disparity between the so-called one percent and the rest of the country. As reported by University of California Berkeley economist Emmanuel Saez, “Six years after the end of the Great Recession, incomes of families in the lower 99 percent have recovered only about sixty percent of their losses due to that severe economic downturn.”

Incomes of the top 1% of families, according to Professor Saez, grew from $990,000 in 2009 to $1,360,000 in 2015, a growth of 37%. In contrast, the incomes of the bottom 99% of families grew only by 7.6%–from $45,300 in 2009 to $48,800 in 2015. The upshot is that the one-percenters are collecting a greater share of total real income growth, about 52%, in the US than the lower 99-percenters.

Detractors argue that their jobs are going overseas or being replaced by robotization and that they are left with lower paying ones, often in the low-skill service industry. Many of those “exported” jobs were in the manufacturing industry. While manufacturing output in the US has risen from about $400 billion in 1947 to $2.1 trillion in 2014, employment in that sector has fallen from a postwar high of 17.2 million in 1979 to 12.2 million in 2015, according to the Federal Reserveand Bureau of Labor Statistics. That translates to productivity (output per hour of work) gains of 250%, a good thing for any economy. But the percentage of the American workforce in manufacturing has declined from 32% in 1953 to under 10% today.

These developments, in fact, speak to the challenges as opposed to disadvantages of globalization. With technological advancement, developed countries innovate to produce the same or newer products faster, better and less expensively. Meanwhile, with economic development and the improved health, education and investment that come with it, lesser developed countries learn to produce less expensively products previously made in the more developed countries because of lower wages or taxes.

These two phenomena are an inevitable outcome of economics as well as globalization. They are also an inescapable reality of human progress, as unstoppable as is human innovation, where developed nations like the US still have the upper hand.

A New Face of Globalization

So, perhaps what the driver economies of globalization, especially the US, should be seeking is adopting a new perspective on globalization as opposed to jettisoning globalization. Governments need to recognize the significant displacement that often occurs as a result and then adopt policies and measures to mitigate or soften its sometimes harsh effects.

These ideas have included some of the following:

Education: Promoting and offering newer forms of education or re-education for greater numbers of the adult population, perhaps also providing salary subsidies while undergoing training, would allow those on the losing end of globalization to move more easily to up-and-coming trades in manufacturing and services.

Salary: Given the increasing importance of services in developed economies, offering more competitive salaries and other benefits would facilitate the movement of workers into those fields, e.g., healthcare, education, social well-being, etc. That might mean government action. However, government must be wary of doing the work that the market is far better able to do.

Mobility: Globalization favors the mobile, and not just phones. People must be able to move with markets. This is hard for many people more accustomed to remaining close to their original communities. However, mobility within the country must be encouraged, perhaps by providing government incentives to individuals and businesses and even requiring businesses to offer assistance to workers and their families who must relocate.

Infrastructure: No nation can expect to become economically progressive and competitive without adequate infrastructure. Even the most modern and developed economies need to maintain and improve their infrastructure. Nowhere is this more evident than in the US, where neglected highway and other transportation, communication and public service systems have not kept up with the population growth or demand. Private capital will follow public capital, and the latter today needs to be directed toward the country’s infrastructure. In turn, that will generate not only the needed private capital into innovative industries but also greater employment opportunities for professional, skilled and semi-skilled labor. Such an undertaking is entirely consistent with globalization and can also effectively address the nation’s overall welfare and competitiveness.

There are other policy areas where action is needed to soften the sharper edges of globalization. Taxation, fiscal policy, research and development, environmental and agricultural policies, and others should be evaluated in the context of globalization and their ability not only to advance globalization but also diminish the repercussions on certain parts of society.

No Turning Back

Any political candidate advocating a retreat from globalization ought to be asked to explain how less—or the elimination—of its most vital components will advance the general welfare. The candidate should be able to explain how it was that the post-World War II period was somehow not in the interest of the country and not better than what citizens saw in the pre-World War I and interwar years. A candidate must be able to answer how a self-marginalized country would protect and advance all of its interests in a less interdependent world.

For political candidates in America advocating a retreat from globalization, there is an additional and even more acute question: In such a scenario, how would the country maintain its position of global leadership? It is rationally inconceivable that the US or any major world power can simultaneously maintain such a role and turn its back on an interdependent world?

In fact, globalization is now a force unto its own. Progress in every field of human endeavor and the imperative to continue have made it essential that peoples and countries borrow from, take advantage of, trade with, learn from, compete with and ultimately find ways to live cooperatively and tranquilly with one other.

There is no turning back from it because the world has embraced it. The great movement initiated by the United States to benefit the global collective interest as well as its own is here to stay.

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Globalization has become bad word of late

August 29th, 2016

By Gary Grappo.

Human Interaction

Modern Globalization Gets Going

The Mechanism for Global Transformation

The achievements of globalization are undeniable. In every field of endeavor, humanity is better off today than at any other time in human history.

War deaths in absolute numbersand in per 100,000 have declined steadily since 1945. The worst year, 1950, which coincided with the deadliest year of the Korean War, saw over a half a million deaths. The second worst, 1970, the height of the Vietnam War, saw over 350,000. Fatality rates in subsequent wars in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq never approached such levels. Moreover, the deadliness of wars—battle deaths per conflict averaged over each decade—declined from the post-World War II period high of about 100,000 to fewer than 5,000 by the end of the first decade of the 2000s.

Richer, Better, Healthier

Globalization Challenged

A New Face of Globalization

These ideas have included some of the following:

No Turning Back

There is no turning back from it because the world has embraced it. The great movement initiated by the United States to benefit the global collective interest as well as its own is here to stay.

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The Middle East’s Perfect Storm?

November 4th, 2015

By Gary A. Grappo.

Summary: Events in the Middle East appear to be converging, making for a dangerously combustible mix and further complicating decisions for policy makers.

In Syria, Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the Palestinian Territories, events appear to be spiraling as new actors enter the picture and old issues re-emerge. These include significantly increased involvement of Russia in Syria, a new alliance in the region, exchanges of dangerous rhetoric between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and a disturbing rise in violence in Palestine and Israel, especially Jerusalem. Against the backdrop of other intractable issues in the region – Libya, Yemen, terrorism and uncertain economies, to name only a few – these events almost appear to be moving toward a perfect storm, in which solutions become ever more elusive and problems exponentially more serious.

Consider the following.

Russia’s move into Syria: With Syria-based fighter aircraft attacking non-ISIS (often US-supported) opposition forces and even deploying ground troops – Russia has significantly altered the strategic landscape in that country. US and coalition options previously available either no longer exist or are constrained, e.g., no-fly or safe zones.

Russia’s challenge to NATO and the US in the Middle East: The recent, allegedly stray flights by Russia’s fighters into Turkey are intended as a signal to Washington that it isn’t the only major power now in the Middle East and a warning to Turkey about siding with the US in stepped-up engagement in Syria. It is especially relevant given President’s Erdogan’s party’s recent parliamentary majority and would not be out of character for Russian President Vladimir Putin. It’s what he’s done in Ukraine and now in Syria by bombing US-backed opposition forces. It bears Putin’s signature MO – challenge the US.
The Moscow-Tehran-Baghdad-Damascus coalition: We can add Hezbollah and Iraqi Shi’a militia to this alliance as well. It has introduced new, or exacerbated existing, tensions, further complicated the situation in Syria and in Iraq, and unquestionably raised the stakes for the US and its Arab and Israeli allies.
Iran’s stepped-up and threatening rhetoric against Saudi Arabia in the wake of the Hajj tragedy: Iran’s bellicose rhetoric has injected new overtones into the Iranian-Saudi feud, having spun up Iranian public opinion and publicly challenged the Saudis. At the recrnt Vienna talks on the Syria crisis, harsh words were exchanged between the senior envoys of both countries.
An effective fatwah issued by 50+ Saudi clerics against Russia and all things Shi’a/Safavid (and even against the feckless West and the US): It will be seen as a call for jihad and will lead to new recruitment drives among Sunnis worldwide, whether intended, which is likely, or not. Moreover, it will also prompt new sources of money for jihadists in Syria and increased financial contributions from existing sources.
Public grousing in Saudi Arabia’s royal family: The public calls for removal of the recently installed King Salmon and vicious verbal attacks on his 30-something son, Deputy Crown Prince and Prime Minister Prince Mohammed bin Salmon, are unprecedented among Saudi Arabia’s customarily taciturn and unwavering royal family. A leadership shake-up, unlikely for the moment at least, would send tremors throughout the Muslim world and deal a major blow to one of America’s most steadfast, if waning, Arab partnerships.
Increased violence and unrest – and a call for a “third intifada” from Hezbollah’s Hassan Nasrallah – in the West Bank: The toll from these attacks – some 40-plus Palestinians and nearly a dozen Israelis – is likely to rise. Palestinian authorities and security forces will be hard pressed to control this, even with the best of intentions. Given the lone wolf nature of the attacks, even Israelis security forces will be challenged to stop them.
We should not underestimate the highly volatile potential of this latter issue. For it may serve to galvanize the whole sordid range of “undesirables” in the region – Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), who are leading the fight in Syria on behalf of Assad against opposition forces; ISIS; Hezbollah; Shia militia forces from Iraq, Pakistan and Afghanistan; Al Qaida and its affiliate in Syria, Jabhat al Nusra; the Muslim Brotherhood; the Syrian regime’s Assad; and jihadists throughout the Muslim world – all vying to be the anointed leader of the anti-Zionists. Antipathy toward Israel is the one and only unifying component of them all.

The tensions in the West Bank bear particularly close watching. Palestinians are as frustrated with their ineffectual leadership as they are angry with Israel. However, it is the latter that will get the lion’s share of attention and blame. Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas is a lame duck. It is doubtful if he can command Palestinian security forces or control the Palestinian street. The frustration, hopelessness and desperation in the streets of Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza are palpable.

All this takes place against the backdrop of all the other issues plaguing the region and of declining confidence in the US. This tempest of events renders predictions off the charts.

It also calls for extreme caution by the US administration (or by responsible presidential candidates). But the US will have to act – for example, by: reaffirming its support for Israel; reasserting its position on the two-state solution (despite declining support/hope on both sides of the security wall for it); considering calls for new, internationally supervised elections for the Palestinian Authority (caveat being that only parties and candidates subscribing to the Quartet Principles may run); and giving some thought to a new UNSC resolution that would give Palestinians some hope as opposed to futility and the fate of violence.

All those who pledged aid for Gaza must deliver and then work closely with Israel to ensure it gets there quickly and that genuine development can take place in Gaza without Hamas interference. Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations are a non-starter, however. Israeli Prime Minister Bibi Netanyahu is right – he has no real Palestinian partner. Abbas has lost all standing among Palestinians and even if he could reach an agreement, neither Palestinians not Arabs in general would support him.

The US must also decide how it will meet the Russian/Iranian challenge, not only to restore stability in the region but also to secure diminishing Arab and Israeli confidence in America. That doesn’t mean a major deployment of US forces, but it will require resolute action to reassert its leadership and commitment to its allies. Syria and Iraq beg for serious policy re-evaluation and decisiveness in Washington.

Those Arab and Israeli allies have very little faith in this administration’s ability to manage a region that’s spiraling. The series of regional policy disasters – Iraq, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, the Iran nuclear accord, the four and a half-year Syrian civil war, and a futile attempt to broker an Israeli-Palestinian peace – provide little solace to them that Washington knows how to confront the current gathering storm.

That means it may likely get worse before it gets better and in ways no one may foresee. And that’s never good for this part of the world.

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Iran’s Strategic Victory: Hezbollah-ized Iraq

March 13th, 2015

By Gary A. Grappo.

As with Hezbollah in Lebanon, Iran is creating an independent pro-Iranian organization in Iraq, ensuring that its interests in its unstable neighbor are well protected.

Three years after America’s withdrawal, nearly 4,600 American lives lost and one trillion dollars spent, where is Iraq headed? The ultra-extremist terrorist organization, the Islamic State, aka ISIS or ISIL, invaded the country virtually unopposed, seized the major towns of western Iraq, Fallujah and Ramadi, and sent the US-trained Iraqi army fleeing from Iraq’s second largest city of Mosul.

The answer might be toward another Lebanon. That Middle Eastern nation underwent its own bloody 15-year civil war (1975-1989) before the warring factions realized there could be no single winner. They reached an agreement, known as the Ta’if Agreement after the Saudi city where it was negotiated, that essentially rendered the country almost ungovernable but brought about peace.

The agreement called for the disarming of all militias. But Syria permitted Hezbollah’s continued operation, effectively legitimizing over time this state-within-a-state apparatus, independent of Lebanese government control. That included its heavily armed and well-trained combat arm. The fig leaf for allowing such an armed group not under direct state control – in contravention to the laws of most other states – was that it was a “resistance movement” defending Lebanon against Israel.

With $100-60 million in funding annually from Iran as well as virtually all its weapons, considerable military training and intelligence assistance, Hezbollah has become Iran’s vanguard against not only Israel, on whose northern border it comfortably sits, but also the West.

Its rap sheet is long and well known, inter alia: a mini-war and other armed actions against Israel 2000-2006; terrorist attacks against the Israeli embassy and a Jewish cultural center in Buenos Aires, the US embassy and Marine barracks in Beirut, and Khobar Towers US airmen’s barracks in Saudi Arabia; and the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. It is a listed terrorist organization by the US, the EU, Canada, Australia, the UK, the GCC and the Netherlands.

Its importance to Iran became critical after the launch of the Syrian civil war in early 2011 when it joined the forces of Bashar al-Assad’s pro-Iranian regime against his hydra-like opposition, including ISIS. Working with Iranian advisers and commanders, Hezbollah ventured outside Lebanon, thus putting the lie to its claim of a resistance movement against Israel. Hezbollah has become a proxy combat unit – and a well-motivated and trained one – of the Islamic Republic of Iran, on call for deployment to Syria, Iraq and elsewhere.

In Iraq, Shia militia organizations mobilized quickly following last summer’s lightning strikes of ISIS and the consequent, fatwa-like call to arms by the nation’s most influential figure, Grand Ayatollah Ali Al Sistani. These militias are well familiar to US troops and diplomats who served there 2002-2011: the Badr Brigades, Asa’ib Ahl Al Haq (League of the Righteous), Kata’ib Hezbollah (Hezbollah Battalions), the Mahdi Army and two dozen others. They sprang headlong into the fight with little training or experience since battling American and Iraqi forces in 2004-2009.

When America hesitated to respond to the Iraqi government’s plea for assistance to blunt ISIS, Iran responded almost instantly, dispatching weapons, ammunition, equipment, trainers and even senior commanders to help plan operations. Unable to contain the mass movement of Iraq’s Shia, Iraq’s parliament legitimized their existence under the innocuous title of Hashid Al-Shaabi, Popular Mobilization (PM), approving $60 million in funding for their various forces. Meanwhile, approval of its Sunni-oriented National Guard equivalent continues to languish.

Like Lebanon’s Hezbollah, PM militias have become a proxy organization for Iran. Why?

First, their command structure is comprised of a triumvirate of dedicated Iran loyalists: Qais al-Khazali, commander of Asa’ib Ahl Al Haq; Abu Mahdi al-Mohandas, aka “The Engineer”, Kata’ib Hezbollah’s commander (both not coincidentally on the State Department’s terrorist list); and Badr Organization chief, Iraqi parliamentarian and Minister of Transportation Hadi al Amri, probably Iran’s most loyal Iraqi ally. Al Amri fought alongside the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps against Saddam’s forces in the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war. Their organizations have received considerable Iranian assistance, both during the years of the US occupation and the Saddam period.

They are close to Major General Qasim Suleimani, the commander of Iran’s elite combat and spy organization, the Al Quds Force, who has been seen at the battle front repeatedly in Iraq. Suleimani coordinates the disparate PM militias to ensure their efforts are unified and don’t conflict.

Second, thanks to Iranian support, these Shia militias have already asserted primacy on the battlefield over Iraq’s national armed forces, especially in the fight against ISIS. They did so last summer near Irbil, Kurdistan and also in areas outside Baghdad.

In the largest Iraqi campaign to date against ISIS, the current operation to retake Tikrit, Saddam Hussein’s hometown, the Popular Mobilization forces are in the lead. Two-thirds of the 30,000 Iraqi forces in the Tikrit campaign come from the PM forces, notably joined by veteran troops from Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps with artillery, rocket launchers and surveillance drones. Suleimani oversees it. There is no US or coalition presence.

Third, the size, relative role and effectiveness of the Popular Mobilization forces exceed those of Iraq’s national forces. The PM forces number some 120,000 volunteers, compared to the Iraqi army’s depleted force of barely 50,000. (By comparison, Lebanon’s ground forces number some 50,000 and Lebanese Hezbollah’s 8,000-12,000 volunteers.) As with Hezbollah, the PM forces depend heavily on Iran for weapons, training, intelligence and operational guidance.

Iraq’s PM forces are not answerable to the government or the national armed forces command structure, though nominally subject to Iraq’s armed forces command.

All successes realized to date by the Iraqis against ISIS have been the result of either Shia PM militias or the militias fighting alongside Kurdish fighters in the north. The US is helping to re-train Iraq’s armed forces, who have been engaged against ISIS sporadically – and almost always with US or coalition air support – but are not expected to be ready for major combat until later this spring or summer.

The lack of an effective Iraqi government and armed forces response to ISIS has provided Iran with the opportunity to replicate a Hezbollah-like model in Iraq: a proxy organization inside the borders of an Arab neighbor and once archenemy.

It ensures for years, if not decades, that Iran will have political as well as military operatives in Iraq answerable to Tehran. When ISIS is driven from Iraq, the PM forces will surely remain, maintaining their military presence and undoubtedly prepared to assert even greater political power. It will weaken Iraq’s still feeble democratic process, institutionalize sectarianism, and, as in Lebanon, relegate Iraq’s armed forces to secondary status.

The presence of the Popular Mobilization forces, answering to Iran, in the Middle East’s most vital and vulnerable area is an unprecedented realignment of forces in the region and, for the US and its Arab allies, a challenge to regional security and stability never envisioned. It is Iran’s most significant strategic victory to date.

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Saudi Arabia and Oman Have Different Experiences With Extremism

February 18th, 2015

By Gary Grappo.

Saudi Arabia and Oman possess differing national identities, varied social and cultural roots, and divergent approaches to tolerance that may explain their different experiences with extremism.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Sultanate of Oman share significant characteristics: language; basic religious heritage; geographic proximity; a remarkably rapid growth in economic development and prosperity; a dependence on oil and gas income; and elements of Bedouin and tribal culture.

However, there are significant differences. And it is those differences, when viewed in light of those foundational similarities, that may account for the two countries’ differing experiences with violent extremism.

The importance of these nations to and of their relationships with the United States and the West is well-known. Moreover, those relationships with the US are historic. With Saudi Arabia, these ties date back to just a few years after the founding of the modern state in 1932, while Oman’s began just a few decades after the founding of America.

The assessment and comments offered here are intended neither to criticize, nor applaud either nation. Rather at a time when al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is aiming to capitalize on the turmoil in Yemen, and hundreds, if not thousands, of Gulf citizens are fighting for the Islamic State (IS) in Iraq and Syria, it is vital to offer an explanation of some of the complex, multifaceted circumstances that may give rise to terrorism, especially Islamist-inspired terrorism today.

The State of Terrorism in Oman and Saudi Arabia

To get a basic understanding of the terrorism and counter-terrorism situations of the two nations, it is vital to start with some basic data. Statistics, especially when it comes to subjects like terrorism or terrorists, are often vague and difficult to come by. Actual figures, outside the governments themselves or intelligence agencies, may be non-existent. However, in the case of these two countries, the differences are so stark that precise figures may not be necessary.

In Saudi Arabia, there have been approximately 60 terrorist incidents since 2000, in which either citizens or foreign residents were killed or injured. These include such headline-making incidents as:

1) the May 2003 Riyadh Compound suicide bombings that killed 35 and wounded over 200,

2) the November 2003 truck bomb explosion at an Arab housing compound in Riyadh that killed 17 and injured 120,

3) the May 2004 so-called Black Saturday rampage at a petroleum complex in Yanbu that left seven people dead (all but one a foreigner) and wreaked havoc on oil markets subsequently,

4) the June 2004 beheading of American Paul Johnson in Riyadh, which would set a gruesome precedent for the Islamic State ten years later,

5) the December 2004 al-Qaeda attack on the US Consulate in Jeddah that killed five of US government employees and wounded 14, including ten of the consulate’s staff,

6) an April 2005 attempt by male terrorists to enter the holy city of Mecca dressed as women – four were killed, two terrorists and two Saudi security officers,

7) a February 2006 attempted suicide attack on the Abqaiq oil facility, the largest in the world, which was foiled by Saudi security authorities but left two Saudi security officers and two of the suspects dead and several employees wounded,

8) the February 2007 murders of three French nationals during a desert outing near the ancient city of Mada’in Saleh, and

9) an August 2009 attempt on the life of Saudi Prince and then-Counterintelligence Chief – and current Interior Minister and Deputy Crown Prince – Mohammed bin Nayef by an al-Qaeda operative killed in the attempt.

I was present in the kingdom when many of these as well as other incidents took place, and I witnessed firsthand the fear that gripped the country during that period.

In Oman, according to the US Congressional Research Service, there have been no terrorist incidents where individuals have been either killed or injured.

With respect to foreign terrorist fighters, various experts and media have reported that hundreds, if not thousands, of Saudi foreign fighters are engaged in conflicts as close as Syria and Iraq and as far away as Morocco and Chechnya. Fifteen of the 19 hijackers on September 11, 2001, were Saudi nationals. At the height of the war in Iraq, the US estimated their numbers into the hundreds. Moreover, approximately 130 Saudis have been incarcerated at the US detention facility in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, although there are none today.

By contrast, there are few known Omani foreign fighters. During my time in Iraq, there were several suspected, but it is unsure whether they were actually Omani or had merely spent time there before leaving the sultanate for jihad. No Omanis have ever been detained at Guantanamo Bay. Moreover, no Omani has been convicted of a violent act of terrorism and imprisoned in Oman or outside.

On the financing of terrorism, there are claims that Saudi Arabia is the world’s largest financier of terrorism. Some of these claims are based on information revealed in State Department cables released through WikiLeaks. This may be a bit too sweeping, especially given Iran’s well-known funding of violent extremist groups in the region and elsewhere. Nevertheless, both the 9/11 Commission report and the 2005 US Government Accounting Office (GAO) report attest to significant Saudi-based funding of Islamist extremism and terrorism in the Middle East, including of al-Qaeda.

These and other reports claim that private Saudi individuals and organizations operating through local mosques — as well as formal charitable organizations such as the Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation and two of Saudi Arabia’s largest, the International Islamic Relief Organization and the World Muslim League — have provided substantial support to extremists and terrorists, including al-Qaeda.

Recently, the Iraqi government and others have claimed that Saudi Arabia or individual Saudis support IS, despite Riyadh’s known antipathy for the group. A 2013 Brookingsreport indicated, however, that of the many millions of dollars reaching the Islamic State through donors in Kuwait, where restrictions on such activity are lax, a significant portion may be coming from private individuals in Saudi Arabia.

Nevertheless, these reports as well as numerous subsequent public reports and US government statements have stopped short of accusing the Saudi government of direct involvement in financing extremism or terrorism. Of course, the term extremism can be relative. But there can be no doubt that individual Saudis are channeling funds of uncertain amounts to extremist groups around the region.

Finally, it is worth mentioning that Saudi Arabia, with strong US and international backing, passed fairly strong laws against such financing after 9/11. Its government signed the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, and established its Anti-Money Laundering (AML) / Combating the Financing of Terrorism (CFT) regime.

The picture in Oman is quite different. For example, in 2014, the Basel AML Index – an annual ranking by the Basel Institute on Governance assessing country risk regarding money laundering/terrorism financing and focusing on AML/CFT frameworks and other factors – ranked Oman 134th globally; the country with highest risk (Iran in 2014) is ranked as number one. Saudi Arabia ranked 87th among the 162 countries covered.

The Financial Actions Task Force reports that the Sultanate of Oman has set up an AML-CFT system that is essentially in line with international standards, robust and effective. Oman has also signed and acceded to the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.

In 2009, Oman convicted and sentenced to life in prison an Omani businessman for helping to plan terrorist attacks in the country and to fund a Pakistan-based terrorist group, Lashkar-e-Taiba.

This represents the basic situation in each country. They are considerably different. What accounts for the dramatically different situations? How is it that extremism and terrorism and the ideology that promotes them have been able to find a footing in Saudi Arabia but are practically absent in Oman? While both maintain strong security forces whose presence can, at times, be fairly visible, neither is a police state with an overwhelming security force presence.

I would like to posit three factors that I believe can explain, at least in part, why the experiences of these two countries have been so different.

A Unique National Identity

The first significant difference between these two countries is their differing national identities.

Oman’s identity as a definable nation dates back to the pre-Islamic period. In the 4th century, Omani traders were sending trade missions to China. These were repeated in the 8th century. In those second voyages, it is said that the Omanis introduced Islam to eastern China.

Throughout much of its history, Oman was divided. There were coastal, trading Arabs whose land was sometimes identified as Muscat and governed by a sultan. And there were the interior, tribal Arabs governed by an imam. Either both or at least one has been variously governed since the 12th century by three main dynasties — the most current of which, al-Said, has governed since 1744 when its founder expelled Persian occupiers.

Omanis were among the first of the region to convert to Islam, having done so during the time of the Prophet Muhammad. By the mid-8th century, Ibadi Islam, a moderate conservative sect of Islam, took root in Oman and became the basis for the imamate established in the interior. Today, Oman is the only majority Ibadi Muslim nation in the world.

Oman was also the first Arab nation to send an embassy to the US and second, afterMorocco, to establish diplomatic relations with the Americans.

What this unique history has given Oman and its citizens is an identity distinct from many other Arab nations and unlike any other Gulf State, most of whose identities and borders were established in the post-World War II period. Its leaders, including the currently reigning Sultan Qaboos bin Said, refer to this identity and count on it to engender the kind of patriotism that comes with a longstanding national identity.

One of the significant achievements of Sultan Qaboos has been his ability to elevate Omanis’ identity as citizens of a single nation, while balancing tribal culture and loyalties where they still exist. Islam is a significant component of Oman’s identity but is one of many characteristics that define its identity.

In essence, Omanis know who they are and, therefore, are less likely to fall prey to the depredations of external actors seeking to woo Muslims based on some new, extremist ideology. Omanis’ national identity coupled with the moderation of their Ibadi Muslim faith has inspired a sense of loyalty, even when they may disagree with certain policies. Extremism is not only avoided, it is condemned.

The history of Saudi Arabia is very different. For most of its history, it was ruled by a patchwork of leading tribes, clans and families. While the roots of the ruling al-Saud family go back to the mid-18th century, the modern Saudi state was not formally established until 1932 under the aegis of the family’s scion, Abdul Aziz al-Saud, or Ibn Saud.

Throughout their governance dating back to 1744, the al-Sauds were ideologically tied to the preaching of Mohammed ibn Abd al-Wahhab, which became known asWahhabism.

Wahhabism is a strict, fundamentalist form of Sunni Islam. As he was establishing control of the Arabian Peninsula, Ibn Saud allied himself with a Bedouin army known as the Ikhwan, or Brotherhood, ardent followers of Wahhabism and bent on purifying the Muslim faith and uniting all Muslims. While he eventually had to put down an Ikhwanrevolt, Ibn Saud preserved the foundational principle of Wahhabism that endures to this day.

The claimed mission of “purification and unification” of the Ikhwan may sound familiar to us today. It is the same Salafist claim made by al-Qaeda, the Islamic State and virtually all other Islamist extremist organizations.

Today, the modern state known as Saudi Arabia is named after a family and maintains a foundational ideology based on a particular version of Islam. The governing al-Sauds have worked hard to establish a national identity in the kingdom beyond just Islam.

But creating such an identity is problematic, given the country’s guiding principle and history. Its tribal culture, disparate tribes and the unique and indispensable linkage of Wahhabism to their unity under the solitary leadership of al-Saud make it difficult, if not impossible, to conjure an alternative identity to serve the same unifying purpose.

That guiding principle of Wahhabism, of course, can be hijacked. Many, if not most, of today’s Islamist extremist organizations have adopted a similar guiding philosophy and use it to argue in favor of Islam superseding national identity. Al-Qaeda has been trying it even within Saudi Arabia since Osama bin Laden returned after the end of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.

Any governing institution based on a religious belief is, by definition, exclusive. Therefore, as it attempts to become more inclusive, it will inevitably fall prey to criticism that its adherence to that faith or pursuance of the faith’s objectives is deficient, corrupt and contrary to the faith.

Indeed, these are criticisms that have been leveled by a number of today’s extremist groups like al-Qaeda and IS at the governing al-Sauds. So, if the foundation principle of the Saudi state, as instituted by the al-Sauds, is viewed as corrupt or even illegitimate by others claiming to be the champions and real “purifiers and unifiers” of fundamentalist Islam, then what is the consequence for that state’s national identity?

Divergent Roots

The second characteristic that may account for the two countries’ differing experiences with extremism and terrorism is their divergent social and cultural roots.

Both nations share a Bedouin and tribal heritage. They are similar in many ways for that part of the world. But they also are significantly different in some important ways.

Westerners have lost almost all of the elements of tribalism we once had – at least those of European heritage. In Europe, tribalism was effectively eliminated beginning with Rome’s conquest of present-day Europe and continuing with the empires and monarchies that succeeded it.

For Americans and other Westerners, therefore, our scant knowledge of tribal culture comes from what we might know about Native Americans or other indigenous groups. Otherwise, we most often identify our so-called tribe by our political affiliation, favorite sports team or even the university we attended. None of those begins to approximate tribalism in the Middle East and especially in the Arabian Peninsula.

Tribal cultures tend to be suspicious of the other — the outsider. Outsiders are not necessarily unwelcome; in fact, Arab Bedouins are rightly famous for their hospitality. But an outsider is always such and can never be treated as a member.

If you want to understand just a bit of what Arabian Peninsula tribal cultures and customs are like, I heartily recommend reading the great 20th century explorer, Sir Wilfred Thesiger’s book, Arabian Sands. In it, Thesiger recounts his repeated expeditions across the Rub al-Khali desert of Arabia in the mid-20th century. He wrote of some Bedouins having to protect him from others because he was a non-Muslim foreigner. His protectors were Omanis.

The aforementioned difference between coastal Omanis and desert Omanis is becoming vaguer with time. The insular, tribal nature of the desert Omanis became tempered by the tolerance and moderation of Ibadi Islam. In addition, the coastal, seafaring Omanis also had an impact on the overall character of the nation.

By virtue of their livelihood, traders and seafarers come into contact with all sorts of people unlike themselves. Omani seafarers traded and dealt extensively with the people of Persia, eastern and interior Africa, India, the Southeast Asian islands and, as mentioned earlier, China. All of that was before they came in contact with Europeans in the 15th century. Of course, they traded extensively with their interior, desert-dwelling compatriots as well.

In the mid-19th century, an Omani “Indian Ocean Empire” controlled areas within present day East Africa, India, Iran and Pakistan and most of the major ports of the Indian Ocean.

Oman became an outward-looking nation early in its history by necessity. Its survival both as a people and a nation became dependent on its abilities to interact with others. As such, familiarity with and acceptance of racial, ethnic and cultural diversities became a defining quality of Omanis. In many ways, it is integral to the national identity of Omanis I referred to earlier.

Boldly proud of their unique national identity but also an avowedly Muslim nation, Omanis accept and even embrace “the other.” That has mitigated the otherwise exclusiveness of their rich tribal culture, which is still very observable today.

In such a cultural and social environment, it is much harder for extremism to take root. Stability and comity, as opposed to rigid adherence to an ideology, require a degree of religious as well as cultural and social tolerance.

The evolution of Saudi society has been much different. Save for the many Muslims who came from around the world on hajj to Mecca, few foreigners and even fewer non-Muslims ventured to Saudi Arabia until the early 20th century. The geography was forbidding and the land was thought to hold little of value. In terms of foreigners, the country was left to explorers like Thesiger and a number before him.

That was until oil. With the arrival of British and then later American geologists and petroleum experts in the 1920s, Saudis saw the potential for oil in what had been thought to be a desert waste land. Those visitors and the development they eventually engendered — and the al-Saud’s desire to build a modern state — began Saudi Arabia’s introduction to the rest of the world.

But the country’s strict religious and tribal cultures, which reinforce one another, greatly circumscribe and restrict its social and cultural evolution. Ibn Saud astutely used the strict Wahhabism — and his many marriages to various women of different tribes — to ultimately unite the disparate tribes in the 1920s and 30s, effectively inculcating the two identities into one another. The suspicious nature of tribal culture and Wahhabism’s censure of non-Muslims and non-Wahhabi Muslims complement and buttress each other. Not surprisingly, the government today still strictly controls who and how many foreigners may visit. The suspicion of Wahhabism and the tribal culture still prevails.

Note that I am referring to different cultures and the diverse ideas and attitudes that they spawn. I am not referring to actual ethnic diversity. Both countries are predominantly Arab with small minorities of non-Arabs. But the experiences of the two societies in terms of exposure to and acceptance of other cultures are very different.

The historic absence of human interaction and cultural exposure until very recently may account in part for some of the challenges that Saudi Arabia as a nation and Saudis as a people have faced in accommodating themselves with the outside world and even with many within the kingdom’s own borders. Addressing that challenge manifests itself in both positive and negative ways, including extremism.

The Key: Tolerance

The final and critical defining difference is the two countries’ approaches to tolerance.

Because Omanis practice a more tolerant form of Islam, Ibadism, other religious faiths — both Muslim and non-Muslim — are accepted in the country. Shiite and Sunni mosques and even Christian churches and Hindu temples all exist in the country; although the activities of the latter are somewhat circumscribed, especially in the area of proselytizing.

In my own experience in Oman, I sensed that Omanis identified themselves with their country, its history and culture, and their tribe as opposed to their religious sect. The sultan, in particular, has been careful to avoid singling out any specific Muslim sect when speaking of the unity of the nation and has purposely cultivated a policy of tolerance, for example, by including Sunni and Shiite in various government posts and donating land for the construction of Christian and Hindu places of worship.

Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia explicitly prohibits public worship within any faith but Wahhabi Islam. Saudi Shiite, for example, who number between 1.5-2 million, must worship in informal mosques known as hussenias. There are no formal Shiite mosques. Nor are there Christian churches for the estimated 1.5 million Christian foreign workers living in the kingdom. Private services are permitted in foreign embassies and may also take place in private homes, as long as the Saudi religious police — the deservedly maligned mutawa or mutaween, formally known as the Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice — are ignorant of them. The very existence of such an organization begs the question of tolerance.

Saudi police, for example, carefully monitor foreigners who enter the few embassies that offer religious services. To be sure, there is a necessary security element to their presence; Christians in Saudi Arabia face risks by going to worship. But the police are also there to ensure that no Saudi enters to attend such services. Furthermore, anyone attempting to conduct a private religious service of more than a handful of worshipers in his/her home, for example, would be arrested and, in all likelihood, deported or imprisoned.

In Oman, by contrast, Omani police direct traffic outside massively attended religious services on special occasions such as Christmas and Easter — much, in fact, as police do in the US for larger places of worship. The same is done for Hindu special religious holidays. Omanis are free to attend such non-Muslim services, though few actually do.

In short, religious tolerance is accepted by the majority of Omanis and formally promulgated by its government and the sultan. It is not in Saudi Arabia.

The late King Abdullah tried to promote greater understanding of the “other,” as non-Sunni Muslims are sometimes referred to. But in the current tense religious environment in Saudi Arabia and throughout the Middle East, there has been limited progress to my knowledge. His efforts, for example, to reach out to the country’s Shiite population, were thwarted by the perceived growing threat from Shiite-dominant Iran, especially after the election of the controversial and outspoken Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as Iran’s president in 2005.

With the recent death of King Abdullah and the assumption of the throne by his half-brother, Salman, it is impossible to predict in which direction the country might turn. King Salman has been viewed as largely pro-Western and supportive of the kingdom’s efforts to play a more prominent role on the global stage and burnish its image abroad. But when he was governor of Riyadh, he was also generally viewed as the family enforcer — the one responsible for keeping the many members of the royal family in line. One thing is clear: If the country is to set itself on a path of greater tolerance, the new king must lead it.

His course will not be easy. The institutional and cultural obstacles to tolerance are still great. Religious dogma and the unwritten alliance between his ruling family and the religious establishment effectively inhibit the country’s political leadership from modifying in any significant way its religious practices.

Unchangeable Circumstances of History

National identity, social and cultural roots, and tolerance form the basis, therefore, for the differing experiences of these two nations of the Arabian Peninsula. They are part of the countries and the peoples who populate them. They are circumstances of each country’s history, geography and development.

We cannot change them. However, what is possible, especially in the case of Saudi Arabia, is that leaders can influence significantly the policies of government as well as attitudes of the people. We have seen that in Oman. The Saudis will have to do so in their own way, however. It will have to be an approach that takes into account their unique history, culture and religious faith.

Outsiders, especially other Muslims and Muslim nations, can be helpful. But the change that is necessary will have to be organic. Outsiders are most helpful when they quietly but firmly encourage and support change from within and provide assistance when it is requested.

There may also be times when a problem appears so overwhelming that external initiative may be necessary. I am thinking of the centuries-old tensions between Sunni and Shiite, which are often manipulated by opportunists for political advantage. We see that today in Syria and Iraq or even between Saudi Arabia and Iran. In fact, promoting and advancing greater tolerance of and respect between Sunni and Shiite among all Muslims may be a good place to start. Oman may be a good example of how to go about such change.

Ultimately, all governments must be held accountable. That includes governments, officials and organizations whose policies and behavior fall short of the actions necessary to end extremism and the violence it promotes.

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The Case for US Intervention in the Middle East

October 24th, 2014

By Gary Grappo.

Washington’s decision to enter war in Iraq for the third time in a quarter century is consistent with long-held US policy.

The debate over isolationism vs engagement is a relatively new one in Americanpolitical history. No less than George Washington and John Quincy Adams warnedAmericans of entangling ourselves in permanent alliances and enlisting under foreign banners regardless of how seemingly righteous.

That seemed like good advice for the young nation for well over 100 years. Then there were the two World Wars. America hesitantly entered the first, exiting with a different attitude about the world and its potential new role in it. Still, as dark clouds gathered over Europe in the 1930s and a new, more assertive power rose in Asia, few Americans were inclined to insert themselves in what was clearly a prelude to war. So resistant was the country, that for most of the period leading up to World War II, the troop levels of US armed forces were kept at dangerously low levels. Not until 1940, after the defeat of France and when all-out war appeared inevitable, did the US ramp up its army. And then there was Pearl Harbor.

Among the many lessons America learned from its Pearl Harbor and World War II experiences were three that have become cornerstones of US foreign and national security policy. First, the US, as the only major combatant nation with its infrastructure and manufacturing base largely intact at war’s end, would have to step up and play a leadership role in the world. Second, its leadership efforts must strive to attain global stability through regional and international alliances. Third, the US must be prepared to confront its enemies abroad, as opposed to at home, so as to prevent another Pearl Harbor from ever happening again.

Isolationist voices persisted, nevertheless, but the threat of communism and a nuclear-armed Soviet Union convinced the majority of Americans that their country’s new role and its pro-active engagement abroad were the right course. Historically speaking, however, Americans have practiced isolationism much longer than engagement. And variations of the isolationist voice persist today, for example, urging American withdrawal from the Middle East and its current turmoil.

Can Washington Afford to Withdraw?

Isolationism is indeed an easier argument to make. America is flanked by two great oceans and by two stable and peace-loving democracies, Canada and Mexico — a luxury no other great power in history has had. And, of course, the US has a long list of domestic problems still unresolved. Leave the world to its problems and concentrate on fixing our own at home.

But can a nation as large as the US afford to withdraw? Or is it even possible for America to simply make itself an equal among all nations? The answer to both is simply no, not even if the US wanted to do so.

The lessons of World War II have become far more difficult in their application than in their adoption. They remain as relevant today as they were in 1945. As the lone superpower in the world, the US is the only nation that can initiate action, preferably with the support and help of other major powers, to address and help solve crises and, yes, even enforce order from time to time.

But must the US exercise a leadership role in every conflict or crisis? And what if the conflict presents little threat to US security interests but endangers the lives of hundreds of thousands of innocents? How does the US determine which crises or conflicts present a genuine threat? Does every conflict require US military force?

There is no overarching answer to such questions. International crises, conflict and discord rarely admit to simple, overarching solutions.

Since World War II, the US has gone to war on 14 occasions — from Korea through the latest wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. That does not include dispatching US troops to far-flung locales to protect or rescue Americans, defend embassies or address humanitarian crises. The American record in these is not flawless. Vietnam and Iraqstand out as two engagements in which American judgment was severely clouded, its estimate of the threat grossly exaggerated and understanding of the local political, cultural and historical context woefully inadequate. Americans paid the price for these errors — 58,000 lives lost in Vietnam and 4,500 in Iraq, tens of thousands more adversely impacted by physical and psychological wounds and trillions of Americans’ tax dollars spent. The toll on the countries themselves remains inestimable.

Bosnia, But Not Rwanda

Other engagements would appear to justify the post-World War II policy. Korea, the 1991 Gulf War, Bosnia in 1994-95 and Kosovo in 1999 all succeeded — with important help from NATO and other allies — in halting invading forces or stopping ethnic cleansing. The 1983 Grenada invasion ended the threat to Americans living and studying there.

There have been times when the US chose not to intervene, too. It turned back Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in 1991, but merely condemned Vladimir Putin’s invasion and annexation of Crimea earlier this year. US and NATO forces prevented ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and Kosovo, but stood by during the Khmer Rouge’s 1978 genocide of nearly 2 million innocent Cambodians and the 1994 Rwandan genocide of 800,000 Tutsis. Why Bosnia but not Rwanda or Cambodia? American hands may have been clean but perhaps not our consciences.

And in the Middle East, where American policy has been challenged and criticized extensively, it has abjured military involvement in the various conflicts pitting Egypt,Jordan, Syria and the Palestinians against Israel, choosing instead to employ its no less formidable diplomatic and economic assets to address those crises. Again, the results have been mixed — Camp David in 1979 on the plus side, but the continuing Israeli-Palestinian conflict on the minus.

Successes do not offset failures. Rather, they call for a continuing debate and thorough reassessment of the policy and its implementation. While largely valid on the whole, the policy — exercising our unique global leadership role, pursuing global stability through alliances, and confronting enemies abroad as opposed to at home — needs to be constantly evaluated. Also, the tools with which the US exercises the policy must be carefully considered.

The primary reason the US can maintain this policy is because it is the only nation that is able to bring massive — even overwhelming — resources to a conflict or crisis. These may be diplomatic, economic, logistical or technological. They must also include our military assets.

The latter tend to be more controversial, especially as applied in some regions like the Middle East. But for the policy to be truly effective, and for the US to acquire the support and especially the respect and trust it needs to play its outsized role, it must be able to deploy its formidable military assets.

Another Round in Iraq

For the third time in a quarter century, America finds itself militarily involved in Iraq. Americans are understandably frustrated and exhausted. “Why us again?” they fairly ask.

If the US re-engagement in Iraq is measured against the policy sketched above, then it appears justified. First, as a global leader with the resources, we can involve ourselves and bring about a positive outcome. That is not to be discounted since there are conflicts or crises whose outcomes we cannot necessarily prevent — such as Putin’s annexation of Crimea.

Second, the US has been able to cobble together a coalition of more than 40 Western and Arab nations. That kind of unified force is almost indispensable in today’s world to any US engagement abroad, even though Americans bear the preponderance of the burden. The symbolic and political value of such a coalition, as long as it holds, is vital.

Third, the declared enemy, the Islamic State (IS), like its ideological forebear — al-Qaeda — presents a danger both to us and our allies in the region. That argues for confronting and defeating the terrorist group in Iraq and Syria before it may strike further afield in countries such as Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Lebanon, or further destabilize Iraq.

There are other motivating factors as well. The US bears some responsibility for Iraq’s current state. While the US did help establish a framework for democracy in Iraq — however fledgling it may be at present — it also inflamed deep-seated sectarian animosities. The US cannot hope to resolve those — it failed to do so after nearly nine years in Iraq — but it can help ensure that the worst elements of sectarianism, like IS, do not threaten the established order within the country or surrounding nations. Indeed, the US managed that, albeit too briefly, with the defeat of al-Qaeda in Iraq in 2009 as a result of the so-called surge.

A second motivating factor is humanitarian. When the US decided to deploy its air forces to the region in September, IS was poised to assault Kurdistan, whose inhabitants we had helped escape the depredations of Saddam following the first Gulf War. The US could not idly stand by and watch the tremendous advances of Kurdistan and the Kurdish people threatened. Also, IS had begun a campaign to kill or enslave the minority Yazidis of northwestern Iraq. It looked like genocide, and it was one that the US had the ability to prevent. So, Bosnia or Rwanda?

What the US cannot say at present is what happens when — though the matter of the “if” may not be entirely settled for a while — the Islamic State is defeated? Instability in Syria will remain, not to mention continuing sectarianism and division in Iraq. The US record in implanting democracies abroad is sketchy — Korea’s took decades, Iraq’s hangs by a thread and Vietnam’s failed disastrously.

So, it would seem on the face of it, there is a good case for American intervention — even military — to eliminate a terrorist organization whose negotiating terms are “capitulation or death.” What neither the US, nor any other nation involved in ousting IS has been able to articulate is: What comes next?

One should not necessarily forgo the first action — elimination of a ruthless and heedlessly violent organization threatening the lives of thousands and even millions — because of the inability to address the second. Rather, it argues for pursuit of the first and vigorous, simultaneous action to get those nations most directly involved in the conflict to answer the second question and supporting them in that effort.

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Steep Mountain of US-Iran Relations

October 17th, 2014

By Gary A. Grappo.

The negotiations between the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany, known as the P5+1, and Iran are currently scheduled to conclude in about six weeks. Prospects for a successful conclusion that would rein in Iran’s nuclear weapons program, which would lead to gradual lifting of economically painful international sanctions on Iran, appear dim. But that isn’t the only thing inhibiting a thaw in the 35-year deep freeze in relations between the US and Iran.

On the negotiations themselves, now nearly one year on and extended once already by five months, things are not going well. The US and its P5+1 partners seek to reduce the number of Iran’s centrifuges from the current number of almost 20,000 – about half of which are operational – to around 1,500, i.e., enough to produce enough low-grade enriched uranium for Iran’s research program but nothing more.

So far, the gap isn’t even close to being bridged. In fact, Iran’s Supreme Leader, Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who has never shown much support for the negotiations, has asserted that his nation will have to build 190,000 centrifuges over the long term, a nearly 20-fold increase in the country’s current operating capacity and more than 100 times more than what the international community is prepared to live with. How does one even begin to negotiate when such a chasm remains between the two sides?

And this does not even speak to Iran’s ballistic missile development program, which the Islamic Republic refuses even to discuss.

After President Hassan Rouhani’s peace and friendship initiative last year, including an exchange of exchange of letters with President Obama, reality seems to be setting in. The P5+1 try to be hopeful that a deal can be struck. If the right deal can indeed be struck, it would significantly reduce tensions in the Middle East and most especially between the US and Iran.

But even with the right deal on its nuclear weapons program, Iran would still be far from any rapprochement with the United States. The new president’s pleasant words and admittedly appealing effort to show the kind of basic courtesy that his juvenile predecessor took such pride in eschewing are a start. But here are a few things to remember before considering future relations between the two governments.

Iran ranks among the world’s most ideologically driven nations. That ideology, suffused with an artful cloak of religion, presents the United States and Israel as the leading causes for the world’s ills. The US is still referred to as “the Great Satan” in Iranian government media. Its theocratic dictatorship subjugates its people in the name of the Islamic Revolution, which takes precedence over the rights and interests of Iranian citizens, and uses it to justify criminal actions to defend that leadership and its virulently anti-American campaign. Nothing Mr. Rouhani has said or done since taking office – nor anything from the Supreme Leader – suggests that Iran intends to modify an ideology substantially unaltered since 1979.

Beyond accepting limits on their nuclear development program, the new Iranian president and more importantly Supreme leader Ali Khamenei will need to undertake some critically important actions before anyone in the US government could consider warming relations.

· Suspend Iranian government support for terrorism and terrorist organizations. This may prove a greater hurdle than the nuclear deal. Since 1979, state support for terrorism has been an essential component of the Islamic Republic’s ideology, reaffirmed repeatedly by the Supreme Leader and his predecessor. The most obvious place to begin is Hezbollah. All funds to its terrorist and violent activities should cease. Also, support for militant Shiite organizations in Syria and Iraq also must be terminated. Internationally wanted terrorists, including Ahmed al-Mughassil and Hussein Mohamed al-Nasser, wanted for the 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia that killed 19 US airmen, should be expelled from Iran. Iran also needs sign and ratify the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.

· Condemn the Government of Syria and Syrian President al Assad for gross abuses against Syrian citizens, including the use of chemical weapons. Such condemnation from the Syrian regime’s strongest backer would be more effective in preventing future cruelties against Syrians than Security Council resolutions or military strikes on Syrian weapons sites. Iran should suspend the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps’ involvement in the conflict, especially training and arming Shia militia in Syria and Iraq. Concomitantly, the Iranian president should offer his government’s cooperation in reaching a peaceful and negotiated settlement of the Syrian civil war, eliminating terrorist elements like the Islamic State within Syria, and eventually transitioning Syria to democratic rule.

· Support Middle East peace. This would mean starting with ceasing all threatening rhetoric and action against Israel. From its inception, the Islamic Republic in both word and deed has undermined Mideast peace and threatened the State of Israel, even calling for its removal from the map of the Middle East. While formal recognition of Israel will have to await many other actions, simply halting Iran’s menacing talk and support for organizations seeking the demise of the Jewish state would offer a breathtakingly transformative approach to the country’s foreign policy. Mr. Rouhani should also unambiguously repudiate the reprehensible remarks of his predecessor on the holocaust. Finally, the president should announce his country’s support, as have most other Muslim nations, for a final, just and lasting peaceful settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

· Defend human rights in Iran. While far from perfect, Iran has made some progress toward democracy in its country. But its human rights record is abysmal. Several political prisoners have been released, including some prominent human rights advocates. But how many more Iranians remain imprisoned for merely expressing their views? There can be no genuine democracy when political opposition is threatened with imprisonment and the media muzzled. Mr. Rouhani should also call a halt to the Islamic Republic’s unrelenting persecution of members of the Baha’i faith.

He could even assume historic world leader stature by calling for dialog and reconciliation between Sunni and Shi’a Muslims around the world, starting with Iraq and Syria, where hundreds of thousands have died in sectarian feuding just in the last decade. None of this is to suggest that the U.S. and P5+1 should not pursue a deal to contain Iran’s nuclear program. The U.S. successfully negotiated meaningful arms agreements with the Soviet Union when the latter showed no inclination to modify its ultimately self-destructive communist ideology. We can no doubt do the same with Iran.

However, no one should be under any illusions about the Islamic Republic or the possibility of warm relations between it and the United States. As long as its patently unacceptable ideology, consequent policies and resulting actions persist, Iran will remain a pariah state and not one with which the US could ever hope to have a constructive relationship.

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Obama’s Flawed Anti-ISIS Strategy

October 7th, 2014

Gary A. Grappo

Is President Obama dealing with cognitive dissonance? First, against all available information, he blames the intelligence community for underestimating the Islamic State. Then, he embarks on a strategy that fails to encompass key elements vital to meeting his mission to “degrade and destroy” ISIS.

Americans were surprised to hear their president’s admission on last Sunday’s “60 Minutes” broadcast that he had “underestimated” the Islamic State – aka, the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham, or ISIS/ISIL – and its rapid rise to power and control in Syria and Iraq. Equally stunning, he sought to shift the blame for being caught off guard to the US intelligence community.

The intelligence community appears to be countering the president’s claim. Officials assert they began warning about ISIS late last year as ISIS took control of greater stretches of the Syrian-Iraqi border. Even the US media reported extensively on ISIS’s rapid advance and capture of Fallujah and Ramadi in the earliest days of this year. The dismal performance of the Iraqi Army was also amply reported.

Sufficient information seems to have been available to anyone willing to listen and reflect on its significance to conclude ISIS was becoming a very serious threat at least as far back as late 2013. Yet, in another stunning presidential admission, in a late August press conference he said that, in fact, he “had no strategy.”

Only in September did Mr. Obama face the obvious and announce a strategy for the US to enter the fray with US air assets and halt the ISIS advance. But in this strategy, he again is ignoring fundamental elements – cognitive dissonance (?) – which will either doom the US and coalition’s effort or force a major strategy correction down the road.

First, while he addresses expelling ISIS from Iraq, there is no cogent plan to deal with ISIS in Syria. Pledging to keep American ground troops out of the fight and to expel ISIS from Iraq, the president plans to rely on ground forces from the Iraqi Army, which caved to ISIS fighters not only in Fallujah and Ramadi but also in Mosul just six months later, and from the marginally more capable but fewer in number Kurdish peshmerga militia.

With further American training, better arms and US air support, one might allow for the possibility of success, even if its timing remains unknown. Defeating ISIS will require attacking it on many fronts – ideology, resources, communication and recruitment. But the sine qua non is beating them on the battlefield. Moreover, ground troops are indispensable to winning on the battlefield, irrespective of air superiority, especially in unconventional warfare. Winning on the battlefield means defeating ISIS in Syria as well as in Iraq.

Where are the ground forces to fight ISIS in Syria? The Syrian Army and other Syrian opposition forces have proven nearly as inadequate as the Iraqi army in beating ISIS. So, assuming the Iraqi Army and Kurdish militia can eventually push ISIS out of Iraq, who then takes them on in Syria? The president’s strategy, other than repeated pledges to arm and train the moderate Syrian opposition, is silent. The president won’t meet his “degrade and destroy” objective without defeating them in both Iraq and Syria.

Second, the US and the coalition it has formed need allies, Sunni allies to be precise. And, they are needed in both Iraq and Syria. There is very little possibility of that happening, even if Haidar al-Abadi, Iraq’s new Prime Minister, invites Sunni Iraqis to rejoin the government in Baghdad. As happened in 2007 when US troops allied with Sunni tribal and political leaders to fight ISIS’s predecessor, Al Qaida in Iraq, in what became known as the Sunni Awakening, or al Sahwa, Iraqi Sunni and their Syrian compatriots – many of whom hail from the same tribes and clans – will want a reliable guarantor before taking the fight to ISIS.

The Iraqi government, thanks to the shortsighted sectarian policies of its previous prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki, is no positon to play that role. And forget about the al Assad regime in Damascus; it is the whole raison d’etre of the Syrian opposition movement, from ISIS to the moderates, most of whom are Sunni.

Nearby Arab countries, especially Saudi Arabia and Jordan, whose own tribes straddle their respective borders with Iraq and Syria, can play an especially helpful role. But the only real guarantor can be the US. Without some American boots on the ground, it’s hard to see how we might do that. Perhaps the CIA can; it undoubtedly has contacts with the tribes. But the ones the Iraqi Sunnis know and know they can trust are the US Army and Marines.

The president insists there will be no American boots on the ground. His armed forces chief, General Martin Dempsey, seems to think otherwise, and that at least some US combat troops may be necessary. In this case, the president and his military advisers ought to be thinking of deploying US special operators, rangers, marine recon and others to pair up with the Sunnis. Moreover, we may also have to deploy larger numbers of combat units to prove to the Sunnis that we have skin in the game.

In fact, the Iraqis have wisely proposed forming national guard units to defend their own communities and tribal areas. Who better to pair up with such units than this limited number of American combat forces? However, it is vital that this task be undertaken now. Just as in 2007, it will take months before these special units will be able to re-establish rapport and then train and prepare these units, which some US forces will inevitably have to accompany into battle.

Critics will argue that such a level of US forces involvement starts the US down the slippery slope of large-scale military re-engagement in the Middle East. But, a failure to completely eradicate ISIS in Iraq and Syria and ensure it can never rise again may engender a prospect necessitating even greater US involvement. Better to commit what is needed now – in Syria as well as Iraq –to ensure the victory we and our allies seek than to gamble on a low-cost, half measure that will mean a protracted conflict with the world’s most diabolically ruthless organization.

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